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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. December 1910.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(9746.)

F.O. 424

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9744.]

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July to September 1910.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9744.]

[22564] No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1910.

LYNCH question.

See my despatch No. 169 of the 17th ultimo and my telegram No. 123 of the 29th ultimo.

In my opinion, if objections are raised to the fusion scheme on the ground of monopoly, Lynch should for that reason be allowed to meet competition, and therefore it would hardly be possible for us to raise objections to his placing a boat on the Euphrates.

What is your opinion?

[22420] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 182.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 177 of the 27th ultimo, relative to the sponge fisheries in the Sporades Islands, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the Sponge Trade Association,* setting forth the circumstances in which the Turkish Government have prohibited the use of diving apparatus in connection with this industry in Turkish waters.

Apart from the question whether action should be taken to induce the Turkish Government to cancel the prohibition of the use of diving apparatus, as to the advisability of which I have to request your Excellency to furnish a report, it appears to me that, if that prohibition is maintained, it would be equitable that they should refund the sums collected by them from the sponge fishermen for licences to use diving apparatus during the current year, which, according to the letter enclosed, have already been paid for. If, as stated, the system prevails of making advances of money to the divers, it would be desirable that the Turkish Government should postpone the prohibition of diving apparatus till the licences now extant expire.

I authorise your Excellency, should you see fit, to represent to the Turkish Government the injury and loss inflicted on those interested in the sponge trade by the sudden prohibition of the use of diving apparatus, and to request them to afford relief in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Sponge Trade Association, June 21, 1910.

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[23786] No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 9th June, 1910, relative to shipments of oxide from Abu Musa.

India Office, July 1, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, June* 5, 1910.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 6th May. The steam-ship "Nasiri" took consignment of oxide to India on the 24th April. On the 12th May I was asked by the German consul to facilitate a further shipment to India by Hassan. I replied that Hassan had already been informed direct that further permission would not be granted. German consul rejoined on the 31st May that he now found that the shipment would be on account of Messrs. Wönckhaus. I replied that my instructions only covered shipments by Messrs. Wönckhaus in order to fulfil contracts which they had entered into prior to the cancellation of lease, and that, as these contracts had admittedly been fulfilled two years ago, I did not feel empowered to comply with his present request. I am sending correspondence by post.

[23944] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 424.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 28, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, being a report on the state of the Hedjaz under the constitutional régime.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

[My reason for making the enclosed "private and confidential" is that I think it should never be seen by any Mussulman, and all the staff of this consulate are Mussulmans.—J. H. M.]

(Private and Confidential.)

Sir, *Jeddah, June* 7, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12, Confidential, of the 12th March, 1909, I have the honour to submit the following observations on the condition of the Hedjaz under the parliamentary régime.

The condition of the province now differs little from its condition under the old régime, except that pilgrims continue to suffer much less extortion. In the proceedings of Parliament hardly any interest is taken.

In and about Jeddah there were in the winter and spring of 1908–9 some signs of awakening. Some sportsmen, both natives and Europeans, used to go out shooting to considerable distances, soldiers used to go out for firing practice, and a Jeddah newspaper was started with a Syrian Christian, an energetic young man, as editor. But before the winter of 1909 the newspaper had died a natural death, the Bedouins had

again become dominant, almost up to the walls, and the old half-mile walk to the northward between the barracks and the arm of the sea had again become, as it still remains, the only exercise that could be safely taken outside the town. The Bedouins have now become perhaps more dangerous than ever, as they have audaciously recaptured, just outside the town, eleven negro slaves whose liberation the British and French consulates had just obtained, and as the Ottoman Government has consequently ordered that no slaves of Bedouins are for the present to be liberated (see my despatches No. 15 of the 22nd May and No. 16 of the 26th May, 1910).

About the slave trade, which is not openly carried on in Jeddah, I do not know much except that it is still flourishing.

A municipality was set up in Mecca last September for the first time. It is the work of the Mecca "Committee of Union and Progress," a secret body of about fifty members, Turkish officers and Turks settled in the town, and is opposed by the grand shereef, from whom it has taken for itself the tithe on dates, fruit, vegetables, and firewood. It has imposed a tax for lighting and cleaning of about 2*s.* a year on each house, and has hung up some hundreds of petroleum street-lamps. Mecca may perhaps be really progressing a little. The long-established Jeddah municipality has never been able to levy such a cleaning and lighting tax. The twenty-eight citizens of Mecca who, for their riotous resistance eighteen months ago to the imposition of a municipal tax, were some months later arrested (I reported the arrest of seventeen of them in my despatch No. 15 of the 5th April, 1909), and were ten months ago sent off to Beirout (not Salonica as was reported in Jeddah despatch No. 45 of 30th August, 1909) for trial, have within the last three weeks all come back to the Hedjaz except a few who have gone for business or pleasure to Constantinople, all the twenty-eight having, I hear, suffered terms of imprisonment under sentences passed in Beirout (in Jeddah despatch No. 45 the number is given as 21, a discrepancy which I cannot now explain).

Of the two newspapers started about eighteen months ago in Mecca, one is extinct, and the other has become a mere official gazette.

Of Medina I know but little.

The Turkish soldiers, of whom there are now generally some hundreds in Jeddah, have much improved in appearance. They are well fed, well cared for in sickness, and much better dressed than formerly, though not yet better shod. Some of them have lately been seen with watches. They are now sometimes to be seen indulging in wrestling and ungainly dances. There is much drilling in the early morning, though firing practice has been almost entirely stopped; and every afternoon and evening there are performances of the atrocious military band. Since Bedouins attacked a pilgrim caravan almost at the gates of Jeddah last October, soldiers have been posted at the gates and some streets. One comes to cry out "Kimdiro?" ("Who is that?") when any one passes in the night. A harmless negro who did not understand these Turkish words is reported to have been shot dead last winter. The measure is of course quite useless, as dangerous Bedouins do not walk about in the town at night, and it would be more to the purpose if the Government would make its authority felt outside. The Turkish garrison officers in general seem not to have improved at all, but only to have grown more arrogant and insolent. The new kaimakam (now mutesarrif) Sadik Bey, himself a colonel in the army, well known to His Majesty's Embassy, works to keep the troops up to a high standard, and is also energetic in civil and social reform. He has put names and numbers on the streets, and numbers on boats, boatmen, and porters, and he has had some hundreds of petroleum lamps hung in the streets. He has had the town well cleaned and swept, but this a comparatively easy task after the pilgrims have left, and is indeed fairly well done every year. Immediately outside the town there is as much filth as ever, and it remains to be seen how he will deal with the pilgrims when they come. He is building a large lodging-house for pilgrims, and he has written me a letter, which I think unfair, complaining of the condition of a certain lodging-house for British Indian pilgrims and of their dirty habits. He has also written to me that no British Indian pilgrims are to sleep out for the future, and that all should have return tickets. His source of supply for town improvements is the municipal chest, which is now getting empty, and the municipality is accordingly addressing unheard-of demands for rent and auction dues to a wealthy British firm, which demands are not likely to have any success. He has vague great schemes for the sanitation of Jeddah, but no real sanitation is possible without great expense, which it seems can never be drefayed. A sufficient port might perhaps be made, always, of course, at considerable expense, instead of the present entirely natural one, in which lighters are continually sticking in the sand, and thereby causing, besides great delay, great damage to cargo from sea water. The reefs would seem to afford facilities for

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the construction of piers, and I suppose some dredging* might be done fairly cheaply, but I do not know that the whole question has ever been studied by competent persons. A proper customs warehouse might surely be built intead of the present enclosure filled with sacks of rice, grain, and dates, with no sort of shelter from the weather.

The mutesarrif (until lately kaïmakam), the director of the customs, and the judges would seem to be now incorruptible. Salaries, however, have not been raised, except on paper, and there is still a good deal of petty corruption, though to this I attach little importance.

The mutessarif is inviting subscriptions for the repair of an aqueduct (that from Ain Faraj Yassir, a well or spring about 15 miles from Jeddah), but in this he does not seem to be well advised, as the water is brackish, and there is plenty of brackish water to be had already.† There is little response to his invitation. He has just sent off a large boat-load of prostitutes and procurers in banishment to Kunfudah, in which wild Arab coast town they will have to live somehow, and he is carrying on quite a "crescentade" against the Greek drink-shops. He is giving great attention to the Government free school, which was opened here with great pomp two months before his arrival. He is pushing on the repairs that are now being made in the school-building in this vacation time, and has engaged new teachers from Constantinople, and the school is expected to begin regular work in August. Some account of education in the Hedjaz seems of possible interest.

Under the auspices of Vali Ahmed Kalib Pasha, the Government free boys' school of Jeddah, which should include a preparatory ("ibtidai") school and a primary ("rushdi") school, almost ceased to exist, and there were no other places of education in the town, except the usual little Koran-gabbling schools for very young children. Five years ago public-spirited persons, including some British Indians, set up a school on the same lines as those laid down for the Government school, but charging fees for pupils of the well-to-do class. This school, called the "felah" (prosperity) school, has prospered exceedingly, having now seven masters and about 250 pupils. Its present head master, a Syrian, travelled with me from Suez to Jeddah last October. I overheard him discoursing to some Turkish fellow-travellers about the civilising power of Islam, and giving them an exaggerated account of the Denshawai affair. He was loud and ostentatious in the performance of the formalities known as Mussulman prayers. The Government free school has had, since its opening, or rather reopening, five months ago, generally about 90 pupils, but should have about 200 when it reopens again next August with its full complement of five teachers. I may mention that one of the teachers, a British Indian, was recently dismissed for his corrupting misconduct, which is very common here, with some of the boys. He does not, however, seem to have lost caste, and is now often coming to this consulate about some business of his. The curriculum in the "felah" and Government schools is as follows: Much time is given to the literary Arabic language, of which the literature is dead, and the literary and official Turkish,‡ which has, perhaps, never had a literature; also to "religion," of which promising students go afterwards to follow the course of old Moslem religious-juristic scholasticism, which is still flourishing in the courtyards and colonnades of the great mosque at Mecca. History of the Ottoman Empire, geography, and arithmetic are also taught, and there is some talk even of French being hereafter included. There are in Mecca two or three large schools in which much the same instruction is given, and one in Taif, and there is said to be a rather superior school in Medina. There seems to be practically no education for girls in the Hedjaz. Such is the education obtainable, and it is not satisfactory. But very few parents or pupils wish to seek a better elsewhere, and indeed I am not sure that there is any much better to be had in Moslem boys' schools elsewhere in the Turkish Empire.

The inhabitants of Jeddah are closely attached to their noisome and rat-infested if stately and generally reposeful town. The easily obtained slave-girls are no doubt a a bond of attachment. When one of them bears a child she is, I understand, inalienable by Mussulman law, and should also be set free so that she may be married to her master or some one else. This state of things may not please the lawful wife, or the master, or perhaps even the slave-girl herself, who, if she becomes free and a

* The mutessarif now (June 10) says he has written to Constantinople asking that a dredger may be sent.

† The last kaimakam also attempted the repair of this aqueduct. The grand shereef has cancelled his promise to contribute to the cost of the water supply of Jeddah on the ground, I hear, that no serious effort was being made (see my despatch above referred to).

‡ I should have put Turkish first.

lawful wife, is then exposed to the perfectly capricious divorce, and accordingly the procuring of abortion, in the case of slave-girls, is quite a common practice, I suppose more common and less disapproved here than elsewhere. Further, there is the comforting belief that each performance of the short and easy pilgrimage to Mecca wipes out all past sins. Any European who lives here for a few months is impressed by the narcotising formalism of the all-pervading religion, and by the truth of Doughty's phrase, "That solemn fool's paradise Islam."

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[23945] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 425.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van reporting on the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the Goyan and other Kurdish tribes, and on certain administrative changes on the Persian frontier.

You will observe that the punitive expedition has been placed under the command of an Armenian Christian, a development of striking novelty, the result of which must be watched with some anxiety.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Van, June 12, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the 4th battalion, 30th Regiment left Van to-day for Chal with the object of suppressing recent disturbances of Kurds in that neighbourhood. Another force—consisting of the 1st battalion, 30th Regiment and one mountain gun from Van, two companies infantry from Midiat, and one from Deh—are under orders to proceed to take punitive measures against the Goyan Kurds, who, as reported by Mr. Morgan in his despatches Nos. 17 and 19 last October, pillaged a Nestorian village in the plain south of Sairt.

Your Excellency will remember that the expedition sent against these Kurds in October last ended in complete failure.

The Goyan Kurds have never yet paid taxes nor recognised the authority of the Government.

The present force is being placed under the orders of the Kaïmakam of Shattakh, a capable Armenian and a former revolutionist, who, no doubt, will not be wanting in zeal.

With him will be associated the Kaïmakams of Awrakh and Julamerk. The conduct of the operations will thus be vested in a civil trio of somewhat discordant elements, who may be expected to have also to contend with the jealousy of the military commander.

Peculiar interest attaches to the fact that this is the first time that a Christian has been given the control of troops sent against Mahommedans—a fact which should prove beneficial at least as bringing into prominence the principle of the exclusion of religious considerations in affairs of this kind.

Having accomplished their task with the Goyan Kurds, it will be the duty of the civil trio to visit other turbulent Kurdish tribes in the neighbourhood, report the conditions they find to Constantinople, and carry into effect the instructions they may receive.

With reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 11, the following alterations have been made:—

Captain Husni Bey has been appointed Governor of Ushnu.
Lieutenant Zia remains at Van.

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Sulduz has been attached to the vilayet of Mosul for purposes of administration, and a governor will be sent from that vilayet.

I have, &c.
J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[23946] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 426.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 252 of the 25th April last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Consul Monahan respecting the state of affairs in the Nejd.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Jeddah, June 11, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatches No. 17 of the 9th April and No. 23 of the 30th May, 1909, relative to Nejd affairs, I have the honour to report that the Hejaz newspaper of the 21st April, 1910, publishes a letter from the Acting Vali Mushir Abdullah Pasha to the Amir Ibn Rashid in the following sense:—

"We have received your letter and spoken with your emissary, and we have perceived with delight the fragrance of the valour of the lions of the desert of Arabia, and we have prayed for your preservation for the world of Islam seeing your devotion with the Khalifate and the Ottoman Government, and have derived much pleasure from the chastisement and correction which, as you have reported, you have inflicted on the rebellious Bedouins, as was the duty of all Moslems and faithful subjects according to the text of Koran. Know that the purpose of our Sultan and his Government is to remove oppression, and spread justice and equality, and ensure the prosperity of the subjects, and I have been sent to perform the duty of governorship and to do the necessary service to you and to every Mussulman, and you shall know that the house of the Government is always open and the ear of compassion is ever ready here to attend to your cry, and the hand of justice will guard your rights, and you are all entrusted to my care by God, and therefore inform me of your Excellency's (Shadet) needs for the assurance of your security, and we will do at once what is needed with the help of God, and give our salutation to the members of your tribe and our brethren in the faith."

Nothing have been published in the newspapers of the circumstances or occasion of this letter, but I have learnt the following details:—

Three or four months ago the young Amir with his uncles, who are his guardians, went on raid to the northward of Jauf and inflicted much loss on the Rowala tribe, which goes in the summer even as far north as Damascus. Rowala tribesmen afterwards in revenge invaded Jauf and took prisoner the Amir's Governor of Jauf, who is his maternal uncle Ali Subhan, and some other persons, and are now demanding the ransom, which it is said is 20,000*l.* An emissary came from the Amir to Mecca to ask for the help or mediation of the Ottoman authorities, and the emissary has returned to Nejd with the above letter, the result of his mission being still unknown.

Little can be heard here of Nejd affairs, but it appears that the expected downfall of Ibn Saood has not taken place, nor has anything further been heard here of the military or other interference of the Ottoman Government in Nejd mentioned in the now extinct Mecca newspaper "Shamsul Hakika," as reported in my despatch No. 17 of 1909 above referred to. The Grand Shereef, according to a Mecca informant, has lately demanded of Ibn Saood a yearly due of 900*l.* for the district of Kasim, which has not been paid for over thirty years, and all the arrears for that time, to which demand no reply has been given, and the Grand Shereef is also said to have ordered the inhabitants of Kasim to throw off their allegiance to Ibn Saood and become his, the

Grand Shereef's, that is, the Ottoman Government's subjects, and it is thought probable that he, the Grand Shereef, will send a raid into Kasim.

There are vague rumours of Ibn Saood being now engaged in alliance with the Sheikh of Koweit in a raid against Muntefik Arabs near Bussorah.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[23949] No. 7.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 429.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 28, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 12th April last, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad informs me that His Majesty's vice-consul at Kerbela has received information confidentially from the governor to the effect that the Russian Government have opened negotiations here for the establishment of a Russian consular post at Nejef. Mr. Lorimer states that, provided the Russian representative is an Asiatic, and is of rank not exceeding that of His Majesty's vice-consul at Kerbela, he sees no objection to the establishment of this post.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23951] No. 8.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 431.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 27, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at the sitting of the Chamber of the 26th June a convention was voted with the Société Ottomane du Chemin de Fer Smyrne–Cassaba et Prolongement for the construction and working of a branch line from Soma (sanjak of Magnesia) to Panderma, a port on the Sea of Marmora.

The concession is to expire on the same date as the concession for the lines Smyrna–Alashehir, Smyrna–Boyoumalna–Magnesia–Soma and Alashehir–Afioun–Karahissar, all of which lines have been constructed and are worked by the same society. At the expiry of the concession the line Soma–Panderma, together with the other lines above mentioned, shall revert, free of all charge and in good repair, to the Ottoman Government.

The society is to furnish plans for the line within one year, and the Ministry of Public Works will then have a period of three months for their approval, modification, or rejection.

Work shall be begun one year after the approval of the plans, and should be finished within four years.

The Ottoman Government shall give to the company for defraying the cost of construction 77,832 bonds at 4 per cent. of 500 fr. each, redeemable during the term of the concession. The company thus starts with a total nominal capital of 38,916,000 fr., or, the length of the line being estimated at 190 kilom., of 204,800 fr. per kilom. The Ottoman Government undertakes to pay interest and sinking fund on these bonds, but, on the other hand, the company shall guarantee, with all its property, movable and immovable, the services of this interest and sinking fund. The company shall pay interest until the line is working throughout its entire length. The line can be set working by sections of 20 kilom. at a time.

The working expenses of the whole line are calculated at 947,670 fr. per annum, or 4,987 fr. per kilom., say, 200*l.* per annum.

Working expenses shall be deducted after payment of interest and sinking fund. If during the first ten years the receipts do not cover the working expenses, the deficit will be made good by the Government. The sums required for this purpose will be deducted from the surplus of the revenues affected to the kilometric guarantee of the line Smyrna–Cassaba–Prolongement, or from the general revenues of the budget. These sums will be advanced by the Government, and will carry interest at 4 per cent.

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in favour of the Treasury, and they will be repaid by the share which the Government will receive later on from the surplus values of the receipts. In this way the Government will have given nothing to the company, but will merely have invested its money at 4 per cent.

If the receipts are in excess of the working expenses, the surplus shall be divided equally between the Government and the company.

The consideration of this convention gave rise to some discussion in the Chamber. The Opposition was led by Loufi Fikri Bey, and the chief objection raised was that the estimate of cost of construction (204,800 fr. per kilom.) was excessive. A proposal was also made to modify the convention so as to give the Government an effective control of the works in connection with the railway, but this proposal was dropped.

Djavid Bey declared that the estimate of the cost of construction was not excessive. From the figure which appeared in the convention must be deducted costs of expropriation of rolling stock and other preliminary items, and, above all, the cost of issuing the bonds. The price of issue might be influenced by the political situation at home or by a war. In the case of the bonds of the Bagdad Railway loan, with a State guarantee, the price had been fixed at 86. It might be that in the present instance it would be impossible to get more than 80. This would reduce the real cost of construction to about 160,000 fr.

Finally, the Chamber approved the convention by 110 votes to 20.

The method of guarantees is analogous to that adopted for the Bagdad Railway. The cost per kilometre is reckoned at 204,800 fr. (or 8,192*l.*), and on this interest must be paid at the rate of 4 per cent., *i.e.*, 8,192 fr. (or 488*l.*) per annum. To this must be added the working expenses, which are put approximately at 5,000 fr. per annum, or 13,192 fr. per kilom. per annum. It is cheaper than the Bagdad rate, but there is no difficult country to go through, and the region is rich and fertile.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[23953] No. 9.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 433. Secret.)

Therapia, June 28, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose translations of some documents which I have obtained from the Arabic translation department of the Porte and which I have good reason to suppose are genuine. They are written by the committee correspondents and adherents in the Yemen, and in a way are in the familiar strain of suspicion of England and her alleged designs in Arabia.

As is well known, the Arabs in general were bitterly disappointed when, some time after the revival of the constitution and after the committee captured the Government of the Ottoman Empire, they discovered that it was guided by Turkification tendencies instead of the decentralisation ideas which they expected, and which they hoped would allow the free development of the different divisions of Arabia under the ægis of the Ottoman Government. Many of them now declare that the binding link of the Caliphate has disappeared and that it is now solely a question of Arab *versus* Turk, while many of them who have been brought into contact with or had experience of British methods in Egypt, Aden, India, and the Gulf have begun to develop leanings towards England as opposed to the Turk.

The committee, perhaps, naturally loath to admit that these centrifugal tendencies are the result of their unconstitutional and unsympathetic attitude towards the Arabs and other races, endeavour to persuade themselves and others that they are due to English machinations, while their correspondents reflect this mental attitude. The nervousness of Stamboul about the Caliphate was a feature of the ex-Sultan's Yildiz government, and has apparently been intensified with the present rulers of Turkey, whose free-thinking ways have alienated the deeply religious Arab population. The present Khedive, who is reputed to be friendly to England, not unnaturally comes in for a fair meed of suspicion.

This mistrust between the Arabs and the committee Government is partly due, as in the case of other non-Turkish races, to its working on negative as opposed to positive lines. The committee, however, in the recent phase of the Cretan question,

has cleverly, and for the moment successfully, gained prestige with the Moslem Arabs by posing as the champion of Islam's rights in the island.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Cairo.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

Translation of a Paragraph of a Letter in Arabic, dated 5 Jemazi-ul-evvel, 1328 (May 1910), written to Seyyid Ahmed-al-Kubssi, Deputy for the Yemen, by his father, Seyyid Yahya-al-Kubssi, in Sanaa.

My Son,

READ the important enclosures in my letter with attention, and acquaint the Government with their contents according to their importance; for the Empire is surrounded with danger and difficulties on all sides. I advise the Ottoman Government to wake up.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

Substance of a Letter in Arabic, purporting to be in the name of the Pashas, Beys, and Chiefs of Egypt, which was sent to the Sultan and forwarded by his First Secretary to the Grand Vizierate.

THE object of the Christian Powers of Europe is to crush the Ottoman Empire and to take from it the Caliphate. The Moslem emirs and chiefs, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder to serve the Empire, are seen to be seditious and treacherous in all their actions. In spite of the benefits they have received, they are ungrateful and are the instruments for the destruction of the Empire.

Since becoming Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha has never ceased striving to break off relations with the Government to which he is subject and to cast off his allegiance. He is being drawn into this path by a foreign hand, the object being to establish an Arab Sultanate. In the old régime there were many who had prepared the way for this, but the new order of things is not favourable for the execution of such schemes. The possibility of the separation of Egypt and other Arab countries near it, such as Hedjaz, from Turkey should not be forgotten. To accomplish this the Khedive uses his position rather than force. He has lately sent his cousin, Aziz Pasha Husni (? Hussan), to the desert Arabs, and a person named Abdul Rahmi-al-Kavakibi to Mecca. He has also sent special officials to Aden, Yemen, and Irak, and at English instigation he has also dispatched men to Tripoli, in Africa, with regard to the extension of the railway.

Seeing the glory of the Caliphate established by the constitution, the Khedive thought to gain the object on which he had spent so much money by going to Mecca on the pretence of making the pilgrimage. He had conversations with the Arab chiefs and prolonged his journey to Syria and Palestine.

The Arab Caliphate and the Sultanate of Egypt will stretch from the deserts of Aleppo to Teharné and Yemmé on the north, and from the Persian frontier to Irak, from Oman to Tripoli, in Africa, on the south, and will be under the protection of England, who rules over the larger part of the Moslem population of the world. With this object in view, the Khedive recently sent his brother, Mehmed Ali Pasha, on a secret mission to Damascus, Aleppo, and Beirout. In a speech he made to the Arab notables, he said how glad he was to visit Damascus and the surrounding country which his ancestors made into a paradise. This speech was published in No. 6398 of the Arabic newspaper "Al Mukattam."

The Khedive passes his time and is in relations with the reactionary Izzet Pasha and his satellites. These traitors to their religion and their country are made use of for the formation of the Khedive's Arab Caliphate, and the newspaper "Al Moayyad," published in Egypt, has been chosen to propagate their views.

The Ka'aba (sacred tomb at Mecca) is thus menaced by England through the formation of an Arab-Egyptian Empire.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

Translation of a Letter in Arabic, dated 28 Rebi-ul-evel, 1328 (April 9, 1910), from Seyyid Mahmoud-bin-Mohammed-al-Harazi, one of the Seyyids and Shereefs of Sanaa, in the Yemen, to the Grand Vizierate.

THE chief cause of the dissatisfaction in the Yemen is the fact that the salaries and pay, which have long been paid to the seyyids and shereefs of the Yemen by the Yemen imams, have not been given by the Ottoman Government. These heart-broken shereefs and seyyids are of the greatest assistance to the imam. From a letter I have received I learn that Imam Yahya is desirous of showing his loyalty and stretching out the hand of friendship to the Government, but that he is vexed because the Government does not favour his present demands. All the Government officials in the Yemen are scoundrels and oppressors. They understand no service but that which promotes their personal advantage. In order to conceal their wickedness, these officials say that the country is in perfect order; but that is a lie, and is just to deceive the Government. If there is perfect order in the Yemen, why does the Government send L.T. 40,000 there every month? Let the rulers of the Empire open their eyes, for the efforts and intrigues of England are many. The people are poor; they are oppressed by want; they are ready to break out into riot and rebellion. The power and influence of Seyyid Idris increase daily, and it is confidently expected that he will surpass the imam. His men travel about in the Hedjaz and in Mesopotamia, and he is in constant communication with Egypt. It is certainly England who is helping and serving him materially and morally with a strong hand. To repair this grave and disastrous situation the Government needs men rather than money; for the Government money is not spent on the country and on the progress and prosperity of the people by the vile hands of the officials, who are devoted to their greedy personal interests, and no good results. If things go on like this, the Yemen will break off completely from the Empire, and Irak and the Hedjaz will follow at once. I would call your attention to the contents of this my fourth letter. If no sign is shown of taking the steps required, I shall give no more advice and service in this way.

I am, &c.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

Translation of a Letter in Arabic, dated April 29, 1326 (May 12, 1910), from "Sa'adoun-al-Mansour," Chief of the Tribes of Muntefik, to the Grand Vizierate.

WE thought we had good reason for expecting that the proclamation of the constitution would completely destroy the despotic régime and would spread justice, and we had strong hopes that under the blessed constitutional régime the Government would hasten to destroy the causes of the disputes and strife that are so apt to burst into flame in Syria and Irak and would gladden all hearts by their just actions. To leave the kaza of Koweit, the key of Irak, in the hands of that protégé of England, Mubarak Assabah, looks like weakness and impotence. In order to carry out his rebellious aims and wishes, Mubarak Assabah used Abd-ul-Aziz Ass'oud, the Wahabi, as his instrument. In order to seize and plunder our goods and possessions, the said Abd-ul-Aziz Ass'oud attacked my tribes with a large, well-armed force. Heaven be praised that through our sincere desire to serve the Government we won a victory over him. After this great defeat Abd-ul-Aziz Ass'oud went to the Bussorah Government, which received them and showed them a place to dwell in. To enable Abd-ul-Aziz and his brigands to attack us again they are being strengthened with guns and other munitions of war by the Bussorah Government, and it is certain that as soon as they have collected all the stores and munitions they will attack us. Although, with the help of God, they do not matter, I would draw your attention to the fact that the present officials of Bussorah and Irak are aiding and helping their subversive movements. For these Wahabis regard as unbelievers all Moslems who do not accept their creed, and the ulema of the Nejd, being also Wahabis, give the Wahabis fetvas, saying that the goods and lives of non-Wahabis are lawful spoil. I therefore beg that the officials of Bussorah and Irak will hasten to prevent the spreading of disorder and rebellion of Mubarak Assabah, who does nothing but serve as a tool to the invasion of England, and of other sedition-mongers of the same kind.

I am, &c.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

Translation of a Letter in Arabic, dated 22 Rebbi-ul-Akhir, 1328 (May 2, 1910), from Mohammed-al-Arif, Chief and Sheikh of the Ismailia Tribe in the Yemen, to Seyyid Yahya-al-Kibsi, Notable of Sanaa.

I THINK it my duty to tell you this, for the matter is gradually moving towards discovery and difficulty. The English Government pretends to have no finger in the Yemen and imam question, but it is known that both Idris and the Imam Yahya Hamid-ed-Din strive to promote the aims of England. Imam Yahya has ordered a machine from England so that he can strike coins, through the Emir of Lahj. This machine has just arrived at Aden and will shortly be delivered to Imam Yahya. The Emir of Lahj told me this when he came to visit me while I was at Aden, in answer to my question. The imam wants independence, but the course of events shows that the Seyyid Idris will surpass the imam. For Seyyid Idris is a just and [illegible]* man, whereas the imam is severe and oppressive. The imam calls the believers infidels, and makes attacks on their honour lawful; yet although he carries rebellion and insubordination to this extent, he has been unable to acquire as much influence and power as he desired. But Seyyid Idris, although he appeared only two years ago, has won the affections of all the imam's supporters and partisans, of all the notables, leaders, and common people of the Yemen, and even of the Turks. To-day, the order of Seyyid Idris is one to be obeyed. The Ismailian community of Haraz (district near Sanaa) is very ignorant, so that it is impossible to find among them a man one can talk to. I wrote to the chief of this tribe, who is in India, but have had no answer. The reason he has not replied is that I tried to turn him against England; for he is an obstinate man with no idea but that of following the orders and instructions of England. I have therefore given up the idea of entering into correspondence with this chief and with the Ismailian sect (their religious head is the Agha Khan) here, for I shall be unable to arouse their sympathy for the Ottoman Empire. During the Grand Vizierate of Hussein Hilmi Pasha, the late vali, Kiamil Bey (now Vali of Hedjaz), received cypher instructions to investigate and watch the relations and correspondence between the Arab notables and chiefs. As a result of his investigations it became clear and proved that the Emir of Lahj had been appointed by England as an intermediary among the Arabs; our present researches have shown that the English Government makes presents and allowances to the Emir of Mecca, Mubarak Assabah, Ibn Reshid, and other Arab notables, through the Emir of Lahj. According to repeated information of a reliable nature, the Arab notables and leaders will make an alliance for their independence, and will resolve to form an Arab Caliphate. It is worth noting that Imam Yahya Hamid-ed-Din is in correspondence with the Emir of Lahj, and that Seyyid Mohammed Ashsherif has selected Lahj as his place of residence.

[23955] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 435.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Cumberbatch, consul-general at Beirout, reporting on the relations between Youssouf Pasha and some of the members of his administrative council.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30. Confidential.)

Sir, *Beirout, June 15, 1910.*

IN one or two of my recent reports on the affairs of Mount Lebanon I have had occasion to refer to the unsatisfactory relations existing between the Governor-General

* Unreadable.

and some members of the administrative council. As these relations have got more embittered of late and may lead to a deadlock when the Government offices re-form at Beiteddin in the middle of July after the summer vacation that commences in a few days, I have the honour to submit the following details, which may be of some utility to your Excellency in case the question assumes graver proportions and has to be brought to your notice :—

Ever since the Beiteddin demonstration made by so-called "Liberals" in September 1908, in connection with the revival of the constitution, on which occasion Youssouf Pasha allowed himself to be terrorised into dismissing Emir Kabalan Bellama, his loyal and devoted personal representative in the administrative council, and several other high officials, the members of the council, led by Selim Bey Amoon, who had been forced upon Youssouf Pasha as Emir Kabalan's successor, assumed powers which they had never dreamt of asserting before, and which went far beyond the limitations of their attributions as defined in article 2 of the "règlement."

In the uncertain state of things existing for some months after the constitutional crisis and during the reactionary movement in the spring of 1909, Youssouf Pasha thought it prudent not to reassert his authority to the full, and he assumed an outward appearance of ceding to the spirit of constitutionalism and to liberal ideas which one heard so much of in those days.

It was soon evident to everyone connected with Lebanese affairs that the members of the council were one and all bent upon one object, and that was to benefit themselves and their friends to the exclusion of real public interests.

Fortunately for the peace of the Lebanon, Selim Amoon died in the spring of 1909, but not before he had shown the greatest possible contempt for the authority of the Governor-General by publishing a sort of manifesto which could best be described as an incitement to the assumption of all the rights of a legislative assembly by the administrative council under his own presidency, the Governor-General remaining a mere figurehead.

The lucky opportunity offered by his sudden death was taken advantage of by Youssouf Pasha to recall Emir Kabalan to the vice-presidency, and from that day his Excellency set to work to recover his dignity and prestige, which had suffered considerably since September 1908.

Quarrels were for some time averted by condescensions and compromises, but the first serious trial of strength took place when the Governor-General in August last refused to carry out a decision of the council for the dismissal of the Druze and Orthodox members of the court of Metn.

Youssouf Pasha had convinced himself that the whole proceedings against these two judges were prompted by motives of vindictiveness on the part of the newly-elected Maronite and Orthodox members for Metn, who wished to revenge themselves on these men for belonging to the party that had unsuccessfully opposed their election.

After much wrangling the members of the council modified their decision, and the judges were only transferred to other courts, which, though not such a severe punishment as that contemplated by their enemies in the council, was an undeserved and unjust measure, which it has only been possible to get repaired quite recently by their reappointment to their former post owing to a vacancy having occurred.

Shortly after this case there were three other decisions of the council on non-financial questions, which the Governor-General had perfectly valid reasons for refusing to sanction, owing to proofs of corruption on the part of interested parties.

This determined attitude of Youssouf Pasha to put down corrupt practices annoyed the councillors very much, and they complained to the consuls-general of what they maintained was the wrongful assumption by the Governor-General of the right to veto a decision of theirs.

From me and the acting consul-general of France, as well as from my Russian colleague, they got no sympathy, as we could but tell them that the provisions of article 2 were very clear, and that they had only a consultative part to play in questions not purely financial.

On my part I undertook to bring about a better understanding between the Governor-General and his council. I had practically found a satisfactory *modus vivendi* when the unfortunate Zwein incident occurred and upset all my work of pacification, because on the one side Youssouf Pasha blamed them as a body for the outrage on his dignity committed by their colleague, and on the other side they were nearly all inclined to sympathise with Zwein, though outwardly they pretended to disavow him. At this juncture, had Youssouf Pasha succeeded in obtaining the

sanction of the Sublime Porte to the dismissal of the council, he would have had the moral support of myself and of my French and Russian colleagues as well as the concurrence of the consuls-general of Austria, Germany, and Italy, as we were of one mind that their openly hostile attitude towards Youssouf Pasha was unwarranted and had undoubtedly contributed towards encouraging Zwein in his outrage on decency and propriety. To make up for the apparent disinclination of the Sublime Porte to authorise the dismissal of the whole council, certain over-zealous officials nearly succeeded in obtaining the committal, by the Chambre des Mises en Accusation, of some members of the council who subsequently, not content with having escaped through the intervention of powerful friends, resumed an actively hostile attitude against the Governor-General at the instigation of the Greek Catholic member for Zahlé on his Excellency's refusal to sanction the election as mayor of that town of an ex-convict but influential local sheikh whom that member relied upon for his re-election to the council in six months' time.

Their tactics in this case have been to attack Emir Kabalan, whom they wrongly and basely accuse of making mischief between them and the Governor-General, instead of acting his part of intermediary and conciliator, and for whose dismissal they now clamour. When they called upon me to support their demand for the emir's dismissal I was unable to do so, as they failed to show me that there was the slightest justification for their charges, but I said I would not interfere one way or the other in a matter which solely concerned the Governor-General, whom they had no right whatever to coerce into dismissing his personal representative for motives so puerile and personal.

My French colleague, though he admits that the accusations against Emir Kabalan are groundless, is not disposed to discourage his dismissal, but M. Fouques Duparc has been always personally biassed against the emir, whose relations with the French consulate-general, since Youssouf Pasha's appointment, have, for purely personal reasons, not been as cordial as they used to be.

Unless a reconciliation between the recalcitrant councillors and the Governor-General takes place before the reassembling of the Government in July, there will be a deadlock in the routine business of the council, and a drastic measure will have to be taken, either by the enforced resignation of Emir Kabalan and the appointment of a more supple and less scrupulous vice-president, or by the dismissal of the refractory members of the council, and the election of new men in their stead. The latter course, though the more difficult of the two, would be the most efficacious and the most likely to restore the weakened prestige of the Governor-General and strengthen his hands, both essential to the proper administration of the Lebanon as at present constituted.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[23956] No. 11.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 136.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, transmitting certain petitions received from the Nestorian community at El-kosh. In returning these petitions, I am informing Mr. Lorimer that the attitude adopted by him in the matter meets with my approval.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 449/18. Confidential.)

Your Excellency, *Bagdad, May 30, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the enclosed papers for your Excellency's information. The circumstances to which they relate are well known to your Excellency, and I need therefore only mention that I caused the original petitions to be returned to those who presented them through the dragoman of His Majesty's vice-consulate at

Musal, with a message to the effect that, after careful consideration, I found myself unable to intervene in the matter.

I trust that my action may receive your Excellency's approval.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, I.C.S., *Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Petition presented to Consul-General Lorimer, May 14, 1910.

(Translation.)

To His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General,

WE beg to explain to your Excellency that we were originally Nestorians;* and that under the old régime, by the oppression of the Chaldean Catholics, we were obliged to follow them. Last year, when the constitution and liberty of religion were declared, we went back to our old religion, under the supremacy of Mar Shimun, the Nestorian patriarch. We elected one of our priests and sent him to the patriarch, Mar Shimun, who consecrated him as a bishop under the name of Mar Elia.

When Mar Elia arrived at El-kosh he was received with great love and triumph. Thence he proceeded to Musal to prove his order. The Chaldean Catholic patriarch, Emmanuel, opposed him, and submitted many false complaints and petitions against him, asserting that he was an intriguer; and, by means of the local authorities, obtained an order that he should be banished to Kadshanis.

Mar Elia, being aware that the local Government would insist on banishing him, left Musal in fear and proceeded to Kadshanis.

We petitioned Government that our names might be separated from those of the Catholics, and that we might be registered as a separate community, as other Ottoman communities are registered. The local Government refused to listen to us; for the administrative council and the director of the registration department are all supporters of the patriarch, and they are endeavouring to crush our Nestorian community, as they crushed our bishop, Mar Elia.

Thereupon we, and our patriarch, Mar Shimun, sent telegrams to Constantinople to the Porte. The matter was put before Parliament and the Ministry of Justice, which gave a decision in favour of the separation of our community from the Catholic community; and orders sent to Musal in this sense.

When we asked the local Government to comply with the order, they asked for a representative on the part of Mar Shimun. After the priest, Hanna Ahuna, had been appointed to represent Mar Shimun, the local Government made empty promises of opening a new register for us. But finally they refused, saying that all Christians were one community, and there was no need to enter them in separate books. So with hollow and vain pretences they dismissed us from the council. That every Christian community, although it consists of five families only, is separately registered by the Government, and that all communities in general have different registers, are facts which they cannot deny.

We have no one to help us to attain our rights; and the authorities, with the patriarch, are opposing us; and, if they hear of any official who is likely to help us, they dismiss him on the spot.

We therefore find ourselves under the necessity of explaining our affairs to your Excellency, as your honourable Government is famous in justice, and is a protector of justice and freedom. We beg you to be so kind as to speak to the vali in the sense that we should be treaty similarly to other communities, and that our names should be separated from those of the Chaldean community, and that we should be saved from the tyranny of the patriarch, Emmanuel; and we shall ever pray that your Government may always succeed in making justice victorious.

Priest HANNA.
Deacon WARDA.

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* This is not correct if it refers to the El-kosh people; for neither the present nor the last generation of them were ever anything but Chaldean Catholics.—(Sgd.) J. G. L.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

Memorandum of Information given to the Political Resident by Shamas Warda, Agent of the Patriarch, Mar Shama'un, on May 15, 1910.

I HAVE been three times at El-kosh, and have spent ten days there in all. It is an entirely Christian village of 500 houses. Most of the people are cultivators owning their land; the rest are chiefly shop-keepers. Formerly El-kosh was a Nestorian village, and it gave seven patriarchs to the Nestorian Church. The inhabitants became Chaldeans gradually, not all at one time. The Church was taken from the Nestorians by force about seventy years ago, but they have continued to cherish the Nestorian faith in their hearts. There have been no Nestorian priests or services at El-kosh for seventy years.

A number of families in villages adjoining El-kosh have signified their intention of leaving the Chaldean for the Nestorian Church if the Nestorian movement at El-kosh is successful, viz., at Tall Kuf about 100 houses, at Tall Iskof about 50 houses, and at Batmai about 25 houses. Some families at Musal also are waiting for the chance to come over.

The only Nestorian villages in this vilayet (excluding those mentioned above) are about fifteen in Barwari. Others adjoin these, but are in the vilayet of Van. In the villages in question the Nestorians have possession of the churches.

It was after the proclamation of the constitution that the Nestorians at El-kosh declared themselves such openly. Before that, about fifteen years ago, they told Mr. McDowell, an American missionary, of their desire to revert to Nestorianism; but at the time it was impossible for them to do anything openly in that direction.

The petition which I have presented to you is from the priest, Hanna, as well as from myself. He has left Musal now, but he saw it, and approved the contents.

The Nestorian bishop, Yaualaha, is here to-day in connection with a dispute with the Chaldeans about two churches in the Musal vilayet. He was sent for by the vali.

J. G. LORIMER, *Political Resident.*

May 15, 1910.

(N.B.—Above is copied from notes I made at an interview at which Nasir, dragoman of the British vice-consulate at Musal, interpreted. The agent could only speak Chaldean.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Petition presented to Consul-General Lorimer, May 16, 1910.

(Translation.)

To His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General,

WE were disappointed to hear from you the words* "that we should have more patience and be humble, which would be better for us than if the local Government were to think that the English were interfering on our behalf."

The local Government consider that we are protected by the English, as they know that the Catholics are protected by the French. If the local Government had not believed this, we would have been entirely destroyed long ago.

2. If the tribes adjoining us had not seen that an English Mission were working in our midst and helping us, they would have made bold to destroy us without fear of consequences. Besides, we could not have ventured to live where we do if the Government, too, were not aware of this help.

3. The Catholics, by means of bribes to the Government, have acquired great influence. They have taken possession of our towns, villages, churches, and other properties. Now-a-days, although the constitution has been declared, they still retain the same influence and intend to ruin our nation.

4. Every Nestorian bishop who proceeds to Musal is suspected of being an intriguer; and the Papists do their best to obstruct him in every possible way. For example:—

(*a.*) When Mar Thimotius came to Musal with the intention of going to India, the Catholics and the French consul opposed his leaving for that country. He only succeeded by Mr. Rassam's help.

* What I said was that they should have patience and show respect for the Turkish Government; and that intervention on my part would be more likely to do their case harm than good.—(Sgd.) J. G. L.

(*b.*) Mar Yawalaha came to Musul two years ago. He was suspected of being an intriguer, as declared by the Catholic patriarch. Mr. Young at the time very kindly spoke to the vali, and asked him to look into the affair as a matter of justice. The matter was not completely settled, but his action had a wholesome effect upon the local Government.

(*c.*) Mar Elia was also suspected to be an intriguer, and if he had not happened to be the guest of Mr. Rassam, he would have been dead long since. He was obliged to escape secretly to his patriarch, Mar Shimun, having failed in his mission.

5. Repeated orders have been received for the removal of our names from the Catholic Chaldean register. No one has paid any attention. We have only received a verbal answer to the effect that "all Christians are one community."

Also the Protestant representative was suspected of being an intriguer also, as he generally helps the Nestorians in their affairs.

The patriarch enlarges to the Government on the fact that the Nestorians conduct their affairs by means of British help.

The French vice-consul (lately) claimed that he had a right to apply for the restoration of some sheep stolen by the Dihaim Arabs, on the ground that they belonged to certain Catholic merchants.* (*Vide* Neiria newspaper of the 21st April, 1910.)

6. Bishop Yawalaha has been summoned to Musal by the Government, and we venture to suggest that, if he does not receive your help, he will certainly suffer the same persecution as Mar Elia did, and will assuredly be defeated.

7. Why the Protestants are intervening in the Nestorian affair:—

(*a.*) The American Mission were in charge of the Musal field for more than thirty years. Having failed in their work, they handed the field over to the English Mission, which was stronger, the object being to check Papistical influences.

(*b.*) When the Church Missionary Society's Mission (subsequently) wished to discontinue work at Musal, the German vice-consul was prepared to help the Protestant community by introducing a German missionary into the field. But, being aware that the Germans wish to extend their influence and trade in this district, Dr. Griffiths, who was in charge of the station, opposed the idea of withdrawal, and endeavoured by all possible means to persuade the society not to stop their missionary work at Musal. Thereupon the Church Missionary Society continued the English Mission's work here.

8. You suggested to us yesterday that we should have patience; but we have already been waiting for more than a hundred years. Being aware of the evil thoughts of the Papists towards us, and fearing that the patriarch will continue his persecution, we beg you to help us in our application to Government for relief from the oppression under which we suffer.

9. The desire of the Protestants to help the Nestorians is due to a wish that the English Mission should extend its operations, by which means they hope to gain success for English works.

10. The Nestorians beg that a promise of help may be given them, for they fear that the patriarch will take revenge on them, and on the Protestants for helping them, by every deceitful means that he can think of.

Hoping for a favourable reply,

Bishop YAWALAHA.
Priest HANNA, *Representative of Mar Shimun.*
Deacon WARDA, ditto ditto.

The Members of the Protestant Community Council,
ABU HASSO, *Protestant Representative.*

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* The owners were Turkish subjects, and I understand that the French vice-consul's right to intervene was denied by the Turkish authorities.—(Sgd.) J. G. L.

[23957]

No. 12.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July 4.*)

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, transmitting correspondence with regard to the present position of the Mesopotamian irrigation works.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 452/10. Confidential.)
Your Excellency, *Bagdad, May 30, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Excellency's perusal, the enclosed papers, which speak for themselves. They have been sent to me confidentially by Mr. J. H. Medlicott, chief engineer of the irrigation works that are now being carried out in Mesopotamia by the Turkish Government, with the advice of Sir William Willcocks.

I venture to think that Mr. Medlicott's action in submitting full information regarding the present position of the affairs to the Minister of Public Works at Constantinople and to the Governor-General at Bagdad is both well judged and well timed, and I hope that it may be the means of removing, in part at least, the misconceptions which are certainly entertained in some quarters.

Mr. Medlicott informs me that he has also suggested to his Excellency Nazim Pasha the expediency of personally visiting and inspecting the works as soon as possible, and this also would seem to be a very suitable step on the part of Mr. Medlicott in the circumstances.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER, I.C.S., *Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Mr. Medlicott to Minister of Public Works, Constantinople.

(Confidential.)
Your Excellency, *Bagdad, May 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that there is at present a disposition prevailing here unfavourable to the new irrigation works.

This is due to the vehemence and persistence of complaints from the cultivators and owners of lands irrigated by the Hilla branch.

I enclose a copy of a letter I have just addressed to his Excellency the Vali of Bagdad on this subject, which will put you *au courant* with the facts and enable you to reply to complaints, demands, and questions that may be made in Constantinople.

The chief point to remember is that the old barrage was never completed, and was, even when new, an incomplete and unsatisfactory piece of work; consequently, it has not been able to withstand the force of the river, but is gradually breaking up. Sir William Willcocks spent £ T. 25,000 in carrying out urgent repairs, but this sum was quite insufficient to restore it as an efficient and complete work of its kind. At present it holds up a little less than 1 metre. To restore it so that it may hold up 2 metres will probably require an expenditure of £ T. 50,000 more.

The question of the present state of the old barrage and the Hilla branch is an ever open sore, and will remain one until the new barrage is finished. It has nothing to do with Sir William Willcocks's new irrigation schemes; nevertheless, he and his engineers are regarded by the public as having failed to accomplish anything, because

they have not performed a miracle. This is the cause of the unfavourable reports current regarding the irrigation works in Mesopotamia.

J. H. MEDLICOTT,
Engineer in Charge.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

Mr. Medlicott to Governor-General, Bagdad.

Your Excellency, *Bagdad, May 28, 1910.*

THE cultivators and owners of land under the Hilla Branch and Hindia are crying to heaven concerning their misfortunes.

On the one side, because they got no water, and on the other because they got too much.

The engineers are anathema, because they have not the wands of magicians.

They are blamed, not only for not having done the impossible, but also as the direct cause of the misfortunes of the cultivators.

The description of the state of affairs irrigational, I have given above, expresses the general public and lay opinions current here.

It would, I respectfully submit, be advisable to publish a statement in the papers setting forth the true position.

This, I think, would be the best way to silence ignorant, ill-disposed, and irresponsible critics, as well as the complaints of the unhappy cultivators. It would also encourage the latter with hopes of good times to come when the new barrage is finished.

This, your Excellency, would be a most desirable consummation. It would indirectly do much to help on the work and encourage the engineers in their difficult and, at present, thankless task.

A bad impression is like a hidden cancer. It may, if not removed, prove fatal to success in the end, and is harmful to the well-being of the works in the present.

I have drawn up a short monograph explaining the situation.

Even if you do not consider publication advisable, the statement will anyhow enable you to reply to questions and criticisms, and to allay the doubts of your colleagues and subordinates responsible for the administration, who may be perturbed by the vehemence and persistence of the demands and complaints of the unfortunate cultivators under the Hindia and Hilla Branch.

I am sending the Minister of Public Works a copy of this letter and its enclosure so that he may know the truth and be able to answer enquiries.

J. H. MEDLICOTT,
Engineer in Charge.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

Report by Mr. Medlicott on the Hindia Barrage and Hilla Branch.

THE Hindia barrage is an old work which was never properly completed. It has never furnished water to the Hilla branch during low water.

When the barrage was new it held up 2 metres of water. It now holds up less than 1 metre. This inability to hold up water is due to breaches which have occurred. The breaches were caused by the gradual breaking up and undermining of the foundations down stream. £T. 25,000 have been spent on urgent repairs, but it is not possible with the money and in the time available to close the breaches. To restore the barrage properly so that it can hold up 2 metres of water will probably cost £T. 50,000 in addition to the £T. 25,000 already spent.

It will take as much time to restore the old barrage as to build the new barrage.

In order to furnish water to the Hilla branch during low water, the old barrage must hold up 3 metres of water. It will cost a very large sum of money, and take at least two years to carry out work, which will enable the old barrage to hold up 3 metres of water.

2. The above is a true account of the state of the old barrage. From it the following facts may be deduced:—

(1.) That no water can be sent down the Hilla branch during low water until a new barrage has been built.

(2.) That the lands below the barrage will be flooded by the Hindia during high water until the new barrage is finished, unless the flood banks are raised and strengthened.

(3.) That a new barrage is the only remedy for the evils complained of, as the old barrage by itself is useless.

3. In the circumstances above described, and considering the fact that the new barrage was only commenced in February last, it is obviously absurd to suppose that the engineers engaged in constructing the new barrage and repairing the old barrage are in any way responsible for the present scarcity of water in the Hilla branch during low water or for the flooding of the lands by the Hindia during high water. The latter evil can be remedied by raising and strengthening the flood bank: there is no remedy for the former till the new barrage is completed.

A large work like the new barrage cannot be complete in a few months; at least two years should be allowed. Even in other countries where the facilities are greater this would be quick work.

J. H. MEDLICOTT,
Engineer in Charge.

[23958] No. 13.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 438.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 29, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 278 of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum enclosing a despatch from Mr. Safrastian in regard to the continued Kurdish excesses in the Mush Plain, the complaisant attitude of Tahir Pasha towards the Kurds.

You will observe that the Armenians are alarmed and are pressing for the recall of Tahir Pasha, and this would seem to prove the efficacy of not interfering in regard to a governor like his Excellency and of leaving it to the deputies, &c.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, June 21, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 7th instant and to previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, respecting the unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in the Mush Plain, where Tahir Pasha's presence seems to exercise an emboldening, rather than a restraining effect on Musa Bey and other Kurdish law-breakers.

It is to be noted that Mussa Bey appears to be devoting his attention, not only to the Armenian population, but also to such Kurdish villages as show unwillingness to lend him their support, and the attitude of Tahir Pasha, as described by Mr. Safrastian, would seem to confirm the most unfavourable rumours as to his Excellency's general behaviour.

In view, however, of the fact that comparative order was maintained in the Mush Plain under the energetic administration of Tahir Pasha's predecessor, Salih Pasha, and that the truth regarding the present situation must be known to the Minister of the Interior, it is difficult not to believe that the attitude of the Sublime Porte towards the Kurds is not weakening; and additional evidence in this direction is afforded by the virtual capitulation of the authorities to the fugitive Kurdish chiefs, who have returned to Ottoman territory as honoured guests. The alleged decision of the Government to compel Hussein Pasha of Patnotz and his compeers to pay their arrears of taxes and to return their ill-gained possessions to the rightful owners has not been carried out, nor is there now any question of depriving these brigands of their rank

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and privileges, although these have long ago been forfeited by failure to comply with the Government's exhortations to return from Persia within a specified lapse of time. And no better indication of the frame of mind of the chiefs (and of the Government) could be adduced than the fact that, on their refusal to pay the sanitary dues leviable on their crossing the Ottoman frontier, the authorities concerned received a hint from head-quarters not to press their claims.

Under these circumstances, and taking into consideration the notoriously pro-Kurdish sympathies of the Mushir, Ibrahim Pasha, it is only natural that the lawless elements among the Moslem population should again be acquiring a sense of their former impunity.

Fortunately, it would appear that many of the higher officials at Bitlis are opposed to the policy represented by Tahir Pasha, and yesterday I received a telegram from Mr. Safrastian to the effect that, in consequence of a change in the vali's attitude, the situation had undergone a decided change for the better. I am also informed that the Haidaranli tribe, to which Hussein Pasha belongs, view his return with displeasure and, far from being disposed to yield him their former allegiance, would welcome a more uncompromising disposition on the part of the Government towards him and his fellows.

For the present, however, the Armenians generally are much concerned by the news from Mush, and this afternoon I received a visit from the Gregorian Bishop of Erzeroum, who, after giving me an account of events in that district tallying substantially with Mr. Safrastian's report, expressed the apprehension lest the spirit of unrest should spread to the Kurds in Khinis and other regions in this vilayet, and, finally, begged me to press for the recall of Tahir Pasha from Bitlis. His Eminence added that the Vali of Erzeroum, actuated by the same motives, had some days ago addressed a report to Constantinople in that sense.

I replied that I was already aware of what was happening in Mush, but that it was for the Constitutional Government alone to decide as to whether any particular official was fit to occupy a given post.

The bishop then told me that he himself had urged the Government to consider the expediency of recalling Tahir Pasha, and, from a hint which the vali let fall in the course of a visit which he paid me shortly afterwards, I gathered that his Excellency had in fact taken action in the sense indicated by the Armenian bishop.

In view of the present situation in Mush I have telegraphed to Mr. Safrastian requesting him to delay his departure on leave of absence until the end of this month unless his private affairs are of a particularly urgent nature.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Bitlis, June 12, 1910.

Sir,

IN continuation of my reports of the 22nd April and the 19th May last respecting the conditions prevailing in the sanjak of Mush, I have the honour to state that the general state of affairs is growing worse and unsatisfactory only in consequence of the shameful policy followed by Tahir Pasha in Mush.

By my last-named despatch I had had the honour to inform you of the murder of four Kurds in the fighting at Dap in the Nahié of Khuyt. The case being one of the common law, the Director of Judicial Courts (Adelié Mudiri) here required to employ the necessary measures for arresting the murderers. Tahir Pasha, who was just on the point of starting for Mush on the 7th of last month, told the director he had nothing to do with the case, and that he himself (the vali) would settle the matter.

(Confidential.)

Veiyk Bey, the above-quoted director, mentioned this to me with bitter resentment against the vali thus seeing no change between his methods of old régime and the present one.

So Tahir Pasha left —— for Mush in such a mood of conciliating the murderers and hiding the truth. It is now more than a month that his Excellency is in

Mush, and the following events seem to be sufficient to show that his presence there has served only to push the matters ahead to the worst and to emphasise the bitterness and hatred already existing between the Armeno-Kurdish relations. I have heard from two of the Government highest officials here that Tahir Pasha has renewed the old system of sending lies to Constantinople in telegrams in cypher.

Musa Bey at work.—As stated above, Tahir Pasha seems to have resolved, before starting for Mush, to play his cherished game of conciliation and inactivity in Mush, thus bringing discredit upon the prestige of the law and the Government. No one realised what he told to Musa and Kassim Beys when the latter came to meet him followed by an armed band in the neighbourhood of Mush, except that he made remarks as to the impropriety of their being armed. But the Director of Judicial Courts and the Commandant of Gendarmerie here protested against the inaction of Tahir Pasha, and caused orders to be sent to him for despatching from Mush a detachment of soldiers to Khuyt to maintain order and capture the murderers. About a hundred soldiers are camping in Khuyt for the last three weeks, in the presence of whom, however, the Armenians are prevented by Musa Bey's Kurds to plough their land disputed by the latter; Sheikh Ismail of Knot (Khuyt) was killed ten days ago by Musa Bey's instigation, and the remaining sheikhs finding no safety for their lives have taken refuge in the mountains, the Mudir of the Khuyt Nahie is being compelled by Musa Bey to obey his orders and not interfere with his movements, otherwise threatening him with expulsion. In face of such criminal behaviour on the part of Musa Bey the soldiers are holding an attitude of strict neutrality as if they were sent there as mere spectators. This indifference displayed by soldiers can only be attributed to Tahir Pasha's policy and influence.

On the other side, the murder of the Armenian of Mushekshen (my report of the 19th May) continues to remain a riddle, two Armenians being imprisoned as suspected. Musa Bey continues to pay visits to several Kurdish chiefs in the plain of Mush, threatening the Armenians and spreading terror on his road.

At first it would seem as quite unreasonable to object to the free movements of anybody round the country. Considering, however, that Musa and his brother Kassim Bey are really to be held responsible for the latest murders and agitation in the sanjak of Mush, the echoes of which fill the press at Constantinople—that the authorities are not willing to fulfil their duty in cases of violation of the public security as they should, and treat the matters in a one-sided direction—under such circumstances it is in the best interests of the Empire that the central Government at Constantinople should consider the present policy of Tahir Pasha, which is not the right way to promote understanding and concord between the two peoples. It may, on the contrary, lead to a diametrically opposed result.

An Incident between Tahir Pasha and M. Karmen.—As I had the honour to telegraph yesterday to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, a rather serious difficulty has arisen within the last ten days between Tahir Pasha and M. Karmen, the leader of the Armenian Tashnaksutiun Committee at Mush. Since the vali's visit to Mush, M. Karmen and his committee never refrained from telegraphing to Constantinople the accurate news of the doings of Tahir Pasha regarding the agrarian and political questions existing between the two peoples. They have endeavoured to bring to the notice of the central Government the advisability of sending to Mush somebody more energetic and honest than Tahir Pasha; upon which Tahir Pasha raised a question as to the identity and the profession of M. Karmen. Then he tried to charge him—without any substantial complaint being made by the villagers themselves—with having extorted money by force from Armenian villages as contributions to the Armenian schools fund, but used for other illegitimate purposes. A lawsuit was brought against M. Karmen, who hid himself in Mush and endeavoured to get hold of an alleged secret correspondence exchanged between the vali and Musa Bey. One of the Armenian quarters in Mush was reported two days ago as being somewhat exceptionally patrolled by soldiers.

The whole affair is of the most regrettable nature. However blameworthy M. Karmen may have been in this question most of the responsibility lies with Tahir Pasha, who, acting probably under evil influences, thinks to have effected a feat by persecuting a liberal like Karmen, who, even in the opinion of some Turkish officials, is much more honest and faithful an Ottoman and understands better the broader interests of the country than Tahir Pasha himself. If anybody is to be persecuted and punished for his misdeeds it is certainly not Karmen or alike, but reactionary brigands like Musa Bey and Haji Nedjmeddine Effendi of Bitlis, both intimate friends to Tahir Pasha.

Plunder of Cattle from Koshtian.—Five days ago some thirty cattle were carried off from the Armenian village of Koshtian, in Akhlat; some villagers followed the robbers and discovered that the plunder was taken to Khevner, Musa Bey's village in the plain of Mush. Further enquiry has proved that the robbery has been committed by the smallest brother of Musa Bey. The authorities have been unable so far to find out the stolen cattle, and a week's time is allowed to Musa Bey to restore the cattle to the Armenians of Koshtian.

There seems to be hardly any need of further comment as regards the meaning for reactionary Kurds of the presence of Tahir Pasha as Governor-General at Bitlis. Some intelligent military officers and civil officials are by degrees raising their voice in protest against the dangerous and unwise administration of Tahir Pasha, on the other hand all reactionary leaders and ignorant classes get more and more emboldened on the assumption that their deputies in the Parliament are managing to make their desires listened to by the Minister of the Interior in behalf of Tahir Pasha.

Two Armenians Killed in Frank-Norshen in Mush.—At the last moment I received a letter from the Armenian Bishop of Mush, dated the 8th of this month. His Beatitude states in this letter that the day before two Armenians were killed in Frank-Norshen, two hours from Mush, while they were leading their sheep to graze in the fields. The criminals have been three Kurds, and the murdered Armenians have been quite defenceless. A sharp protest has been lodged with Tahir Pasha for these two last murders, but up to the moment of the writing the criminals were not discovered.

His Beatitude further describes the situation prevailing in Mush as quite hopeless, if Tahir Pasha is not removed from there; or if he does not take strong measures to maint in order and the prestige of the constitutional Government.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[24253] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July 4, 1910.*

LYNCH concession.

Please see my telegram No. 123 of the 29th June and your telegram No. 158 of the 1st July.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day, with reference to the conversation I had with him and which I reported to you in my above-mentioned telegram, that the Minister of Public Works had been instructed by the Grand Vizier, after consultation with the latter, to enter into a discussion of the whole matter with Lynch's Constantinople agent. His Excellency said that the chief difficulty consisted in the monopoly, and that this stood in the way of obtaining Parliament's consent to the fusion scheme.

Rifaat Pasha told me that none of the permits recently applied for at Bagdad would be granted until it was seen whether this discussion led to anything. This he told me privately and confidentially.

In reply to the question asked in your above-mentioned telegram, the objections we are now raising to the grant of permits to natives for purposes of navigation would apply equally to Lynch's case in the event of the latter seeking to run a steamer on the Euphrates.

It seems that what the Ottoman Government really wish is that, apart from Lynch's existing rights on the Tigris, Ottoman subjects only should enjoy rights of navigation on the two rivers. In this way the only means Lynch would have of running a steamer on the river would be by entering into a private arrangement with Ottoman subjects and by running the steamer under Ottoman disguise. It is not now likely that the Porte and the Parliament will consider that the old claims of 1836 and 1860 entitle Lynch to run steamers on the Euphrates.

I will ascertain the outcome of the Minister of Public Works' discussion with Lynch's agent and inform you of the result.

[24366] No. 15.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 5, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of two telegrams which have just been exchanged between our agents in Bussorah and ourselves on the subject of an attempt on the part of the Governor of Bussorah to prevent the departure for Bagdad of our new steamer, the "Julnar."

When, after protracted negotiations with the Turkish Government, we obtained the right to run a third steamer on the Tigris, no limitation was placed upon our old-established right to keep a steamer in reserve for the purpose of taking the place of any steamer which it might be necessary to take off the run temporarily. We are therefore making no fresh departure in putting on the new steamer and placing the "Blosse Lynch," as hitherto, in reserve. The action of the Governor of Bussorah would seem to be purely arbitrary.

We should be obliged if you would kindly communicate this information by telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, in order that the necessary instructions may be sent to the local authorities at Bussorah to prevent any recurrence of arbitrary action of this nature.

By direction of my board, I have the honour to enclose some photographs of our new steamer, the "Julnar," and I should feel obliged if, when you have done with them, you would kindly bring them to the notice of the proper department of the India Office, as this is one of the steamers employed in carrying the British and Indian mails.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

(Telegraphic.) *Bussorah, July 4, 1910.*

THE Governor of Bussorah informs us by letter through the British consul at Bussorah if the "Blosse Lynch," after being withdrawn, should hereafter be put on the run in place of another steamer temporarily withdrawn, she will immediately be stopped. I therefore put this point on record clearly at the present time for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's information, and request you to inform Lynch, Bussorah, that the "Blosse Lynch" will not hereafter be able to move in this place upon no consideration whatever. The Governor of Bussorah requires following information before departure of the "Julnar" from Bussorah: What is the cargo capacity and horse-power of both the "Julnar" and "Blosse Lynch," which please inform us. We are waiting instructions how to act. Meantime, the "Julnar" will be detained by us. Telegraph as soon as possible.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

(Telegraphic.) *July 5, 1910.*

PLACE the "Julnar" with cargo on Bagdad; run immediately unless prevented in writing. If the British consul at Bussorah considers advisable, but not otherwise, inform the Governor of Bussorah as matter of courtesy, but not of right, that cargo capacity of the "Julnar," excluding coal, is 440 tons at 60-inch draught and 1,000 horse-power. Analogous particulars of the "Blosse Lynch" 275 tons and 350 horse-power. Point out to the British consul at Bussorah that supplying these figures means giving important information to trade rivals. For your private information only, we beg to inform you that of course we will employ the "Blosse Lynch" as reserve steamer as hitherto. We are taking up the "Blosse Lynch" question with the Foreign Office.

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[24406] No. 16.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 6, 1910.

Sir,

BY direction of my board I enclose a memorandum embodying our views upon the present phase of the steamer question on the Euphrates and Tigris.

My board feel that the situation is an extremely serious one, and they would beg you to bring this memorandum to the personal attention of the Secretary of State.

I have, &c.

H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 16.

Memorandum respecting the Euphrates and Tigris Steamer Amalgamation.

NO effect having yet been given by the Turkish Government to the resolution passed by the Chamber in December last, empowering the Cabinet to conclude the amalgamation scheme provided it placed no financial burden upon the Turkish budget, and in view of the fact that other vested interests on the Euphrates and Tigris are in process of being created, it becomes necessary to review and to realise the present situation.

The Turkish Cabinet appear to be resolved to disregard the resolution of the Chamber, and to have adopted the standpoint taken up by the German Ambassador in Constantinople before the close of last year in conversation with our representative in Constantinople, Colonel Picot, that no monopoly of navigation ought to be permitted. It is, however, easy to demonstrate that this is a German rather than a Turkish standpoint, and that, though Germany might no doubt expect to gain by its acceptance, the Turkish Government and Ottoman interests would certainly suffer.

The amalgamation scheme is not in the nature of a monopoly pure and simple. It contemplates among other things the improvement of the existing navigation as well as its extension to Meskene on the Euphrates and Mosul on the Tigris, extensions which the Turkish Government itself proposed. These features of the scheme have necessitated guarantees in the nature of exclusive rights for steam navigation. Moreover, the exclusive portion of the rights are terminable at certain periods by the will of the Turkish Government.

These provisions, of which the effect would be to furnish the requisite security for capital to be employed in developing the enterprise, would, by improving and opening up the navigation, confer substantial boons upon a very large area of the Ottoman Empire.

If Ottoman subjects would in this way greatly benefit by its adoption, the direct interests of the Turkish Government in the navigation of the rivers would also be safeguarded and promoted. At present traffic on the river is equally divided between the British company and the Turkish Government steamers. If the Turkish Cabinet decides against exclusive rights, their existing fleet of steamers and the revenues which they derive from their use will become of little or no value. Other steamers will appear upon the river like mushrooms, and, while the capital employed in these competing steamers would naturally be inapplicable to works of development, the steamers themselves would run the present Turkish steamers off the river.

On the other hand, German capital would be given an opening on the river. The fact, too, that the Euphrates and Upper Tigris would be likely to remain in their present most unsatisfactory condition would prevent the Bagdad Railway from being exposed to serious competition on the part of cheap water carriage on the Euphrates and Tigris.

The question of what measures should be adopted to safeguard British interests and to save the Turkish Cabinet from the consequences of their present policy, which they would not appear to realise as clearly as they were realised by Hilmi Pasha, is of course a question for His Majesty's Government. The Minister of Finance, David Bey, is shortly to arrive in London, and his visit offers a favourable opportunity for its discussion. It may be suggested, however, that if the Minister were given clearly to understand that British assistance in economic questions, including the 4 per cent.

increase in the customs question, could not be expected until a satisfactory issue had been given to the navigation question, this might at least have the effect of preventing the existing Cabinet from giving away the whole position on the rivers by allowing other vested interests to grow up upon them before a final solution has been arrived at.

It is even probable that, in spite of the present tendencies of the Turkish Cabinet, a satisfactory solution would be found by the Minister of Finance, provided that he were made to feel that the British Government had made up their minds to secure such a solution.

[24407] No. 17.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 6, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to our letters of the 5th instant and of to-day on the subject of the amalgamation of the steamer interests on the Tigris, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a telegram which we have just received from our representative in Constantinople under yesterday's date. This communication makes it clear that the Turkish Cabinet have decided to adopt a definitely hostile attitude towards the proposals which have so long been under negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the Porte.

I have, &c.

H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 17.

Telegram from Constantinople received by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

July 5, 1910.

WE have seen the Minister of Public Works. He stated that the Council of Ministers have formally notified their decision to refuse concession for fusion scheme. The Turkish Government has decided simply to grant permits for navigation to Ottoman subjects only, declining any responsibility for the stoppage of navigation by irrigation works. Replying to a question of mine, he stated that the Turkish Government would refuse to grant a permit for formation of an Ottoman Company under the Turkish flag to the British interests which I represent.

[24370] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 191.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 8, 1910.

THE Rev. W. A. Wigram, the head of the "Archbishop's Mission to the Assyrian Christians," who had been recommended to me by the Archbishop of Canterbury, called at this department on the 30th instant, and was received by Mr. Mallet.

He said that the head-quarters of the mission had hitherto been at Van, but that they were about to be moved to the near vicinity of Mosul. The position held by the mission in that neighbourhood was, he said, very remarkable; they were regarded with confidence and respect by all the ancient Christian churches with head-quarters in that country, and, quite apart from religion, their presence had undoubtedly done much for British prestige.

They were practically the only educational agency of the Protestant Christian churches, and had some flourishing schools.

The object of Mr. Wigram's visit was to draw attention to the question of the Chaldean converts to the Nestorian Church, with the details of whose case your Excellency's reports have made me familiar. He asked Mr. Mallet whether His Majesty's Government would not use their influence with a view to have instructions sent to the Vali of Mosul to change his attitude in this matter and grant the registration desired by the converts, which, in view of the fact that liberty of

conscience was guaranteed under the new Turkish constitution, he had no right to refuse. He said that British prestige was suffering, and that the transfer of Mr. Young to another post had been construed as a disapproval of his unofficial intervention in the matter, and as a triumph for the Chaldean party.

Mr. Wigram was informed that Mr. Young's unofficial and friendly endeavours to arrange the matter had not been disapproved, but that your Excellency had been instructed to inform him that he should avoid taking any official action tending to involve him in that or any other religious quarrel. Mr. Wigram pressed that Mr. Greig should, at any rate, be instructed to continue the unofficial and friendly endeavours of his predecessor. He also remarked that it would be inexpedient to appoint a Roman Catholic consul to Mosul, as had once been done at Van.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22860] No. 19.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 8, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd ultimo relative to irrigation in Mesopotamia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, from the reports received on the subject from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the details of the scheme now under the consideration of the Turkish Government does not appear, so far as it is settled, to correspond with those given in your letter. It is, moreover, understood that the scheme is as yet by no means complete, and that further modifications of it may be expected.

Sir E. Grey therefore considers that it is too early to foresee what effect the scheme, if it is ever carried out, will have on the supply of water required for the navigation of the rivers.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[24651] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 192.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1910.

COLONEL PICOT called at this department on the 2nd instant and discussed with Mr. Mallet the present situation of the scheme for the fusion of the navigation interests on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

He said that Mr. Lynch had heard that the Porte were about to grant a permit to a well-known Turkish family to place two steamers on the Tigris, and that if this rumour proved true the fusion could never take place.

He asked whether His Majesty's Government could not instruct your Excellency to press the Porte to fulfil their obligations, taking your stand on the resolution passed by the Ottoman Parliament last December, and expressed the opinion that without such support the scheme would certainly fail.

Mr. Mallet informed Colonel Picot of the action which your Excellency reported in your telegram No. 123 of the 29th ultimo, and said that I expected a further report shortly, but he was not satisfied, and enquired whether His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the fusion scheme had altered.

Mr. Mallet replied that the completion of the negotiation would be viewed with favour, but pointed out that owing to its monopolistic character a great deal of opposition had been aroused, and expressed a doubt whether His Majesty's Government were prepared to press the Turkish Government very persistently in the matter, owing to the evident unpopularity of the scheme, and to the possibility of endangering larger interests by such action. He also assured Colonel Picot that your Excellency was quite alive to the situation, and that it was not necessary to furnish you with the further instructions which he had urged should be sent to you.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24854] No. 21.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 448.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 5, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the uneasiness which prevails among the Christian and foreign population in that town at the present moment.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Vice-Consul Rawlins to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Adana, June* 23, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report that there is a certain feeling of unrest throughout this district, as the Christian, and more especially the Greek, population has become very nervous, and imagine that rioting, or even massacre, may begin at any moment. I venture to believe that this is due in great part to the rumours that are being spread abroad as to the strained relations between Turkey and Greece on account of the Cretan difficulty.

Meetings of protest against Crete, Greece, and the action of the Powers have been held throughout the Empire, and they have had a disturbing effect. Last week Mersina was thrown into a great state of alarm owing to the report that a secret meeting, under the auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress, had been held and a decision arrived at to make an attack on the Christians and foreigners in general, and more particularly the Greeks, on the following Friday.

This plot was supposed to have been betrayed by two certain persons, and I heard that some of the Mersina consuls and consular agents had telegraphed to their respective embassies and asked for the protection of some war-ships.

The British vice-consul at Mersina informed me of all this, but I considered it more prudent not to take action too hurriedly in the matter, and therefore refrained from sending any telegram, preferring rather to wait for more definite news.

I had, however, the opportunity of seeing Mr. Kenn personally, and we decided that he should send in an official account of the situation at Mersina. This report has presumably reached you by now.

Here in Adana there cannot be said to be any open danger at the present moment, and I am to a certain extent diffident about making mention of the present feeling of alarm, as I am unwilling to make matters be thought to be worse than they really are.

Owing, however, to the continuance of unpleasant rumours, and to the fact that the majority of the Christian and Greek population of this town are really frightened, it is, in my humble opinion, only right that I should report upon this state of unrest, although I am far from wishing to exaggerate the present danger.

In a conversation which I had with my German colleague yesterday the latter remarked that anyone who had had experience in Turkey would readily admit that so long as the central Government had made up its mind to keep things quiet in the provinces no disorder would ever take place at Adana or anywhere else; on the other hand, if the central Government either purposely or through weakness let it be shown that it was not going to take up any definite stand in the matter, either one way or the other, then trouble might break out at any moment. All this is very true, and the question as to the relative importance and meaning of the present state of alarm here depends entirely upon the policy of Constantinople, and also, I take it, on the policy of the party of Union and Progress.

On two occasions I have had it reported to me that a drunken man has been heard cursing the Europeans openly in front of one of the large cafés here, and on another occasion a man shouted out some disparaging remarks about Great Britain and the British flag.

Several Greeks have also been insulted in the streets, and my honorary dragoman, Mr. C. Trypani, has informed me that of late he has often heard threats spoken against the Greeks and Europe in general. With regard to all this, I beg to state that I have so

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far] refrained from making any specific complaint to the local authorities, and have tried to preserve a most cordial attitude towards them, but I have been naturally trying to find out the real import of all these rumours, threats, and meetings.

In the course of a visit which I made the other day to the deftardar, I mentioned having heard of several rather disturbing reports, but expressed myself as unwilling to believe them; still I let it be understood that I was alive as to the facts of the present situation, and finished by uttering the hope that the Government would speedily see a way to setting everyone's fears at rest, so that this district might continue on its way of progress untrammelled by these political alarms.

To conclude, I would most humbly beg to request that, if you see fit, I may be informed as to his Excellency Djemal Bey's doings during his recent sojourn in Constantinople along with any opinions that may have been formed there as to his future plans and political leanings. I only beg to make this request as such information would be of great help to me in my future dealings with his Excellency on his return, and I should also be able to gauge more accurately the future intentions of the local Government in this district. Besides, the more I know of his Excellency and the esteem in which he is held by the central Government, the better should I be able to estimate the degree of confidence, or otherwise, that could be placed in the actions and assurances of the local Government.

I have, &c.
E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[24859] No. 22.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 453.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 5, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 9th May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, reporting further on the pretensions of Shoikh Said Idrisse.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Jeddah, June 18, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 26th March and Vice-Consul Dr. Richardson's No. 8 of the 4th April, 1910, showing that the Ottoman Government has abandoned to Sheikh Idrisse a part of the rights of sovereignty over Assyr, and has much diminished its military force in that province, I have the honour to report that the sheikh lately sent some men into Lith, a village on the Hejaz coast, to collect a tax of one-fortieth on cattle and sheep, which tax has hitherto gone to the grand shereef. The latter, hearing of this, sent one of the shereefs from Mecca with some shereefian guards, on whose arrival Sheikh Idrisse's emissaries withdrew without having collected any tax.

I hear that the people of Lith are for the present not paying it to the grand shereef either, but are awaiting the result.

Another report which has just reached me, showing the pretensions of Shoikh Idrisse, is that two large Hejaz tribes named Gamid and Zahran to the south-east of Mecca, who are always hitherto counted as under the grand shereef, have just submitted to the sheikh.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[24865] No. 23.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 459.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 6, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Diarbekir, reporting on his recent tour in his vice-consular district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, June 18, 1910.*

REFERRING to my despatch No. 19 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report for your Excellency's information that, in addition to the seventy-five Yezidis, from fifteen to twenty Christians have been imprisoned at Nissebin.

Situation in Midiat and Nissebin.—On the 16th instant I drew the vali's attention to the situation created in Midiat and Nissebin. He admitted that many Yezidis and Christians had been arrested on the ground that they were engaged in a propaganda to convert the Yezidis to Christianity. I expressed my surprise at his permitting such a flagrant violation of the constitution, and urged on him the necessity of taking measures to secure the speedy release of those against whom there was no charge of brigandage. This he could not see his way to do, but he promised to telegraph to the judicial inspectors at present at Mardin, instructing them to make an enquiry. He shared my views on the incapacity of the officials at Midiat, and pointed out that the kaimakam had been changed and that the Mal Mudir was about to be removed. I have dwelt at some length on this affair, as it seems desirable that the attention of the central Government should be directed to it.

Plundered Kurdish Village.—I have the honour to report further as follows on my recent tour through the Bisheri, Midiat, and Mardin districts. At Shkefta, a village on the left bank of the Tigris, and head-quarters of the Ramun Kurds, an appeal was made to me on behalf of the two sons of the late chief, Ibrahim Agha. It appears that some eight months ago Ibrahim Agha failed to answer with sufficient promptitude an invitation to proceed to Diarbekir, and there to hold himself at the disposition of the authorities. His village was therefore attacked and plundered by troops and Bashi-Bazouks; he himself was killed, and his two sons surrendered some time later. Before the restoration of the constitution Shkefta was a nest of robbers, who plundered all "keleks" (rafts) refusing to pay toll, an exception being made, however, in the case of foreigners. The village interested me, as showing that the methods of the present régime in punishing disobedience to its orders differ little from those of its predecessor. The chief's house overlooking the village had been plundered and burnt, nor did any house in the village that would burn escape this fate. Fortunately, most of the houses were fireproof, being built of mud or stone, or being cave dwellings hollowed out in the face of the cliff.

Feeling of Population towards Government.—Throughout the districts traversed I was astonished at the intensity of the feeling of the population, both Christian and Moslem, against the Government. The present régime has succeeded in making itself detested. "Hurriet" (liberty), as the constitution is designated, is execrated. This feeling is due in a large measure to the worthlessness of many of the local officials. These officials are said to be as venal as their predecessors, with the added disadvantage from the inhabitants' point of view, that they frequently fail to carry out their part of the bargain. Corruption is now accompanied by a fear of detection on the part of the official. It is to be hoped that this fear will develop into a fixed habit of refusal to accept bribes, and that the inhabitants on their part will become accustomed to insist on their business being attended to without the traditional bakhshesh. At Simm, the headman of the village (a Moslem) complained bitterly of the venality and incapacity of the Kaimakam of Bisheri, whose immediate predecessor was removed at the instance of this vice-consulate. The removal of an undesirable official does not always mean an improvement.

Kurdish Movement.—In the Bisheri district the Christians expressed themselves as

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certain that some movement was on foot among the Kurds, indicating a certain Sheikh Khalid, of Kanirawal, as leader. They were convinced of the existence of Kurd clubs, but were unable to give me any specific instances of the activity of these clubs or of oppression or outrage. In various villages the Moslem headmen would inform me that such an Agha was reactionary, but it is impossible to attach much weight to such statements, which I discovered were usually prompted by tribal jealousies. The Kurds in general found fault with the Government for arresting good and bad chiefs without making any attempt at discrimination. They invariably denied the existence of any secret organisation. From what I saw and heard, I am forced to the conclusion that the Kurds of this vilayet are too divided among themselves to unite in a common movement against the Government, however much they may dislike it. An anti-Christian campaign of plunder is another matter, but I do not think that there is any real danger of the Kurds engaging in such a campaign unless assured beforehand of official approval.

Proposed Measures for Settling the Cheul.—The measures for settling the Cheul recommended by the General Council (my despatch No. 12 of the 11th April) are regarded with little favour at Mardin. The view is generally held that the Government would be ill-advised to interfere with the migrations of the nomadic tribes.

Visit of German Engineers in 1909.—I was informed at Mardin that three German engineers had spent some months surveying the Cheul during the spring of 1909, and had attracted interest by the unlimited supplies of money which they appeared to have at their disposal. These engineers were presumably surveying the route of the Bagdad Railway.

Opening for Machinery.—Whenever an opportunity presented itself, I discussed the advantages to be obtained by the introduction of modern agricultural implements and machinery. Most of the local landowners objected that until railways, or at least roads, had been constructed, the importation of machinery was impracticable. The most intelligent of these men seemed quite satisfied to continue in the old way. The experience of Nicullah, of Altoun Akar, who two years ago introduced some threshing machines, which he has never succeeded in working, is certainly not encouraging. On the other hand, a Moslem millowner of Mardin equipped his mill with a British oil engine and plant which he purchased in Aleppo about a year ago. His venture has been a complete success, but his example has not been imitated. It has been suggested by my predecessors that a British firm, or group of firms interested in machinery, would be well advised to send an agent to this vilayet with power to book orders, and possessed of sufficient technical knowledge to explain the working of any machinery that might be ordered. I would add that, unless British firms see to it that they are first in the market, they may find it difficult to obtain a footing later on when the manufactures of other countries have become familiar. At present an opening exists, and the market may be secured by any firm possessed of the necessary enterprise and prepared to nurse the market for a year or two at the outset.

Harvest Prospects.—It must be placed to the credit of the new régime that public security has been established and that brigandage is no longer tolerated. One result of this change is that this year's sowings of cereals have been on a considerably larger scale than usual. The crop of barley is good and is now being reaped. The wheat crop of some villages in the Bishori district has not come up to expectations owing to the depredations of an insect which ate through the young stalks. Between Mardin and Midiat I saw swarms of locusts, which the villagers were making frantic efforts to frighten away by beating drums and shouting. Little real damage had been done by the locusts, which it was hoped would be driven south by the north wind. Although the optimistic forecasts of spring may not be fully realised, it is now beyond doubt that this year's harvest will be much above the average.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[24866] No. 24.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July 11.*)

(No. 460.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 6, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatches No. 396 of the 28th May, 1909, and No. 646 of the 9th August, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His

Majesty's consul at Bussorah in regard to the negotiations for transfer of the Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fedaghia.

It would seem very dangerous for us to interfere in the matter.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Bussorah, June 6, 1910.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 9th August, 1909, on the subject of the transfer of the Sheikh of Koweit's land at Fedaghia, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to the British Resident at Bushire in reply to his enquiries, together with a copy of a telegram communicated to me by His Majesty's acting consul at Mohammerah on the same subject.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

Consul Crow to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Bussorah, June 6, 1910.*

IN reply to your letter of the 22nd May last on the subject of the registration of Sheikh Mubarek's property at Fedaghia, I have the honour to state that, according to information I have received here, orders were sent by the Sublime Porte to the effect that Sheikh Mubarek may transfer his property in the names of his four sons, as he asked in Moharrem Bey's time, provided he registers them as Ottoman subjects.

I understand Sheikh Mubarek has on many occasions applied to have the land transferred in the names of his sons, but that he does not agree to take out teskerehs of Ottoman nationality for them, and on his recent visit to Bussorah, on the 31st May last, he proposed to the vali to transfer the land to one or several of his womenfolk. The vali, however, I am told, said he could not do this, as it was not in accordance with the instructions he had received, and he suggested that, if Mubarek wanted it done, he should make a fresh application to that effect, which the vali professed himself willing to forward to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

Acting Consul Wilson to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 552.)
(Telegraphic.) *Mohammerah, June 3, 1910.*

SHEIKH of Koweit left to-day for Koweit. I am told by Sheikh Khazal that he has failed in his object—to obtain registration from the vali for his Fedaghia lands—for which he has been working, and has now announced his intention of abandoning all further advances towards Turks or vali. He has written you a long letter to-day, giving details.

Sheikh Mohammerah expresses fear that Turks may now begin to worry Koweit Sheikh like himself.

24867] No. 25.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July 11.*)

(No. 461.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 6, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatches Nos. 172 and 177 of the 20th and 27th ultimo respectively, inclosing statements concerning the

prohibition of the use of diving machines in the Turkish sponge fisheries, and calling for a report in the matter.

It appears that, in fact, after permits had been issued for the use of diving machines, a counter-order was published forbidding their employment, the object being to prevent the destruction of the sponge beds, a measure which was found necessary a few years ago in Egyptian waters.

The Council of State also wished to draw up regulations, and to provide for suitable supervision over the fishing before the diving machines were again brought into use. This decision of the council, which was only that of a minority, was approved by a Grand Vizierial rescript, and application was made to the Public Debt for the preparation of the desired regulations. The council on being approached pointed out that permits had already been issued and paid for, and if the right to use the machines were now withdrawn, it would be necessary to refund the sums paid for permits, which would occasion a considerable loss—some £T. 1,200 to the Debt; it was also observed that the fishers would continue to use the machines whether they had permits or not. They replied, therefore, to the Council of State in this sense, inviting them to authorise the use of the machines in conformity with their decree of the 23rd July, 1908, and they adduced the arguments which they had on several previous occasions used, that the machines do not contribute to the destruction of the beds, because the divers, having more time at their disposal at the bottom of the sea, are enabled to collect the sponges with greater liberty and discretion than the ordinary naked diver. At the same time, they gave directions that regulations should be elaborated without delay in order to put an end to the incessant discussions to which the question gives rise.

I hear that the strange decision of a minority of the Council of State to suspend the use of machines was due to an intrigue started by certain Greeks.

I shall have the honour to inform you of any further developments in this matter.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[24868] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 462.) *Constantinople, July 6, 1910.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of the amended Turkish law governing concessions in this country as finally approved and passed by the Chamber.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Draft Turkish Concessions Law.

ARTICLE 1er. Les concessions ayant trait aux travaux d'utilité publique seront accordées directement par le pouvoir exécutif, à l'exception—

1. Des concessions qui impliquent tant pour le présent que pour le futur, et de n'importe quelle façon, la garantie financière du Gouvernement ou l'affectation des biens et des revenus publics.
2. De celles qui se rapportent aux services publics prévus par le budget.
3. Des concessions qui jouissent d'exemptions non prévues par la présente loi.
4. De celles qui entraînent la modification ou la restriction des lois en vigueur.
5. Des concessions non comprises dans la catégorie de celles que les autorités locales auront le droit d'accorder, conformément aux prévisions des lois qui seront instituées par rapport à l'organisation des municipalités des vilayets.

Art. 2. L'achat, ou l'occupation et la cession provisoire de toute propriété immobilière et foncière dont la possession ou l'utilisation serait nécessaire pour la concession, seront régis par les règles suivantes:—

Toute propriété immobilière et foncière dont l'achat serait nécessaire pour l'exécution des travaux concédés et de tout ce qui en dépendrait, sera achetée, au cas

où le concessionnaire ne pourrait s'entendre avec le propriétaire, conformément aux prévisions de la loi sur l'expropriation et le prix d'achat ainsi que les frais seront réglés par le concessionnaire.

Pendant la durée de la concession, sur la proposition du concessionnaire et l'approbation du département compétent, les terres, carrières de pierres et de ballast dont l'occupation provisoire serait nécessaire seront livrées par les autorités locales au concessionnaires contre paiement par ce dernier de l'indemnité fixée sur la base de l'estimation appliquée en matière d'expropriation en faveur du propriétaire.

Les terres "miri" abandonnées qui seraient nécessaires pour l'exécution des travaux concédés et de qui en dépendrait, pourront être livrées gratis au concessionnaire jusqu'à l'expiration du terme de la concession. De même les dites terres qui devront être provisoirement occupées pendant les travaux ainsi que les carrières de pierres et de ballast qui s'y trouveraient pourront si le Gouvernement l'estime nécessaire être affectées gratis au concessionnaire.

Art. 3. Jusqu'au terme de la concession les revenus, le fonds de réserve, les immeubles, et les terrains nécessaires à des travaux pourront être exemptés des impôts; quant aux actions et aux obligations elles pourront être exemptés de tout impôt et taxe à l'exception du droit de timbre.

Contre certains avantages assurés par le concessionnaire, on pourra aussi lui accorder le service gratis des voies télégraphiques du Gouvernement. Au cas où le contrat ne contiendrait pas de provisions spéciales l'exemption ne s'entendra exclusivement qu'aux impôts gouvernementaux nouveaux ou augmentés.

Art. 4. Le Gouvernement s'il le juge nécessaire pourra lors de la préparation de la convention stipuler qu'à l'expiration du terme de la concession, il pourra acheter tout le matériel et les biens meubles se rapportant à l'exploitation.

A l'expiration des termes fixés par les conventions des concessions, le Gouvernement se réserve le droit d'achat.

Art. 5. Pour les travaux non prévus par le cahier des charges et que le concessionnaire exécutera soit nouvellement soit par adjonction aux travaux déjà faits conformément à une autorisation du département compétent, au maximum durant les quinze dernières années de la concession, et qui existeront lors de l'expiration de ladite concession, le Gouvernement pourra stipuler dans la convention lors de sa préparation, qu'une indemnité pourra être accordée au concessionnaire, et qu'elle sera équivalente aux frais que l'on déclarera et prouvera avoir encourus, moins un quinzième, pour chaque année écoulée à partir de l'achèvement des travaux en question.

Art. 6. On pourra accorder la franchise douanière pour le matériel et l'outillage que le concessionnaire recevra de l'étranger, et qui seront destinés à la constitution première des travaux ou à leur extension.

Art. 7. Les concessions accordées doivent être absolument transférées dans les délais prévus dans leurs conventions et cahier des charges à des sociétés anonymes constituées sous l'empire des lois et règlements ottomans.

Art. 8. Dans les affaires relatives aux concessions, le nombre et les attributions des employés techniques et du personnel administratif, ainsi que des contre-maîtres et des ouvriers qui pourront être étrangers, seront fixés.

Art. 9. Les lois relatives aux concessions présentées à la Chambre et au Sénat, examinées avec les conventions et les autres pièces y annexées, et sont acceptées, rejetées, ou retournées, avec un exposé des motifs, pour être modifiées, conformément à la décision qui sera prise à propos de l'ensemble des documents.

Art. 10. Le Gouvernement central continuera, comme par le passé, à s'occuper des concessions qui, aux termes des lois qui seront instituées par rapport à l'organisation des municipalités et des vilayets, devront être du ressort des gouvernements locaux, et jusqu'à la publication des lois susmentionnées.

Art. 11. Le pouvoir exécutif est autorisé à établir par un règlement spécial les formalités qui devront être accomplies relativement aux concessions à accorder.

Art. 12. La présente loi n'aura pas d'effet sur les mines, les minières, et les carrières de pierres réglementés par des lois spéciales, ainsi que sur les concessions relatives aux affaires commerciales, agricoles, industrielles, et financières.

Art. 13. Le Cabinet est chargé de l'exécution de la présente loi.

[24870] No. 27.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 404.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 5, 1910.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 393 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Sir William Willcocks left Constantinople at the end of last month for Cairo, where he will make various studies for the continuation of his works, stopping there some two months. He expects to be back at Bagdad by the 20th September. Before leaving he telegraphed to Mr. Medlicott, his representative at Bagdad, advising him to consult the Vali Nazim Pasha in everything, so that he might think he were directing the works. The Ministry of Public Works thought he might be very useful, instead of obstructive, if he were humoured. Mr. Medlicott replied that the Pasha was willing to pay off all obligations and to supply money for the works as required. He approved the purchase of a dredger for the purpose of keeping the Euphrates open to navigation, which Mr. Medlicott thought necessary (this evidently refers to the navigation by Aga Jaffar's steamers—see my despatch No. 401 of the 21st June—by which the material for the irrigation works is conveyed up the Hindieh), and left it to Sir William Willcocks to order it.

Mr. Lorimer informs me that this favourable turn of affairs is due to his private intervention, but he recommends great caution, and very careful control of expenditure at Constantinople pending the result of an expert enquiry, which he continues strongly to recommend.

It cannot now be very many days before I receive his despatches on the subject, when I shall lose no time in forwarding them to you. I have already reported reasons for his recommendation in my despatch No. 385 of the 17th ultimo.

Mr. Medlicott is anxious to resign, for he states that present conditions render progress impossible. Sir W. Willcocks was in a disheartened state when he left here. Despite all his endeavours, he could get nothing more than fair words and promises. He was told he would be given £ T. 190,000, but the money is not yet forthcoming.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[24406] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 195.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1910.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of three letters from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, together with my reply thereto, on the subject of the company's navigation interests on the rivers of Mesopotamia.*

With reference to the letter of the 5th instant, I feel that a sharp distinction should be drawn between a refusal to grant a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic rights of navigation, and, on the other hand, an attempt to whittle down the existing rights of the company or to exclude them from the river. From the correspondence which passed in 1907, when the company acquired the right to place a third vessel on the rivers, it does not appear that they forfeited that of keeping a vessel in reserve, and I therefore authorise your Excellency to make a representation to the Porte in this sense if and when you may think fit to do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24406] No. 29.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1910.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your three letters of the 5th and 6th instant—(1) complaining of action

* Nos. 15, 16, 17, and 29.

threatened by the Vali of Bussorah with regard to your steam-boats "Blosse Lynch" and "Julnar"; (2) forwarding a telegram from your representative at Constantinople regarding the hostility of the Turkish Government towards the fusion scheme; and (3) enclosing a memorandum on the present situation of the whole question of navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

With regard to 2 and 3, I am to inform you that apprehension as to the effects of the monopolistic or exclusive features of the fusion scheme has been expressed to him in quarters quite independent of the Turkish Government, and that he therefore considers it impracticable now to induce the Turkish Parliament to accept the scheme. He therefore considers it at present advisable that His Majesty's Government should concentrate their efforts on safeguarding the interests to which your company are entitled in virtue of the rights conceded to them in the past.

I am to inform you that the question will be mentioned to the Turkish Minister of Finance on the occasion of his approaching visit to this country.

I am to add that copies of your three letters have been forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and, with reference to that relating to the threats of the vali with regard to your steam-boat, the "Julnar," to state that Sir G. Lowther has been informed that in the view of His Majesty's Government your company, in acquiring in 1907 the right to place a third vessel on the river, did not forfeit that of keeping a vessel in reserve. His Excellency has therefore been authorised to make a representation to the Turkish Government in this sense if and when he thinks fit to do so.

The photographs of the "Julnar" enclosed in your letter of the 5th instant have, in accordance with your request, been forwarded to the India Office with the necessary explanations.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[25466] No. 30.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 14.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 13, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to our letter of the 5th instant, regarding the action of the Vali of Bussorah in the matter of our reserve steamer, I have the honour to inform you that our new steamer, the "Julnar," was dispatched from Bussorah on the 9th instant for Bagdad, and the "Blosse Lynch" retained at Bussorah as reserve steamer.

Our agent at Bussorah telegraphs that the Vali now explains his statement—that the "Blosse Lynch" will not be allowed to move on any account in "this place"—as meaning that the "Blosse Lynch" will not be allowed on either the Euphrates or Tigris above Gurnah.

It seems, then, the present contention of the vali of Bussorah is that we have no right to run, at will, our reserve steamer in place of any one of our steamers plying in these Turkish waters. Our reserve steamer has been repeatedly used, in the past, in the place of each one of our other steamers, and we beg that His Majesty's Government will see that our rights in this matter are respected.

Meantime, as our right to keep a reserve steamer at Bussorah is not questioned, we are instructing our agent at Bussorah that he may send the "Blosse Lynch," as has frequently been done in the past, for a time to the Karun, where the transport of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipe-line material is a pressing matter.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[25713] No. 31.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

(Confidential.) *India Office, July 14, 1910.*

With reference to your letter, dated the 8th July, 1908, as to a proposal that has been made to transfer to Koweit the Government coal depôt at Bushire,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of correspondence regarding this proposal and the selection of a site. The correspondence also deals with the question of the location of the rectangular plot of ground at Bunder Shweikh that was leased by the Sheikh of Koweit to the British Government in 1907.

As regards the latter point, the Government of India agree with the opinion of the naval commander-in-chief, and Viscount Morley would propose, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to sanction the selection of the site that has been agreed upon by the local officers, and to leave its boundaries without formal demarcation. (See paragraph 3 of Captain Shakespear's letter of the 2nd March, 1910.)

As regards the proposal to transfer the coal depôt from Bushire to Koweit (which the Government of India also recommend, and in connection with which I am to invite reference to the letter from your department to the Treasury of the 16th September, 1907), Lord Morley is unable to express an opinion pending consideration of detailed estimates which are now under preparation, and of the further question of the incidence of the expenditure. He sees no preliminary objection, however, to the site for the depôt recommended in Major Cox's letter of the 8th August, 1909, and would be glad to learn if Sir E. Grey is of the same opinion.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[Enclosures Nos. 1 to 8 already printed.]

Enclosure 9 in No. 31.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 8, 1909.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Department letter dated the 24th July, 1909, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Public Works Department on the subject of the projected coal depôt at Koweit.

2. It will be understood that it was inconvenient that the somewhat difficult questions of, firstly, the delimitation of the precise limits of our concession and, secondly, the selection of the most convenient point within it for the location of a coal depôt should be gone into on the spot just as a change of political agents was imminent. Hence Major Knox's reply to the late assistant engineer Mr. Laffère. As soon, however, as Captain Shakespear had settled down, the matter was taken up and the senior naval officer was requested to be good enough to depute one of His Majesty's ships, when a convenient opportunity offered, to make a survey of the foreshore of Bunder Shweikh in consultation with the political agent. His Majesty's ship "Lapwing," Lieutenant-Commander MacLean, was in due course deputed for the work, and I am now able to submit the results in the form of the communications and accompaniments enclosed.

3. The position to start with is briefly this: our concession must contain the sheikh's enclave, which must contain the sheikh's coal shed, which was already built, on precisely what proves to be the most desirable spot on the whole foreshore, before the negotiations commenced. Our selection of ground, therefore, must be within certain preliminary limits, determined by the position of the sheikh's shed.

Within these limits there seems to be no practical doubt as to which will be the most convenient spot for our coal depôt. The selection of the best site of our concession, however, is obviously a problem of great moment, and I have no doubt the Government of India will decide to refer the question with His Majesty's ship "Lapwing's" survey, to His Majesty's Government for decision under the advice of the Admiralty.

4. It was found by the political agent and Lieutenant-Commander MacLean in the course of the present operations that the English text of the second clause of the first condition of the agreement, as rendered by Major Knox in the translation forwarded with his letter dated the 16th October, 1907, was incapable of practical interpretation on the ground, and on reference to the vernacular original and to certain demi-official explanations written to the residency by Major Knox while the negotiations were in progress, it became evident to me that his translation needed amendment. It is on the amended version, of which I now enclose a copy, together with copies of the

demi-official papers above-mentioned, that the reports of the political agent and Lieutenant-Commander MacLean, and my present observations, are based. I beg that the said revised version, including the punctuation, may be closely examined, and if it is held to be correct, it may replace the previous translation on the record.

5. If I may be pardoned for making a simple suggestion, in order to realise readily on the survey plan the limits of our sphere of selection, it is convenient to cut out of the centre of a piece of card a rectangle showing the size of our concession, drawn to the scale of the survey, then one can see the limits of the field of choice for the location of our concession compatible with the retention of the sheikh's enclave *in* or *on* its seaward face. I say *on*, because it will be remembered that everything to seaward between the prolongation of the side boundaries, up to the 3-fathom line, goes with the concession.

6. Assuming, as I believe to be the case, that the views of the two officers concerned as to the best site for the coal depôt, as contained in their present reports, are based on a correct interpretation of the agreement, I see no reason to differ from them, and therefore, if opportunity offers, I think no harm will be done, while time will be saved, if the assistant engineer makes his preliminary estimates on the provisional supposition that the site now recommended is the one which will ultimately be decided upon.

In the meanwhile, I beg that the larger question may be subjected to expert examination as soon as practicable.

Enclosure 10 in No. 31.

Captain Shakespear to Major Cox.

Koweit, July 28, 1909

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence regarding the location of a coal depôt at this port ending with this office letter dated the 22nd January, 1908.

2. The arrival of a launch for this agency having made the matter of storage of coal for her use one of some urgent necessity, I have the honour to address you on the two much more important subjects upon which this matter will depend for settlement, viz., the exact situation of the Bunder Shweikh foreshore concession leased from Sheikh Mubarek in October 1907, and the institution and location of a properly equipped coal depôt.

3. A reference to the lease agreement forwarded with my predecessor's letter dated the 16th October, 1907, shows that the British Government has the option of so selecting its ground that a rectangle 7,500 by 600 cubits (3,750 by 300 yards) may be taken up anywhere along the Bunder Shweikh foreshore, with the following reservations:—

(*a.*) That the long seaward boundary of the rectangle shall lie through the existing coal-shed belonging to the sheikh.

(*b.*) That this long side shall also correspond with "the sea-line" (presumably high-water mark, as far as is consistent with its being a perfectly straight line.

(*c.*) That the rectangle shall extend only 600 cubits (300 yards) in depth from this line for the landward boundary.

(*d.*) That in the rectangle on the seaward side there shall be an enclave a square of 300 cubits (150 yards) side, the property of the sheikh.

(*e.*) That in this square shall be situated the sheikh existing coal-shed, though the actual area of the coal-shed is excluded from that of the square.

The British Government is further entitled to all ground above or below water contained between the prolongations of the two short (east and west) sides of the rectangle as far as the 3-fathom line at low water springs, excluding that portion contained between the prolongations of the east and west sides of the sheikh's enclave. The British Government has also the right to lay buoys and navigation marks anywhere in Koweit territory, and to build jetties, coal-sheds, &c., within the limits defined above.

4. To obtain full advantage of this concession, I presume as fundamental that that portion of the harbour should be secured which will give the maximum area of deep water necessary for a good anchorage near enough to the shore to enable possible piers and wharf-walls to be constructed without abnormal expenditure owing to distance and heavy work.

5. From a reference to the plan supplied by His Majesty's ship "Lapwing's"

recent surveys, it will be seen that the sheikh's existing coal-shed occupies the best possible site along the whole foreshore, the 3-fathom and 4-fathom lines being only 100 and 150 yards distant respectively from the high-water mark, within a few feet of which the shed stands. On both sides of the sheikh's coal-shed the 3-fathom line gradually draws further and further away from high-water mark until, at a point 1,600 yards east of the sheikh's shed, it is 400 yards from high-water mark, and, taking a sharp bend to the north, narrows the deep-water channel and gives a large area of the harbour near the town only 2 fathoms or less water. On the westward the same gradual receding takes place for 1,100 yards from the sheikh's shed, and the 3-fathom line is then 300 yards distant from high-water mark; for the next 1,000 yards to the west there is slightly less water with the 3-fathom line averaging about 500 yards distant from high-water mark; further west still, the deep-water (*i.e.*, anything more than 3 fathoms) again narrows and the end of the harbour is reached.

Along nearly the whole length of the foreshore, the bottom appears to be solid dead coral rock with mud and sand covering it in varying shallow depths, whilst in places it appears bare as a reef. All along the shore, therefore, good solid foundations will be found for either masonry or pile-work.

6. I attach a tracing of a section prepared by His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" on a line passing through a spot 159 yards north by 48 east from the sheikh's coal-shed, which gives a very good idea of the fall for some 1,000 yards of the shore line. Commander MacLean, of His Majesty's ship "Lapwing," and I went thoroughly over and discussed all the ground, and both agreed in the conclusion that the best site for any proposed coal-sheds was undoubtedly as close as possible to the sheikh's shed on the eastward and the spot through which the section attached hereto passes was selected so as to give a clear 150 yards for the sheikh's enclave; between this spot and the sheikh's shed the section improves by becoming steeper, whilst it deteriorates further eastward by becoming less steep. An alternative site presented itself at about the same distance to the west of the sheikh's shed, but we found that a large area above the actual high-water mark, as shown on the chart, is liable to flooding at spring-tides, and this fact would necessitate the construction of a long sea-wall, some 1,800 yards at least, with high plinths and much filling work behind it, to allow of buildings remaining sufficiently dry; moreover the section was hardly as steep from high-water mark to the 3-fathom line.

7. I trust that the above paragraph will give sufficiently clearly the best site for any buildings or coal depôt now proposed. We can now turn to a consideration of the rest of the area. From the details given in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 above, I am of opinion—and I think I have Commander MacLean's support from a seaman's point of view—that the best site for our rectangular concession will be with the seaward (north-west) boundary line running about north 64 yards east and south 64 yards west through the northernmost corner of the sheikh's coal shed with some 1,600 yards to the eastward and 2,150 yards to the westward of that shed. My reasons for this suggestion are the following:—

(*a.*) Commencing from the easternmost point, we shall have our frontage (including the sheikh's enclave), for nearly 1,600 yards practically on the high-water mark; buildings, piers, &c., can be conveniently erected along the whole of this frontage economically, as necessity arises, without any extra expenditure for sea-walls, &c.

(*b.*) The next 1,800 yards is made up of three portions, along the whole front of which a heavy sea-wall or wharf will be required if the perfectly straight line is to be preserved and the overflow at high spring-tides is to be kept out of the concession. The first portion, 600 yards, varies from high-water mark down to the 2-fathom line; the second 550 yards, from the 2-fathom line down to 3 fathoms and up again to 2 fathoms; the third 650 yards from the 2-fathom line up to high-water mark again.

(*c.*) The last 350 yards is all above high-water mark on comparatively high ground with a small area of dry ground to the front (north-west side).

Portion (*a*) will meet all our possible requirements unless a vast change takes place in the importance of Koweit as a port, such as would result from its becoming the terminus of the Bagdad Railway. In the event of this change taking place general, financial, and political considerations would at once make it worth while proceeding with harbour works along portions (*b*) and (*c*). In the meantime, if my suggested location of the concession meets with approval, we hold practically all the available moorings for any ship drawing 20 feet or more, with no single mooring further distant than 500 yards, and several within 300 yards, whilst, with comparatively short piers,

many berths could be arranged for such ships to load and discharge cargo alongside railway jetties at all tides.

8. The above conclusions have been arrived at after much anxious consideration on the spot, and with the advantage of thorough discussion with a naval officer in whose hands lay the special survey with the sole object of furnishing the necessary data. The subject being of supreme importance, and in view of our position in Koweit, and what the future may hold for us in regard to the Bagdad Railway, I have ventured to express my views in some detail in the hope that the final decision as to location may be facilitated. My endeavour has been to suggest the best site for ourselves, to leave no opportunity for a foreign Power, and at the same time to keep in view economy of present and future possible construction.

Enclosure 11 in No. 31.

Commander Litchfield to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir, "*Sphinx*," *at Bushire, August* 5, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward a tracing of the survey of Bunder Shweikh, carried out by officers of His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" during recent visits to Koweit in accordance with the request conveyed in your letter of the 26th June, 1909.

The modifications and additions which you desired when discussing the original tracing at Subzabad on the 22nd July have been inserted.

2. I attach a copy of Lieutenant and Commander MacLean's report for your information.

I have, &c.

SHIRLEY LITCHFIELD,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 12 in No. 31.

Lieutenant MacLean to Commander Litchfield.

Sir, "*Lapwing*," *at Bushire, August* 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward tracing carried out by officers of "Lapwing" for the information of political officers during recent visits to Koweit. In accordance with your directions, the position of the sheikh's coal-store was fixed by triangulation and is shown on tracing.

2. A site was selected for proposed Government coal store, and is shown on tracing about 159 yards north-east of sheikh's coal-shed. The actual position has been marked by two broad arrows cut in two rocks on the foreshore of the position selected. A section of foreshore through Y opposite this spot is shown on tracing.

With reference to my instructions to determine the nature of the bottom to a depth of 20 feet at L.W.S. off the foreshore of Bunder Shweikh, I found that Captain Shakespear only desired an 18 foot contour line, and such information as could be obtained by a cursory examination. The general nature of the foreshore and bottom have been inserted on tracing.

A rough survey was supplied to Captain Shakespear who expressed himself satisfied with the information contained in it.

The foreshore of Bunder Shweikh is generally sandy with no sign of coral outcropping except where it is shown on tracing.

I should say that coral would be found at varying depths all over the sandy plain and foreshore in the vicinity of the sheikh's coal store.

The reef shown on the tracing opposite the sheikh's coal store is not really a reef, but simply coral laid bare by the action of the tide and slopes down to the water just the same as the sandy beach.

I have, &c.

C. K. MACLEAN.

Enclosure 13 in No. 31.

[Demi-Official.]

Political Agent, Koweit, to First Assistant Resident, Bushire.

August 14, 1907.

TURN that Bunder Shweikh negotiations are taking is better than I expected. Sheikh Mubarek has taken the pearl out of the oyster for himself by reserving the coal-house recently erected with surrounding compound 150 yards square, coal-house occupying the centre of the north-west or seaside. Apart from that reservation he grants us rectangular plot of ground 3,750 yards by 300 yards at a perpetual rent of 60,000 rupees per annum paid in advance. The north-west boundary 3,750 yards long in a direct line and roughly parallel to foreshore, but must contain coal-house or compound. Subject to these two conditions, position is at our option. Rent gives right without further demand to all foreshore to depth of 5 fathoms at lowest spring-tide between north-east and south-west boundaries produced to north-west except immediately in front of Mubarek's reservation and full liberty to erect buildings of any kind, to sublet to British, British Indian, and Koweit subjects, to put down buoys and carry out all works necessary to ease passage of steamers from open sea to harbour Shweikh. As area of land now granted is more than twelve times that originally asked for, rent is proportionally one-third of Cox limit, and I strongly recommend I should be empowered to accept at once without further question.

Koweit subjects right of pre-emption or prior lease is stronger than ours to the land surrounding present concession to distance of 1,000 yards from any point of our boundary but otherwise Government has precedence over all comers with regard to such land.

Government has absolute right of pre-emption or prior lease to entire island of Shweikh and its foreshore (also called on chart Karaim).

Government had absolute right of pre-emption or prior lease to Ras Kathama and foreshore to limit of 2 nautical miles in any direction, but sheikh reserves to himself land for house within boundaries of total linear length of 600 yards somewhere at his option near Ras Kathama, but will grant a right of way to sea to Government 15 feet broad, if such is found necessary. Kathama land can only be leased.

Concession also contains clause dictated by sheikh asserting spirited declaration of independence, and Sheikh Mubarek's determination not to part with his rights in land to any foreign Government including Turkey or to their subjects without consent of British Government asked for and granted. Agreement is terminable at option of British Government only. Sheikh Mubarek also binds his heirs, but his signature only holds good for two months. If within that period, Government consents, agreement is binding. If not, new terms can be arranged.

S. G. KNOX.

P.S.—Plan enclosed* gives rough idea of concession, but north-west line may shift to right or left and it will perhaps be better to bring it to the left a bit.

S. G. K.

Enclosure 14 in No. 31.

[Demi-Official.]

Political Agent, Koweit, to First Assistant Resident, Bushire.

August 14, 1907.

LATEST reports just before closing the mail. Mooka Abdulla took the amended agreement up to the sheikh by request, and read over and over to him, with a map of the same kind as I send you now, which I prepared for him. He made a few verbal alterations. The land in Kathama could only be hired at a rent that would satisfy the sheikh; the sheikh's house compound at Kathama would be enclosed by 600 yards,

* Not printed.

instead of 500 yards, and a curious interpolation, the 150 yards north-west boundary of Sheikh Mubarek's reservation is to be exclusive of the coal-house dimensions. I boggled at this a bit, as it upsets the symmetry of the plan, but I don't see that it really affects the concession.

* * * * * *

Enclosure 15 in No. 31.

Suggested Revised Version of Translation of the Second Clause of the First Condition of the Bunder Shweikh Agreement. Received with Political Agent's letter dated October 16, 1907.

*Arabic Version.**

Major Knox's Version.	*Suggested Revision.*
* * *	* * *
And, secondly, the eastern side and the western side shall be each 600 cubits long, and the southern side shall be 7,500 cubits long, and the whole land shall be rectangular; and of this land there shall be to me, Sheikh Mubarek-us-Subah, Ruler of Koweit, and to my heirs after me, of it a plot, on the north-west side of which shall be the coal-house aforesaid, the four sides of which plot shall be each 300 cubits long, apart from the dimensions of the coal-house, and opposite this plot of ground to the north-west shall belong to me, Sheikh Mubarek-us-Subah, Ruler of Koweit, and to my heirs after me.	And, secondly, [as to] the eastern side and the western side, the length of each side [shall be] 600 cubits, and the southern side 7,500 cubits, and the whole land [shall be] rectangular; and from this land there shall come from it to me, Sheikh Mubarek-us-Subah, Ruler of Koweit, and to my heirs after me, a piece from the north side, on which shall be the coal-house above-mentioned; on the four sides the length of each side shall be 300 cubits, the whole amounting to 1,200 cubits, exclusive of the measurement of the house, and [the space] opposite this piece, on the north, shall be to me, Sheikh Mubarek-us-Subah, Ruler of Koweit, and to my heirs after me.

P. Z. COX.

Enclosure 16 in No. 31.

Government of India to Rear-Admiral Slade.

(Confidential.) *Simla, September* 21, 1909.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your Excellency's predecessor's letter, dated the 23rd October, 1907, on the subject of the establishment of a coal depôt at Koweit, I am directed to forward the accompanying copy of correspondence and to request that your Excellency will be so good as to favour the Government of India with your views on the proposed location of the concession.

Enclosure 17 in No. 31.

Rear-Admiral Slade to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bombay, January* 18, 1910.

WITH reference to Marine Department letter of the 21st October, 1909, on the subject of the establishment of a coal depôt at Koweit, be pleased to lay the following remarks before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

2. It is considered that the location of the concession should be such that the sheikh's coal-shed would be exactly in the middle of the frontage. The site proposed is indicated by the rectangle ruled in pencil on the largest of the enclosed tracings.

3. This position, opposite Bunder Shweikh anchorage is, however, 4½ miles from the anchorage for large ships in Koweit Harbour. Bunder Shweikh anchorage is narrow

* Not reproduced.

and confined, and capable of accommodating at one time only three ships of the "Proserpine" class and three gun-boats.

4. Springs rise 10 to 11 feet, neaps 7 to 9 feet, so that a ship of the "Proserpine" class should be able to enter at high water on any day, but it would be advisable to erect a tide pole, so that the depth of the channel could be signalled to incoming vessels, and to lay down moorings for three vessels of the "Proserpine" class.

5. Midway between the outer anchorage (Koweit Harbour) and the inner anchorage (Bunder Shweikh), the channel carrying not less than 12 feet at L. W. O. S., narrows to 1 cable for a distance of 400 yards, and then opens out again. It would be necessary to buoy the mouth of this funnel and to erect leading marks.

6. The tracings enclosed in the letter under reply are returned herewith as requested.

Enclosure 18 in No. 31.

Government of India to Major Trevor.

(Confidential.) *Fort William, February 8*, 1910.

I AM directed to refer to Major Cox's letter, dated the 8th August, 1909, on the subject of the selection of sites for—

(1.) The rectangular plot of ground on the Bunder Shweikh foreshore at Koweit leased by the sheikh to the British Government in 1907; and

(2.) The proposal coal depôt at Koweit.

2. I am to forward herewith a copy of a letter from his Excellency the naval commander-in-chief, East Indies squadron (Confidential), dated the 18th January, 1910, on the subject, together with the original tracing, and to enquire whether you have any objection to the proposal contained in paragraph 2 of his letter as to the location of the rectangular concession, and whether the position of the site proposed for the location of the coal depôt will be affected thereby.

3. I am to add that the revised version of the translation of the second clause of the first condition of the Bunder Shweikh agreement put forward by Major Cox is accepted as correct, and it will accordingly be substituted for the translation at present on record.

4. I am to request that you will reply to this reference as early as possible.

Enclosure 19 in No. 31.

Major Trevor to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, March 13*, 1910.

WITH reference to Foreign Department letter dated the 8th February, 1910, I have the honour to forward the letter which I have received from the political agent, Koweit, on the subject of the Bunder Shweikh agreement.

2. Captain Shakespear states that the rectangle marked in pencil on the tracing is covered by the terms of the concession, and includes the site of the proposed coal shed, and that therefore he has no remarks to offer.

3. I agree with Captain Shakespear, and see no objection to the proposal contained in paragraph 2 of his Excellency the commander-in-chief's letter of the 18th January.

4. The tracing sent with the letter under reply is herewith returned.

Enclosure 20 in No. 31.

Captain Shakespear to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, March 2*, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge Major Trevor's letter dated the 20th February, 1910, regarding the selection of the most advantageous site at Bunder Shweikh.

2. The rectangle marked in pencil on the tracing has the approval of his Excellency the naval commander-in-chief and is covered by the terms of our agreement with the sheikh; I have therefore no further remarks to offer regarding its selection.

3. The site proposed for the location of the coal depôt will not be affected as it falls

within the rectangle. In this connection I would solicit the favour of instructions, if the present proposal is finally approved, as to whether the whole rectangle should be marked out on the ground by boundary pillars or left indefinite.

4. I return herewith the original tracing forwarded with the letter under reply.

Enclosure 21 in No. 31.

Government of India to Government of Bombay.

(Very Confidential.) *Simla, May 23*, 1910.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department dated the 24th July, 1909, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of the papers on the subject of the proposed coal depôt at Koweit. I am to request that, with the permission of the Governor in Council, arrangements may be made with the least possible delay for the preparation and submission of detailed estimates for the works referred to in the letter from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, dated the 9th July, 1908, on the supposition that the site now recommended for the coal depôt will be the one which will ultimately be decided on.

[25829] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 470.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 9*, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout enclosing his quarterly report on the vilayet of Beirout and mutessariflik of Mount Lebanon.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 31.)

Sir, *Beirout, June 16*, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my quarterly report on the administrative and economic affairs of the vilayet of Beirout and the mutessariflik of Mount Lebanon.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

Report on the Administrative and Economic Affairs of the Vilayet of Beirout and the Mutessariflik of Lebanon (February 15–June 15, 1910).

PART I.—*Beirout.*

THE only incident that has occurred during the last four or five months to disturb public tranquillity was the attempted arrest, on the Greek Easter, of a man who had defied standing orders against firing in the streets. A panic was caused by his taking refuge in the church during the service and by exaggerated fears that the police intended firing on the crowd if any resistance was offered to his arrest. The Archbishop greatly upset sent for the vali, whose appearance on the scenes calmed the excited mob. Not content with such a satisfactory termination of what he had made out was a critical situation, the Archbishop insisted upon the immediate dismissal of the chief of police on the grounds that he had no right to enter the precincts of a Christian church. The chief of police himself was ready to resign to

oblige Nazim Pasha who had promised the Archbishop he would go, but the Committee of Union and Progress resented the arguments adduced by the Archbishop—which certainly showed a spirit of intolerance towards Ottoman authority—and they took up the cudgels for the chief of police as against the Archbishop and the vali for siding with him. Owing to the threat of the Archbishop to resign and shut all the churches as a sign of protest if he did not obtain satisfaction, the Sublime Porte suspended the chief of police pending an investigation in order to ascertain whether this official had committed any irregularity rendering him liable to prosecution. Though the result of legal proceedings, if decided upon, is bound to end in the acquittal of the police officer, the Sublime Porte will probably see fit to transfer him to other and perhaps higher duties as it is not likely that they will risk the natural consequences of a religious agitation by the strong local Greek orthodox element at this juncture.

This incident is chiefly interesting as illustrating how little, if any, headway has been made, since the revival of the constitution, towards solving the all important problem of reconciling the opposing racial elements of this Empire. At one of the numerous public meetings held in 1908 to celebrate the opening of Parliament the same Greek Archbishop, Mgr. Gerassimos Messara, in a very patriotic oration, created great sensation by declaring that, whereas in preconstitutional times he used to call on the vali two or three times a week to obtain redress for injustices committed on members of his flock, he was happy to say that the necessity had since become only a monthly or fortnightly one. On my reminding him of this the other day he promptly replied: "Now it is almost a daily necessity."

It is undeniable that the practical results, so far, of the reforms so loudly preached at noisy public meetings, in parliamentary speeches, in press articles and in official circles have not come up to expectation, and many functionaries with the best intentions to reform their respective departments are disheartened at the lack of support they get both from their superiors and from the public.

The unfriendly relations existing between some of the departments does not tend to improve matters. To mention one instance. The judicial bench, which ought to act in perfect harmony with the police officials, appears determined to assert their independence of the vali and chief of police—which technically no one wishes to deny—by an exaggerated leniency towards prisoners arrested by the police.

It is this general loose state of things, due principally to the withdrawal from the vali of his former authority over every administrative department, including police and gendarmerie, that led to the recent resignation of his post by Nazim Pasha after submitting patiently for months to most humiliating and vexatious treatment from all sides including the Committee of Union and Progress, upon whom he had counted for support instead of hostility. It is to be hoped that the new laws on vilayets and on municipalities, which are said to be in course of preparation, will restore sufficient authority into the hands of valis as appears to have been specially done in the case of the new Vali of Bagdad, otherwise events, to judge of what is going on here, will show that however repugnant the idea may be to constitutional ideas something approaching a partial state of martial law will be found necessary till the all important lesson of respect to authority is sufficiently impressed upon the public, which is far from being the case at present.

Even as between Mussulmans the vital question of language, another stumbling block, does not seem to be getting removed. Recently the students of the "Idadieh" school, instigated by residents of this town, protested against the nomination of a man from Anatolia to the Professorship of Arabic, which they insisted should be filled by a native of Syria as more fitted for the post. The nationalistic feelings aroused by the discussion of this delicate question were not calmed by the onslaught of the "Ikdam" on the Arabs, and every precaution had to be taken by the authorities, under orders from Constantinople, to prevent the circulation of that mischievous copy of the paper. Notwithstanding the weakness of the Administration in all its branches there has not been much crime to record and only one serious affray, in April, in which one man was killed and four wounded by a band of street rowdies. The situation was considered sufficiently critical, owing to the disorganised state of the police force, to justify the conveyance from Damascus of 200 soldiers to strengthen the garrison of Beirout.

The circumstances of the attack on British and American travellers by Haifa boatmen (reported separately), the daring murder in broad daylight of a Christian by a Moslem in Sidon, and the violent ill-treatment of the Mahassebedji (chief accountant) of Acre by a mob on some trivial pretext related further on, all tend to shake confidence in the power of the local authorities to maintain order.

There have been several commissions on reforms of various kinds at work, such

as the judicial commission of inspection under Saadeddin Bey, who arrived in Beirout in March to investigate all judicial matters, including the state of the prisons, where much improvement is urgently needed if only from a hygienic point of view. The permanent commission of administrative reorganisation "tanzikat," having completed its labours as regards Beirout, transferred its attentions to the requirements of the sanjaks and cazas before being dissolved. A customs reorganisation commission has also been very busy, and showed great energy and activity in the matter of removing inefficient officials, but whether they have been replaced by better men remains to be seen.

There has been a slight alteration in the constitution of the commercial court due to the provisions of the new law regarding commercial courts which abolished the two assessors ("juges suppléants") one Moslem and one Christian, and thus reduces the bench from five to three members.

The gendarmerie reorganisation work progresses slowly but surely, and the pupils of the school have a smart appearance, which is in such striking contrast to the slip-shod habiliments of the old gendarmes. Colonel Shevket Bey, president of the International Gendarmerie Commission, has been succeeded by Colonel Omar Bey, from Salonika, and it is rumoured that Colonel Albera, the senior foreign officer on the commission, will not return when his leave is over.

An extensive conflagration in May, causing losses of over 100,000*l.*, only half of which was covered by insurance, brought to light in a most striking manner the total absence of any sort of service for extinguishing fires at Beirout, and this consulate-general has been instrumental in bringing about an understanding between the British and foreign insurance offices and the Beirout Waterworks Company to materially assist the impoverished municipality to form an efficient fire brigade.

In financial affairs all that can be said is that the taxes have been collected with more regularity than formerly, and that it is no longer only the Customs administration that pays its salaries punctually. Many private financial projects are talked of, but none have yet come to a head, and no public works of any consequence have been decided upon.

The enrolment of Christians for military service is still confined to the periodical performance of preparatory operations for the drawing of lots, but the date for this final operation is continually put off, which presupposes the existence of as little eagerness on the part of the authorities to enrol Christians as there is enthusiasm on the part of the latter to serve.

The only vice-consul to report as to the general condition of things in his district is Mr. F. Abela, of Haifa, who states as follows:—

> The general administration was exceptionally bad. Public security, owing to the incompetency of the officers of the gendarmerie and police, left much to be desired. The cadi has proved himself not only most ignorant and corrupt, but very fanatical, which will probably create trouble between Christian and Moslem. The interests of certain foreign subjects have been trodden upon, and little or no attention has been given to their complaints.

During the March quarter the German Levant Cotton Company of Adana appointed an agent at Haifa to encourage the growing of American cotton by furnishing the seed and making advances in cash to cultivators at low interest.

The immigration of Jews from Russia continues, and a better class of Jews who have been educated at German Universities also come. They find great difficulty in purchasing land from Government officials or from the inhabitants who demand exorbitant prices from them. The real price of land is, however, going up steadily owing to this influx of Colonists, added to the reasonable expectation of a harbour being constructed in the near future.

On the 18th April the Muhassebedji (chief accountant) of Acre was attacked in his office in the Konak by a large crowd of Moslems. He was severely beaten and insulted. He was suspected of having written to his superiors in favour of the participation of foreigners in the newly conceded right to the public to possess property in the vicinity of the walls of the town, which privilege the Moslems wished to be confined exclusively to them. This incident shows the insolence of the mob and the weakness of the local authorities.

From Tripoli it is reported that the opening ceremony of the new railway works (Tripoli Homs) took place on March 24th, and that though at first the contractors encountered some difficulty in finding labourers, the operations are now well forward, and it is expected that the line will be ready for traffic by the Spring of 1911. Govern-

ment surveyors have also been at work in the port, and it is thought that harbour works have been decided upon in principle, and that the same French company will carry them out.

PART II.—*Mount Lebanon.*

In Mount Lebanon the question that has attracted most attention locally has been the independent attitude bordering on hostility taken up by the majority of the members of the administrative council against the Governor-General, which has been reported separately (No. 30, Confidential, 15th June, 1910).

The proceedings against Zwein, the Maronite member for Kesrouan, who created an unedifying scene in the Konak in February (No. 10, 18th February, 1910), have also been followed with interest. There has been some delay in his trial, owing to his appeal to the Court of Cassation against the decision of the "chambre des mises en accusation" to consider his act as a crime in lieu of a misdemeanour. The Court of Cassation has granted the appeal, and the trial will now take place on the minor charge in a court of first instance, and pending the hearing he will be let out on bail.

Youssouf Pasha had been the object of virulent attacks in the local press, but as these are easily traced to disappointed officers and to editors angered by his determined attitude regarding the press laws, they need not be taken seriously, though in one or two instances the Pasha has thought fit to institute legal proceedings for libel.

The excitement over the application of the Ottoman press laws to the Lebanon has subsided, and the "Nufus tezkereh" question has apparently been tacitly dropped since the withdrawal of the obnoxious order to the various Government departments to refuse their services unless the applicants are possessed of the tezkereh.

The question of the liability to military service of Lebanese residing in the Beirout vilayet (No. 16, March 25, 1910) has also remained in abeyance.

Only the non-opening of the ports to steamers still gives rise to dissatisfaction and murmurs among the inhabitants of those seaport towns that are deprived of their mutual rights.

Towards the end of 1909 the Government published for the first time a sort of budgetary statement purporting to show the estimated revenues and expenses for the financial year 1325 (1909–10), but, owing to the little confidence the public had in the ability of the officials of the financial department to grapple with the confused mass of accounts, that so-called budget was not taken seriously, except in so much as it affected to show that there would be a deficit of over 7,000*l.*, which announcement caused general consternation. The criticisms which this financial statement was subjected to on all sides induced the Governor-General to personally superintend the elaboration of a less fanciful budget giving, as far as the resources of his financial department permitted of its being done, the actual receipts and disbursements during the year 1325 (1st March, 1909–28th February, 1910), with the result that the overwhelming deficit foreseen in the previous so-called budget was made to dwindle down to 340*l.* in some incomprehensible and inexplicable way. The lame official explanation advanced was that the previous estimates have been based on figures furnished for preceding years, which proved misleading, and that during the year in question the Government had made strenuous efforts to collect arrears of taxes and to curtail expenses.

This dexterous juggling with figures can but strengthen the recommendation that has been repeatedly made by me and by my predecessor to the Lebanon Government as to the desirability of an examination of the whole system of finances by a competent accountant with a view to establishing in an authoritative manner whether, as some think, a revision of the cadastre and census is necessary in order to improve the financial condition of Mount Lebanon, or whether, as some say, a more intelligent and businesslike system of accounts is all that is required for the present.

Beirout, June 15, 1910.

[25831] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 472.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 9, 1910.

REFERRING to my telegram No. 126 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Whittall, Messrs. Lynch's agent, was duly received by the Minister of

Public Works, and reported to me on the 6th instant the result of his interview, which was briefly as follows:—

1. Porte refused to proceed with the fusion of Messrs. Lynch's boats with the Nehrie Company.

2. Porte would henceforth throw open the navigation of the rivers to Ottomans only.

3. Porte would pay no indemnity whatever to anyone in the event of navigation being stopped by irrigation works.

4. Government reserved for themselves absolute freedom as to the disposal of the waters of the rivers as they thought best.

No discussion appears to have taken place which might open the road to some understanding, and the attitude of the Minister seems to have been somewhat uncompromising and little in harmony with what I was led by Rifaat Pasha to expect.

Under these circumstance, I took an opportunity to-day of seeing the Grand Vizier and briefly recapitulated the circumstances under which the arrangements for the fusion of the two navigation companies had been agreed upon last year, how the negotiations had been undertaken on the initiative of the Ottoman Government, how repeated promises had been given me by His Highness's predecessor that the fusion would be carried through, and how it had actually received the approval in principle of the Chamber of Deputies. I reminded His Highness that on several occasions during the winter I had asked him what solution he proposed to give to the matter, and that I had always been met with the reply that the adoption by Parliament of the concession law was necessary before anything could be done. This law had now passed, and I had been led to believe by Rifaat Pasha that the Government were prepared after a meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place to consider the matter in an equitable spirit, and I had consequently asked Mr. Whittall to see the Minister of Public Works, but I regretted to say that the Minister had adopted an attitude of *non possumus*.

The Grand Vizier replied that he had carefully studied the matter. The feeling in the Chamber against a monopoly in favour of the fusion was too strong for the Government to submit it; nor would they ever be able to pass through the Chamber an arrangement which committed the Government to pay compensation in the event of the water in the rivers falling short, and this, from Sir William Willcocks' reports, seemed to be a contingency that must be counted with. It should not pass the wit of man to discover some means by which the company could compensate itself in this eventuality by some system of sinking fund. The local opposition to the scheme had been and still was very strong, and he thought that if local capitalists could be interested financially in the concern some scheme could be found that would be adopted by the Chamber. Although the scheme had in November last passed the Chamber, this was only a parliamentary manœuvre to get rid of his predecessor, Hilmi Pasha, without bringing about the fall of the two Ministers who are the committee representatives in the Cabinet, *i.e.*, Talaat Bey and Djavid Bey, and in no way implied that Parliament endorsed the fusion scheme itself.

His Highness said he felt convinced that, in spite of the fact that no declared monopoly could be given the companies once the fusion had taken place, the companies would practically be able to re-establish a monopoly, and if it was necessary to carry out dredging works, these could either be carried out by the Government or a system of *péage* could be adopted.

His Highness promised to give more categorical instructions to the Minister of Public Works, after which Mr. Whittall could see him again, and he felt sure that some arrangement could be arrived at acceptable to Parliament.

His Highness repeated, as Rifaat Pasha had done, that for the present, and pending further discussions, no fresh permits would be granted.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[25961] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 485.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 13, 1910.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 472 of the 9th instant I have the honour to inform you that, subsequent to my interview with the Grand Vizier, the Minister for

Public Works sent for Mr. Whittall, the local agent of the Lynch Company, and explained to him that he had not meant at his last interview to convey to him that no concession would be granted, but merely no monopoly; he did not think the Turkish Government would object to a fusion of the Lynch with the Hamidieh Company in the form of an Ottoman company, but that this new body would only receive simple permits of navigation similar to those granted to other Ottomans, all being treated necessarily on a footing of equality.

Mr. Whittall pointed out that the whole of the contract, as at present drafted, depended upon the exclusive right of navigation. It was on account of this, and not for the Hamidieh boats, which were worth only some 30,000*l.*, that the Turkish Government was being offered 160,000*l.* He was, however, unable to bring the Minister to any definite statement as to what proposals the Government were ready to put forward, his Excellency saying that it was for Messrs. Lynch to consider the matter, and make proposals, but in any case no exclusive rights would be granted, but only simple permits for navigation.

Mr. Whittall considers such conditions as entirely unacceptable, and that it would be better for the Lynch Company to remain under the British flag under the protection of His Majesty's Government, but Mr. Whittall offers these observations merely in a private manner, and declares that he has no authority from Messrs. Lynch to discuss any modifications of the fusion scheme provisionally agreed upon last autumn.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[26401] No. 35.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 21.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 20, 1910.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 12th instant I have the honour to report that further advices from our Bagdad agents on the subject of the fusion scheme are to the effect that there has recently taken place a revulsion of native opinion towards the proposal in favour of its completion. Our agents attribute this change to the facts, first, that the terms of the fusion are now better understood, and, secondly, that no group of natives can be formed to take over the Turkish steamers at the price required by the Government. They add that, according to their information, native opposition to the scheme has been organised in quarters closely connected with the Government. I may state, for your confidential information, that Eram Bey, the new Secretary for Political Affairs at Bagdad, informed our manager, Mr. F. W. Parry, in the course of conversation, that the Governor-General of Bagdad, had asked the native merchants of that city to purchase the steamers, but none of them had responded to his request.

As you are aware, all the principal British merchants and ship-owners who have any connection with Bagdad have expressed in writing their full approval of the fusion scheme.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the serious situation which will be created if the scheme, after having been under negotiation for so long a period, should fail to be carried out either now or in the near future, my Board feel that they would be wanting in their duty to the interests which they represent if they did not express to you their earnest hope that the Secretary of State may not lose sight of this question. I am to add that of course the Turkish Parliament has already accepted the proposed Convention between this Company and the Turkish Government, after a very full explanation of its terms by the Cabinet to the Chamber, and has, by resolution, passed by a very large majority, authorised the Cabinet to conclude the matter subject to its imposing no fresh burdens on the Turkish budget.

As regards the rights of this Company, upon the defence of which my Board understand that the efforts of His Majesty's Government are to be concentrated, I must point out that the limitations placed by the Turkish Government upon our operations, confining them to three steamers and seeking to restrict these steamers to the use of the River Tigris only, and that between Bussorah and Bagdad, expose our Company to wholly unequal conditions of competition, and, therefore, render it incapable of withstanding the attempts which are likely to be made to run it off the river. My Board, therefore, trust that His Majesty's Government will make it plain to the Turkish Government that if they so far alter the *status quo* on the rivers as

to extend to private parties the right of navigation, they will at the same time have to remove the disabilities to which we at present submit. We also hope that His Majesty's Government will insist upon a settlement of the question before consenting to economic advantages in favour of Turkey which it may be within their discretion to withhold.

I have, &c.
E. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[26463] No. 36.

Foreign Office to Mr. Lynch.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 21, 1910.*

WITH reference to my letter to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company of the 12th instant and to the verbal enquiry which you made at this department on the 14th instant as to the nature of the apprehension aroused by the fusion scheme in quarters quite independent of the Turkish Government, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that according to reports received by him the fear of a monopoly being forced upon the Turkish Government had during the past winter given rise amongst all sections of the population in Mesopotamia to a widespread and apparently genuine agitation against the amalgamation scheme. It was to this feeling of apprehension that reference was made in my above-mentioned letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[26770] No. 37.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 14, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the Chester Railway scheme, in reference to my telegram No. 114 of the 18th ultimo, and my despatches No. 164 of the the 21st March last and No. 357 of the 4th June.

The American Ambassador was, as I have informed you, certain that the convention would be presented to the Chamber and obtain its sanction during the session recently ended, and it seems that definite promises to this effect were made to the promoters. But in one way and another obstacles were interposed, and Parliament rose without having had the convention under its consideration. My American colleague is greatly annoyed, his only crumb of comfort being that he sees the other missions no more successful than himself in obtaining what they desire.

It is, he says, an entirely new departure for the State Department to back up the efforts of their capitalists, and consequently they have taken special pains to examine into the whole matter and to satisfy themselves of the genuineness of the enterprise. The embassy are resolved that the matter shall be pushed through; they are incensed with the Germans rather than with the Turks, for they consider the check to the success of the scheme as entirely due to German machinations, and they intend to retaliate on them in South American domains. They say that there is no trick to which the Germans will not descend, and that, though they cloak their bribery adroitly, yet no more corrupt or corrupting influence could be conceived.

Meanwhile, the promoters will not lose their time, but Messrs. McArthur, who are one of the principal of the parties interested, are sending an expert of high reputation, a Mr. Colt, to investigate along the proposed *tracé*, so that they may be better informed by the time the Chamber reassembles.

I am inclined to think that the very intervention of the American Embassy has tended to check the progress of the scheme. The Turkish Government seem to be in a frame of mind such that while they might perchance grant a concession of some sort —such as the Mahsoussch—to private concession hunters, yet they will give nothing to anybody, no matter how solid and respectable, who present themselves protected by the recommendation of their embassy and relying on their support. They seem, in fact, to have a general sort of grudge against foreign embassies, all of which, in their view, used them unkindly under the old régime, and which, under the new, do nothing but

check their activity in every direction, pointing out that such and such action is contrary to "ancient treaties" and "agreements in force." By their present attitude, which is extended in the provinces by the authorities to the foreign consuls, they think they assert their independence and their sovereign prerogatives.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[28774] No. 38.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 491.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 18, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, reporting on the continued refusal of the local authorities of Mosul to register the Nestorians in the vilayet as a separate religious community.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Mosul, June* 3, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency further on the subject of the separate registration of the Nestorians in this vilayet to which reference has been made in various despatches from this vice-consulate.

In a telegram dated the 2nd May I reported that, according to reliable information received, the deputy for Hakiari (in Van vilayet) recently obtained from the Minister of Religion and Justice a promise to order the separate registration of the Nestorians in this vilayet.

Two envoys sent by Mar Shimun, in view of that promise to take the steps necessary for the promised registration, have now been in Mosul for about two months, but have failed to accomplish anything.

In conversation on the 25th of April the vali admitted to me that an order to register the Nestorians in this district had been received, but he immediately checked himself and sent for the chief of police, who, he said, knew all about it. The chief of police corroborated his Excellency's statement, but added that persons wishing to change their religious denomination must first produce to the authorities a certificate from the head of the church to which they intended transferring their allegiance; that such a certificate can only be given by a spiritual chief possessing a "firman"; that Mar Shimun has no "firman"; and that, therefore, no one can become a Nestorian.

Soon afterwards the authorities in Mosul seem to have deemed it advisable to abandon this argument, and the vali told the Nestorian envoys they should refer to the registration officer ("nufuss naziri"), who, he said, would open a register for them. By dilatory methods, which it is unnecessary to describe, the registration officer has for nearly a month baffled the attempts of the envoys to get this done.

If I have entered into a somewhat lengthy account of the latest phase of this matter, it is mainly because it provides a typical instance of the facility with which officials in this vilayet can still for their own purposes evade honest compliance with their instructions, and argues that Roman Catholic influences have succeeded in very deeply involving the local authorities, and committing them to a policy in this particular question from which they cannot easily extricate themselves.

There are signs, however, that the local authorities are not without misgivings as to their own position, and the ignominious termination of the illegal attempt of the 4th February to arrest a Nestorian bishop on the premises of the honorary dragoman of this vice-consulate has called into being—temporarily, at all events—a wholesome disinclination, which has been manifested recently on more than one occasion, to lend themselves rashly to Roman Catholic intrigues. Thus, in a recent petition to the vali, the Roman Catholic Chaldæan archbishop denounced as a sedition-monger one Abu Hasso, a peaceful inhabitant of this town, who was a short time ago officially recognised as head of the local Protestant community, and has shown hospitality to the Nestorian envoys already mentioned. This spiteful petition (a translation is herewith transmitted), which would certainly have sufficed a few months ago to involve its victim in search, arrest, detention, or other indignities, was rejected, and no steps were taken by the authorities.

And again, the Roman Catholic Chaldæan archbishop has failed in an appeal heard at Mosul against a judgment given at Amadia in favour of the Nestorian community in respect of the disputed ownership of a church.* A Nestorian success over the Roman Catholic authorities in a Mosul court was a thing unheard of before.

I have, &c.
G. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

Petition addressed by the Roman Catholic Chaldean Archbishop of Mosul to the Vali of Mosul.

(Translation.)

UNDER a foreign ægis the rebel monk, Gergis Abouna (Mar Elias) of Elkosh, after giving rise to intrigue and evil, made good his escape from you, our honourable and prudent officials. We and all our community hope that your influence may increase and prevail always.

After his escape (from Mosul), this man did not relinquish his wicked designs, but has made use of a member of the Protestant community, one Abu Hasso, the broker of hypocrisy and discord, together with a certain low native of Tiari named Warda, the servant of Gergis Abouna (Mar Elias), who recently presumed to submit a petition to the Registration Department to the end that a new register may be opened for the Nestorians.

Your Excellency, the Administrative Council and the Government departments, are aware that the Patriarchate has encountered many difficulties and sacrificed much time in trying to check intrigues, and we pray that you will resolutely and prudently reject the present application presented by the man Warda, and give orders whereby all possibility of the registration in question will be precluded.

EMMANUEL, *Chaldean Patriarch.*

April 17, 1910.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Mosul, July* 1, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report further on the subject of the separate registration of the Nestorians in this vilayet.

As reported on p. 2 of my despatch No. 22 of the 3rd June, the local registration officer ("nufuss naziri"), whose duty it is to open a separate register for them, refuses to do so notwithstanding orders received from Constantinople.

Those orders have been repeated in a further communication from the Ministry of Justice dated the 13th instant, a copy of which, received through a confidential channel, is herewith transmitted, together with translation.

Nevertheless, the local authorities have found a pretext for persisting in their refusal to open a separate register for the Nestorians in the wording of the original order, which appears to run thus: "You should register the Nestorians according to the regulation."

The regulation, they assert, provides that in future only three denominational classes of Ottoman subjects are to be recognised—Moslems, Jews, and Christians generally (*i.e.*, one register is to suffice for Protestants, Jacobites, Roman Catholic Chaldæans, &c.).†

* The church referred to is known as Mar Odish. It is in the village of Douri (Amadia kaza), which, I believe, contains some 100 Nestorian families and only three persons professing the Roman Catholic faith. It is traditionally believed to have been built 1,500 years ago by the Nestorians, and has always been a Nestorian church until nine years ago, when the Nestorian priest of the village appears to have declared himself a papist after getting his own name substituted for that of the Nestorian community in the title-deeds of the church. In April last the Nestorians, with some degree of pardonable force, again made themselves masters of their church, whereupon the Roman Catholic authorities prosecuted Mar Yowalhim, the Nestorian bishop for the kaza of Amadia. A judgment was given at Amadia in favour of the Nestorians. Hence the appeal to the court at Mosul.

† Enclosure 2 (which is a copy of Enclosure 2 in Mr. Young's despatch from Mosul, No. 18, of the 15th October last), showing the number of families in the various Christian communities recognised by the authorities of Mosul and registered under separate headings in the official register, gives the lie to this argument as regards the practice even here. This argument has been used by the local authorities before (see despatch from Mosul, No. 18, of the 15th October last), but was dropped a long time ago. Its present revival indicates that they are in considerable straits.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

In answer to this barefaced falsehood, the Nestorians have made the obvious retort that in every other vilayet the different kinds of Christians have separate registers, and have asked why the Nestorians of Mosul should not be treated in this respect like the Nestorians in the Van and Diarbekir vilayets, pointing out further that even in Mosul the Jacobites, Protestants, Roman Catholic Chaldæans, and other Christian communities are registered in the official "Defter" under separate headings.

Their protest continues to be met with a deaf ear, and orders from the central authorities continue to be ignored.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

The Minister of Justice to the Authorities of Mosul Vilayet.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, June 13, 1910.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 10th of Jumadi Evvel (19th May), complaints against the vali having been received because no steps have been taken to separately register the persons in Mosul vilayet who have embraced the Nestorian faith, I confirm my previous communication, and you must take the necessary steps.

Enclosure 5 in No. 38.

CHRISTIAN Communities recognised by the Authorities of Mosul, and by them registered under separate denominational headings in the Official Register.

	Households.
Roman Catholic Chaldæans	750
Syrian Roman Catholics	700
Jacobites	750
Armenian Gregorians	40
Protestants	14
Greek Orthodox	8

[26775] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 492.)
Constantinople, July 18, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul reporting the grant of pardon to the Barzani Sheikh, in spite of efforts of the local authorities of Mosul, and remarking on the desirability of the punishment of persons responsible for the campaign against the sheikh.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Vice-consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28.)
Mosul, July 1, 1910.

Sir,

IN a telegram addressed to your Excellency on the 19th June, I had the honour to report that, in consequence of investigations made by order of Nazim Pasha, the Barzani Sheikh has been pardoned, that Osman Agha* (see despatches Nos. 8 and 11 of the present series) has fled, and that the military operations in the Aera district have been suspended. Further, the release has been ordered of some 150 persons arrested or captured in the course of the campaign and confined in prison here and at

* In the course of the investigations at Aera it appears to have been ascertained that a fusillade, to which the Ottoman troops at Bir-i-Kepri (six hours from Aera) were constantly subjected from the neighbouring hills, was kept up by persons employed by Osman Agha, who represented it as the doing of the sheikh's men.

Rowandooz, together with the sheikh's womenfolk, and by order of the central authorities a grant of £T. 1,000 is to be made to the sheikh from the revenues of this vilayet.

The pardoning of the sheikh is a well-deserved humiliation inflicted by a higher authority on the local officials, who, in league with certain corrupt local notables, have hitherto tried to pose as superior to any superintending control.

These classes are not only disappointed of their quarry, but as the sheikh has been pronounced innocent, they fear that their own guilt will be exposed. Hence they are leaving no stone unturned to obstruct the present trend of events, and telegrams have been sent to Constantinople both by the local authorities themselves and by private individuals acting in concert with them, protesting that the sheikh is a danger to the peace and that the pardon granted him will be an encouragement to rebellion.

To these the central authorities seem to have wisely abstained from replying.

Certain persons are at present soliciting signatures for a further petition in the same sense, which is intended, by its imposing dimensions, to be sure of commanding attention.* Its most active promoter is one Ala-ed-Din, a man of considerable local influence. Family ties exist between him and the Sheikh Bamarni, of Amadia, a bitter enemy of the Barzani Sheikh, and one of those who, together with the Roman Catholic Chaldæan Archbishop of Mosul and the notorious Reshid Beg, Mir of Berwari, have taken part in gross persecution of the Nestorians in the Tiari district.

The servile population of Mosul, almost devoid of independent thought, and completely incapable of independent action, is used to rendering unquestioning obedience to one or another of the local notables, and through their influence a large number of signatures may be obtained for the petition now under preparation. Hence, the number of signatures obtained would be no test of public opinion, which, if it can be said to exist at all, has from the first favoured the sheikh.

The following estimates, exclusive of military expenditure proper,† of losses entailed by the campaign against the sheikh are probably not excessive:

1. Loss of life—

Officers (a Kol-aghasi and two lieutenants)	3
Rank and file	60
Women and children (butchered by tribal irregular auxiliaries)	130
An unknown number of the sheikh's followers.	

2. Direct pecuniary losses to the State—

	£T.
In tithes on ruined crops	10,000
In sheep tax	15,000

3. Other losses—

Some 40,000 sheep and 2,000 oxen, cows, and mules stolen by the tribal irregular auxiliaries.
Eighty villages sacked and destroyed.

The investigations made appear to have established the sheikh's innocence. Unless they are carried further and show who were the real authors of the war (see despatch from Mosul, No. 8 of the 9th March last, and paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 11 of the 31st March last), the State is likely to be involved in further campaigns in the interests of the same persons, involving further loss of life, funds, and prestige.

So long as these persons are at large, no attempted reform in this district can have any advantageous result.

The movements of troops resulting from the termination of the Aera campaign are detailed in paragraph 1 of despatch from Mosul, No. 32 of to-day's date.

Only two companies of the 2nd battalion of the 31st Regiment (detached from the IVth Army Corps) now remain at Aera.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

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* This observation is made because the central authorities have, on previous occasions, acted on petitions got up in the interests of dishonest individuals or cliques, and represented as an expression of public opinion in view of the number of signatures attached. The Roman Catholic Chaldæan Archbishop resorted to this means in the hope of obtaining the expulsion of Mar Elias from Mosul (see despatch from Mosul, No. 6, of the 24th February last).

† For more than sixteen months five battalions were continually employed against the sheikh.

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[26778] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 495.) *Therapia, July 18, 1910.*

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 29th ultimo, I had the honour to forward to you despatches from His Majesty's consular officers at Erzeroum and Bitlis reporting on the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Mousb plain under the governorship of Tahir Pasha. I reported to you on the character of this official in my despatch No. 278 of the 3rd May last, and there are good authorities who consider that, were he left to himself, he would introduce a greater measure of order. But the state of affairs in the Armenian provinces seems to depend upon the line of action taken by the committee at Constantinople. At the outset, upon the proclamation of the constitution, there was promise of an entirely new era; the destruction of Ibrahim Pasha and his power struck terror into the hearts of the other great Kurdish chiefs who desisted from their unrestrained tyranny which, it must be remembered, was exercised with almost equal severity over the sedentary Kurds or Kurds of another tribe to that of the chief, as over the Armenians, and there was a very marked rapprochement between the Kurdish and Armenian peoples. This, however, by no means suited the book of the powers that be at Constantinople, who prefer that dissention should prevail between the two. Whereas at the beginning promises had been made to the Armenians that the land question should be taken in hand alone, and they should be restored to the lands of which they hold title-deeds, and of which they had wrongfully been dispossessed by the Kurdish chiefs, it must be remembered, rather than to the ordinary Kurdish peasantry—now this matter of plain justice is being presented in another light: it is unjust to deprive the Kurds of lands of which they are now in possession, and it is wrong of the Armenians —and might become a source of danger to them—to claim it, though perhaps some compensation is due to them for having lost their lands. The Armenians, on the other hand, urge that the Government should compensate any Kurds who are to be dispossessed, but that church and monastery lands and those of private Armenians who still hold the title-deeds should be restored to their lawful owners whose fathers and ancestors have been born and laboured on such lands, and are consequently attached to them. The committee's idea is expressed in a characteristic way in the article from the "Tanin," which I have the honour to enclose a copy herewith.

This paper, in another article, accuses the Armenians of trying to make trouble instead of reconciling their differences. The Armenian papers, it says, when printing news from the six vilayets, use unrestrained language about the "usurpers." It would be far better if they showed more self-control. The constitution is better occupied in working for the future than in avenging the past. If the Armenians are not careful the Kurds will become alarmed and cause trouble. If the "Tanin" thought the Kurds were doing real harm to the people it would speak otherwise. In overthrowing a tyranny gradual means must be used; ignorance must first be banished by education. Many of the "usurpers" may become useful citizens.

It is now the turn of the Kurdish chiefs to receive encouragement, and thus these chiefs who had fled into Persia are now seen returning to their homes, welcomed on the way and feasted by the Vali of Van; and it is clear that the "Tanin" indicates the course which the Government intend to adopt over the Armenian land question—there will be little or no restitution.

The latest reports I have received from Mr. Safrastian reiterate his charges against Tahir Pasha, to whom, he says, orders to repress with severity the turbulent elements have been sent by the Porte, on representations made by the Patriarch, but with very little result.

All that can be done at present is to leave the matter in the hands of the patriarchate and of the Armenian deputies, who are best able to draw out of the tangle the greatest share of advantage that is possible for their compatriots.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Extract from the "Tanin" of July 5 and 6, 1910.

Turks, Kurds, and Armenians,

IN order to get a clear view of the Armenian-Turkish relations and to appreciate their respective virtues and faults it is necessary to look at the question from as far off as possible. An article recently published in our paper is a very clear proof of this. It was an article in the New York paper, the "Gushnak," by a certain Dr. Sinbat Gabrilian, taking a very non-partisan view of the question. The writer only dealt with the relations between Armenians and Turks; we shall talk of those between Armenians and Kurds. To those who think properly a mixture of various natures and characters in one country is an excellent thing. As the differences between individuals were the cause of the happy principle of division of labour, so also the difference of natures in nations and their various virtues, and even faults, produces an international division of labour. In proportion as this international division of labour is bounded by walls and progress-killing limits, so also the fruits of this division of labour become limited. But when, as in Turkey, there are no boundaries to it, then it is proportionately productive of progress, and the ambitions of the State which has become a "common family" become realised. From this point of view the Ottoman Empire is a good example. Taking into consideration, also, the differences of climate, that degree of success which might be acquired elsewhere by the mutual aid of the parts of a country can here only be attained in its entirety by a nation under the influence and domination of a single Government.

The various characteristics of different nationalities of the Ottoman Empire ought not to clash but to run parallel with each other. History shows that the various nationalities of the Ottoman Empire were meant to live side by side in peace, and not exterminate each other. The climate of the East does not permit the destructive development sometimes seen in other nations. The writer above referred to only dealt with the relations between Armenians and Turks, but a large part of the Armenian race live in closer contact with the Kurds, so we will examine also the characteristics of the Kurds. It is impossible to deny that from the point of view of national character it is not impossible to put an end to the differences between the two races. On the contrary, many of the customs and peculiarities of one race are common to the other, and those which are different in the two serve to supply defects rather than rouse dissension. The Kurd is warlike, but at the same time amenable to Government; very pious but not intolerant, quick-tempered but forgiving. Though a large part of the Kurdish land is a stony desert, yet he is of a generous disposition. Respect for superiors and the observance of "hierarchichal order" even in the family are among the principal qualities of the Kurds. These characteristics are not lacking in the Armenian; but the Armenian has some qualities which the Kurd has not. For instance, he is quick-witted in commerce, but the Kurd, on the other hand, is a cultivator and agriculturist. While the Armenian, through his schools, religious order, and by wealth and trade, has acquired certain other advantages, the Kurd, unfortunately, has not yet obtained these benefits. In brief the Armenian element can live in concord with the Turks on Turkish soil and with the Kurds on Kurdish soil. The blood-stained events of the last reign cast unhappily a black shadow over the recent Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Kurd relations. The only thing to do is to reckon them as a misfortune incidental to the wretched happenings of the last reign and to forget them. As the writer of the article says the Armenians are hyper-sensitive. Dr. Gabrilian says "The Armenians were projected on to the political field in 1878 through their own sensitiveness. They thought that the fundamental policy of the powers consisted in forming an union in the name of Christianity. . . . . The committee of union and progress succeeded in bringing about the Ottoman revolution without shedding a drop of blood." Yes, hyper-sensitiveness is the same as having extravagant ideas. Those who have one have the other. If in the last reign a portion of the Armenians had not been quite so ready to consider the Turks as a decadent race incapable of being roused, if they had not as a consequence entertained certain false ideas, the black blot the writer mentions would never have sullied their history. If the Armenians had thought sooner what they thought after the constitution, and had set about the assistance of the common fatherland in a different way, they would have avoided the disaster. During the last reign the Armenian committee published so many true and false reports that the most enlightened Armenians were deceived into believing that a hope of separation had arisen. Then

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the intervention of the powers and the pressure brought to bear on Turkey increased this feeling.

This came from the false ideas of inexperienced people, and a bitter and mournful experience taught the Armenians that there was no alternative but to be born, live and die in Ottoman territory. The men who some time ago entered the bank, demonstrated in front of the Sublime Porte, and travelled from place to place in Anatolia as Armenian victims, if they had performed these acts of self-sacrifice, not only in the name of their Armenian fellow-countrymen but in the name of all Ottomans, their country would have been indebted to them to a greater extent than they imagined, and the union which has now been accomplished through reason and necessity would have been sealed by sentiment and affection. However, if one thinks reasonably it is a great incentive to blot out the nightmare of the past. It is a more worthy action for the vital being of a people to get ready by joining hand to hand for the sake of the glorious results which the future holds in store than to reflect on this unprofitable past.

To expand and explain the idea more fully we are of opinion that between the Armenian and Turkish elements in Constantinople and other large commercial centres there exists no real discord worth mentioning. If at the present moment there is a point which occupies the Armenian political press and political circles, it is the "six vilayets." News about the districts are sometimes exaggerated by our Armenian fellow-countrymen; and a certain bad feeling is continually kept up, the removal of which is desired by both parties. Before all we beg our Armenian comrades to weigh well the meaning of the opinions they express about the news from Kurdistan. As an extra gram of arsenic poisons a dose, so a few too many or too violent words poison the mind. Here on the table words slip easily from the point of the pen, but afterwards deep and unhappy traces are left which hurt the feelings of *amour-propre* of a whole nation.

Certain papers, and especially the "Azadamard," making use of more moderate and just language limit their complaint to the subject of the people they call "usurpers," and use the strongest and most insulting epithets in speaking of them. This must be reckoned as a sign of progress deserving thanks. However, would it not be a more cautious and politic action to restrain their words in talking of these men, and only to speak evil of those who actually are seen to be evil? Because it is necessary to examine their position before and after the constitution. Before the constitution, profiting by the universal lawlessness and individual immunity, they performed many tyrannical deeds; but since then, a great fear and dread having seized them all, they have repented. As the constitution exists to assure the future rather than to avenge the past, it was forced to accept these penitents whether genuine or not until their acts proved the latter. It was impossible to purify the annals of a whole reign. From this point of view we are sure Armenians will agree with us. So, even when speaking of usurpers, too great freedom must not be used. Because otherwise the principal people in the country will say to themselves "this new Government will sooner or later take its vengeance and destroy us," and, becoming scared, will naturally be the cause of disastrous events. If in the country of these usurpers there were sensible poor people, and if they thought that the "usurpers" would really do them harm, then we could show these people the path which their real interests mark out for them, but we have proof of the opposite. It is ignorance which throws them into the hands of those who hurt them. A fortress cannot be taken by force till it has first been shelled. To fire off a whole battery before first preparing people's minds by education, and removing to some extent at least ignorance, does more harm than good (*sic*).

When education becomes general, certainly usurpation will cease of itself. People who before were called the worst usurpers may become the most useful element. These observations show the need for caution in the objections which are printed in the papers. If a writer uses a style as though he were in France, he is responsible for his abuse of a lofty and delicate duty. In the six vilayets no important political events have taken place since the constitution; but the past has left a mutual distrust between the two parties. The Kurd watches the Armenian and the Armenian the Kurd. If the Kurd sees several Armenians collecting, he says, with alarm, "Are they going to form committees again and use bombs?" The Armenian if he see several gentlemen gathered together in a Kurd's house suspects fresh massacres.

July 6, 1910.

The Armenians in Anatolia.

This mutual mistrust between the Armenians and the Kurds; which at present we shall consider as puerile and ridiculous, is fostered by thoughtless articles; and if on the other side ignorance is encouraged, it may bring about disastrous consequences. We think this scare ought to be suppressed. The Kurds ought to understand that the Armenians have accepted Ottomanism and the constitution, and the Armenians, for their part, ought to realise that the Kurds, so long as their religious feelings, their property, and their *amour-propre* are not interfered with, will not perform acts of aggression. As the Government will maintain a strict impartiality, and will at once take action to stop any attacks or faults which may take place on either side, there must naturally remain no cause of terror. It is, and ought to be, impossible to think otherwise in the event of any strong excitement being provoked by sensitiveness or old grudges. Therefore it is necessary to warn the Armenians not to interfere with the Kurds' feelings, and to show them that it is impossible to introduce a state of order and perfection like that of Switzerland immediately after the constitution has come into force; and the Kurds must be taught that since the constitution the Armenians are a real and integral part of the Empire, and that now, as before, they must live side by side with them. The first thing necessary is that the two races should be sure of each other. It is probable that certain foreign agitators in the guise either of Kurdish agas or members of the committee will attempt to stir up discord by pamphlets, or even by speeches meant to incite them, for their own purposes. It is essential for the peace and tranquillity of both sides that these should not be listened to.

But it is above all things necessary to increase the union between the two elements, and especially to settle the land question which has been the cause of so much talk during the last two years.

The more clear-seeing among our compatriot Armenians who are so impatient about this question doubtless see that it cannot be solved in a moment. The Government will make every sacrifice to find a solution which will hurt neither party.

The returning Armenians shall not remain landless. For this the State has decided to make a sacrifice of 50,000, 60,000, or even 100,000 liras. But the problem demands that neither the Kurd should lose his land nor the Armenian remain landless. To take from the land of the one and give to the other is not a means of solving the difficulty, but rather a cause of division and discord. In our opinion, if moderation and quiet are observed, and hand is stretched out to hand in a sincere manner, the Kurdish-Armenian question will be cleared of difficulties.

[26780] No. 41.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 497.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 19, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on German enterprise and activity in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Vice-Consul Rawlins to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Sir, *Adana, July 6, 1910.*

OWING to the great activity and increasing influence of the Germans in this district I humbly beg to transmit the following report, which will show, I think, clearly the preponderant position which that country is gaining in this part of Turkey.

The most important German society here is naturally the Bagdad Company, with

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Herr Winkler is local director and his large staff of engineers and surveyors. These gentlemen are most exclusive, hold together, and even seem to be unwilling to mix in any foreign society whatever. I may just here remark, perhaps, that although I myself have had several conversations with Herr Winkler in his office he has never come to this vice-consulate, either for social or official purposes. As evidence of what I may call this exclusiveness I can mention the following incident: A short while ago the Reverend W. Nesbitt Chambers, head of the American Mission in Adana, but himself a British subject, attempted to approach people with a view to obtaining subscriptions and forming an international committee for the hospital here. There is great need for such an institution and the present building is quite inadequate. Mr. Chambers approached me on the subject, and told me that his idea was that the hospital should be as international as possible and that sufferers of every nationality and creed would be admitted. I immediately saw the benefits of such an institution and promised him my support. The Imperial Ottoman Bank was also approached, and most willingly agreed to help with subscriptions. The Deutsche Orient Bank also lent an ear to the proposal, but did not give any definite answer. When, however, the same matter was brought to Herr Winkler's notice as head of the Bagdad Construction it met with a most cool reception, and a few days later—after a meeting between the German consul and the heads of the German colony—Mr. Chambers was given to understand that the Bagdad Company was unwilling to contribute. The Deutsche Levantinische Baumwoll-Gesellschaft took the same course, and the Deutsche Orient Bank will presumably follow suit. This means that no money will be given by any of the Germans for this purpose. On the contrary, they have decided to build at once a hospital themselves, which will be a thoroughly German institution, and to which, I hear, only Germans and employés of the Bagdad line will be admitted.

The railway company have also a co-operative stores at Mersina, which is only to be used by employés of the company, and it is said that a German club may also be formed to which none but Germans will be admitted.

The German doctor, paid by the Bagdad Company, is a new arrival. He was formerly a military doctor (captain) and is noted among the Germans themselves for being, as they call him, very "Komniss," which can only be translated, perhaps, by a term such as "an ultra-jingoist."

As to the local influence of the Bagdad Company, I must frankly acknowledge that it is great and also evident. Besides, the company makes a great "show," a fact which goes a long way towards producing an impression on the Oriental mind. For instance, the company's offices are, for Adana, imposing, and they were the best decorated in the town on the occasion of the Sultan's birthday. Minor details, such as the residence of the director (one of the most expensive houses in Adana) and his smart German carriages, &c., all go to impress still further the native mind.

Then there is the Mersina–Adana Railway with Herr Endricks as director. The latter is a young and extremely capable man, formerly an officer in a German dragoon regiment. He runs the railway on the sternest Prussian discipline lines, and has the reputation of being a pronounced Anglophobe. He is, of course, hand-in-glove with the Bagdad Company and the two railways may be counted as one. I believe that I am right in saying that there is not a single British subject on the Mersina–Adana line or even in the Bagdad Company, and a Maltese came to me the other day and begged for my help, if needs be, as he feared that he would be dismissed from the Bagdad Company upon some pretext, as they had found out that he was a British subject—a fact that he had concealed when making his application.

The Deutsche Orient Bank has branches at Mersina and Adana, and the latter branch carries on business in a lavish and advertising way. I may mention that a large German flag and a Turkish one are flown daily at this branch. The director, a Herr Mordtmann, is most energetic, but seemingly rather tactless in his conversation, unless he believes in open-speaking. When speaking with me the other day he went so far as to say that "whether the vali or even the Turkish Government liked it or not, the whole of this district was practically in Germany's hands and would be so *ipso facto* very shortly."

I have heard that he often talks in this strain, and does not mind who his hearers are. He is also, so it is said, going to introduce a German company to compete with British traction engines, threshers, and machinery in general, and if any future good luck attends his efforts one of our sole important markets here will be crippled.

Another large German firm here is the Deutsche Levantinische Baumwoll-Gesellschaft, with Herrn Stockle and Lutz as directors. This company has fine buildings, employs a great many people, and has been mentioned in the Trade Report

for 1908, and in a despatch of my predecessor to His Majesty's Ambassador (24th January, 1910).

Besides these large societies, there are the German commercial houses of Mersina, &c., and it is impossible for one not to be struck with the German expansion in this district.

As to British trade, we have an agency of Whittall and Co., and another British firm or two, but there are so few signs of British interest here, that I am continually met by people of other nationalities who naively express to me their astonishment at the few English people to be found or seen in these parts, and the lack of British enterprise.

That things are not so bad as this as regards trade can happily be proved by a glance at the trade reports for this district, wherein it can be seen that Great Britain's trade with Mersina and Adana has never been unimportant; but I confess to quite understanding that people dwelling here in Adana do not trouble to look at trade reports and statistics before they make such remarks, but are forced to express their astonishment, as I stated above, when they see all these Germans, Italians, French, &c., around them, and the activity and energy of all these latter daily before their eyes.

I have, &c.
E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[23782] No. 42.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 499.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 19, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, respecting the state of affairs in the Montefik district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Bussorah, June 25, 1910.*

I HAVE received the following information regarding the state of affairs in the Montifik district:—

Yusuf Pasha, who was in charge of "reforms" there, has been recalled to Bagdad. The troops have all been withdrawn, and only a battalion of Nizamiés left. The Turkish Government is quite powerless there, and revenue cannot be collected. Steamers, lighters, and boats can only navigate the Euphrates in safety if accompanied by an Arab escort, and on payment of gratifications to any tribesmen who oppose their passage and choose to blackmail the passing craft. A kaimakam of Refiis passing down-river was set on by Arabs and insulted, his fez being knocked off, his clothes torn, and he himself being hustled and spat upon. The assistant public prosecutor of Nassriye, who has just arrived here, states that the Government is held in derision by the Arabs, and that officials are publicly insulted both by the Arabs and their women in the streets. The Acting Mutessarif of Nassriye, while passing down-river in a steam-launch with an Arab escort, was stoned and fired upon from the banks. The sight of a fez is an abomination, and is not tolerated outside any of the towns, and those who venture to wear one are assaulted and derided. Many officials have resigned their posts. The Turkish garrison having been withdrawn from Suk-es-Shiyukh, the Turkish flag has been lowered at the barracks. The flag affords no protection. The arrears of taxes claimed by the Government are said to amount to more than £T. 200,000, and to date from the year 1300.

The vali leaves for Montifik to-day to negotiate with the sheikhs. I understand the Arabs are quite out of hand, and that, even though the sheikhs themselves may be amenable to reason, their tribesmen are thoroughly dissatisfied with the prolonged misgovernment of the country, and will not obey their leaders.

The only course for the Turks appears to be to waive these large arrears of taxes,

a great portion of which have no doubt been already paid and misappropriated, and to send some clean-handed officials to carry on on equitable lines, backed by a military contingent to enforce their orders when necessary.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[26784] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 501.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 20, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a report in Arabic from Seyyid Muhammad-ibn-Ali-ibn-Idris to Suleiman Pasha, mutessarif and commandant of Assir, in regard to the condition of affairs among the Arab population of Assir district.

The original of this translation comes from what I believe to be a genuine source, and shows the fairly good relations established between Seyyid Idris and the Ottoman authorities in Assir. As you will observe, the cardinal condition laid down in the enclosed report is respect for the "Sheri," or sacred law.

Suleiman Pasha had considerable experience in the Yemen and Assir under the old régime. He was commander of the Selimié barracks at Scutari, Constantinople, to the time of the mutinous outbreak of the 13th April, 1909, and he subsequently offered to serve in Assir, and was appointed to the position which he now holds.

I have sent a copy of this translation to His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Report in Arabic from Seyyid Muhammad-ibn-Ali-ibn-Idris to Suleiman Pasha, Mutessarif and Commandant of Assir.

(Translation.)
(Greetings and compliments.)

COMPARED with Imam Yahya and Ibn Assoud and other Arab chiefs, the loyalty with which we are bound to the Government is very great. Moreover, praise be to God! we have greater dignity than these chiefs. They do not fail to show us respect and reverence, and Imam Yahya has even given up ruling and occupying many "points" and "mountain lands" on our account. Ibn Sooud, too, who levied a tax of 2 reals on every camel belonging to the Kahtan tribes, who go backwards and forwards between his territory and Jabaya, resolved to abolish this tax out of respect for us. Our efforts and perseverance are directed towards bringing about the unity of the nation and promoting the honour and glory of the Empire. We therefore hope that our services will meet with the approval and satisfaction of the Government. We believe that our good intentions and our sincerity have been shown and proved to the Government in repeated communications from yourself, from Seyyid Pasha, and from Sheikh Muhammad Towfik. After these proofs and evidences it would break our hearts if any attention was paid to the tales of our opponents and we were regarded with doubt and suspicion; such an attitude would also damage the cause of the unity which we desire. It is therefore most important that no attention should be paid to idle tales and lies. As to the reason for Seyyid Mustapha's being sent to Ardie, it arose, as we told you before, from the necessity of settling the Bilkurn (? Kilburn) incident and reforming Habad. He succeeded in reforming Ardie, and he reformed the tribes in the parts near Ardie in our name also, and reduced them to terms and submission. The other tribes and nomads are also all inclined towards us and obedient to our rule. When Seyyid Pasha was with us I explained to him in detail about Seyyid Arar's being sent as an official to the Kahtan, and gave him a copy of the instructions I had given Seyyid Arar. Seyyid Yahya was with you at that time, and gave you sufficient information about the matter. After Seyyid Mustapha they were (he was?) sent to SeyyidAhmed-bin-Khurshan, Zuleid, and Bin Hassan, for there were several untoward incidents which they were sent to clear up. The day before I sent you this proclamation it was sent to the Bedouin tribes around Rab'ie, and a few days before to a group composed of the Hussein, Sabia, Melha, and Ju'a-fura tribes; for

some of the Rab'ie tribes had made an attempt to kill a man on the road. Our object in persevering to carry out such useful and proper reforms, and in appointing and choosing good and virtuous men to enforce the law, was to correct and punish rebels and maintain order.

In order to bring about this security we have been compelled to put our lives in danger.

Among the tribes and the nomads there are some seditious and ignorant men who pay respect and obedience to no one. Even Seyyid Mustapha, too, was several times in danger of death. In order to support and, in case of need, to help the force we sent to reform the said seditious tribes, we went in person as far as the boundaries of these tribes. No power to hear and arrange important affairs was given by us to Seyyid Mustapha and other persons sent for reforms; their duty was merely to bring about a pacification, to ensure that the tribes should not prevent the passage of travellers, and to keep the roads protected and safe from all attack and open to passage. All our men are compelled to apply to us to settle other important affairs and incidents . . . . [unintelligible] . . . .; for such commands appertain to ourselves. In accordance with the decisions we came to with you, your humble servant will look after the affairs of these parts until the Government and other officials have become accustomed to carrying out the administration according to the commands of the Sheri; for as the people cannot trust anyone but ourselves, it is certain that if they do not see us among them they will return to their former ignorance and opposition. It is impossible to win the hearts of these people for the Government without us. The state of the nomads and tribes to-day is exactly what is was yesterday. Their is neither order nor prosperity among them; or if there is a little tranquillity and prosperity for the moment, their maintenance depends upon our presence. Our decisions and acts are not confined to Assir; but, although our rule and influence extend to the whole of the Yemen, we see no objection to allowing the officials of the Imperial Government to interfere in the execution of orders and affairs, out of respect for the rights of the sacred Khaliphate. When you, Seyyid and Seyyid Pasha [*sic*] and Sheikh Muhammad Tewfik and Fuad Bey, were here you asked me, in the course of correspondence with the Government, what title I would like. In order to get rid of the emirate, I preferred to receive the grade of Alim (i.e., of the Ulema). You then promised me to recognise me as Mufti of the Yemen, to have titles suitable to the office given to me, and to write to the Government to that effect; but up to the present there is no sign of such an award being made me, nor any news of it. I would therefore inform you that I am writing with great eagerness for the promise to be fulfilled. The granting of the promised name and title would serve to strengthen the project for unity. We are continuing to carry out our promise to settle important and difficult matters. As to carrying out the provisions of the Sheri [meaning doubtful], that we are also doing, as we said. We are very desirous that the Government should appoint the officials who are to be appointed and sent to accompany the men we send to bring the rebels and other opponents into the path of loyalty. In strengthening and confirming the good work which we are trying to do, the award of a grade and suitable title would unquestionably give us great influence among the nomads. The people of these parts cannot be taken by force and severity.

In spite of its great and terrible strength and power, the Government has been unable to ensure obedience and establish tranquillity as it desired to do. Now we possess nothing in the way of material power, but we have nevertheless succeeded in accomplishing many desired objects. The sole cause of these successes is that we treated the Arabs with the kindness and gentleness to which they are accustomed; they saw that our mercy and tenderness was greater than their own parents, and so praised our conduct. From the time when we began to carry out reforms until the present moment the number of persons on whom we have carried out the law of retaliation has not exceeded five. Before carrying it out on them we proposed that the relatives of the murdered persons should accept blood-money in order to get pardon for the guilty persons; but being unable to get the relations to accept blood-money, we were forced willy nilly to exact the penalty of retaliation. This gave the people such great satisfaction that even the condemned, while being taken to execution, hastened submissively and obediently to the place of retaliation. But for the favour of God this sentence of retaliation, which was so easily accomplished, it would have caused much bloodshed; for if there is any great and terrible thing which the Arabs have accepted, it is the law of retaliation. Thus, though acting gently and mildly, both we and our companions have become a place of salvation and refuge for the

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Arabs; and we have managed to make them all inclined towards us through such qualities as treating Arab guests with respect and honour, stretching out a helping hand to such as are in need and softening and taming the barbarous. We have not taken a single real in taxes, as alms ("zekiat") or any other name, from the tribes which submit to us—the Kahtan, the Alma, the Muhail, the Zibran, the Ghamid, and the Ardie—whereas even the kadis of these tribes will not discharge their duties or hear a single case until the tribes have paid them their salaries and incomes in advance. Not only have we taken nothing in the shape of taxes from these tribes and nomads, but our purse is always open to help them. By this means we have won and united the said tribes and induced them to become orderly and tranquil. At present there is not a sign of revolt or dispute amongst them, and they live together in perfect sincerity and amity. This must be considered as a great success, but owing to recent well known events it is difficult at present to lead them further in the way of civilisation and progress. We have to report that it is absolutely necessary for the Government to reduce the taxes and imposts to a suitable point, in accordance to the agreement we came to with you after long and deep discussions and considerations, and to levy alms (the "zekiat," an income tax of a quarter), which is the Government's right, as before. Everyone will admit that the trouble and difficulties we have experienced in reforming the Arabs has wearied both ourselves and our friends. Is it for this world that we have taken such unbearable trouble on ourselves, or in obedience to the commands of God in the Koran? It is to earn this praise that we have done what we have.

Our object in giving these details and explanations is to express the hope that the Government officials who are appointed to accompany our men in these parts may be aware of these points, and that in accordance with this principle men of experience and ability may be chosen. To serve the cause of mutual help and unity wins the approval of God. Our aim and object cannot be denied. What is required of you and me is that we should obey the sacred laws. We approve your remarks about the goods which have been seized. However great the value of the things plundered we are prepared to pay it. Although to demand the return of these goods from the Arabs is as serious a matter as killing them and seizing all their wealth (yet we will do so), and until the whole be demanded from the plundering nomads we send you on account the sum of 10,000 piastres good money, being the equivalent of £T. 100. If we succeed in recovering the said goods we can do nothing but return them to you in full; for however small the Government's loss it is important in our eyes, and we cannot permit any loss at all. As therefore we shall be unable to meet indemnities and claims of this kind we beg you to send the goods and property of the Government with great care and circumspection and by safe means. In the matter of the protection of Government property, the help and supervision of Seyyid Ibn-Hurshan and Sheikh Hassan-ibn-Khader in the sending of the things is worthy of confidence; for their influence in taking charge of Government property is great. There seems to be a necessity of sending money and necessaries from Khizan; we are prepared to employ and get ready a trustworthy band to fetch the things in perfect security to the required place. The nomads of the lands from Dala (Aden hinterland) to Shukiki are mere barbarians and ignorant of civilisation. If anything passes over their lands, it is bound to be exposed to loss; and whatever the loss the Government suffers in those parts it is impossible to make it good or to ask for restitution. We explained this clearly to you when Seyyid Pasha and Sheikh Muhammad Tewfik were here. No demand can be made for restitution, either in kind or in cash, for any goods lost or pillaged in those parts. A few incidents have occurred in those regions lately. The Rab'ie tribe attacked a man, but he managed to escape. It is also said that Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Ahmed has been wounded in your neighbourhood. There has been a murder too among the Beni Shahr, so we have sent Seyyid Mustapha there again. All this will prove clearly how devotedly and untiringly we toil against the seditions. And yet our ill-wishers do not cease to attack us and to cast aspersions upon us; for they think that these aspersions and instigations are received with favour by the Government. But such scoundrels are punished in this world and rejected in the next. (Arabic text unreadable). . . . . The Shekik tribes made an attack on the life of Sheikh Ali-bin-Mubhi but God protected and preserved him. The same tribes seized and plundered the property of Abdullah Salim-al-Masou'na and his brother, Muhammad Effendi Salim, the clerk of the Customs. As the losers of the goods were subject to us, they did not apply to the Government direct for restitution or to any other quarter, but made their complaint straight to us. We therefore sent a proper summons for the members of the tribe who committed the act of pillage to appear before us. God bring the matter to a successful conclusion! In your enlightened wisdom you

are acquainted with the local circumstances, and you have learnt that we shall succeed in ruling and in carrying out reforms in accordance with the sacred law. If God will the result of our work and our efforts will be success.

(The report concludes with a few words of loyalty to the Government and with compliments).

(Sealed with the seal of Muhammad-ibn-Ali-ibn-Muhammad-ibn-Ahmed-ibn-Idris).

[26785] No. 44.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 502.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 20, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the subject of the irrigation works in Mesopotamia.

I think it is possible that Sir W. Willcocks does not realise how disappointed the Turks are with his work. When he gets on to the spot in September, if he does get there, he may realise this, and may then exert himself to finish some one work that will prove of practical benefit to the natives. I adhere to the opinion that the Turks in their present mood would never agree to a commission consisting of English and Indian engineers being called in, and I think that if Sir W. Willcocks is to be kept on in the employ of the Ottoman Government he must come to terms with them on lines which would give them greater control over expenditure.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25. Very Confidential.)

Your Excellency, *Bagdad, June 18, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the execution by Sir William Willcocks of the irrigation works which he had been commissioned by the Turkish Government to design and carry out in Mesopotamia.

2. As I shall be obliged in this despatch to make suggestions that are probably distasteful to Sir William Willcocks, I may be allowed to state at the outset that Sir William is my personal friend—at least, I consider him to be so—and that I have always taken, and still take, the strongest interest in the success of his great undertaking. I was present at his original lecture on the "Regeneration of Chaldæa," delivered at Cairo in the winter of 1902–3; I met him again at Bagdad in the winter of 1904–5, he being then engaged in his preliminary reconnaissance of Mesopotamia and I in collecting information for the "Persian Gulf Gazetteer," and both of us being guests in the British residency; and, since my appointment to Bagdad as political resident last November, I have maintained close relations with him and afforded him, as I think your Excellency is aware, the fullest degree of assistance which was consistent with his position as an employé of the Turkish Government and with mine as the representative of a foreign Power. My attitude towards Sir William Willcocks and his undertakings up to the end of last May is sufficiently explained in my monthly summaries of events:—

November 1909, V, 1.
December 1909, January 1910, V, 9.
February 1910, V, 8.
March 1910, V, 5 and IX, 1 (the latter in three places).
April–May 1910, V, 9.

To these may be added some remarks in my Tour Journal No. 1 of 1910, under the date 23rd December.

3. Up to the middle of April at least, when I left Bagdad for a six weeks' tour

into Kurdistan, I believed that the irrigation works were progressing as satisfactorily as was possible in the circumstances; and I considered such difficulties as Sir William Willcocks was experiencing to be due to the reluctance of the Turkish Government to meet his financial requirements as they arose, and that their reluctance was unjustifiable. During my absence on tour, however, a new local Government, more influential and, I believe, more intelligent and better informed than that which had preceded it, was established at Bagdad under a specially selected Governor-General in the person of Nazim Pasha; and it was with something approaching to dismay that I learned, on my return to Bagdad, that this new administration had assumed an attitude very hostile to the continuance of the works under Sir William Willcocks's uncontrolled management. I have not failed to report to your Excellency by telegram the subsequent developments of the case as they arose.

4. The views of the new local Government, which were conveyed* to me in a perfectly friendly and courteous manner through the vali's political secretary, were such as compelled me to reconsider my own; and it now appears to me, on reflection, that the anxiety of the local Government in regard to Sir William Willcocks's proceedings is neither unnatural or unreasonable. They find that a large sum—large, at least, for a country as poor as Turkey is at the present juncture—has been spent on repairs to the old Hindiyah Barrage, and that the efficiency of that work has not been improved by the expenditure. On the contrary, they hear it asserted in some quarters that the barrage is actually in a more precarious condition than it was before it was taken in hand by Sir William Willcocks's engineers; and, whether this assertion be true or not, there is no independent authority here capable of giving them a reliable assurance that the money spent on it has not been wasted. At the same time they know that Sir William is proceeding energetically, so far as the financial restrictions which they have imposed on him admit, with other works of a larger and more expensive nature. In these circumstances they cannot but ask themselves whether, supposing Sir William Willcocks to have been unfortunate enough to miscalculate what was required in the case of the old barrage, any guarantee exists that he has not fallen into similar miscalculations in regard to the new and more important works in progress, on which the future of the country largely depends.

5. Your Excellency will observe that in the preceding observations I am very far from assuming that Sir William Willcocks has committed any mistakes; and I venture to hope that the result of an expert enquiry would be to vindicate his policy and exonerate him from all blame. But it seems to me, with due deference, that a point has been reached at which the Porte are at least entitled to reconsider the terms on which they have engaged him. So far as I am aware,† the Porte did not, before retaining Sir William Willcocks's services, consult the British, Indian, or Egyptian Governments, or, indeed, any other expert body, in regard to his qualifications as a designing and constructing engineer. It also appears to me that they have hitherto treated him to an unbounded confidence, such as could hardly with safety be reposed by any Government in the judgment of any single individual, however gifted. Now, however, that their anxiety has been excited by Sir William Willcocks's apparent failure in his first task, they appear disposed to rush to the opposite extreme and virtually to condemn all his proceedings before any expert investigation of them has taken place. I can only conjecture the intentions of the Porte in this matter, but if they are such as the indications here lead me to suppose, they would seem to be unfair to Sir William Willcocks, and perhaps prejudicial to the interests of the Porte itself. I need not enlarge on the injury to the prestige of British engineering which would ensue if the case were to be brought to a summary (and in all probability unjust) conclusion by the Porte's dispensing with Sir William Willcocks's services, for it is sufficiently obvious. It is more necessary, perhaps, to draw attention to the financial losses which the Turkish Government themselves would undoubtedly suffer if everything that Sir William Willcocks had done up to the present time were to be hastily thrown on one side, and the whole question of the irrigation of Mesopotamia taken up again *de novo*, perhaps without any countervailing advantage.

6. I venture very respectfully to suggest that the whole matter should be examined by a competent technical commission, which, as the reputation of an eminent British engineer is at stake, ought to include one or two British irrigation experts. As the countries in which irrigation has been brought to the highest perfection are India and

* *Vide* my telegram of the 10th June to your Excellency.

† The vali's political secretary gave me, in confidence, an account of the manner of Sir William's engagement, which seemed to show, if correct, that the Porte had acted without proper caution in the matter.

Egypt, and as both of those countries resemble Mesopotamia, which is probably intermediate between them in character, a British engineer with experience of both, or two British engineers with separate experience of each, might suitably, it would seem, be nominated to such a commission. The first duty of the commission would be to investigate and report on Sir William Willcocks's proceedings hitherto; a second and more important duty would be to examine his programme of unfinished works or works not even begun, to consider whether it is satisfactory both in general design and in detail, and to suggest, if necessary, modifications; and a third duty, hardly inferior in importance to the second, would be to advise as to the manner in which the works should be financed—viz., whether by loan with a view to rapid and simultaneous execution, or by annual grants from revenue, which might (from some points of view) be more suitable. This last is a very important question, which, so far as I have means of knowing, has not yet been adequately discussed. I may note in passing that it is useless suddenly to cover a country with canals if the agricultural population is insufficient to take advantage of them, and cannot be rapidly increased.

7. It seems to me, with all respect, that a programme properly considered and approved by an expert commission, after examining the surveys and (if necessary) the country itself, is the only proper basis for an undertaking so momentous as the irrigation of Mesopotamia. I cannot imagine the Government of India, for example, allowing a scheme of such magnitude to proceed on the *ipse dixit* of even the most distinguished engineer in the world. Yet this apparently has been the position here up to the present time; for it can hardly be imagined that the Turkish Ministry of Public Works disposes of the services of experts competent to check or criticise the proposals of Sir William Willcocks.

8. Expense and some delay are inseparable from resort to a commission; but the expense, if my view is correct, would be a prudent insurance and safeguard against the occurrence of grave and irreparable mistakes, and the delay might be reduced to a minimum by concentrating for the present on survey work (if any remains to be done) and on excavations such as those for the new Hindiyah Barrage (if they appear at all clearly to be necessary and useful), and by keeping together, with some reduction of the total expenditure, the best part of the staff of executive engineers whom Sir William Willcocks has collected, and who have by this time acquired a valuable knowledge of local conditions.

9. In conclusion I would apologise to your Excellency for the unusual length of this despatch, which I trust, however, may be considered to be justified by the vital importance to the new Government of Turkey on the subject with which it deals. It is, in fact, the first great measure of internal development which that Government has undertaken, and it would be a deplorable circumstance if it were to fail to answer their expectations, and if the cause of failure were to be the unsupervised proceedings of a distinguished British engineer.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, *I.C.S., Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[26960] No. 45.

Mr. Lynch to Foreign Office.—(Received July 25.)

Sir, 33, *Pont Street, London, July* 22, 1910.

I AM much obliged to you for your letter of the 21st instant, and for the reply which you have kindly furnished to the request which I made verbally at the Foreign Office on the 14th instant that I might be informed in what quarters, quite independent of the Turkish Government, apprehension had been expressed as to the effects of the proposed fusion between the British and Turkish steam-ship interests on the River Tigris.

In reply, I would beg to refer you to the letter addressed to you by the secretary of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company on the 20th instant, conveying the gist of further advices on the subject just received from the agents of the company in Bagdad. The manager of the company, Mr. F. W. Parry, who is responsible for these advices, is a man who has had a long and thorough experience of the country and people. He has made it clear in his various reports that the agitation against the scheme was organised in quarters closely connected with the Government, and it was

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certainly initiated by the deputy Sassoon Effendi, who has for several years been in close touch with the German Embassy in Constantinople, and who made a special visit to Bagdad at the time when the negotiations were in progress. I think you will realise the difficulty which the manager of a private enterprise encounters in combating unassisted intrigues set on foot by a personage of this kind in close touch with Government circles in Constantinople. Mr. Parry's efforts, however, appear now to be bearing fruit.

In order that they may be crowned with success, I would submit the following proposal: As the Turkish Government have offered their steamers for sale to native merchants in Bagdad without meeting with any response, the Turkish Government might be asked to offer their moiety of the share capital of the proposed new Ottoman company under the fusion scheme for subscription to the natives of Bagdad, Bussorah, and Mosul. I have little doubt that, if the merchants of these important centres were given an opportunity in this way of direct participation in the enterprise, any objections which they may still entertain would be removed. Such an offer would be a complete answer to the insinuations which have been spread abroad that the enterprise would be conducted without consideration for local interests.

In conclusion, permit me to remind you that the fusion project was originally formed at the instance of the Foreign Office for the purpose of preventing the extension of German influence into an established field of British commerce. In view of the methods employed by Germany in promoting her railway projects in Asia Minor, the object aimed at was in the nature of self-defence. In order to prevent its accomplishment, German agents have skilfully fomented local opposition; and I submit that it will be disastrous to acquiesce in such a situation. I would also respectfully urge that the forthcoming visit of the Turkish Minister of Finance to this country offers a favourable opportunity to His Majesty's Government for regulating a situation which otherwise is likely rapidly to pass out of their control.

I have handed a copy of this letter to the secretary of the Euphrates and Tigris Company.

I have, &c.
H. F. B. LYNCH.

[25713] No. 46.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, respecting the site for the Government coal depôt at Koweit.

I am to state for the information of Viscount Morley that Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposal to sanction the selection of the site for the concession agreed upon by the local officers, and to leave its boundaries without formal demarcation.

Sir E. Grey further concurs in the proposal to postpone consideration of the the question of transferring the coal depôt from Bushire to Koweit pending the receipt of detailed estimates now in course of preparation; but he agrees that there is no objection to the adoption of the site for the depôt recommended in Major Cox's letter of the 8th August, 1909.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[27172] No. 47.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to India Office of the 20th July, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 25th July, relative to the Abu Musa oxide question.

India Office, July 26, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 25, 1910.

REFERENCE is invited to fourth paragraph of letter dated the 5th ultimo from resident, Persian Gulf, forwarded with letter dated the 30th ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, in regard to Abu Musa. We should be glad to be informed if consideration has been given, and, if so, with what result, to suggestion of resident, Persian Gulf, that question should be settled by commercial compromise.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 25, 1910.

REFERENCE is invited to your telegram of the 5th May regarding Abu Musa, and to correspondence sent with letters of the 9th and 30th ultimo and 14th instant, respectively, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Views expressed in second paragraph of letter dated the 15th ultimo, from resident, Persian Gulf, have our support. Your instructions are solicited.

If it is agreed by His Majesty's Government that Hassan should now cease all operations, we propose that suggestion in third paragraph of above-quoted letter from resident, Persian Gulf, viz., that owners be called upon to remove load gear from island, should be approved. Letter dated the 2nd May from resident, Persian Gulf, referred to in this paragraph, was sent to India Office with weekly letter dated the 28th May, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

[27196] No. 48.

Count Metternich to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *German Embassy, July* 26, 1910.

MESSRS. WÖNCKHAUS AND Co., of Lingah, propose to ship a further 400 to 500 tons of the oxide already ordered ("gefordert") by them from the Island of Abu Musa. Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, the British consul-general at Bushire, has, however, refused to allow the oxide to be shipped, and the efforts of the German vice-consul to obtain a modification of this decision have remained without effect.

In their memorandum of the 10th January, 1908, the British Government gave the assurance that all oxide already ordered by the firm of Wönckhaus could be shipped by them, and they confirmed this assurance in their notes of the 4th and 23rd July, 1908.

In April 1908 Messrs. Wönckhaus shipped a large quantity of the oxide lying on the beach on board the steam-ship "Louise," but some 400 tons was still left lying on the shore, while about 3,000 tons was lying near the second mine in the interior of the island. In your Excellency's *note verbale* of the 4th July, 1908, it is expressly mentioned that these two quantities would be at Messrs. Wönckhaus's disposal. Although the firm have repeatedly intended to make further shipments, only one has so far been undertaken in the spring of this year to the extent of about 300 tons, while a request was made for permission to ship 400 to 500 tons. In this case also the British resident raised difficulties, which were only overcome after a protest had been made by the German Government. There can therefore be no doubt that the firm has the right, in view of the existing agreements with the British Government, to dispose of the oxide which is still lying there, and which must amount to more than 3,000 tons.

I am therefore instructed to make a protest against Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's action in again raising difficulties in regard to this matter, and in failing to observe the earlier engagements entered into by the British Government. The German Government feel assured that the British Government will without delay address the necessary instructions to their representative at Bushire, in order that he may abandon

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his opposition to the proposed shipment, and that he may in future act in accordance with the assurances given by his Government in regard to this matter.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply, I have, &c.

P. METTERNICH.

[26401] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 218.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1910.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company respecting the amalgamation scheme.

Your Excellency is aware that I have informed the company that I cannot at present press the Turkish Government to carry the fusion into execution. It is, however, reasonable that they should be freed from restrictions if exposed to unlimited Turkish competition on the rivers, and this consideration can be urged with the more force if the Turkish opposition to the fusion scheme is based on its monopolistic character. Indeed, to set the company free to compete is the reverse of granting a monopoly.

It is true that the Turkish Government have undertaken to grant no further navigation permits on the Mesopotamian rivers for the present, but this undertaking on their part does not appear to be of a definitive nature, and, on the other hand, Aga Jaffar seems to have had a steam-boat on the Euphrates for some time. It also appears possible that other Turkish persons or firms may have already acquired the right to navigate the rivers.

I shall be glad to learn whether, in your Excellency's opinion, there are any concessions, such as the removal of existing restrictions on the Euphrates and Tigris Company's rights, or the explicit recognition of their right to ply on both rivers up to the limit of their navigability, which the Turkish Government might be disposed to grant, and which might strengthen the British Company's position in Mesopotamia.

It is, however, impossible for His Majesty's Government to put themselves in the position of urging the Euphrates and Tigris Company to begin negotiations on these lines, and the initiative must proceed from them.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[26583] No. 50.

Foreign Office to Mr. H. F. B. Lynch.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1910.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to call your attention to statements made by you verbally to Mr. Norman on the 14th instant, in your private letter to him of the 22nd instant, and in your official letter to myself of the same date, to the effect that it was at the instance of the Foreign Office that your firm had initiated negotiations with the Turkish Government for the fusion of the navigation interests on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

I am directed by Sir E. Grey to point out that you are under a misapprehension on this point, and to state that the first information received by this department on the subject came from an independent source, and was to the effect that your firm had already begun negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to effect the amalgamation.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27483] No. 51.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 29.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, July 28, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE not had the pleasure of addressing you for some time past on the question of the Mesopotamian oil concession, as our representative in Constantinople

had given me to understand that no action would be taken by the Turkish Government in regard to the oil concession pending consideration by them of the Anatolian Railway proposals which were put forward by Messrs. Chester and Glascow, and, consequently, my company were awaiting news as to the result of these proposals before taking any further steps in the matter of the oil concession.

From the enclosed letter to our representative you will see, however, that it has been stated here that the Chester scheme was actually accepted by the Turkish Government some time ago, and that a party of engineers representing the American group is already engaged in the survey of the projected railway line, and in the investigation of the mineral possibilities.

I shall be much obliged if you can give me any information either confirming or refuting this statement, because, if correct, no purpose will be gained by retaining our representative in Constantinople any longer—or by taking any further action in regard to the Mesopotamian oil concession until such time as the Chester group have declared whether or not they will exercise the option which they appear to have obtained.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Managing Director.*

Enclosure in No. 51.

Letter addressed to Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Representative in Constantinople.

Dear Mr. Nichols, *July* 26, 1910.

I HAVE not written to you for some time as there was nothing in your letters to reply to, and no change in the position has taken place.

The letters from you that I have to acknowledge are yours of the 9th, 14th, 23rd, and 30th June, and the 16th instant, the contents of all of which have been read with interest.

My object in writing to-day is to advise you that I have had a call from a Mr. Frederick Stokes, of Constantinople—in connection with some other business—and in the course of conversation he stated :—

1. That the Chester scheme was actually sanctioned some time ago.
2. That the Americans he represents are the well known financiers, Plant and Gould, the former of whom was in Constantinople for some months cutting a great dash, and entertaining various members of the Turkish Government on his yacht.
3. That a party of eight engineers are now engaged on the survey of the projected railway on behalf of this American group.
4. That Colt, to whom you referred in your last letter, is to remain in Turkey on behalf of this group to superintend the survey and other operations.
5. That he (Stokes) has personally visited the Agana Copper Mines, and considers that they are of enormous value, and taken into conjunction with the petroleum deposits and the agricultural traffic, fully justify the expenditure of 15 to 20 millions on the railway.
6. That the Turkish Government have favoured the granting of the concession to this group because America has no political interests to serve in Asia Minor.
7. That as Plant and Gould are connected with the Standard in other business operations it is possible that the latter are really the *deus ex machinâ* of this scheme.

The above information, if true, seems to indicate that the Chester scheme has progressed a good deal farther than has been reported to you. Can you ascertain the exact facts ?

Certainly—if it be true that the group has eight engineers actually engaged on the survey of the line and in examining the mining possibilities—and Colt has (as you state), also started on a journey over the projected route—it would appear as if the Chester scheme has actually been accepted by the Turkish Government.

Stokes further mentioned—which is corroborative—that the Americans have sixteen months from January last in which to decide whether or not they will carry out the concession.

Yours sincerely,

[Unsigned.]

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[27592] No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

India Office, July 29, 1910.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India reporting that Zakhnuniya Island has again been occupied by the Turks.

The policy of His Majesty's Government as regards the ownership of the island has been themselves to observe, and to require the Turkish Government to observe, the *status quo*. Accordingly, when His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reported on the 27th September last that the Turkish gendarmes had been withdrawn, Lord Morley instructed the Government of India in his telegram of the 13th October that the Sheikh of Bahrein should not be allowed to hoist his own flag on the island.

It is perhaps doubtful whether it will be possible to adhere to this policy, in view of the general activity which the Turks are now showing at the head of the Gulf and of their attitude towards Bahrein, as illustrated in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 100 of the 21st February last. But in the first instance, at all events, Lord Morley would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be instructed at once to remind the Porte of the representations which he made to them in accordance with Sir E. Grey's telegram of the 30th May, 1909, and to request the immediate withdrawal of the guard.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

July 25, 1910.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEE my telegram dated the 26th November and previous correspondence as to occupation of Zakhnuniya Island by Turks. It is reported by resident, Persian Gulf, that island has again been occupied by Turkish soldiers, and that on every Friday the Turkish flag is hoisted. Further strong representations will, we trust, be made to Porte by His Majesty's Government. We reserve our recommendations pending their result.

[27148] No. 53.

Memorandum communicated to Count Metternich, July 30, 1910.

ON the 25th instant the German Ambassador reminded His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that his Government had as yet received no reply to the statement of their case respecting the dispute in connection with the working of the red oxide mines on Abu Musa Island, which was enclosed in his Excellency's note of the 4th December last.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to inform Count Metternich, with reference to the conversation above referred to, that the statement of the German case, which was a reply to a communication from His Majesty's Government, dated the 10th July, 1908, was of a nature to require reference to the India Office, to the Government of India, and to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, with a view to permit further investigations to be made on the spot, and to obtain additional opinions.

Sir E. Grey hastens, however, to assure his Excellency that there will be no unnecessary delay in the preparation of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the statement in question.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1910.

[27807] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 503.)

Therapia, July 23, 1910.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 461 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that the Turkish Government has now come to the decision to allow the use of diving machines in the sponge fisheries during the present season to those persons who are already provided with permits.

Meanwhile the Public Debt, which has a considerable interest in the dues arising from this industry, is preparing regulations which are intended to put the fishing on a satisfactory footing in the future.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[27809] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 505. Confidential.)

Constantinople, July 25, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 30th March last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the subject of the amalgamation of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company with the Nahriyeh line.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 511/24. Very Confidential.)

Bagdad, June 18, 1910.

Your Excellency,

IN continuation of my despatch of the 27th February, 1910, I have the honour to report that, having become aware last week that Mr. F. W. Parry, the local representative of Messrs. Lynch at Bagdad, had published a letter in a native newspaper at Musal relating to the amalgamation of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and Nahriyeh River steamboat lines, I enquired of him whether he had any objection to communicating his letter to me, along with any criticisms on it which might have appeared in the native press. Mr. Parry, in reply, very kindly offered to pay me a personal visit on the subject, and, at an interview a few days ago, he handed to me the documents, of which (A), (B), and (C), enclosed are copies. Mr. Parry told me that he gave me these papers confidentially, in the sense that he did not wish their contents to be made public, but that he was perfectly willing that I should submit them to Government.

2. At our meeting, Mr. Parry invited me to say what I thought of the documents; and he also, at least so it appeared to me, endeavoured to sound my views on the case generally. I told him, accordingly, that I had no official instructions in the matter of the proposed amalgamation, but that, in the capacity of a private individual who had some knowledge of the facts, I would willingly give my opinion of what he had written.

I first drew his attention to the statement made in the sentence which I have underlined* in his letter to the "Nineveh" newspaper, and said that, according to my ideas, it might with advantage have been more guardedly expressed. I pointed out that the navigation of the Tigris above Bagdad presented great natural difficulties; that a survey, probably an expensive one, would be required in order to determine whether navigation on the upper reaches could be profitably undertaken at all; and that the result of such a survey might conceivably be to show that navigation at a profit was an

* In italics.

impossibility. In these circumstances, it seemed to me that Mr. Parry had written too confidently of the opening up of navigation to Musul; and that, in the event of his anticipations not being realised, his letter might hereafter become a dangerous weapon in the hands of those who had condemned in advance the proposed amalgamation and monopoly. Mr. Parry, however, replied that it was the intention of the promoters of the amalgamation to open a service to Musul, and that, such being the case, he considered his statement to be justified.

My next observation was that I did not think that Mr. Parry's explanations regarding the composition of the directorate were such as would satisfy the other side. I could quite well imagine a case in which the directorate would be divided on political lines, the foreign directors all voting on one side and the native directors on the other. The very question of extending steam navigation to Musul might so divide them.* It appeared to me that the question of the casting vote was a vital one, and that it was useless to hope that the adversaries of amalgamation could be brought to regard it in any other light.

On Mr. Parry's asking me particularly what I thought of his letter to the "Rakib," which is a draft only, I replied that the concluding sentences did not appear to be so framed as to facilitate its acceptance by the newspaper. Mr. Parry rejoined that, if the "Rakib" would not publish it, he could find another native newspaper that would.

3. I submit with deference for your Excellency's consideration that, inasmuch as the amalgamation and monopoly in question have been recommended to the Porte by His Majesty's Government, the means by which it is now sought to make them popular in Mesopotamia deserve close scrutiny. An impression is gaining ground here, if I am not mistaken, that the concession would have as its necessary result the extension of steam navigation to (or at least towards) Musul, and proper conservancy of the River Tigris. Indeed, I was myself under the influence of this impression until I received, as I very recently did receive, a copy of the draft convention relating to the concession, from which it appears that the monopolist company formed by amalgamation would not be bound, but only empowered, to undertake the improvements indicated. If this be so, it might happen that the new company would eventually decide, in accordance with its commercial interests—the only interests that it is bound to regard—to leave navigation above Bagdad alone, and not to interfere with the course of the river as it at present exists below Bagdad. In such a case, though the impression above described could not perhaps be traced to any more authoritative source than Mr. Parry's letter to the "Nineveh," accusations of bad faith would probably be brought against the promoters of the amalgamation and monopoly; and if the monopoly were found to work in any way oppressively or unfavourably to trade feeling on the subject might become strong, and might be directed in part against the British Government, which is known to have favoured and supported the scheme. I find no guarantee in the draft convention that the new company will do more than maintain the present service unchanged subject to a certain maximum tariff.

In this connection I have the honour very respectfully to draw your Excellency's attention to the last sentence of Mr. Cree's letter of the 17th February to my address, a copy of which was forwarded to your Excellency with my despatch of the 21st February. With Mr. Cree's remark there I personally agree, to the extent of believing that any disapprobation or odium which may hereafter attach in Mesopotamia to the new amalgamated monopolist company—supposing it to come into existence—will also attach, though probably in a lesser degree, to the British Government.

4. The necessity for a monopoly in favour of the company formed by the amalgamation is not apparent to me; but I do not claim that this is a point on which my opinion is entitled to any weight. I should expect such a company—having sufficient capital, local knowledge, experience, and connections, and Turkish and British Government influence behind it—to stand in an almost unassailable position, at least so long as it continued to behave with reasonableness and moderation.

5. The possible consequences of the constitution of the directorate by which it is intended that the new company shall be managed deserve, in my humble opinion, the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government. Should it ever happen—and this seems a not impossible contingency—that the directors were divided among themselves upon political lines, and that the Turkish Government favoured the view of the native directors, while the view of the foreign directors was commercially the more sound,

* The native directors, under the influence of patriotic feeling, might approve of the extension as a great public improvement, while the foreign directors might condemn it as an unsafe or, at least, unpromising investment.

might not inconvenient discussions between the Porte and the British Government be the result?

6. Yesterday Mr. Sirop, an Armenian merchant, to whom his Excellency Nazim Pasha has lately confided the administration of the Nahriyeh steamers, visited me and gave me a melancholy account of the present state of the line. I had already understood from other sources that the vessels were rapidly deteriorating in unskilful hands, and that corruption and mismanagement prevailed to such an extent on the commercial side of the undertaking that the receipts had latterly been less than the expenditure.

I have no means of knowing whether these last statements are true, but it is certain that they possess a considerable foundation in fact, and I doubt whether the new Government of Turkey can at any early date provide the Nahriyeh steamers with an administration as efficient as that by which they were successfully managed under the Hamidiyah régime. The inference may safely be drawn, I think, that the Porte are in a weak position as regards the proposed amalgamation and monopoly; and I respectfully submit that, with an eye to future possible changes and difficulties, it would not be advisable in the present negotiations to take advantage of their weakness.

7. A guarantee by the Porte that the ownership and management of the Nahriyeh steamers should not be transferred to any foreign, or partially foreign, body of concessionnaires without the consent of the British Government would afford, perhaps, a sufficient temporary protection to British interests; and by the mere lapse of time the question of what should be done might become clearer and simpler to both sides.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, I.C.S., *Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

Documents communicated to Consul-General Lorimer by Mr. Parry.

(A.)

Letter from Mr. Parry published in the "Nineveh" (Musul).

(Confidential.)

To the Editor of "Nineveh."

Sir,

I VENTURE to address you with the hope that you will be able, through the medium of your valuable paper, to eliminate some of the misunderstandings which have arisen in the minds of the people of Mesopotamia regarding the proposed amalgamation of the business of the river steamers running on the River Tigris.

It has been reported by some people that the Nahriyeh steamers are to be handed over to a foreign firm, and that, in consequence, merchants will be charged exorbitant rates of freight if the amalgamation of the steam-ship lines is completed. Further, it was reported that by handing the steamers to a foreign firm it would be tantamount to giving Mesopotamia to foreigners.

In order to show how incorrect these reports are, I give below an outline of the terms of the proposed arrangement:—

1. An anonymous company registered under Turkish laws, with a capital of about £T. 300,000, half of which is to be subscribed by Ottoman subjects and half by foreigners, is to be formed with the object of taking over the steamers belonging to Messrs. Lynch and the Nahriyeh administration.

2. The affairs of the company are to be administered by four directors elected by the Ottoman shareholders and four directors elected by the foreign shareholders, and a president elected in the usual manner customary in the formation of commercial companies.

3. All steamers will run under the Turkish flag, and will be subject to Ottoman laws.

4. A maximum rate of freight based on the rate of freight charged by the Nahriyeh administration and Messrs. Lynch during the last two years will be fixed, and the new

company will not be permitted to charge more than the maximum rate or give preference to any shipper, either large or small.

5. The employés of the company will be chiefly Ottoman subjects.

It will be seen from the terms set out above that the reports circulated in Bagdad and elsewhere are without the slightest foundation, and it can only be assumed that they were circulated in ignorance of the real facts, or with self-interested motives.

The English company will cease to exist and all the steamers will be taken over by the new Ottoman company, and the Ottoman shareholders will have the guarantee that they have an equal number of representatives to look after their interests and the interests of the people generally.

*The most important point as far as concerns Musal merchants and landowners is that in addition to taking over the existing steamers running on the Tigris the company will provide capital to develop the river transport to Musal and on the River Euphrates.** It must be obvious to all that a properly organised river service to Musal would have the effect of increasing trade and improving the lot of the people.

Merchants and traders who now have to depend on the primitive methods of transport afforded by camels, mules, and rafts would have the advantage of being able to get their goods and produce from place to place without risk and unnecessary delay.

Without an adequate supply of capital and a properly organised management by men of experience no successful development in this direction can be achieved; it would therefore seem obvious to all who are not unduly biassed against progressive movements in Mesopotamia, and especially Musal, that the completion of the proposed amalgamation of forces would be generally advantageous by supplying the capital and means of securing the much-desired improvements.

Believing that ignorance of the terms of the proposals has been at the root of some of the unfair criticisms, I have the hope that you will allot a portion of your valuable space with the object of publishing the true facts of the case.

I am, &c.

F. W. PARRY.

(B.)

Extract from the "Rakib" (Bagdad), No. 122, dated June 3, 1910, being a criticism of Mr. Parry's Letter to the "Nineveh."

(Confidential.)

Lynch Company.

WE have read in our contemporary "Nineveh," No. 44, printed at Musal, an article in Arabic signed by Mr. Frederick Parry, manager of Stephen Lynch and Co., explaining the basis of the projected company, which created an extraordinary excitement among the public a little time ago.

By this article the contributor of the article aims to disguise the truth by giving the question a form which would entice the public.

He says: "The public are against the project, because they say if the concern is given to the hands of a sole foreign firm they charge exorbitant rate of freight, which virtually means giving Mesopotamia to the hands of foreigners."

He continues giving his explanation under five headings. First and second. The company was to be formed as purely Ottoman concern, with a capital of £T. 300,000, of which half was to be contributed by Ottoman subjects and half by foreigners.

Yes, this was so, but the contributor of the article has either intentionally or otherwise winked at the condition that the manager is to be a foreigner; when there is such a condition then it is natural that the majority should be at the side of foreigners; if so, what voice should the Ottomans have? The way that the Ottoman subjects are treated by this company is well known to all; what benefit do the shareholders derive from their shares in this company even now?

Fourth. He says that the freight should be charged on the same basis as in previous years. This is not the fact; there was no mention about previous years, but the arrangement was that it should be charged on the same basis as in 1906.

The freight in that year was 12 paras per oke for wheat from Bagdad to Bussorah, which works out 54 fr., or 48*s.* per ton, whereas the usual freight for downward

* Italicised by us.—J. G. L.

cargo is only 2 to 3 paras per oke, except during date season, when it goes to 7 paras. Will this not be a heavy blow on the trade and agriculture as well as the industry of Irak?

5. He says that the majority of employés should be Ottoman subjects. Respected manager, how many non-Ottoman subjects you have now in your service? Do you take the coolies and labourers also as part of the Ottoman staff? No doubt the principal men should be foreigners, and you have strong reason for doing so, as your official language will be English.

The manifold advantages desirable from a system which would facilitate the transport between Bussorah and Musal is evident, and there is no need for reiteration, but it is impossible to give the monopoly and the key of all the trade in Irak to one company. If there was another company to compete with we should hail the enterprise with pleasure.

We are surprised to see that the editor of "Nineveh" only reproduces this article without any comment on his part.

We request Mr. Parry to publish the conditions word by word for the information of the public.

As we are aware that, sooner or later, this administration under all circumstances is to be converted into an Ottoman Company that can better serve the interest of the public, we would request our Governor-General to try his best to this end in a manner which would prove beneficial to the trade, agriculture, and the general welfare of the public.

(C.)

Proposed Reply of Mr. Parry to the Article in the "Rakib."

(Confidential.)

To the Editor of "El Rakib."

Sir,

I HAVE read your article commenting on my letter addressed to the editor of the "Nineveh" at Musal, and as you have formulated one or two queries on the subject of the proposed amalgamation of the business of the steamers running on the Tigris, I venture to hope that you will permit me to answer them through the medium of your valuable journal.

1. If I rightly understand your first comment, you allege that the Ottoman shareholders would have no voice in the management of the affairs of the new company if the foreign directors are in a majority.

The Ottoman shareholders as subscribers of half the capital would have equal rights with the foreign shareholders to regulate the actions of the directors. Every anonymous company gives its shareholders the right of regulating its affairs through the medium of a board of directors, and if they are dissatisfied with the board they can elect a new one by obtaining a majority of votes.

The proposed new company is a partnership of Ottoman and foreign capitalists investing capital equally, and obviously they would co-operate to prevent any mismanagement on the part of the directors appointed to manage their interests.

2. You state that the basis on which the maximum rate of freight to be charged has been calculated on the rate of freight charged in 1906 when the rate was high. You are misinformed. The maximum rate has been fixed on the basis of the rates charged in the years 1907 and 1908.

The rate would obviously be regulated by the law of supply and demand in exactly the same manner as the sale of merchandise is made, but, in order to safeguard traders from unfair charges, an agreed maximum is to be fixed which cannot be exceeded.

3. With regard to the employment of Ottoman subjects a clause in the draft agreement distinctly states that, whenever possible, Ottoman subjects are to have the preference for employment in the company. The shareholders of the company will, of course, expect the most efficient men to be employed, whether Ottoman or foreign. The fact that the head offices of the company are to be located at Constantinople is clear proof of the desire of the promoters of the scheme of amalgamation to make it an Ottoman concern, and I fail to see what cause Ottomans have for doubt in this connection.

You appear to distrust the proposed scheme because it gives the new company the right of the navigation of the rivers for a given period, and because foreigners are interested in its development.

I venture to point out that it is obvious to all who know the conditions of business in this place, or in any other country, that neither foreign nor Ottoman capitalists can afford to invest money for improvements without some guarantee of getting a reasonable return.

The Ottoman and foreign promoters of the amalgamation project are all men of long experience in business in Mesopotamia, and they expect to earn a profit on the money they invest, and it should be obvious to all that in order to earn a profit on the capital they propose to invest they must offer better facilities for trade to the people of Mesopotamia.

The merchant and land-owner of to-day, whether Ottoman or foreign, are well aware of the difficulties they have to contend in connection with the transport of goods and produce of the country, and it is only reasonable to assume that they would welcome improvements.

The scheme offers them these improvements without calling upon the country to spend a single piastre, and as such it should receive the support of all men interested in the progress and welfare of Mesopotamia.

Before concluding, I regret to have to call your attention to a statement in your article, which, although veiled with ambiguity, tends to cast suspicions on the directors of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company as to their treatment of their Ottoman shareholders.

Every shareholder, whether Ottoman or foreign, receives the same treatment and the same dividend on their invested money, and I take this opportunity to publicly proclaim that the insinuations contained in the statement cannot be supported by facts.

If the grievances of some people who have been refused free tickets to travel on the steamers are being aired I have nothing to add, but, as the statement is put forward with the apparent object of discrediting a concern which during the last half-century has done good service for Bagdad and its people, I am constrained to look at it as an uncalled-for slander, which does not redound to the credit of your journal.

I am, &c.

[27813] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 509.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 26, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 495 of the 18th July, I have the honour to forward herewith despatches from Captain Molyneux-Seel, consul at Van; from Mr. McGregor, consul at Erzeroum; and Mr. Matthews, vice-consul at Diarbekir, reporting on the Kurdo-Armenian land question.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Van, July 12, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a report on certain affairs of this vilayet which have been in progress during the preceding month.

As previously reported to your Excellency, in December last a number of Kurdish chiefs, among them Hussein Pasha, of Patnotz, left Turkey and took up their abode at Maku. This so-called flight could in reality only be regarded as a demonstration against the Turkish Government.

In May last, fears being entertained that these chiefs were organising a Kurdish revolt, the Mushir of Erzingan sent an officer to Maku to try to persuade them to return. The result was that Mehmed Sadik came to Van, secretly interviewed the vali, and brought about the return of all the chiefs except Emin Pasha. Hussein Pasha and Timur Pasha came to Van as the guests of the vali; the other chiefs returned to their

villages. Their lands, which had been sequestered by the Government, were returned to them.

The reception of Hussein Pasha by the vali was the subject of much criticism here, and the action of the vali can hardly be held to be consistent with his avowed policy of breaking the power of the Kurdish chiefs and causing them to rely on the Government for protection and justice.

On the 4th June the vali proceeded to Arjish and Adeljivas, the principal object of his tour being the settlement of the question of the restoration of Armenian lands by the Kurds. At Arjish the vali, in accordance with arrangements made last year, obliged the Kurds to leave the Bani villages of which Emin Pasha had possessed himself. Regarding other lands, it was ruled that the Kurds should leave them on receiving from the Armenians the value of the crops sown therein by the Kurds. Complicated cases were to be referred to the law courts. This latter arrangement did not of course give satisfaction to the Armenians.

At Adeljivas, where Hussein Pasha had possessed himself of some thirty Armenian villages, it was ruled that the Armenians should pay to Hussein Pasha the sum of £T. 450, representing money spent on upkeep of houses, &c., and that Hussein Pasha should quit the lands entirely and live at Van. This arrangement was accepted by the Armenians as being just in principle, but unfortunately no means has yet presented itself for their obtaining the necessary money. No actual settlement is therefore likely to be arrived at for the present. Hussein Pasha remains at Adeljivas.

The vali has now gone to Serai, and intends visiting Shattakh, Bashkala, and possibly the "new territories" in September next.

Discontent prevails at present among the Tyari Nestorians. Mar Shimun and Melik Ismael, of Upper Tyari, have come here to represent their grievances to the vali. Mar Shimun, however, did not arrive until after the departure of the vali for Serai.

Melik Ismael, while admitting the principle of taxation, complains that the Government are demanding arrears of taxes (they have never previously paid taxes, only tribute through Mar Shimun), and that the taxes demanded are excessive and above that which they are able to pay.

The vali is trying to persuade the Tyari to move to a certain more fertile country further south, and it is possible that he hopes by pressure of the taxes to oblige them to occupy a more accessible country. It is unlikely that the Tyari will accept the present scale of taxation without offering resistance.

Letters are arriving at Van from Constantinople reactionaries blaming the Government's action in the Cretan question, and endeavouring thereby to excite the fanatical and reactionary feeling in these parts.

There is little doubt the people here are readily excited in this way. The following incident which occurred here recently furnishes an illustration:—

A young Turkish girl, the daughter of a retired officer, dressed herself as a European and, during the absence of the directeur, went to the office of the Tobacco Régie. There, representing herself to be the daughter of a newly-appointed consul at Tabreez, she managed to obtain the object of her visit, viz.: a private interview with a good-looking Armenian employé. When these facts got known, the fanatical and reactionary Turks became excited, and went about saying "see the way the Armenians take advantage of the constitution to approach our wives and daughters." As a matter of fact, the young Armenians had never seen the girl before in his life. However the Turks threatened to take his life, and he was obliged to flee to Constantinople. The vali also found it necessary to expel the Turkish officer and his family from Van.

The branch of the Committee of Union and Progress at Van has latterly had little or no influence. Yesterday an officer from Constantinople named Nazim Effendi arrived here charged with its "reorganisation."

An English traveller informs me that the Sheikh of Barzani has been appointed Kaimakam of Akra.

I have, &c.

L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, July* 16, 1910.

IN confirmation of my telegram to your Excellency of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the Governor-General of Erzeroum called upon me yesterday with the object of communicating to me in strictest confidence the following details regarding a Kurdish reactionary movement, the existence of which he has suspected for some time, but which he hopes has now been nipped in the bud, thanks to the arrest of one of the principal agents.

His Excellency told me that for more than two months past the authorities have been aware that a mysterious personage, known among the Kurds as "Ibrahim Pasha," had been moving about from place to place throughout this province, his presence having been ascertained at localities so far apart as Kighi, Khinis and Veli Baba, on the Russian frontier. It was known that this person was everywhere treated with extraordinary deference by the Kurdish Beys, who vied with one another in showing him hospitality, and a certain Ali Fakih, of Yazili Tash, near Veli Baba, a Hamidié Colonel, had not only given him a valuable horse, but had insisted on taking off his boots for him.

All the efforts of the authorities to effect the arrest of the stranger had proved unavailing, and no clue had been discovered until about a fortnight ago, when a lapidary at Erzeroum informed the vali that an unknown individual had given him an order for a seal bearing the inscription "Ibrahim Pasha, Hamidié Light Cavalry"! The vali told the seal engraver to execute the order, and, when the seal had been duly delivered, he caused the purchaser to be arrested and placed in solitary confinement. The prisoner, a young Kurd of about 25, who gives his name as Ali-ibn-Said, at first declared that he was merely a poor man wandering about to collect alms from various wealthy Beys; but, on the arrest of Ali Fakih, which took place some days later, he admitted that he had been entrusted by the Kurdish committee at Diarbekir with the mission of conveying letters and messages to all the Kurdish tribes with the object of bringing about a general rising against the new régime. He further stated that the committee at Diarbekir consisted of many local notables, including a certain Khalil Khoja, a widow of Ibrahim Pasha, and a brother of Niazi (Niazi being a former deputy for Diarbekir, now living abroad, having been expelled from the Chamber on account of his former relations with the Yildiz camarilla). In consequence of Ali's statements, a search for compromising documents was made in the houses of many Kurdish notables, including those of Kulham Bey of Khinis, Ali Fakih, and Niazi's brother, but nothing was discovered.

With regard to Ali's identity, he admits having taken advantage of his personal likeness to the late Ibrahim Pasha in order to pass himself off as his son; but the vali is inclined to believe that he is really a son of Ibrahim's and he has had Ali's photograph sent to Constantinople and Diarbekir in the hope of elucidating the mystery.

This is the sum of the information which the vali says he has so far obtained and he is pursuing his investigations with a zeal probably not diminished by the desire to vindicate his views as against those entertained by the mushir regarding the policy to be adopted towards the Kurds.

As far as I can gather, his Excellency has no knowledge of any definite organisation having been achieved in view of a rising, and he himself expresses the opinion that, even if the Government had not got timely notice of the conspiracy, the majority of the Kurdish population would have been loth to risk their lives in a contest with the regular troops.

One cannot, however, ignore the fact that, according to the information which I had the honour to submit to your Excellency in my telegram of the 12th instant and also to recent reports from His Majesty's vice-consul at Diarbekir, there does exist a certain amount of unrest among the Kurds of Diarbekir and Bitlis; and it is a fact not without significance that the Kurdish committee at Diarbekir should choose as a rallying word the name of the late Ibrahim Pasha, whose family appears to be receiving peculiarly harsh treatment from the present Government.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 56.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, July* 16, 1910.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Bitlis giving an account of the recent attack by Kurds on the troops quartered at Khuyt and describing the measures taken by the military authorities for coping with the situation.

Your Excellency will observe that, while troops are reported to have arrived already at Khuyt from Diarbekir and more are said to be proceeding thither from Van, the authorities at Bitlis—only a few hours from the scene of the incident—have so far confined themselves to sending a Commission of Inquiry whose findings will, no doubt, determine the course eventually to be pursued.

Mr. Safrastian informs me privately that the country between Bitlis and Van, as also the districts of Bulanik, Akhlat, and Sairt are perfectly quiet.

I learn on good authority that Tahir Pasha is about to be recalled and that he will be succeeded by Galib Bey, a high officer of police at Constantinople.

I have, &c,

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 4 in No. 56.

Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Sir, *Bitlis, July* 12, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the latest events which have taken place in the sanjak of Mush during the last two weeks.

As I had had the honour to state in my previous despatches, about 100 soldiers were sent to Khuyt at the end of May last to keep the order and arrest some Kurdish murderers. On the 1st instant, the soldiers in question succeeded in arresting the murderers of Sheikh Ismail of Knot (my despatch of the 22nd June last), and capturing some deserting Kurdish soldiers.

On the eve of leading these malefactors to Mush some 150 armed Kurds of Belekli and Shego tribes in Khuyt attacked the soldiers, and in the fight that ensued one Sergeant Mehmed was killed, a soldier wounded; five Mauser military rifles and the arrested murderers and deserters were carried off by the assailants.

Upon this violent attack on the part of Kurds in Khuyt, orders were given to the military commandant at Mush to send at once two battalions of soldiers and two mountain guns to repress harshly these rebel Kurds. Major Veissi Effendi, of the 3rd battalion of the 32nd Regiment at Mush, was entrusted with full power and authority to deal with the situation in Khuyt, as might seem to him to be necessary and suitable. One more battalion has arrived Khuyt from Diarbekir a week ago. Some further troops and one gun are reported as coming out from Van. Riza Bey, the gendarmerie major at Sairt, is appointed to command the gendarmerie forces in Khuyt. As you will see from the above facts, such a concentration of troops seems to show that the Government has decided to treat the Kurdish unrest with a certain measure of seriousness in order to avoid further troubles and graver consequences in the future

The notorious Musa Bey, who, as I understand, has played a foul play in the present outbreak above referred to, has telegraped to Tahir Pasha, the vali, assuring the authorities of his loyalty and readiness to assist the troops in suppressing the movement of Kurds; and the comical part of it is that some military and civil officials are inclined to take for certain the hasty loyalty displayed by Musa Bey. Considering the conduct and the doings of Musa Bey during the last three months with a view to raise trouble and bring about a Kurdish union against the new régime, I humbly venture to express the opinion that Musa Bey is at the bottom of the present outbreak, which will possibly be proved if the special commission of enquiry sent from here is sufficiently honest to bring out to light the truth. So three battalions of soldiers, some detachments of gendarmes, and two guns under the command of such an honest officer as Veissi Effendi are ready for action in Khuyt for the suppression of all vestiges of revolt or reaction. But the above-mentioned officer in command is awaiting still for orders; though entrusted with full liberty of action, Veissi Effendi is not left quite free in necessary

operations. Owing no doubt to the representations of Tahir Pasha, the Vali of Bitlis, a commission of enquiry composed of military and judicial officials has gone to Khuyt from here to enquire first whether the Kurdish outbreak in Khuyt has any political nature, or it is only an ordinary occurrence. Much will depend of course on the report which the commission in question will submit to the vali.

It is to be hoped that both the Minister of the Interior and the authorities here will consider the moment most propitious and convenient to crush the reactionary intrigues in the sanjak of Mush and to restore the Government's prestige, fallen down since a certain time in the eyes of Kurdish reactionary leaders.

Quiet prevails in the other parts of this vilayet.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

Enclosure 5 in No. 56.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Kharput, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, July 6, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency as follows on certain questions which interest the Armenians of Diarbekir:—

During the past six months my attention has been frequently drawn to the fact that since the re-establishment of the Constitution nothing has been done to restore to their rightful owners the lands seized by Kurdish beys and Moslems from Armenians at various times, and in particular during the events of 1895–6. Cases have also been reported to me of lands belonging to Moslem villagers having been appropriated by Kurdish beys. I have invariably advised patience, adding that the question had been brought to the notice of the Cabinet, and that no useful purpose would be served by local agitation. The consideration of this land question cannot be indefinitely deferred.

In my despatch No. 19 of the 8th ultimo I had the honour to report to your Excellency the arrest of Mir Ismail Bey on a charge of stirring up sedition among the Yezidis. It would appear that Mir Ismail Bey had been in negotiation with the Armenian Patriarchate to arrange for the opening of schools among the Yezidis, with a view to the Yezidis eventually joining the Armenian community. As the proposals which led to the negotiation originated with Mir Ismail Bey, whose father was sheikh of the Yezidis, it was difficult for the Armenians to refuse to consider them. The official view that the Yezidis (who are really a pagan survival) are a branch of Islam cannot be reconciled with the facts, while the stern repression of the movement is incompatible with Young Turkish professions.

On the 14th ultimo the Armenian priest of Jezreh was summoned for preliminary examination at Mardin on a charge of sedition. He refused to accept service of the summons on the ground that it should have come through his ecclesiastical chief, but his objection was overruled and I have not heard what finally happened.

During the past month the Tashnagists have attracted the anxious attention of the community. For some time past the Tashnagists have been conducting an active "socialistic" propaganda, and have succeeded in gaining adherents to their views among the Armenian youth. Projects for the advancement of the community, however visionary and impracticable, may be tolerated, but the communistic theories on marriage and family life recently advocated by the Tashnagists have called forth a storm of indignant protest. It is stated that the Tashnagists have the support of the Young Turks in this campaign.

Thoughtful Armenians are fully alive to the necessity of exercising restraint and caution at the present juncture. They have no confidence in the capacity of the Government to treat them with fairness, and appear to me to be more pessimistic than the circumstances warrant. Incidents such as the desecration of the chapel at Ali Punar (my despatch No. 10 of the 4th April) and the direct service of a summons on a priest are not tended to reassure them. The authorities would be better advised to devote their energies to the accomplishment of works of public necessity than to the violation of treaties granting certain religious privileges to the most industrious and progressive section of the population.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[27817]

No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 514.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 26, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Greig, vice-consul at Mosul, reporting the death of Osman Pasha, chief of the Jaff Kurds, and giving other information about the tribe.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Mosul, July 1, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that news has been received of the death in March last of Osman Pasha, who was for eighteen years hereditary chief of the Jaff Kurds, an important tribe comprising some 10,000 families settled partly in the Turkish frontier districts of Silahieh (Mosul Vilayet), Kerkuk (Mosul Vilayet), Sulemanieh (Mosul Vilayet), Chemchemal (Mosul Vilayet), and Khanykeen (Bagdad Vilayet), and partly on the Persian side of the frontier. He was, however, only chief in name. The real power—a power said to have been greater than any previous head of the tribe had exercised—was in the hands of his wife, a woman of considerable ability, who was generally know as "Khanem," and is said in her youth to have possessed remarkable beauty.

She has now come to an untimely end at the hands of her own son, Tahir Beg, who is believed to have put her to death, either because he apprehended the defeat of his own ambitions through her preference for one of her step-sons, or because he resented the guilty relations alleged to have sprung up, after Osman Pasha's death, between her and the Mutessarif of Sulemanieh.

Tahir Beg, who is thirty to thirty-five years of age, and has hitherto enjoyed a favourable reputation, has thus become chief of the tribe, with an officially recognised position as kaimakam of the Jaff Kurds. His head-quarters are at Halepja (Sulemanieh Kaza).

There is no record of any collision between this tribe and the authorities in recent years.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[27819]

No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 516.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 27, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 412 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting the departure of the commission to enquire into the position of the Sporades Islands.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July 19, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, as arranged by the vali of the archipelago during his recent visit to Constantinople, a commission arrived at Rhodes to enquire and report on the privileges and financial condition of the Sporades.

This commission consists of the Mutessarif of Scio and of two members belonging to the Ministries of the Interior and Finance.

The commission left Rhodes on the 12th instant for the isles of Symi, Calymnos, and Leros, and will proceed to Scio to draw up their report.

The vali of the archipelago, who left on the 14th instant for Lemnos, will, on his way back, meet the commission at Scio, receive their report, decide on any other steps which it may be deemed necessary to take, and then report to Constantinople.

The vali exerts himself to induce the inhabitants of the islands to admit the principle of military service, but the young men continue to emigrate.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[27196] No. 59.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1910.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th ultimo relative to the desire of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co. to make a further shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith translation of a note from the German Ambassador at this court,* complaining of the opposition offered to the request of the firm by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, and asking that he may be furnished with instructions to abandon it.

Sir E. Grey understands that Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's attitude in this matter is based on the view that the contracts into which the German firm had entered before the cancellation of the lease having admittedly been satisfied by the shipment of April 1908 made on board the steam-ship "Louise," His Majesty's Government are under no obligation to agree to any further shipments on their behalf so long as the dispute remains unsettled, since to permit such shipments would be to place Messrs. Wönckhaus in a position of unfair advantage in relation to their British competitors, who are precluded from removing any of the mineral from the island at all.

Sir E. Grey is far from disputing these facts, and he in no way calls in question the logical soundness of the attitude assumed by Colonel Cox, the more so as it appears to be certain that Messrs. Wönckhaus have even been unable to dispose of a portion of the oxide shipped by them on board the "Louise," and he considers that the following passage which occurs in the note addressed by him to Count Metternich on the 10th July, 1908, can properly be adduced in support of the contention advanced: "They (*i.e.*, His Majesty's Government) are prepared . . . . cancellation of the lease."

It must not, however, be forgotten that, on the 10th January of the same year, Sir E. Grey, in a memorandum addressed to the German chargé d'affairs, wrote: "His Majesty's Government, however, see no objection to Robert Wönckhaus removing the red oxide which has been already mined and is now ready for shipment from the island." Again, on the 4th July, writing to Count Metternich of the 400 tons of oxide remaining on the beach and of the quantity lying near the mine, estimated at about 3,000 tons of saleable quality, he said: "These amounts are at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus." Finally, on the 23rd July, he informed his Excellency that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire had informed the German consul on the 8th June preceding "that all the red oxide mined might be exported from Abu Musa."

I am to state that, in view of these declarations, Sir E. Grey cannot see his way to support Colonel Cox in his opposition to the proposed shipment, and is disposed, subject to the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to instruct him to allow it to take place without further delay, and to inform Count Metternich of his action.

As regards the other point mentioned by Colonel Cox in his letter to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, copy of which was enclosed in your communication above referred to, viz., the intervention of Messrs. Wönckhaus and of the German consulate at Bushire on behalf of the British subject, Hassan Samaiye, which is not raised in Count Metternich's note, Sir E. Grey does not propose to allude to the subject in replying to his Excellency.

As regards the third sentence in the third paragraph of the Ambassador's communication, I am to state that Sir E. Grey presumes it to refer to the shipment which formed the subject of correspondence ending with the Foreign Office letter of

* No. 48.

the 2nd May, respecting which a full explanation has been furnished to his Excellency. He would accordingly suggest that Count Metternich's attention should be called to the fact, and that it should be pointed out to him that the attitude of His Majesty's consulate-general on that occasion was completely justified by the facts of the case.

I am to add that, on the 25th ultimo, before his note was written, Count Metternich made a verbal representation to Sir E. Grey on this subject, in the course of which he asked that the matter might be dealt with as quickly as possible in view of the loss to the interests concerned involved in the delay of the shipment.

I am accordingly to request that Sir E. Grey may be favoured with an answer to this letter at as early a date as may be possible.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[26960] No. 60.

Foreign Office to Mr. Lynch.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1910.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo on the question of amalgamating the navigation interests on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

With reference to your suggestion that the Turkish Government should be asked to offer their moiety of the share capital of the proposed new company under the fusion scheme for subscription to the natives of Bagdad, I am to reply that, as already pointed out to you, His Majesty's Government cannot see their way at present to press the Turkish Government to accept the fusion scheme, the adoption of which your suggestion presupposes. If, however, you choose, you are of course at liberty yourself to put your suggestion before the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[28116] No. 61.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, dated India Office to Foreign Office, the 26th July, 1910, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th July, 1910, relative to the property of the Sheikh of Koweit at Fadaghia.

India Office, August 2, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, June 19, 1910.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 7th June, 1910, I have the honour to forward a translation of the Sheikh of Koweit's letter therein referred to, together with the other documents cited on the same subject, viz., the registration of the sheikh's property at Fadaghia.

2. It will be seen that while, according to Mr. Crow, the vali has expressed his willingness to forward a representation from Sheikh Mubarak for the registry of the property in the names of one or more of his women-folk, Sheikh Mubarak himself asserts that the vali has definitely refused to register the property unless he lets his four sons take out Turkish certificates as a preliminary step.

The sheikh evidently fears now that the Porte will put the sellers up to repudiate the sale, and that he will be done out of his property, and of the purchase money.

3. I am sending a copy of Sheikh Mubarak's and Captain Shakespear's letters to His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, by first opportunity, but it is advisable that I should not delay submission of them to Government in the meanwhile.

It will be realised that, unless the matter can be got round by the registration of Sheikh Mubarak's daughters or blind son, we shall be placed in a very difficult position; we must either come to direct issue with the Porte over the question; or, if we wish to take the other alternative and advise Sheikh Mubarak to resell the property or try and get his money back from the vendors, we must face the contingency of making good his loss to him—an inconvenient prospect, but preferable, I venture to believe to the complications which the registry of his sons as Turkish subjects would create in the future.

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

Sheikh Mubarak-es-Subah to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(After compliments.) *26th Jemadi I*, 1328 (*June* 5, 1910).

I BEG to enquire after your health. I beg to state that Ahmed Pasha-el-Zoheir and Abdul Wahab Pasha-el-Kertas came to me at Koweit and Ahmed Pasha-el-Zoheir sold (to me) the El Fadaghia (landed property) for the sum of 48,706 Turkish liras and I sent my confidential employé, Abdul Aziz-el-Salem, with them to Bussorah and they informed the Vali of Bussorah, Mahrun Bey (of the sale), and he wished me prosperity (in the bargain). While making the purchase, I firstly made a condition with Ahmed Pasha-el-Zoheir and his agent, Abdul Wahab Pasha-el-Kertas, that they should settle the "tapoo" (official deed of purchase) for me. A communication was made by my confidential employé, Abdul Aziz-el-Salem, with the Vali of Bussorah for the "tapoo" documents, and the vali ordered Abdul Aziz-el-Salem to go to the place where the landed property was situated, take surveyors with him, and ascertain the area of the land so that it may be recorded in the "tapoo." My confidential employé went over there, taking surveyors with him and paying their expenses, as it was made a condition that I should bear these expenses—and the area of the land was ascertained and they returned to Bussorah, where he (Abdul Aziz) met Mahrun Bey and reported the measurement to him. He (Mahrun Bey) ordered him to settle the matter in the Government Department as usual, and he (Abdul Aziz) did what was requisite. The seller and his agent appeared there and admitted the sale and the receipt of the value. Afterwards the Vali of Bussorah, Mahrun Bey, informed my confidential employé, Abdul Aziz-el-Salem, that he had received an order from Constantinople to defer the settlement until further orders. After this purchase was made by me, some of my subjects inhabiting Koweit (by name), Hus-ein and his brother Shamlan, Ibrahim-bin-Muzaffer, and Helal, purchased the landed property belonging to the sons of Kasem-el-Thani, and it was recorded in the "tapoo" for them without any demand being made for their Turkish certificates of nationality. Similarly, a year before this purchase, I bought a landed property at Motavvah during the valiship of Abdul Rahman Hassan Bey and it was duly written in the name of my children without their demanding any Turkish certificates of nationality. Nowadays an order having been received from Constantinople by the Vali of Bussorah to settle (the affair of the) landed property and the postponement until further instructions having been removed, I sent my confidential employé, Abdul Aziz-el-Salem, to the present Vali of Bussorah, Soleiman Nadhif Bey (to state that), according to a telegram received by me from the seller, Ahmed-el-Zoheir, orders have been given for a settlement. The vali refused to do so, however, unless the property is recorded in the names of my senior sons—Jaber, Salem, Naser, and Hamad—and they should take out Turkish certificates of nationality. My confidential employé returned with this reply. I did not accept this unless I should refer to you and act upon what you may order. Afterwards I found an easy solution for this matter—in the same way as I have been treating them with kindness for the sake of convenience—and sent my employé to the Vali of Bussorah asking him to record one-half of the property in the name of my son Naser and the other half in the name of my seven daughters, as my son Naser was dear to me for many reasons and I found him to be inclined to piety and I appointed him as guardian over the landed property belonging to them jointly. My confidential employé stated this to the vali, but the vali refused and did not agree unless the property should be written in the names of my four sons, who should take out Turkish certificates of nationality.

When I saw that this was the case, I postponed action until I should refer to you because I will do nothing without your order and desire. This is an urgent affair because they do not now recognise the property to be in my name and they did not even demand from me the "mirri" (fixed land revenue) for the last year but demanded it from the seller who replied that he had sold the property to Sheikh Mubarak-es-Subah, but they did not demand it from me and do not recognise the property to be mine, although it is in my possession and I have incurred considerable expenses in repairing, constructing buildings, and growing date-palms and trees thereon; and I also took a document from the seller at the time of the purchase which contains the attestations of all the notables of Bussorah, and when the document was completed the British consul at Bussorah, Mr. Crow, certified thereto. During my interview with you, on your return from Naseri, you asked me (about this) and I stated that the settlement has not been made as yet, but that I was treating them kindly as perhaps the affair could be settled more easily and you stated that I should not agree to my sons taking Turkish certificates of nationality. Neither for the sake of this property nor for anything greater than this, will I take any action against your consent and order, I, my sons, my town, Koweit, my property, and my honour are all under the protection of the exalted Government as mentioned in the treaty, and so it follows that my property also is under their protection. Now the matter has reached the highest degree and this is an urgent affair. So I beg of your sense of justice and honour to find a good scheme which may prevent my property being played with and endangered, as I do not feel sure that they will not misdirect the attention of Ahmed Pasha-el-Zoheir and will not assist him to play a dodge to do me harm. Your good graces will not agree to this, and I beg to receive the favour of a reply which may render my mind easy as I have seen certain indications on their part which frighten me as regards the future, and I am awaiting your order at the earliest date so that I may be sure of receiving your high regards. Herewith you will find a true copy of a letter which I have received from the agent of Ahmed Pasha-el-Zoheir, Abdul Wahab Pasha-el-Kertas, and I expect to receive your sincere considerations; and, at any rate, it rests with you to give orders.

May you be preserved.

Enclosure 3 in No. 61.

Abdul Wahab Pasha-el-Kertas to Sheikh Mubarak-es-Subah.

(After compliments.) *24th Jemadi I*, 1328 (*June* 3, 1910).

I BEG to state that after entering Bussorah I went out in the forenoon and was informed of your arrival; I was sorry for not having met you. As regards the settlement of El Fadaghia affair, an order has been received for the settlement to be effected. In consideration of my sincere regards, I venture to tell you to avail yourself of this opportunity and have this settlement effected in the same way as you requested in the days of Mahrun Bey, and do not lose this chance, because delay will produce evil in every way, either on the part of the Government or on that of my cousin Ahmed Pasha, as I guess he will depose me of the agency. I think you should not delay the affair. May God guide the honourable Ahmed Pasha. His dealings with me are all of a hostile character, and it is now more than one and a-half months that he does not communicate with me, but communicates with another.

At any rate your opinion is higher, and please favour me with your services. I write this letter in haste.

Enclosure 4 in No. 61.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sheikh Mubarak-es-Subah.

(After compliments.) *Bushire, June* 7, 1910.

YOUR esteemed letter of the 26th Jemadi-el-Awwal, 1328, duly reached me, and I understood its contents. I am very sorry to learn that the question of the registration of the transfer of the Fadaghia property is giving you so much difficulty. I know well that the matter in question is a very important one, and have represented the present

state of the case and your requests to Government by telegram, and trust that they will be able to devise wise means of achieving a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. I will write again directly I receive news from them.

May you be preserved.

Enclosure 5 in No. 61.

Captain Shakespear to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, June 8, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with my letter dated the 11th May, 1910, regarding Sheikh Mubarak's property at Fadaghia.

2. On his return from Bussorah, where the sheikh had met the vali, he informed me that he had sent a long and urgent letter to you from Fao giving the latest demands of the Turkish officials. The sheikh also furnished me with a copy of this letter to you of the 26th Jemadi-el-Awwal, 1328, together with a copy of the enclosure.

3. The case is very plainly set out in the sheikh's letter, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat its purport here. Sheikh Mubarak, for some reason which I cannot at present divine, was most anxious that I should see the original of Abdul Wahab-el-Kertas's letter (a copy of which accompanied the sheikh's letter), and that I should inform you that I had done so. He seemed to attach great importance to the advice tendered by Abdul Wahab-el-Kertas not to delay in registering the property, although it necessitated compliance with the Turkish demands as a necessary preliminary.

4. The sheikh said he was most anxious, for Abdul Wahab's letter showed that for some reason Ahmed Pasha Zoheir did not seem to be as well disposed to him (Abdul Wahab-el-Kertas) as he used to be, and if he caused any trouble the sheikh would be left without a remedy. The sheikh by this insinuation means really that Ahmed Pasha Zoheir, from the members of whose family the property was purchased, is in a such position that the Turkish law will help him at every turn if the case came to dispute.

It will be advantageous to recall the main facts; that four separate sale-deeds were executed; that nearly all the property really belonged to women of Ahmed Pasha's family; that he was their attorney; that he then constituted Abdul Wahab-el-Kertas as his attorney for the sale to Sheikh Mubarak; that the property still stands in the names of some ten different persons in the books of the "tapoo" (land registration) office; that the purchase price has been paid over in full and heavy further expenditure incurred by the sheikh on improvements, buildings, &c. Consequently, if Ahmed Pasha, either as the result of Turkish intrigue or through personal greed, laid claims to the property, repudiated the sale, or induced any of the persons concerned to repudiate either a power of attorney or the sale of their own particular portion, the only course for Sheikh Mubarak would be to file a suit in the Turkish courts. If he did so in order to establish his rights, he is at once face to face with entries in the land record office books showing the property as still belonging to the Zoheir family. Moreover, without a Turkish nationality certificate, it is a question whether he could even plead in the Turkish courts. Mr. Consul Crow gives the legal position very clearly in his despatch No. 6 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, dated the 12th February, 1909, a copy of which was forwarded to me under your office endorsement dated the 24th October, 1909, and I would invite a reference thereto; it will be seen from this despatch how helpless Sheikh Mubarak would be in the event of the Fadaghia property becoming a subject of litigation. This insecurity will continue so long as the transfers are not legally effected in the "tapoo" office records.

5. Since the revolution in Constantinople I am informed that the greatest strictness has been observed and insisted upon in all matters in which the laws require that nationality should be proved. In the case of land transfers this rule is complied with by the person desiring the transfer to his name producing his certificate of Turkish nationality. This law, which I understand not to be a new one by any means, used to be freely evaded under the old régime with comparative ease, but that evasion has now become impossible.

6. Though the transfer of the Fadaghia property was originally prevented for political reasons, these have now been sufficiently explained by the present vali not to

exist, in so far that he has satisfied himself that the purchase was *bond fide* and not effected with British gold. Accordingly the vali asked the authorities in Constantinople to rescind their previous order of suspension, and this request has been approved. It was to this rescission that my letter dated the 11th May, 1910, referred. The crux of the position now is that the law does not allow of a legal transfer without the admission of Turkish nationality, and the vali therefore would seem to be perfectly correct in his attitude when he informs the sheikh that he may effect the transfer to-morrow if he wishes, but that the law requires the production of a teskereh of Turkish nationality by the person to whose name the transfer is to be made. His Majesty's consul at Bussorah may be able to verify if this view is substantially correct.

7. With regard to the vali insisting on the transfer being made to the names of Sheikh Mubarak's four sons, I am informed by the sheikh's secretary that this request has arisen through the fact that when the property was first purchased the sheikh desired it to be registered in the names of his four sons, and the preliminary arrangements were all made accordingly until the whole matter was stopped by the orders of suspension from Constantinople. Since then the sheikh has changed his mind, and wishes the property to be inscribed in the name of his blind son Naser and his seven daughters. This, however, appears to me to be matter of minor detail, which could probably be got over when the primary question of the necessity for registration as a Turkish subject is solved.

8. As his letter to you shows, the sheikh is exceedingly anxious, for there is now no way for him out of the difficulty. He has not, so far, registered any of his family as Turkish subjects, though I fear that his apprehension for the security of his property, worth nearly 50,000*l.*, may before long induce him to comply with the Turkish demand, perhaps unknown to us until too late, and it is for this reason I would be glad of something of a reassuring nature which I can communicate to the sheikh. I have told him that I am putting the matter before you in detail, and advised him to await the decision of His Majesty's Government.

9. Though an unpleasant question to handle in view of the regeneration of Turkey, it would seem that we are now confronted with the solution of the position of Koweit as between an independent sheikhdom or a vassal appanage of Turkey. The sheikh is an old man, anxious not to lose a valuable property nor its revenues during his own lifetime, and in the absence of some solid assistance which will permanently relieve him of his present difficulty is quite capable of safeguarding his undoubted rights by compliance with Turkish demands and pleading *force majeure* to us. I was told once that he himself had cynically remarked that it would be for his son Jaber and not for him in his own lifetime to fight out the position of Koweit between the Turks and the English, and while he thanked God that it would be so, he pitied Jaber. The present Vali of Bussorah loses no opportunity of trying to bring Turkish influence actually into Koweit, and to identify Koweit with Bussorah—witness the Koweit-Bussorah telegraph idea, the suggestion for Koweit gendarmerie for Al Hassa under Turkish officers, and the frequent meetings between Sheikh Mubarak and the vali.

10. That Sheikh Mubarak is aware his port and country stand to lose by definitely becoming subject to Turkey is I think true, but he has now reached an age (some 72 years) when he is also inclined to favour a prospect ensuring him ease and freedom from Turkish worries during his remaining years, and to add *après nous le déluge*.

Enclosure 6 in No. 61.

Consul Crow to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Bussorah, June 6, 1910.*

IN reply to your letter of the 22nd May last, on the subject of the registration of Sheikh Mubarak's property at Fadaghia, I have the honour to state that, according to information I have received here, orders were sent by the Sublime Porte to the effect that Sheikh Mubarak may transfer his property in the name of his four sons, as he asked in Muhrim Bey's time, provided he registers them as Ottoman subjects.

I understand Sheikh Mubarak has on many occasions applied to have the land transferred in the names of his sons, but that he does not agree to take out teskerehs of Ottoman nationality for them and, on his recent visit to Bussorah, on the 31st May last, he proposed to the vali to transfer the land to one or several of his women-folk. The vali, however, I am told, said he could not do this as it was not in accordance with the instructions he had received, and he suggested that, if Mubarak wanted it

done; he should make a fresh application to that effect, which the vali professed himself willing to forward to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[28339] No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 5.)

Sir, *India Office, August 4, 1910.*

WHEN your letter of the 2nd instant was received, the Secretary of State for India was about to address the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding a further shipment of oxide from Abu Musa in connection with the two telegrams from the Viceroy, which are now enclosed; and he was about to propose that Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's action should be approved, on the ground that Messrs. Wönckhaus's outstanding contracts had already been satisfied.

The question has now been further examined in the light of the opinions expressed in your letter under reply, and I am to say that it is regretted that Sir E. Grey cannot see his way to support Colonel Cox in his opposition to the proposed shipment.

Sir E. Grey, it is observed, neither disputes the facts nor calls in question the logical soundness of the attitude assumed by Colonel Cox. But it is held, apparently, that, in view of the terms of the communications to the German Government of the 10th January, 4th and 23rd July, 1908, His Majesty's Government are precluded from insisting on a strict maintenance of the conditions laid down in the memorandum to Count Metternich of the 10th July, 1908.

It is no doubt true that the limiting condition is explicitly mentioned in one only of the four communications that have been made to the German Government. But it is equally true that it has been implicit in the whole correspondence, for reasons that are obvious when the origin of the correspondence is borne in mind. This, it will be remembered, was the note of the German chargé d'affaires of the 31st December, 1907, forwarding the "complaint" of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., in which it was implied —if not expressly stated—that Herr Wönckhaus had commitments to the extent of at least 2,000 tons of oxide; and it was to enable that gentleman to meet the liability which was thus understood to exist that Sir E. Grey, in Mr. Mallet's letter of the 8th January, 1908, proposed to inform the German Government "that Messrs. Wönckhaus will be allowed to remove all the red oxide which has already been mined and is now ready for shipment."

It was on this understanding, or (as it eventually proved) misunderstanding, that His Majesty's Government have acted throughout; and it is only within the last few months that it has come to their knowledge that the firm were not in fact committed to the extent originally supposed, and that the shipment of 1,810 tons by the "Louise" in April 1908 more than discharged their liabilities. These appear to be material facts, which must not be left out of consideration in interpreting the undertakings that have been given to the German Government.

Further, although the condition is mentioned in only one of those undertakings, it has never been challenged by the German Government, and, moreover, the document in which it appears is of such importance that it may fairly be argued that it overrides the other less-guarded communications. The document in question (dated the 10th July, 1908) is the reasoned reply of His Majesty's Government to the note of the German chargé d'affaires above referred to; and at the end of it, as the sum and conclusion of the whole matter, His Majesty's Government declare that "they are prepared to use their good offices in order that temporary arrangements may be made whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus will be enabled to procure a limited amount of red oxide to place them in a position to fulfil such contracts as they may have entered into before the cancellation of the lease." (See also Foreign Office letter to India Office, No. 11051, of the 23rd April, 1908.)

It is submitted that the real intention of His Majesty's Government could not have been more authoritatively stated, and it is suggested that it may be practicable to answer the present representations of the German Government on the lines indicated above. If, however, Sir E. Grey remains of opinion that this course is not possible, or that it will prejudice the eventual settlement of the whole question, the Government of India will of course be instructed accordingly.

The other suggestions made in your letter under reply are concurred in.

Turning now to the question raised in paragraph 3 of Colonel Cox's letter of the 5th June last (copy of which, with other papers received from India, is enclosed*), I am to say that it appears from the enclosures in his letter of the 2nd May, 1908 (copy of which was sent to your department on the 3rd July of that year), that the utensils referred to were allowed to remain on the island pending the removal of oxide then awaiting shipment. The decision as to their disposal must depend upon the answer which Sir E. Grey determines to give to the German Ambassador's note. If it is decided that no further shipment is to be made until a general settlement with the German Government has been arrived at, it may be desirable either to call upon the owners to remove their gear, or to inform them that they leave it at their own risk. I am to ask that Sir E. Grey's wishes on this point may be communicated to this Office.

I am also to ask whether any information can be given (with reference to the fourth paragraph of Colonel Cox's letter) as to the present state of the discussion between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 25, 1910.*

REFERENCE is invited to the 4th paragraph of letter, dated the 5th ultimo, from Resident, Persian Gulf, forwarded with letter, dated the 30th ultimo, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, in regard to Abu Musa. We should be glad to be informed if consideration has been given, and if so with what result, to suggestion of Resident, Persian Gulf, that question should be settled by commercial compromise.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 25, 1910.*

REFERENCE is invited to your telegram of the 5th May regarding Abu Musa, and to correspondence sent with letters of the 9th and 30th ultimo and 14th instant respectively from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Views expressed in second paragraph of letter, dated the 15th ultimo, from Resident, Persian Gulf, have our support. Your instructions are solicited.

If it is agreed by His Majesty's Government that Hassan should now cease all operations, we propose that suggestion in third paragraph of above-quoted letter from Resident, Persian Gulf, viz., that owners be called upon to remove load gear from island, should be approved. Letter, dated the 2nd May, from Resident, Persian Gulf, referred to in this paragraph, was sent to India Office with weekly letter, dated the 28th May, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

[28544] No. 63.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 510.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, giving details as to the Hodeidah-Sana'a Railway scheme.

From information recently obtained at the Ministry of Public Works, it appears that the plans of this railway have now been received at the Ministry from Paris; a commission is to be formed and these plans and surveys are to be carefully studied. The Paris group, who have been practically promised the concession (David Léon and the Rouvier Bank) find that the line as surveyed by the engineers through the mountainous section will be much more costly than was at first anticipated (a sum of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 fr. per kilometre was mentioned), and consequently authorisation

* See Enclosures sent to Foreign Office on the 20th July and 2nd August.

has been asked for a new survey to be made of the mountain section in order to find an easier *tracé*. The department has given the necessary permission, and the Paris group have sent out an engineer. Mr. Weakley tells me that he has obtained private information that the Government intend giving the concession to the Paris group (represented here by Menasche, a Jew, a former collaborator of the ex-director of the Société de Tombac, M. Grandjian, now the manager of Rouvier's Bank), although the concession will, *pour la forme*, be put up to adjudication, only a very short time being allowed—perhaps three months—not sufficient for any competitors to make surveys, draw up plans, and make serious offers. Grandjian was spoken to last year about the participation of capital in this enterprise, but he held out no hope of such participation being either possible or desirable.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22/E.)
Sir, *Sana'a, June 20, 1910.*

I REGRET to observe that no report has yet been submitted to your Excellency on the Hodeidah–Sana'a Railway construction scheme, a survey of which was completed in April last by a body of French and Italian engineers, representing M. David Léon, of Paris, who received the concession for that survey last year from the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works.

Certain particulars of the draft agreement for the above survey, signed by the Ottoman Minister of Public Works with a certain Jacques Menasche, of Constantinople, on behalf of the above-mentioned concessionnaire, were furnished to your Excellency in Mr. Waugh's memorandum dated the 9th June, 1909, an extract from which was forwarded to me for my private information.

I have since been privately shown a copy of the aforesaid agreement itself, contents of which I find agree in the main with Mr. Consul Waugh's information. I have also been able to elicit some further facts about the course of the proposed railway, with details regarding construction and of the estimated cost of same.

I now submit these together with particulars of the terms of the agreement entered into with the concessionnaire for the survey, for the information of His Majesty's Government, which, however belated, I am in hopes may still prove of use to British investors who may be interested in the enterprise.

In October last year, during my absence at Jeddah, two survey parties, one under M. Berneyton with seven French engineers, and the second under Signor d'Violini, and with seven Italian engineers, landed at Hodeidah, to make the survey and study the project on the spot.

The former party, under M. Berneyton, proceeded immediately to Sana'a and commenced to make a survey of the proposed line from that place to Mefak', a distance of 85 kilom., and later from Sana'a to Amran (57 kilom.).

The other party, under Signor d'Violini, first made a study of the proposed harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, some 17 kilom. to the north-west of Hodeidah, and then of a line from the former to Hodeidah and thence to Mefak', where a junction will be effected with the line from the north. The distance from Ras-el-Ketib along the railway line to the Mefak' junction is estimated at about 186 kilom.

The survey parties completed their work in the Yemen at the end of March and left for Europe during the first week of April, where they will make their maps and draw up estimates for the scheme.

During the study of the line, the Ottoman Government was represented by two civil engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, one of whom was attached to each survey party.

The agreement entered into with M. Jacques Menasche at Constantinople, acting on behalf of M. David Léon, of Paris, by the Ottoman Public Works, was to the following effect:—

1. The concessionnaire was to make a survey of the site at Ras-el-Ketib where it was proposed to construct a harbour.

2. Also a survey for a railway of 1·05-metre gauge from the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib to Hodeidah and thence viâ Mefak' to Sana'a, with a branch from the latter place going northwards to Amran.

The concessionnaire undertook to complete the survey of the line in ten months from the date of his receiving such concession, viz., from the 6th September, 1909.

On expiration of the above period, detailed plans and drawings would have to be submitted, which the Ministry of Public Works would examine, and within the space of three months of receipt of such notify the concessionnaire whether the plans were approved or not, reserving the right to modify such, if considered necessary.

One month after the Ministry had made known its opinion on the plans, Léon Bey, the concessionnaire for the survey, would be required to tender his lowest price for the construction of the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib and of the railway line to Sana'a and its branches, the price in no case to exceed £T. 7,200 (equivalent to 6,480*l.*) per kilometre. The above rate to include, besides cost of construction of the line complete ready for exploitation, that of a telegraph line along the railroad, post offices at the railway stations, and the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, with the custom-house, gendarmerie, and police offices, &c., to be erected on the wharf there. Accidents, profits, and cost of administration to be included in the tender for construction per kilometre, but cost of rolling-stock to be extra and not included therein.

Should Léon Bey's tender be accepted by the Government, the Ministry undertook to notify him of that fact within a month of his submitting such tender, when the concession would actually be awarded him.

On the other hand, if the Ministry of Public Works were unable to accept his tender, he would receive information to that effect within a month also, when alternative proposals would be made to him.

Should he still not accept, the concession would be put up to tenders in the open market.

All tenders for construction would be required to deposit a sum of £T. 20,000 (18,000*l.*) with the Ministry before their proposals were considered at all, and would be required to be sent in sealed.

The Government will then inform Léon Bey of the lowest tender received, and give him the option to tender on the same lines, and offer him the first refusal for the concession.

Should Léon Bey eventually not come to terms with the Government in the matter of the concession, the latter agreed to pay him the cost of the survey made by him at the rate of 1,500 fr. (60*l.*) per kilometre, plus 50,000 fr. (2,000*l.*) for the survey of the proposed harbour at Ras-el-Ketib.

The other conditions laid down for prospective concessionnaires are, that in the event of their tenders being accepted the concessionnaire must—

1. Submit final plans for the construction of the first 100 kilom. of the railway, as well as of the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, within ten months of securing the concession, and before the expiry of another twelve months he must submit the remainder of the plans for the railway.

2. He must start construction within three months of approval of the plans finally submitted by him, and complete the whole work within the space of three years from the date on which such plans have received approval.

3. All unforeseen obstacles to construction to be excluded from the contract time.

The whole Yemen Railway scheme may be divided into:—

1. Construction of a harbour at Ras-el-Ketib; and

2. That of a railway line line (1·05-metre gauge) from Ras-el-Ketib viâ Hodeidah to Mefak', a distance of 186 kilom., and thence to Sana'a (85 kilom.). It is proposed also to add a branch to the line proceeding north-westerly to Amran, some 57 kilom. from Sana'a

Ras-el-Ketib lies about 10 miles to the north-west of Hodeidah, where there is an enclosed space of deep water, well protected and eminently adapted for the construction of a harbour where ships of fairly moderate size (say, drawing between 20 and 24 feet of water) would be able to enter freely and come alongside a wharf.

A few miles to the south of the above place is the village of Djabana, that has at present a fairly decent water supply, which could be greatly improved by the boring of artesian wells.

The estimated cost of construction of a harbour at Ras-el-Ketib is about 5,000,000 fr. (200,000*l.*). As already mentioned, the above amount would also

include the cost of erection of a wharf, of a custom-house, of police, gendarmerie, and control offices, and a railway station situated in the vicinity of the wharf.

The harbour would be 5 kilom. in length by 3 kilom. in width. The average depth of the harbour will be 9 metres (*i.e.*, about 29 feet 4 inches). The soundings now obtainable inside Ras-el-Ketib are maximum 9 metres at low water and minimum 8½ metres. At high tide a depth of 9½ metres is easily obtainable.

The channel leading from the north to Ras-el-Ketib is about a mile or 1½ kilom. wide, and having a depth of 9 metres of water.

Eight buoys, moored 1 mile apart, will be laid down to denote the course of the channel leading into the harbour.

The question of erecting a light-house at Ras-el-Ketib will naturally arise, if it were decided to build the harbour there, which, of course, would fall within the purview of the Ottoman Lights Administration at Constantinople.

It is needless to mention that it would be quite impossible to construct a railway in the Yemen without first constructing a harbour at Ras-el-Ketib or some such protected site in the vicinity of Hodeidah. The conditions obtaining at the latter place, which is merely an open and exposed roadstead, with reefs scattered about, and having very shallow water, necessitating the lying-out of ships about 2 or 3 miles from the shore, are such as would preclude the disembarkation of heavy machinery for the construction of the railroad, and the necessary rolling-stock.

It is further proposed to build a stone wharf at the harbour, 1,100 metres, where four or five cranes would be installed, and from which three lines of railway would lead to the main railway line.

About twenty vessels of moderate size will be accommodated in the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib, moving by themselves on to the wharf, alongside which two vessels could be tied up at the same time.

The depth of water alongside the wharf would be 7½ metres at low water.

Stone for construction of the wharf is obtainable at Djebel Zougar, an island lying 50 miles to the south-west of Hodeidah. The price per cubic metre of stone delivered at Ras-el-Ketib is estimated at 86 fr. (5*l.* 8*s.* 9*d.*). Stone is also to be had in large quantities at Bajl, where it can be blasted from mountains or rocks.

I should think that if construction operations were commenced at Bajl at the same time as they were at Ras-el-Ketib, a distance of 65 kilom. viâ Hodeidah, the stone available at that place could be utilised with much advantage and economy for building the railway and the wharf.

The following is a list of the villages through which the Tehama section of the railway line will pass and where stations will be established. The respective distances from the terminus at Ras-el-Ketib are also given. Most of the places are marked on maps of the Yemen :—

	Kilom.
From wharf at Ras-el-Ketib to Hodeidah	16
,, ,, El Tamam	40
(El Tamam is a rest-house on the caravan route.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Bajl	65
(Bajl is a garrisoned town and the head-quarters of a kaimakam.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Dair Salim	86
(Dair Salim is a small village on the caravan trace.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Obal	102
(Obal has a garrison of half a battalion of infantry, where a military provision depôt is established.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Mareigha	125
(Mareigha is a village in the Wadi Sahan.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Jaira, a petty village	150
Or from Ras-el-Ketib to Beit-es-Sharifa	155
(In the Wadi Sanfar.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to Mefak'	176
(Mefak' is a fortress and has two companies of infantry stationed there. It has also a provision depôt, and is the residence of the mudir of the nahie, or parish.)	
From Ras-el-Ketib to junction with northern section of the railway ..	186

I learn from a confidential source that the cost of construction of the southern section of the railway that will traverse the Tehama principally is estimated at 4,000*l.* per kilometre. This section would, therefore, cost for the whole 186 kilom. roughly 744,000*l.* To this must be added 200,000*l.* as cost of the harbour, making a total of 944,000*l.*

The northern section of the proposed railway, of which I have no very detailed

information, will run from the junction near Mefak' around the mountains in the vicinity traversing the Wadi Ferseh and emerging near Sana'a, and then entering that town.

The length of this section of the line will be about 85 kilom. Stations will be established at the following places, after the Mefak' junction of the two sections, viz., Suk-el-Rubuh', Hammam Jarif, Ali Saar, Suk-el-Afish, and Wayira, with its terminus at Sana'a.

The cost of construction of this section, I learn from the same confidential source, will vary from 150,000 fr. (6,000*l.*) to 200,000 fr. (8,000*l.*) per kilometre, and which, taking an average of 7,000*l.* per kilometre, will amount to 600,000*l.* in round figures for the whole 85 kilom.

The branch line going from Sana'a in a north-westerly direction to Amran will be about 57 kilom. in length, and will traverse practically flat country.

The cost of construction of this branch line, at 4,000*l.* per kilometre, will be about 228,000*l.* Stations will be established at the following places :—

1. Ma'mer, 26 kilom. from Sana'a;
2. Darwan, a distance of 10 kilom. from Ma'mer; and
3. Amran, 21 kilom. from Darwan, or 57 kilom. from Sana'a.

Amran is an important military station, where the Turks maintain a strong force, according to the requirements of the political situation and the attitude of the Zeidi imam, Seyyid Yahya, that ranges from four to eight battalions of infantry with one battery of mountain artillery.

It is generally used as a base of operations against the imam or the rebellious and truculent tribesmen inhabiting the mountainous country to the north and north-west of Sana'a.

It will thus be seen that, according to my source of information, the total cost of constructing the 326 kilom. of the proposed Hodeidah Sana'a Railway, including the branches to Ras-el-Ketib from the former and to Amran from the latter, and of the harbour, wharf, and accessory buildings at Ras-el-Ketib, will amount to 1,772,000*l.*, made up as follows :—

	£
1. Cost of harbour, wharf, and buildings, at Ras-el-Ketib	200,000
2. Estimated cost of construction of southern or Tehama section of railway (186 kilom.)	744,000
3. Estimated cost of construction of northern section of 85 kilom. ..	600,000
4. Estimated cost of construction of branch line from Sana'a to Amran (57 kilom.)	228,000
Total for 328 kilom. of railway, harbour, &c.	1,772,000

I infer that my informant obtained his figures regarding the estimated cost of construction from the chiefs of the respective sections of engineers sent out by the concessionnaire to make the survey. I also understand that these estimates are somewhat in excess of the amount that would actually be incurred in construction, including a reasonable margin of profit.

On the other hand, the maximum rate for construction at which the Ottoman Government will be prepared to entertain tenders is, as has already been referred to in the draft agreement concluded with David Léon Bey, £T.7,200 (6,480*l.*) per kilometre, to include cost of harbour and accessory buildings, &c., and telegraph line along railroad. The maximum cost at the above rate would come to £T. 2,361,000, or 2,125,440*l.*, for the 328 kilom. of railway from Ras-el-Ketib to Amran.

I believe that a tender for, say, £T. 1,650,000, or 1,500,000*l.*, which would be the lowest estimate at which the work could profitably be undertaken, would be the figure acceptable to the Ottoman Public Works Ministry.

I have not been able to ascertain locally whether the Ottoman Government intend to grant a concession for working the line, after construction, for a limited number of years, although it would appear from Mr. Waugh's memorandum already referred to in this despatch that there is an intention to grant a ninety-nine years' concession for working the line.

As it would be many years before such a line as it is proposed to build could be made to pay, owing to the limited commercial traffic in the interior (the principal object for which the railway is being constructed being to serve military and political requirements), and the great cost at which it would have to be worked on account of the entire absence of skilled labour in the country and of fuel, coal, and other important accessories, to say nothing of the frequent outbursts of unrest that arise

any prospective concessionnaire would naturally demand a very high kilometric guarantee from the Government, which the latter can ill-afford to pay.

In my opinion, and it is the opinion generally shared by the local authorities and officials, the Ottoman Parliament will only grant a concession, most probably to some foreign company, for the construction of the harbour and the railroad simply, and that the line will afterwards be worked by the military authorities in the Yemen on similar lines to the Hedjaz Railway.

As agreements for railway contracts in Turkey, although negotiated with the Ministry for Public Works and examined by the Sublime Porte, require parliamentary sanction, I hardly think that the concession under report can be given before next year, in view of the fact that the present parliamentary session is almost at its close.

Under the circumstances I would venture to suggest that His Majesty's Board of Trade place before the principal chambers of commerce at home, or communicate to British syndicates likely to be interested, such details of the Yemen Railway scheme contained in this despatch as it might consider fit to make public.

I understand that the concessionnaire, David Léon Bey, of Paris, represents a French group of investors interested in railway enterprise in Turkey, and that there is no British capital at all in the syndicate above referred to.

A map showing the course of the proposed railway line to Sana'a and Amran, and the position of the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib follows this despatch.

Extra copies of my despatch are herewith enclosed for favour of kind transmission to His Majesty's Foreign Office and the Board of Trade.

With, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[28552] No. 64.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 527.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 31, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 509 of the 26th July, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. McGregor on the Kurdish reactionary movement, in which he reports a conversation with Nazim Bey, chief of the Committee of Union and Progress at Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No 48. Confidential.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, July* 20, 1910.

AS the Vali of Erzeroum is spending a few days at Hassan Kala, where he is engaged in superintending arrangements for the housing of the sufferers by the recent flood, I am unable at present to give your Excellency any further information from an official source regarding the progress of the enquiry into the Kurdish insurrectionary movement reported in my despatch No. 45, Confidential, of the 16th instant.

Yesterday, however, I had a conversation with Nazim Bey, the local director of the Public Debt, who appears to be one of the most intelligent Turks here, and who, in his capacity of chief of the Erzeroum branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, is, to say the least of it, in very close touch with the Governor-General, himself also a member of the committee. Nazim Bey, after some remarks on general topics, spontaneously touched on the subject of the Kurdish movement, and his language conveyed to me the impression that he was much more concerned about its potential seriousness than was the Governor-General. While he admitted that nothing had as yet been revealed respecting the scope of the movement, he stated that the Kurds in general were sufficiently well armed to render the suppression of a revolt an extremely awkward task for the military resources of the Government in these provinces, and, during a journey which he had made last year in the districts adjacent to the Persian frontier, he had been surprised to find the Kurds so abundantly equipped with fire-arms of the most modern patterns.

He said there was no doubt that the equivocal attitude of the Vali of Diarbekir had encouraged the Kurds to make that vilayet the centre of their propaganda, and he also stated that the present unrest was due, in a certain measure, to emissaries paid by the Russian police authorities in the Caucasus. There was nothing Russia dreaded so much for the security of her rule in the Caucasus as a settled condition on this side of the frontier, seeing that a basis would thus be formed for the dissemination of liberal ideas among the heterogeneous Caucasian races which were already being drawn closer together by the repressive policy applied to all alike.

Nazim Bey further informed me that the supersession of the mushir, Ibrahim Pasha, had already been decided upon in principle, and that the appointment of new divisional commanders was also being considered; but that the selection of a successor to Ibrahim Pasha was a matter of some difficulty owing to the lack of officers of sufficiently high rank and authority.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Kharput informed me by telegraph, on the 16th instant, that domiciliary visits had been made in the houses of several suspected reactionaries at Diarbekir; but I gather that he was not then acquainted with the object of these measures, and he reports everything as being outwardly quiet.

In reproducing the foregoing statements by Nazim Bey, I do not wish to be supposed to share his alarmist view of the situation which, in my opinion, is still obscure. The mass of the Kurds is not credited with a martial spirit or with a gift for concerted action, and hitherto they have distinguished themselves mainly by acts of violence committed on a defenceless Christian population.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[28560] No. 65

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 535.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 2, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 929 of the 22nd November, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the report of the council of administration of the Damascus–Hamah Railway.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Report of the Council of Administration of the Damascus–Hamah Railway.

Conseil d'Administration : Assemblée générale du 16 *décembre*, 1909.

M. Générbras de Frédaigues, président.
M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, vice-président
M. R. Emond, administrateur délégué.
M. A. Rey, administrateur délégué technique.
M. G. Auboyneau, administrateur.
M. C. Carraby, administrateur.
M. F. Delauney, administrateur.
M. G. Hubert, administrateur.
Son Excellence Hamdy Bey, administrateur.
M. M. G. Mallet, administrateur.

Rapport du Conseil d'Administration.

Messieurs,

NOUS vous avons convoqués en assemblée générale conformément à l'article 24 des statuts, à l'effet :—

1. De soumettre à votre ratification le quatrième acte additionnel conférant à notre société la concession de la construction et de l'exploitation d'un embranchement à

voie normale entre la station de Homs, sur la ligne de Rayak–Alep, et Tripoli de Syrie, avec faculté d'accéder à la mer et d'établir un port à mahonnes au lieu dit El Mina. Cet acte a été signé avec le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman le 17 (30) octobre dernier.

2. De vous demander, avec l'assentiment du Syndicat des Obligataires à revenu variable, pour la réalisation de cette concession, et, conformément à l'article 31 des statuts, l'autorisation de créer et d'émettre 43,747 obligations de 500 fr. nominal rapportant 4 pour cent, ou 20 fr., par an, et amortissables en quatre-vingt-cinq ans, à partir de l'année 1910. Lesdites obligations seront gagées sur tous les produits de notre réseau, après déduction des frais d'exploitation et du service des obligations privilégiées émises en 1901 et des obligations Jonction-Bagdad émises en 1905.

3. De présenter à votre approbation la convention que nous avons passée avec la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer pour la construction et l'exploitation de l'embranchement de Homs–Tripoli.

L'acte additionnel du 17 (30) octobre est ainsi conçu :—

"*Quatrième Acte additionnel à la Convention du 21 zilcadé, 1310 (25 mai, 1309 (6 juin, 1893)), relatif à la Construction et l'Exploitation d'un Embranchement à voie normale entre Homs et Tripoli de Syrie.*

"Entre son Excellence Haladjian Effendi, député de Constantinople et Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics, agissant au nom du Gouvernement ottoman, d'une part ; et M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, agissant en conformité des pouvoirs qui lui ont été conférés par le conseil d'administration de la Société Damas–Hamah et Prolongements, d'autre part, il a été convenu ce qui suit :—

"Article 1er. Le Gouvernement ottoman accorde à la Société ottomane, qui accepte, la concession de la construction et de l'exploitation d'un embranchement à voie normale, dont la largeur entre les bords intérieurs des rails sera de 1·435 mètres, entre la station de Homs, sur la ligne Rayak–Hamah, et Tripoli de Syrie, avec faculté d'accéder à la mer et d'établir un port de mahonnes à El Mina.

"Art. 2. La concession prendra fin à la même date que celle de la ligne Rayak–Alep, et l'embranchement Homs–Tripoli fera retour à l'État en même temps que cette ligne.

"Art. 3. La Société ottomane présentera dans un délai de trois mois, à partir de l'échéance du présent acte additionnel, au Ministère du Commerce et des Travaux Publics, les plans et projets complets après études définitives. Ces plans et projets devront être examinés par le Ministère du Commerce et des Travaux Publics et approuvés tels quels ou modifiés, s'il y a lieu, dans un délai maximum de trois mois, à partir de la date de leur présentation.

"Art. 4. La Société ottomane s'engage à commencer les travaux dans un délai de un an, à partir de l'échéance du présent acte additionnel et à les terminer dans un délai de deux ans au plus, à partir de la date de l'approbation des plans. En cas de force majeure dûment constaté, les délais prévus ci-dessus seront augmentés des retards dus audit cas de force majeure.

"Art. 5. Le matériel et les matériaux nécessaires au premier établissement que la société fera venir de l'étranger, jusqu'à la réception définitive, seront affranchis des droits de douane, à l'exclusion du charbon nécessaire à l'exploitation, qui sera assujetti aux droits de douane.

"Pendant toute la durée de la concession les sol, fonds, et revenus du chemin de fer et de ses dépendances ne seront passibles d'aucun impôt. Les obligations à émettre par la Société ottomane seront assujetties au droit de timbre, conformément à la loi en vigueur au moment de l'émission.

"Art. 6. Comme garantie de l'exécution des présents engagements, le concessionnaire devra, dans un délai de quinze jours, à partir du jour où l'octroi de la concession lui sera notifié officiellement, déposer, à titre de cautionnement, une somme de £. T. 5,000 en numéraire ou en titres de l'État ottoman au cours du jour à la Banque Impériale ottomane ou dans une autre banque, agréée par le Gouvernement, et qui déclarera par un acte en due forme certifié par son ambassade reconnaître la compétence des tribunaux ottomans en cas de contestations portant sur le cautionnement. Si le dépôt est fait en titres, la banque devra parfaire la différence en cas de baisse de prix. Si, dans le délai précité, le concessionnaire n'effectuait pas le dépôt susénoncé, il serait déchu, sans aucune mise en demeure officielle au préalable, de tous droits à la concession.

"Art. 7. Le Gouvernement ottoman ne pourra racheter l'embranchement de Homs–Tripoli que simultanément avec la ligne de Rayak–Alep et réciproquement celle de Rayak–Alep avec Homs–Tripoli. Le rachat de l'embranchement se fera moyennant le paiement d'une somme annuelle équivalant à 50 pour cent des recettes brutes moyennes des cinq années qui précéderont le rachat, sans que ladite somme annuelle puisse être inférieure à 11,000 fr. par kilomètre. Le Gouvernement assurera au concessionnaire au moment du rachat le paiement régulier du prix de rachat. Le Gouvernement se réserve la faculté d'effectuer le rachat en payant le capital de ladite annuité calculé à 4 pour cent. Il sera procédé à la remise de la ligne au Gouvernement ainsi qu'à l'achat par ce dernier des matériaux de construction et approvisionnements existants, conformément à l'article 19 du cahier des charges du 21 zilcadé, 1310 (25 mai, 1309 (6 juin, 1893),) le matériel roulant devant toutefois être remis gratuitement au Gouvernement Impérial.

"Art. 8. La Société ottomane assurera à ses frais, risques, et périls, et sans aucune garantie ni subvention de la part de l'État, la construction et exploitation de cet embranchement, dont toutes les recettes brutes, y compris celles provenant du service du port à mahonnes, lui appartiendront. Toutefois, à partir de la quarante-sixième année de la concession, 50 pour cent de l'excédent des recettes brutes au delà de 15,100 fr. par kilomètre appartiendra à l'État, et à partir de la cinquante-sixième année jusqu'à la fin de la concession il lui sera payé 50 pour cent de l'excédent des recettes brutes au delà de 13,600 fr. par kilomètre. Les tarifs de l'embranchement seront élaborés conformément aux clauses prévues au cahier des charges annexé à la convention du 21 zilcaldé, 1310. Les transports militaires s'effectueront au tiers du tarif. Quant aux tarifs à appliquer pour l'utilisation du port à mahonnes, il devront être soumis à l'approbation du Ministère.

"Art. 9. La Société ottomane construira l'embranchement en se conformant aux types de voie, d'ouvrages, et bâtiments et autres approuvés antérieurement par le Ministère des Travaux Publics pour la ligne de Rayak–Alep ; de même le matériel roulant qui sera acquis par la Société ottomane, pour cette embranchement, devra être du même type que celui qui a été arrêté pour la ligne Hamah–Alep.

"Art. 10. En exécution des stipulations de la convention intervenue le 15 décembre, 1297, entre le Gouvernement Impérial et la Société de la Route de Homs à Tripoli, la Société ottomane s'engage, dans le cas où le Ministère du Commerce et des Travaux Publics lui en ferait connaître la nécessité, à faire l'acquisition du matériel, chevaux, et autres de la Société de la Route, moyennant le paiement de leur valeur estimée à dire d'experts et majoré de 20 pour cent.

"Le Gouvernement ottoman fera, à la Société de la Route, dès la signature du présent acte additionnel, la notification nécessaire pour éviter toute augmentation inutile dans la reprise dudit matériel.

"Art. 11. Le matériel roulant, dont la Société ottomane armera la ligne de Tripoli–Homs, comprendra au moins :—

"2 locomotives avec leurs tenders ;
"2 fourgons ;
"2 voitures mixtes, 1re et 2e classe ;
"4 voitures, 3e classe ;
"25 wagons à marchandises.

"La Société ottomane s'engage, en outre, à faire circuler sur la ligne Homs–Tripoli le matériel roulant de la ligne Rayak-Alep et à se procurer le matériel roulant complémentaire qui serait nécessaire pour assurer le trafic ("nakliat").

"Art. 12. Toutes les conventions et tous les actes concessionnels relatifs au lignes concédées à la Société ottomane restent en vigueur en tout ce qu'ils n'ont pas de contraire au présent acte additionnel, et notamment les dispositions non abrogées par le présent acte de la convention et du cahier des charges du 21 zilcadé, 1310 (25 mai, 1309 (6 juin, 1893)), sont applicables également à l'embranchement Homs–Tripoli.

"Art. 13. Dans les cas où le Gouvernement ottoman accorderait à une autre société la concession d'un port à Tripoli de Syrie, les dépenses effectuées par la Société Damas–Hamah et prolongements en vue de l'établissement du port à mahonnes, prévu à l'article 1er, lui seront remboursées par le concessionnaire du nouveau port, mais la Société ottomane ne pourra réclamer aucune autre indemnité. La Société ottomane devra d'ailleurs raccorder ses voies aux voies ferrées du port.

"Art. 14. A conditions égales, la Société ottomane devra, pour les emplois vacants

en rapport avec leurs connaissances, donner la préférence aux soldats libérés ayant fait leur service dans les bataillons de chemin de fer et obtenu des certificats de l'Administration militaire.

"Certifié conforme à l'original en turc, Constantinople, le 17 octobre, 1325.

"Le Directeur du Bureau de Traduction,
"EDHEM.

(Sceau du Bureau de Traduction.)

"Le présent acte additionnel, fait en double expédition, a été signé et échangé à Constantinople, le 15 chewal, 1327 (17 (30) octobre, 1325 (1909)).

"Le Vice-Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Damas–Hamah et Prolongements,
"SALLANDROUZE DE LAMORNAIX.

(Signatures en turc.)

"Certifié conforme à l'original, le 17 octobre, 1325.

"Le Commissaire Impérial à Constantinople des Chemins de Fer orientaux et Inspecteur,
"MUSTAFA.

"Le Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics,
"HALADJIAN."

(Sceau du Ministère.)

Il nous paraît utile, messieurs, de vous exposer dans quelles conditions nous avons été amenés à exercer sur la concession de la ligne Homs–Tripoli le droit de préférence accordé à notre société par l'article 36 de la Convention Damas–Biredjik, du 21 zilcadé, 1310 (1893).

Le Ministère des Travaux Publics nous a notifié, les 8 et 28 mai dernier, deux mises en demeure successives invitant notre société à déclarer si oui ou non elle était décidée à assumer la réalisation de la concession Homs–Tripoli, aux conditions qui étaient proposées par un groupe de capitalistes indigènes appuyé par des financiers étrangers et cautionné par un établissement de crédit important.

Il ne vous échappera pas, messieurs, que l'intrusion d'une société concurrente, dans la zone de préférence qui nous est réservée par nos actes concessionnels, constituait pour l'avenir de notre entreprise un danger que notre devoir nous commandait de conjurer. En conséquence, nous avons répondu affirmativement à la mise en demeure du Gouvernement et, en ce faisant, nous avons conscience d'avoir pris le parti le plus prudent qu'il y avait à prendre pour la sauvegarde de vos intérêts.

Pour la réalisation de la concession Homs–Tripoli nous passerons, si nous avons votre approbation, avec la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer, les accords financiers et industriels suivants :—

"*Convention de Construction et d'Exploitation.*

"Entre la Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Damas–Hamah et Prolongements (ci-dessous dénommée 'Société ottomane'), dont le siège est à Constantinople, représentée par le président de son conseil d'administration, M. de Frédaigues, dûment autorisé à l'effet des présentes par délibération du conseil d'administration, en date du , et avec l'approbation de l'assemblée générale des actionnaires, d'une part ; et la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer (ci-dessous dénommée 'Régie générale'), dont le siège social est à Paris, 6 Boulevard de la Madeleine, dûment représentée par son président directeur, M. le Comte Vitali, d'autre part, il a été exposé ce qui suit :—

"La Société ottomane a été déclarée, par firman Impérial en date du 13 chewal, 1327 (15 (28) octobre, 1325 (1909)), concessionnaire du Chemin de Fer de Homs à Tripoli de Syrie, dans les conditions stipulées à la convention passée, le 15 chewal, 1327

(17 (30) octobre, 1325 (1909)), entre son Excellence le Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics de l'Empire ottoman et M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, convention dont copie est annexée aux présentes, après avoir été visée par les parties soussignées, qui déclarent en avoir pleine et entière connaissance.

"La Société ottomane ayant décidé de confier à la Régie générale, qui accepte, la construction de toute ligne de Homs–Tripoli et de ses dépendances, conformément aux projets et à la note descriptive ci-annexés et d'incorporer également cette nouvelle ligne au réseau dont l'exploitation est assurée par ses soins de la Régie générale, il a été dit et convenu ce qui suit :—

"Article 1er. La société procédera à la création de 43,747 obligations de 500 fr. nominal, rapportant 4 pour cent, ou 20 fr., par an et amortissables en 85 ans, à partir de l'année 1910. Ces obligations prendront rang après les obligations privilégiées de 1901 et Jonction-Bagdad de 1905, étant convenu entre les parties soussignées que les ressources de la régie co-intéressée seront, dans leur entier, affectées à la garantie desdites obligations, y compris la rémunération de la Régie générale, nonobstant les droits antérieurement stipulés en faveur de cette dernière sur cette rémunération.

"Comme contre-partie des engagements pris par la Régie générale à l'article 2 suivant, la Société ottomane remettra les 43,747 obligations par elle créées, comme il vient d'être dit, à la Banque Impériale ottomane choisie d'un commun accord comme tiers détenteur.

"Art. 2. Moyennant l'exécution, par la Société ottomane, de l'article 1er ci-dessus, la Régie générale assume à forfait les obligations suivantes :—

"1. Etablir, présenter au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et faire approuver par lui tous les plans et projets définitifs de la ligne de Homs–Tripoli, conformément aux avant-projets soumis le 2 (8) [?] juillet, 1909, à l'examen de MM. Alexis Rey, Administrateur délégué technique de la société, et Genty, Inspecteur général des Ponts et Chaussées.

"2. Construire la ligne de Homs–Tripoli et toutes ses dépendances, y compris le port à malonnes, prévu auxdits projets, et les faire recevoir provisoirement et définitivement par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, dans les délais fixés par la convention précitée du 15 chewal 1327 (17 (30) octobre, 1325 (1909)).

"3. Pourvoir, jusqu'à la mise en exploitation complète de la ligne Homs–Tripoli, au service des intérêts intercalaires des obligations émises en exécution de l'article 1er ci-dessus.

"4. Sur le produit de l'émission des obligations déposées chez la Banque Impériale ottomane, comme il est dit à l'article 1er ci-dessus, laisser disponible une somme de 1,870,000 fr., qui sera portée au crédit de la Société ottomane, conformément à l'article 5 de la Convention de Construction en date du 3 juillet, 1909, et sera affectée comme suit :—

	Fr.
"(*a.*) A l'achat du matériel roulant, du mobilier des stations, du petit matériel d'équipement et d'entretien, d'outillage des ateliers et de dépôts, du matériel maritime, au rachat éventuel du matériel de la Société de la Route de Homs à Tripoli (article 10 de la convention du 15 décembre, 1257) et à la constitution du fonds de roulement nécessaire à la Société ottomane	1,620,000
"(*b.*) A la constitution d'une réserve destinée à couvrir, s'il y a lieu, les insuffisances des premiers exercices d'exploitation	250,000
	1,870,000

"Le solde du produit de l'émission des 43,747 obligations créées par la Société ottomane revenant à la Régie générale, lui sera délivré par acomptes mensuels, en forme habituelle des situations de travaux exécutés, et sur la base de la série de prix en cent millièmes annexée aux présentes.

"Art. 3. A dater de l'ouverture à l'exploitation de la ligne de Homs–Tripoli, le Traité d'Exploitation et l'Avenant en dates des 15 février, 1901, et 8 juillet, 1905, sont maintenus dans toutes leurs parties, clauses, et conditions, sauf en ce qui suit :—

"1. L'exploitation de la ligne de Homs à Tripoli sera réunie à celle des lignes actuellement exploitées par la Régie générale, pour la durée du traité en cours, telle qu'elle est déterminée par l'article 6 de la présente convention.

"2. L'article 8 du Traité d'Exploitation du 15 février, 1901, devenu l'article 3 de l'Avenant du 8 juillet, 1905, est partiellement modifié comme suit.

"(*a.*) Le paragraphe 2, commençant par les mots 'Les comptes de recettes' et finissant par les mots 'réseau à voie large,' est annulé et remplacé par le paragraphe suivant :—

"'Les comptes de recettes de l'exploitation seront tenus par l'exploitant en trois comptabilités distinctes : une pour l'ancien réseau à voie étroite ; l'autre pour la ligne Rayak–Alep ; enfin, la troisième pour la ligne Homs–Tripoli.'

"Le paragraphe 6, commençant par les mots 'L'exploitant fera figurer,' et finissant par les mots 'pour la nouvelle ligne,' est annulé et remplacé par le paragraphe suivant :—

"'L'exploitant fera figurer, dans les dépenses de l'exploitation, le paiement de la redevance au Gouvernement et à la ville de Damas, soit £ T. 1,300 par an, les frais de contrôle du Gouvernement, soit £ T. 2½ par kilomètre de la ligne de Beyrouth–Damas–M'zerib, et 300 piastres or par kilomètre pour la ligne de Rayak–Alep et pour la ligne de Homs–Tripoli.'

"Les paragraphes 14 à 19, commençant par les mots 'Lorsque les comptes d'un exercice' et finissant par les mots 'et 3 pour cent à la Régie générale,' sont annulés et remplacés par les paragraphes suivants :—

"'Lorsque les comptes d'un exercice auront été définitivement arrêtés, la participation dans les résultats de l'exercice attribuée à l'exploitant, pour rémunérer sa gestion de régie co-intéressée, sera déterminée par l'application des calculs suivants :

"'1. Il sera fait un total des recettes brutes des lignes Beyrouth–Damas–M'zerib, Homs–Tripoli, du raccordement et des voies de quai, y compris les résultats de l'exploitation des Tramways libanais, et du montant total annuel de la garantie de la ligne Rayak–Alep, due par le Gouvernement ottoman, et ce total constituera "Les Produits."

"'2. Il sera fait un autre total comprenant :—

"'(*a.*) Les dépenses d'exploitation des trois lignes ci-dessus nommées du Raccordement, y compris les sommes à payer à la Compagnie du Port, à titre de service du capital ou de part du produit net.

"'(*b.*) Un prélèvement de 10,617 fr. par an et par kilomètre exploité de la ligne Rayak–Alep.

"'(*c.*) Le prélèvement de la somme nécessaire au service, en intérêts, amortissements, et impôts, des obligations 4 pour cent émises pour la réalisation de la concession Homs–Tripoli.

"'(*d.*) Une somme forfaitaire de 1,500,000 fr. en faveur de la Société ottomane, sauf ce qui est convenu aux articles 4 et 5 ci-après.

"'Ce second total constituera "Les Charges" et l'exploitation recevra, à titre de rémunération, 50 pour cent de la différence entre "Les Produits" et "Les Charges" tant que cette différence ne dépassera pas 1,2000,000 fr.

"'L'excédent éventuel au-dessus de 1,400,000 fr. de solde net du compte de régie co-intéressée, sera partagé : 60 pour cent à la société et 40 pour cent à la Régie générale.

"'L'excédent éventuel au-dessus de 1,400,000 fr. de solde net du compte de régie co-intéressée sera partagé : 70 pour cent à la société et 30 pour cent à la Régie générale.'

"Art. 4. Pour réduire au minimum les aléas pouvant résulter pour la Société ottomane, de l'incorporation de la ligne Homs–Tripoli (dont les recettes brutes ne sont pas garanties) dans celles qui font l'objet de la régie d'exploitation, la Régie générale consent, si la liquidation du compte annuel de régie co-intéressée effectuée comme ci-dessus ne permet pas d'attribuer aux obligations à revenu variable un coupon brut de 15 fr. et une somme minima de 100,000 fr. pour leur amortissement, à ce que le mode de calcul prévu par l'article 3 de la présente convention soit éventuellement modifié comme suit :—

"Si les recettes brutes de la voie étroite sont inférieures à 4,135,000 fr., elles seront inscrites conventionnellement à ce chiffre et, si cette modification ne suffit pas pour que le calcul fasse ressortir, pour les obligations à revenu variable le résultat correspondant à ces 15 fr. bruts de coupon et 100,000 fr. pour l'amortissement, le prélèvement de 1,500,000 fr. stipulés au paragraphe (*d*) sera majoré de la somme nécessaire pour assurer le double résultat de 15 fr. de coupon brut et 100,000 fr. pour l'amortissement en faveur

desdites obligations à revenu variable, ainsi que la part concordataire revenant aux actions.

"Dans ce dernier cas, l'exploitant sera crédité, à un compte spécial d'Avances, de la différence entre la somme qui lui serait échue en appliquant le texte de l'article 3 de la présente convention et celle qu'il aura effectivement reçue pour sa rémunération dans l'exercice considéré, par suite de la déduction opérée en vertu du présent article.

"Art. 5. Les avances ainsi éventuellement consenties par la Régie générale seront inscrites à la suite de la liquidation de chaque exercice. Le compte d'avances sera arrêté au 30 juin de chaque année et son solde créditeur portera intérêt à 4 pour cent l'an, au profit de la Régie générale.

"Par contre, lorsque et tant que ce compte sera débiteur vis-à-vis de la Régie générale, il sera, jusqu'à due concurrence, versé à la Régie générale, en liquidation de chaque exercice, tout excédent restant acquis à la société, après satisfaction donnée au service des obligations à revenu variable, à raison de 15 fr. de coupon brut par obligation effectivement en circulation dans l'exercice dont il s'agira et 100,000 fr. d'amortissement, ainsi que, comme il est dit plus haut, la part concordataire revenant aux actions, et le Compte d'Avances sera débité de ces versements. Et, à titre exceptionnel, il sera porté au crédit dudit compte, pour rentrer dans son jeu et ses effets, la somme de 250,000 fr., remise consentie par la Régie générale à la société, sur la construction de la ligne Homs–Tripoli.

"Si, à l'expiration du Traité d'Exploitation, le Compte d'Avances n'étant pas entièrement amorti, la société aura le droit, soit de rembourser la Régie générale au comptant lors de la liquidation du dernier exercice, soit de prolonger ledit traité pour une période à convenir, que les parties évalueront, d'après les résultats des exercices précédents, devoir probablement conduire à son extinction.

"Au besoin, il pourra être fait sur les mêmes bases une deuxième prolongation équitable, à l'expiration de laquelle le solde débiteur sera abandonné par la Régie générale, au profit de la société, quel qu'en soit le montant.

"Art. 6. En compensation des risques acceptés par la Régie générale, à l'article précédent, la durée du Traité d'Exploitation du 15 février, 1901, qui était de vingt-cinq ans à partir du 1er janvier, 1903, est portée à trente ans ; par conséquent, son expiration n'aura lieu que le 31 décembre, 1932.

"Fait en double à , le ."

En ce qui concerne l'exploitation, la nouvelle ligne est incorporée à notre réseau actuel, avec quelques particularités, dont les principales sont :—

L'ouverture d'un compte spécial pour les recettes de la ligne Homs–Tripoli.

L'adjonction du service des obligations Homs–Tripoli aux charges qui doivent être soldées avant tout partage avec l'exploitant.

L'engagement pris par l'exploitant—dans le cas d'insuffisances provenant de l'exploitation de l'embranchement Homs–Tripoli—de ne recevoir sa part bénéficiaire dans les produits nets du réseau, qu'après paiement aux obligations à revenu variable d'un revenu brut annuel de 15 fr. et affectation de 100,000 fr. à l'amortissement des mêmes obligations, ainsi qu'après paiement aux actions de leur part concordataire. Etant convenu toutefois que la part de bénéfices qui, en cas de besoin, serait ainsi abandonnée provisoirement par l'exploitant, constituerait une avance à récupérer sur les excédents futurs au delà de 15 fr. de coupon brut annuel et 100,000 fr. d'amortissement pour les obligations à revenu variable ainsi que de la part concordataire des actions, avance productive d'un intérêt annuel de 4 pour cent. En compensation des risques acceptés par l'exploitant, la durée actuelle du Traité d'Exploitation a été prolongée de cinq ans.

Nous avons la conviction, messieurs, d'avoir mis les meilleures chances de votre côté, en traitant comme nous venons de vous exposer, avec le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et avec la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer, pour l'incorporation de l'embranchement de Homs–Tripoli à votre réseau syrien. Nous vous demandons donc d'approuver les conventions dont vous entendu la lecture et nous pensons que vous vous féliciterez avec nous de ce fait que la première concession de chemin de fer accordée, depuis la proclamation de la constitution dans l'Empire ottoman, est échue à votre groupe, qui, depuis plus de cinquante années, a constamment consacré ses efforts au développement économique de ce grand pays.

RÉSOLUTIONS.

Première Résolution.

L'assemblée générale, approuvant les déclarations du conseil d'administration contenues dans le rapport, ratifie l'acte additionnel passé avec le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, le 17 (30) octobre, 1909, pour la construction et l'exploitation de l'embranchement de Homs à Tripoli, conformément aux clauses et conditions inscrites dans ledit acte additionnel du 17 (30) octobre, 1909, et confirme, en tant que de besoin, les pouvoirs donnés au conseil d'administration, en 1901, en vue des accords à établir avec les réseaux voisins.

Deuxième Résolution.

L'assemblée générale approuve la convention à passer avec la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer, pour la construction et l'exploitation de l'embranchement de Homs–Tripoli, dans les termes reproduits au rapport dont lecture vient de lui être donnée.

Troisième Résolution.

L'assemblée générale, en vertu des pouvoirs que lui confère l'article 31 des statuts, autorise le conseil d'administration à créer et émettre 43,747 obligations du type 4 pour cent rapportant 20 fr., ou 88 piastres or, d'intérêt annuel, remboursables à 500 fr., ou £ T. 22, en quatre-vingt-cinq ans et gagées sur le solde intégral des produits nets de l'exploitation du réseau de la société, restant après service des obligations privilégiées émises en 1901 et des obligations Jonction-Bagdad émises en 1905, et, au besoin, sur toutes les ressources de la société que le service des mêmes obligations privilégiées et Jonction-Bagdad laisserait libres, pour lesdites 43,747 obligations être déposées dans les caisses de la Banque Impériale ottomane, aux fins et destinations indiquées dans le rapport dont lecture vient d'être donnée à l'assemblée.

[28561] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 536.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 2, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting a recrudescence of trouble in the Island of Samos in connection with the elections to the General Assembly of the principality.

I mentioned the matter to the Grand Vizier yesterday, and his Highness informed me that he considered that the Prince, Kopassy, though somewhat inclined to be severe, was an excellent official, and that the elections had been irregularly and improperly conducted, a question which should be dealt with by the Assembly itself. In the meantime, with a view to the preservation of order and the prevention of the danger of disturbances, the Turkish Government had dispatched a gun-boat, two torpedo-boats, and 400 men, whose presence will, they believe, produce a satisfactory settlement of the matter.

To the French chargé d'affaires, who also mentioned the matter to him, his Highness was more emphatic, saying he was determined to uphold Kopassy, who was a good man. The French Embassy concur in this view, which I am inclined to share myself, despite the irregularities attributed to him by Mr. Mare, and think it would be very difficult to find a suitable successor.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July 29, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a despatch which I have received from the British vice-consul at Samos, reporting upon the recent elections which resulted in the defeat of the party of Prince Kopassy.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Vice-Consul Mare to Consul-General Barnham.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Samos, July 24, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that the elections for the General Assembly of the island took place last Wednesday, with quite unexpected results against the Prince's party.

A certain M. Nicolaides, one of the leaders of the Opposition, who has been hiding for the last few months to avoid arrest, having been accused, and thus dismissed, as you are aware, from his post of Senator, for having been found deficient of a certain sum of money belonging to the Mavroyennis School, reappeared lately, and, contrary to the general expectation, Kopassy Bey ordered the president of the tribunal here to dismiss the case, believing that, in this way, he could secure in the elections M. Nicolaides's support. His expectations, however, were not fulfilled, for M. Nicolaides at the day of the elections declared himself against his Highness, and thus obtained against the Prince's party thirty deputies out of thirty-nine.

Kopassy Bey, on hearing this, cancelled at once the elections in certain villages, on the ground that the electors at the time of the voting were all under the influence of the leaders of the Opposition. The truth, however, is that the Prince did not expect such a defeat, and tried for this reason to alter accomplished facts by force; using the local gendarmerie and the Turkish troops. In Upper Vathy, for instance, M. Capsoula, the Chief of the Police, assisted by 100 Turkish soldiers, conducted to church by force most of the electors, where they were compelled to cast their votes in favour of the Prince's friends.

Yesterday the Opposition assembled at Carlovassy, and telegraphed to Constantinople, asking for the removal of the Prince Governor. From what I hear a commission also will very shortly proceed to Constantinople for the same purpose.

In the event of a change being made, I consider it very necessary to bring to your notice that the appointment of the new Prince Governor must be secured, at least, for a term of five years, as otherwise there is no hope whatever of any Prince being able to successfully govern the island, no matter how capable and honest he may be, since he knows that his position depends, perhaps, on the vote of one ignorant person who may have been elected deputy by a village of 100 electors, and who will gladly cast his vote to form the necessary majority against the Prince, provided that the leaders give him a suitable bribe. The Prince, under the present system, is but the servant of the deputies in power, and has to approve of all their acts, which, as a rule, are directed to extermination of their rivals. For this reason, the Opposition always regards the Prince as its enemy, and anxiously awaits the first opportunity of gratifying its revenge by sending him away. By having the Prince Governor appointed here for a fixed period, he will thus be able to govern the island with impartiality.

Prince Kopassy is a very severe, but capable official.

Unfortunately, owing to the sad events on his arrival at Samos, and his policy of keeping in the island a great number of Turkish troops, as also the hoisting of a Turkish flag on an elevated place over the Turkish barracks, and his last conduct in trying to obtain the majority of deputies by means of the Turkish army, made him lately so unpopular here, that his further stay at Samos may lead to serious trouble.

With regard to the Turkish troops stationed at Vathy, I must say that this garrison consists at present of 700 men and about 15 officers, under the command of a Binbashi, now residing at Samos, and not at Smyrna, as it was formerly the case. To this, I must point out that there is no necessity whatever of keeping so many

troops at Samos, more especially now that a Belgian officer, formerly in the Turkish army, has been called to reorganise the Samian gendarmerie, consisting of 150 men, more than enough, I should say, for keeping order in this place.

I hope you will be good enough to communicate by first mail the contents of my present report to his Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

GREGORY D. L. MARC.

[28562] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 537.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 3, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, transmitting his quarterly report on the Syria vilayet.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No 67.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Damascus, July 12, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on the general state of Syria vilayet during the quarter ended the 30th June.

The Governor-General was visiting districts to the south, and spent two or three days at Medina, in the month of May, being away about five weeks. The Mushir Osman Feizi Pasha, who went on leave to Constantinople about two months ago, is expected back in ten days' time, and there have been rumours, reproduced in two or three Syrian newspapers, that he would be appointed Vali and Commandant of the Vth Army Corps, while his temporary *locum tenens* Lieutenant-General Fatih Pasha (whose activity, good sense and tact have been remarked) would be retained in execution of his present onerous military duties at the same time.

With some such arrangement this province would find the present state of tension somewhat relieved, and the inhabitants of Damascus more particularly, and of Syria vilayet in general be pleased.

For it would seem that under the present administration much odium is being accumulated both against the vali and his officials, whilst the antagonistic sentiment as between Arab and Turk has been greatly fomented during the past three or four months now, whether by hasty or somewhat automatic behaviour on the part of office holders, or by their occasionally contemptuous or discourteous manners towards local notables, or by the over-advanced views of those connected with the Young Turks' party, who are manifesting themselves (not alone here in Syria, I imagine) in a distinct tendency towards xenophoby.

The antagonistic sentiment between Turk and Arab is beginning to permeate downwards to the lower classes; and will soon be no longer confined to the ulema, notables and grandees, and official circles.

The most sore point of all is the attempt of Young Turks to propagate the use of Turkish in exclusion of Arabic in all official circles; and while all verbal evidence is in Arabic at the law courts, judgments, sentences, decrees, and sundry orders are put into Turkish often to the confusion of the applicant or litigant. In the Judicial Department again most of the higher officers such as the Procureur-General, Presidents of Courts, know scarcely any Arabic or indeed none at all, and, in fact, out of some thirty or more, only about one-half a fair colloquial knowledge of the language of the country, these being mainly the clerks and assessors; of the three Mustantiks, one knows very little Arabic, whereas it is absolutely essential for his investigation.

The chauvinistic feelings of "Young Turkey" were somewhat stirred by the uncertain state of affairs in Crete no doubt, and that the tone of the native local press is sharing in the general vaguely expressed anti-foreign feeling may be deduced from occasional remarks and opinions published; just this same moment some bitter animadversions are being brought out in respect of the administration of Egypt.

The insolent confiscation of a bell used at a British church mission society school

in this district caused unpleasantness for this consulate, and the refusal of local authorities to allow of Archbishop Germanos (whose seat is at Zahleh) exercising jurisdiction at Zebedani in this province gave grave offence to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch here.

Prince and Princess Eitel Friedrich with their suite of fifteen arriving from Jerusalem made a two-days' unofficial visit in mid-April, which, though arrangements for their reception were not very perfect, passed pleasantly enough. Having refused an offer of hospitality from the vilayet, their Highnesses were accommodated at an hotel.

Bishop Blyth, of Jerusalem, held a confirmation at St. John's Church about the same time; and at this church was duly celebrated with profound respect for His late Majesty a well attended memorial service on the 20th May; while on the 15th a special service had been held at the native Protestant church.

In consequence of a disturbance at Beirout half a battalion of infantry (40th Regiment) were sent off there hastily on the 16th April. Troops were moved about the country near Damascus rather more than usual, in anticipation of any trouble, and the small garrisons kept at villages east and south of this city were renewed or enlarged, while altogether a whole regiment with two guns have been posted at Derna. These were the two guns so unhappily used at Unkhil village.

Various incidents of Bedouin turbulence and robbery have been frequent of late, and the old-standing quarrel between Druzes and the town of Busr-Eski-Sham, which came to a climax in April of last year, is by no means allayed yet, but though the Druzes have been uttering threats quite recently, local authorities are awake and prepared and it is trusted that no fresh disorder will occur there. On one occasion the peasants of the "caza" village Busr-el-Harir rose and assaulted their cadi and two or three government officials, recalling an incident at Kuneitra (*vide* No. 51 of the 18th October, 1909.)

The wheat and barley harvests were satisfactory as an average, in places quite as good as last year's, but on the whole perhaps from 15 to 20 per cent. less, as far as can be roughly calculated at present. Prices still rule high, for the grain merchants wished to hold their stocks as long as possible; this led to some petty disturbances in the nature of bread riots at the end of last month (here at Damascus almost exactly as at Aleppo); the merchants were at once compelled to release a portion of their stores, and prices fell for the time being though they remain high. Locusts did not damage Syrian crops, but are mischievous to the north and beyond this province.

Apricots and fruits, and garden produce generally, are not good this year, the former being even less than one-half of last year's abundant quantity. Vineyards, however, promise exceptionally well.

In my annual trade report was mentioned the project of a company of local merchants of establishing a glass factory; these have purchased land, and are beginning to erect buildings; and also a foreign undertaking for artificial ice. All is now ready for its production, but it seems there is a little difficulty as to the furnishing of the Ain-Fijeh spring-water for the purpose at the last moment.

The supply of this potable water has been a cause of much trouble to the Egyptian contractor, Mr. Faris Rahbeh, who has fulfilled his part, but to whom the municipality still owe a sum of 14,000*l.*, while, with a depleted treasury, all they had to offer was £T. 1,500. Consequently, Rahbeh Effendi had to declare himself bankrupt, and his affairs are now being wound up by the Ottoman Bank.

As a sequel to the above scandal three weeks ago, the whole municipality resigned office in a body. There have now been four presidents (Reis Belediyye) in the last six months, viz., Munir Effendi Yakub, Ahmed Hassibi, Hussein Bey, and the last appointed Ghalib Bey el-Zalik. Faris Effendi Khouri, lately Dragoman of this consulate, is a member of the new council, and serves on it with zeal and activity.

Rumours have been spread broadcast during the past few weeks of an intention of the Khedive of Egypt to purchase the firms and lands (Arazi seniyye) of the deposed Sultan Abdul-Hamid throughout Aidin Konia Aleppo and this vilayet, for a sum of two millions, and that agents are being sent to inspect them. Upon these vague reports are based surmises that Egypt, besides seeking profit, hopes to gain more political influence in Syria and Palestine.

The appointment of a French consul-general and of a Dutch vice-consul at Damascus have been recorded, but nothing is yet known as to the expected arrival of an Italian or of a German consul, and the Persian consul-general is still absent.

The chief rabbi of Turkey, Haim Nahum Effendi, who has been inspecting the provinces, came here from Jerusalem ten days ago.

Professor A. Musil, who took for name Sheikh Musa, of the Ruwéla tribe, travelling under the ægis of Sheikh Nuri-ibn-Saham, head of the Ruwela (now visiting here), in order to study geology, anthropology, &c., in the region between Akaba and Maan on the north, and Tebuk and El-Wjh on the south, during the last few weeks, returned with his two comrades to Damascus to-day. A sketch of his explorations in North Arabia 1909, is published in a recent Royal Geographical Society Journal.

A German cavalry subaltern and rittmeister has just come here to instruct the Turkish cavalry either here or at Aleppo. Commandant Noirot is still absent at Beirout engaged in teaching the gendarmerie there or in the Lebanon.

The Damascus members of the "Medjliss Meebusan" returned from their session at the close of last month and beginning of this, and among those who were received with a warm welcome and ovation were Shefik Bey Muayad, Abdur-Rahman Bey, and Rushdi Bey Shama.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[28563] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 538.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 3, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 453 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Jeddah, reporting on the state of affairs in the Hedjaz and on the expulsion of Hedjazis from Mecca and Jeddah, which has been ordered by the Grand Shereef of Mecca.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Acting Consul Abdur Rahman to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Jeddah, July 14, 1910.*

IN continuation of letter No. 35 with regard to the state of affairs in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to report that the Grand Shereef of Mecca has ordered the expulsion of all Hedjazis of the tribes of Ghamid and Zahran from Mecca and Jeddah. In Mecca they say there is not a single Hedjazi of these tribes left; even some merchants belonging to these tribes were forced to suspend their business and to go away. In Jeddah the date fixed for their expulsion is Thursday, the 14th July, 1910.

The rumour is afloat that the Grand Shereef of Mecca is collecting armed Bedouins in a place near Taif called Khurma. The destination of this force, which will be headed by the son of the grand shereef, is not known.

One old servant of this consulate (doorkeeper) belongs to the tribe Ghamid, and he has also received orders to leave the town. I have, however, represented the case of the doorkeeper of this consulate to the authorities, and am waiting for the result.

Any further development I will not fail to report for your Excellency's information.

I have, &c.
S. ABDUR RAHMAN.

[28565] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 540.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 3, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on troubles at Zobeir.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Bussorah, July 8, 1910.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 44 of the 6th instant, I hear that Sheikh Mubarek informed the vali on the 25th June, in reply to his Excellency's enquiries, that he was unacquainted with the Arabs who attacked the Zobeir people.

Plundering is said to be still going on round Zobeir, and on the 4th July, according to my information, the vali telegraphed through the Kaimakam of Fao to Sheikh Mubarek regretting the behaviour of the Arabs, who had attacked the townspeople of Zobeir and killed four persons, besides carrying off camels, donkeys, and goods, and stating that such action was both wrong and cruel. He warned the sheikh that, if he attempted to assert his influence in this manner in the district of Bussorah, the Turkish Government would undoubtedly take action to prevent him. The vali requested that the plunder might be restored.

It is reported that the vali is making further enquiries into the matter. The Mishri family, one of whose members is Sheikh of Zobeir, are at enmity with the Essaimi family, their rivals for this position, and the former allege that the affrays which have recently occurred at Zobeir are the work of Sadun Pasha, instigated by the Essaimi. The latter, however, state that the marauders come from Koweit and that the trouble is fomented by the Mishri family. It is said that on one of the raids eight donkeys belonging to Haji Ibrahim-ez-Zobeir were carried off, and that the animals were afterwards returned by Sheikh Mubarek when Zobeir asked him for them.

I am also informed that a mazbata has been made by the people of Zobeir throwing all the blame for the recent plundering on Sheikh Mubarek. The Sheikh is supposed to be causing trouble out of spite because the vali will not register his Fedaghia lands. It is said that this mazbata will be forwarded to the vali in a day or two.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[28566] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 541.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 3, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 509 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a further despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Bitlis vilayet. I am informed that the Vali of Bitlis, Tahir Pasha, is to be replaced by Hussein Hosni Pasha, whose energy and intelligence when Vali of Kossovo last year were favourably reported on by Mr. Satow, who stated that his Excellency soon effected a considerable improvement in the conduct of affairs at the konak, initiated sanitary measures, was easily accessible to persons of all ranks and creeds, and strove to keep the troops under his command up to the mark by constant inspection.

I am also informed that the Minister of the Interior proposes very shortly to make a tour in these districts to try to settle the land question.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, July 24, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 46 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from Mr. Saffrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the dilatory and unsatisfactory methods employed by the authorities in dealing with Kurds of Khuyt.

Touching the general condition of the Bitlis vilayet, Mr. Saffrastian reports that since

Tahir Pasha's arrival in April no less than about forty murders have been committed, a state of things worthy of the worst traditions of the Hamidian epoch; and he also refers to the danger arising from the apparent inability of the Government to grapple with the agrarian problem.

There can, I think, be no doubt that the procrastinating and vacillating attitude of the Turkish Cabinet with regard to the land question and the Kurdish question is doing much to undermine what prestige the new order of things possesses in these regions, and, although the recall of Tahir Pasha seems to have been promised, the situation can hardly be regarded as saved by any such negative measure. It appears to be forgotten at Constantinople that nothing can be accomplished in these provinces in winter, and the short summer would need to be used with great energy and decision in order to produce any beneficent results before another winter's snows come to stifle, but not to extinguish, the smouldering discontent among the whole agricultural population.

It is evident, moreover, that without harmonious co-operation between the military and the civil authorities no enduring result can be attained with regard to either of the two questions mentioned above, and at present this co-operation is notoriously non-existent.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Bitlis, July 18, 1910.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch of the 12th instant, respecting the Kurdish attack on soldiers quartered in the nahié of Khuyt and the concentration of troops to punish the aggressors, I have the honour to state that the Commission of Enquiry referred to in my above-mentioned despatch seems to work very slowly in ascertaing the responsibilities incumbent upon Kurdish chiefs in Khuyt. A few days ago a disquieting rumour was started here by reactionaries to the effect that several Kurdish tribes in Sasun, especially the warlike and powerful tribe of Seleklis, were openly declaring war against the constitutional Government by invading the camps of B'diri tribe which would not comply with themselves.

The object of this false and unfounded rumour, started chiefly by the notorious Musa Bey and his friends in Mush, was to divert the attention of the Government to another direction and relax the pressure brought now upon the criminals in Khuyt.

Three battalions of infantry and two pieces of mountain artillery are camping now at Rabat, the centre of the nahié of Khuyt, and are reported as assisting in the enquiry carried on by the commission.

No operations against the guilty have as yet been begun, the military commandant and the judicial commission having been instructed to follow the orders sent from the mushir at Erzinjan and Tahir Pasha at Mush respectively. These orders, as I understand from a well-informed officiat here, are of a reserved and vacillating nature, recommending a policy of reconciliation and peace in cases where the prestige of the Government may be upheld unimpaired. I humbly venture to express the opinion that the Cabinet of Hakki Pasha seems to possess either a poor idea of the geographical and ethnographical situation of Kurds in general and more than that of their moral and psychological conditions, or it is being conducted into a wrong track by Tahir Pasha's wicked efforts and intentional misrepresentation of the real state of affairs. Even assuming that the various branches of Belekli Kurds form a compact majority in Khuyt and Sasun, that they are a warlike and powerful race and their mountains are hardly accessible to artillery; they certainly lack in what seems to be essential for the success in fighting—*moral* or any sort of ideal. The nightmare of a Kurdish general union or rising against the Government which appears to prevail heavily at Constantinople and disturb the peace of Turkish statesmen, one example of which in Albania caused so much trouble and anxiety to the Government, is ironically considered here by all those who are thoroughly aware of the present demoralised state of Kurds, even by men like Dervish Bey and Ibrahim Effendi, who are the last descendants of the sometimes ruling Kurdish families at Bitlis.

It would be a gross blunder on the part of the central Government to lose the present opportunity of crushing the Kurdish agitation and unrest, and not hang some

notorious chiefs, such as Musa Bey and his brother Kassim Bey, who seem to be the instigators of the attack on soldiers in Khuyt. Such a capital punishment inflicted upon such a leader as Musa Bey will produce undoubtedly the desired results to the benefit of the general peace and tranquillity in the country.

Some recent Murders.—As I had the honour to telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the 16th instant, in the course of the last week two Armenians and one Kurd have been killed in various parts of this vilayet; one Armenian of Gop (Bulanik) was killed six days ago, near Khovner, Musa Bey's village, in the Plain of Mush, where he had gone with other Armenians and Circassians to buy timber. The latter were attacked at night, six oxen were carried off, and one Armenian shot. Both Armenians and Circassians in question have protested against Musa Bey, stating his men were the murderers.

Some eight days ago a telegram from Hazzo (sanjak of Mush), addressed to the acting vali here, stated that one Armenian was killed there by Kurds for land disputes. No more details. Five days ago one Kurd was killed in Shatak (kaza of Bitlis) by Kurds, again for the land disputes.

Since my telegram above referred to, another Armenian has been killed in Bast (nahié of Tadig, kaza of Bitlis) by the servants of the Sheikh of Khizan. The latter are reported as cheating the Armenian in question, and taking him out of the village where the crime has been committed. Protests are being made against the Sheikh of Khizan.

Summing up all murders committed in this vilayet since the date of the arrival of Tahir Pasha here (the 16th April last), it will be seen that they amount to about forty cases of murder—a number of crimes hardly outnumbered under the old régime during a corresponding period. In view of such crying facts Tahir Pasha continues to cheat the central Government, and endeavours to show everything quiet and in good order, and denies many cases of murder. Vefyk Bey, the Director of Judicial Courts here, told me yesterday that by the desire of the Minister of Justice he was daily informing the Ministry of the events as occurring in this vilayet, and that he, the director, occasionally received reply to the effect that such and such murders or cases of violence committed by Kurds were denied by Tahir Pasha. In my humble opinion, this tends to prove that Tahir Pasha does not report the whole truth, according to his old custom.

Some Appointments made by Tahir Pasha.—Medjib and Mudib Effendis, formerly the secretaries of the administrative council at Van when Tahir Pasha was Governor-General in that town, and lately dismissed from their functions as corrupt and useless officials, have been appointed a month ago by Tahir Pasha to the posts of Kaimakam of Mokzgord and Shirvan respectively. Another, Khalil Effendi, of Bitlis, an ordinary thief, who was not employed under the old régime, as an unworthy man, has just been appointed as kaimakam to Khizan.

The Stolen Cattle of Koshtian Restored.—Musa Bey's brother has been compelled by the authorities at Mush to restore the thirty cattle stolen from the Armenian village of Koshtian, in Akhlat, as reported in my despatch of the 12th June last.

Expectations of the Dismissal of Tahir Pasha.—As I had the honour to inform you from Van by my private letter of the 6th instant, in reply to the protest of the Armenian Taselmuksutiun Committee at Van addressed to the Minister of the Interior against the maladministration of Tahir Pasha at Bitlis, his Excellency Talaat Bey promised to the committee in question to recall Tahir Pasha from Bitlis in the course of the following four weeks.

A few days ago, one of the Moslem deputies of Mosul, on his way home, telegraphed to Tahir Pasha from Aleppo telling his Excellency that he was sure to see him (Tahir Pasha) shortly at Mosul. These above facts seem to show that the fall of Tahir Pasha is nearer and that an end will be put shortly to the criminal policy pursued for the last three months in this ill-fated vilayet.

I understand that the agrarian question existing between the Armenians and Kurds is lately causing some renewed anxiety in the sanjak of Siirt. No details have reached me as yet.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

P.S. *July* 19.—The Commission of Enquiry returned here last night from Khuyt. I understand from a trustworthy source that the Kurdish aggressors have restored the five military rifles taken away during the attack (my despatch of the 12th instant), they have further promised to hand over to the commandant in Khuyt the real Kurdish assailants and criminals, and this is said to be all required for the present by the mushir

of the IVth Army Corps at Erzinjan. It seems that nothing more will be done under the present circumstances.

This morning Tahir Pasha returned here from his tour in Mush and Bulanik.

A. S. S.

[27592] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 8, 1910.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the India Office,* with its enclosure, from which you will see that Zakhnuniyeh Island has again been occupied by Turkish troops.

I request that your Excellency will, in accordance with the India Office's suggestion, remind the Turkish Government of the representations which you made to them on this subject last year (see my telegram No. 328 of the 30th May), pointing out that the occupation of the island constitutes a violation of the *status quo*, and requesting them to issue orders for the immediate withdrawal of the guard.

Your Excellency should also point out that His Majesty's Government have not hitherto allowed the Sheikh of Bahrein to hoist his flag on the island, lest the *status quo* should be infringed.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[26785] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 227.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 8, 1910.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 502 of the 20th ultimo, enclosing a report from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the subject of irrigation in Mesopotamia.

While it would be inadvisable that your Excellency should make any unsolicited suggestions to the Turkish Government in regard to Sir W. Willcocks's work or position, it is possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may complain to you of him. In that case your Excellency might remind them that Sir W. Willcocks was chosen by them without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government, who are in no way responsible for his selection, and state that, if they wish it, the competent authorities in this country can easily recommend competent persons to advise them on the subject of irrigation in Mesopotamia.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[29040] No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 21st July, 1910, relative to the registration of the Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fadaghia.

India Office, August 9, 1910.

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* No. 52.

Enclosure 1 in No. 73.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, July* 10, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward a further report from the political agent at Koweit on the subject of the registration question difficulty connected with the transfer of Sheikh Mubarak's Fadaghia property, in continuation of the correspondence ending with Foreign Department letter dated the 21st June, 1910.

2. Captain Shakespear's present communication seems to me to confuse two hypotheses or aspects of the question which need to be distinguished, and to introduce a third which is new to me.

(i.) The first of these is that the Vali of Bussorah is technically and legally correct in his attitude towards the transfer question (as Captain Shakespear suggests in paragraph 6 of his letter No. 35 of the 8th June) and is merely interpreting against the public, including Sheikh Mubarak, the provisions of a law of general application in the Bussorah vilayet—a dead-letter under the old régime but strictly enforced under the new—which permits of no transfer of landed property in the said vilayet except on the condition that the enquirer declares himself to be of Turkish nationality.

(ii.) The second hypothesis is that the vali's attitude is not based on any such law of general application in the vilayet, but is merely an arbitrary departure from ordinary usage devised in the hope that by throwing Sheikh Mubarak into a state of apprehension lest his bargain should otherwise be upset and himself possibly put to great loss, they will drive him to declare himself or his sons to be of Turkish nationality.

(iii.) The third, and to me new, aspect of the question is indicated in paragraph 2 of Captain Shakespear's present report, namely, that the Bussorah authorities do not primarily and positively contend that Sheikh Mubarak must necessarily declare Turkish nationality; he might declare French, English, or any other nationality if he enjoyed it, but that "Koweiti" is no nationality, and that for Sheikh Mubarak Turkish nationality alone is indicated.

3. If the position with which we now have to deal were that indicated in (iii), then it would seem that it might be possible for us to induce the Porte in a friendly way to accept the definition "Koweiti" as a nationality for purposes of registration in the case of land-transfers in order to avoid the raising of awkward issues. A recent report, however, from Mohammerah seems to indicate that hypothesis (iii) must be eliminated. Lieutenant Wilson writes that the Sheikh of Mohammerah informs him that the lands in Turkish limits which he purchased last year, known as Umm-el-Tuwaihah (an island above Failieh) have not yet been registered, the present vali having refused to permit it, and that the sheikh has decided to wait on events and let the registration remain in abeyance until he sees what action we are going to take to see Sheikh Mubarak through his present difficulty.

It would appear, therefore, that it is either contingency (i) or (ii) with which we have to reckon. In the former case, if we make enquiries from the Porte they will probably reply that their vali's action is not directed against Sheikh Mubarak but is merely the interpretation of existing land laws applicable to the Bussorah vilayet; that Sheikh Mubarak is under no obligation to buy property in the Bussorah vilayet, but that if he does he must fulfil the same preliminaries and conditions as other persons; and that unless he complies the transfer cannot be recognised by the Turkish courts, and so the property must be considered as still belonging to the persons in whose name it has hitherto stood. We should then be confronted with the issue indicated in the concluding paragraph of my letter of the 19th June.

4. If, on the other hand, the position indicated in (ii) is the one with which we have to deal, the issue is simpler, and we seem to have good reasons for objecting on the ground that the invidious treatment of Sheikh Mubarak, and the departure from past usage involved, constitutes an infringement of the *status quo* in regard to Koweit affairs which the Porte has undertaken to observe. The Mohammerah report above mentioned, however, seems to point to hypothesis (i) as the correct one.

5. It goes without saying that I entirely endorse the political agent's view that, if the main question of the status of Koweit is involved, we have everything to lose by

delaying to face the issue, and that the longer we do so the more difficult will it become to get it settled in the way we desire.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 73.

Captain Shakespear to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Confidential.)

Koweit, June 30, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the correspondence covered by your second assistant's endorsements dated the 21st and 22nd June, 1910, respectively.

2. I would first correct a possible misunderstanding to which the latter part of paragraph 6 of my letter dated the 8th June, 1910, may give rise. When I said "Turkish nationality" I meant the sentence to apply only to Mubarak and Koweitis, for of course other nationalities such as English, French, &c., are accepted, but in the case of Koweitis the Turkish officials will not accept "Koweit" but insist on "Turkish" nationality.

3. With reference to your letter dated the 19th June, 1910, to the Government of India, and especially to paragraph 3 thereof, I would venture to submit the following observations resulting from a thorough discussion of the whole subject with His Majesty's consul at Bussorah. In your letter you foresee the possible alternative of advising Sheikh Mubarak to resell the property and of having to indemnify him for any loss thereon. With all deference I would venture to deprecate any such course, and for the following reasons:—

(*a.*) The sheikh is certainly alarmed about this property, but at the same time I am inclined to think now he is not improbably exaggerating that alarm for our special benefit as a means of forcing our hand to free him from Turkish intentions.

(*b.*) Mr. Consul Crow considers that the possibility of the sale being repudiated is an extremely remote one, seeing that the sale deeds bear the signatures of most of the notables of Bussorah as well as the cachet of the British consulate.

(*c.*) The property is so large that a buyer would be difficult to find who would purchase it as a single lot, and there is, besides the grave objection in the advice of a resale, of an appearance of weakness on our part in sustaining the sheikh's claim.

4. In my humble opinion it would be far more advantageous to maintain the position of our special interests in Koweit, the sheikh's long-continued independent status, whilst pressing upon the Porte that the recognition of Koweit as a nationality should suffice for the "Tapu" office. The Porte is, I admit, not likely to agree, but as there seems no immediate risk of the sheikh losing his property, it would seem worth while to state the above as defining to some extent what is the actual *status quo* in Koweit.

5. The question of the status of Koweit must come up before many years, and it seems fairly obvious that the Turkish officials have realised the powerful lever they possess for raising that issue in the registration question, which goes directly to the root of the matter on the point of nationality. The registration of any of Mubarak's family, whether the women or sons, would seem undesirable, as likely to admit the principle that Koweit nationality is unrecognisable as against Turkish. For the same reason the taking out of Turkish teskerehs by Koweit subjects is to be deprecated, and, though the sheikh denies it, I hear from other sources that many Koweitis with business or land in Bussorah have already done this. Under the new order of things this practice is likely to grow, and in a few years' hence it seems to me there will be far greater difficulty in insisting on the independence of Koweit than is the case at present, and it is for that reason that I would urge that the question should not be avoided.

I have, &c.
W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, *Captain,*
Political Agent, Koweit.

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general policy of more active interference in the affairs of Koweit, he is departing arbitrarily from ordinary usage in the hope of compelling the sheikh to declare either himself or his sons as of Turkish nationality. The recent attitude of the Turkish authorities appears genuinely to have alarmed the sheikh, and we trust that it may be possible to ascertain the real intentions of the Porte with regard to his property at Fadaghia, and to authorise us to make him some reassuring communication.

Some lands above Fāiliyeh, in Turkish limits, were purchased last year by the Sheikh of Mohammerah. As the vali has declined to permit the registration of these, Sheikh Khazal is letting the matter drift pending settlement of the case of the Sheikh of Koweit.

[29259] No. 75*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 12.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 11, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the difficulties that are being experienced by the Sheikh of Koweit in regard to the registration of his property at Fadaghia, together with papers received by mail,* which explain the position more fully.

Viscount Morley is inclined to share the opinion expressed by Sir G. Lowther in his despatch of the 6th July, that "it would seem very dangerous for us to interfere in the matter." But inasmuch as it is important both that the sheikh should believe in our power to help him and that he should not be induced to commit himself or his successor to Turkey, his Lordship would suggest that, if the position at Constantinople is such as to warrant any hope of success, His Majesty's Ambassador should be instructed to use his good offices to secure the registration of the property in the name of the sheikh's blind son or of one or more of his women folk.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 75*:

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 26, 1910.

KOWEIT. Sheikh's property at Fadaghia. My telegram dated the 13th June, and papers sent with letter from Foreign Secretary of the 14th July.

I have received from the Resident, Bushire, the following telegram, dated the 20th July:

"With reference to my letter of the 10th July: A letter from Sheikh Mubarak, transmitted through the political agent, which reached me yesterday, encloses letters from friendlies in Bussorah, in which it is alleged that Ahmed Pasha-el-Zobair (who has since returned from Constantinople to Bussorah), acting in collusion with intriguers at Bussorah, has the intention of repudiating the sale of the property at Fadaghia, on the ground that the price paid was inadequate, and on other pretexts; and that he proposes to offer to refund to Mubarak the price paid, the amount to be refunded by instalments, which will extend over ten or fifteen years. Information has also reached the sheikh that it is the intention of Ahmed Pasha to send surveyors to the property with instructions to measure the ground, and to eject, with the assistance of Government, any of Mubarak's cultivators who may interfere with them. In the sheikh's opinion the vali, in order to coerce him in the matter of registration, is putting up this intrigue. It is also possible that, in view of Mubarak's difficulties with the vali, this means of bleeding him is being devised by a certain clique in Bussorah.

"Mubarak repeats that he is determined, following our advice, to persevere in his refusal to register as Turkish subjects either himself or his sons, but he again appeals urgently to us to protect his interests, and he explains that he will be put to enormous pecuniary loss by the subversion of the sale. I have received simultaneously a report from the political agent, who considers that there is good ground for the apprehension of the sheikh with regard to the contemplated repudiation of the Fadaghia bargain, and remarks that the recent bombardment of Zain and the turn now given to the Fadaghia affair have thoroughly alarmed the sheikh.

"I shall be glad to be placed in a position to make some reassuring communication to Mubarak on the subject referred to in my telegram of the 7th June."

A copy of the resident's letter was sent by last mail with the Foreign Secretary's letter. As to the vali's demand that the sheikh's sons should be registered as Turkish subjects, it is not clear whether his action merely indicates that the provisions of the law of general application in the Bussorah vilayet, which under the old régime had become a dead letter, are being strictly carried out, or whether, in pursuance of a

* Enclosures in Foreign Secretary's letters dated July 14 and 21, 1910.

[27807] No. 74.

*Foreign Office to Mr. Petrides.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1910.

WITH further reference to your letter of the 14th June, regarding the prohibition of the use of diving apparatus in the sponge fisheries of Turkey, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, according to a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the Turkish Government have now decided to allow the use of diving apparatus during the present season to those persons who are already provided with permits.

Meanwhile the Administration of the Public Debt, which has a considerable interest in the dues arising from the industry, is preparing regulations which are intended to put the fishing industry on a satisfactory footing in the future.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[27483] No. 75.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th ultimo respecting the question of the Mesopotamian oil concession, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the only agreement that he is aware of between the Turkish Government and Mr. Chester is that to which reference is made in Mr. D'Arcy's letter to this Office of the 8th April.

This draft agreement, which was apparently signed by the Minister of Public Works, required also to be accepted by the Council of Ministers and by the Ottoman Parliament. According to a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople the Turkish Parliament has adjourned without having discussed at all the question of this concession, and the matter is therefore still unsettled. Sir G. Lowther adds, however, that the syndicate are sending a certain Mr. Colt, an expert of high reputation, along the *tracé* of the proposed line to carry out further preparatory investigations.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[29509] No. 76.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 552.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 7, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 278 of the 3rd May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, transmitting a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Bitlis reporting on the present phase of the agrarian question in the Bitlis vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 76.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, July* 31, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 16th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting at some length on the present phase of the agrarian problem in the vilayet of Bitlis.

After enumerating in detail the various methods employed to dispossess Armenians

* Also to Sponge Trade Association: *mutatis mutandis*.

under the late régime, Mr. Safrastian states that most of the lands thus usurped have been restored to their rightful owners in the course of the last two years; but I gather that, since the administrative methods which had brought about this satisfactory result were abandoned last April in favour of recourse to the ordinary tribunals, the process of restitution has slackened, and the decisions of the courts are, as might be expected, causing much discontent among the Christian population.

I cannot but endorse the penultimate paragraph of Mr. Safrastian's despatch, calling attention to the vital importance of a speedy and equitable settlement of the agrarian problem, which has received a distinct setback since the unfortunate appointment of Tahir Pasha as Vali of Bitlis, and which continues to be endangered by the halting attitude of the Central Government.

I have, &c.
P. H. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 76.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Sir, *Bitlis, July 25, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatches of the 6th and the 17th April last respecting the agrarian question prevailing in this vilayet, I have the honour to report that, since the date above referred to, the authorities are telling the dispossessed peasants to address themselves to the ordinary civil courts in cases where the unlawful occupation of land has taken place before the July of 1908; as to the lands seized after the proclamation of the constitution, they are to be restored to the legitimate proprietors in an administrative way, if the claimant has enough evidence to prove the ownership.

In consequence of such an attempt for the settlement of the agrarian question, I understand that unwarrantable misdeeds are being committed by the local tribunals in behalf of the oppressive Kurdish chiefs, and that the civil court here continues unheeded to transfer upon the latter many disputed lands, in spite of protests of Armenian and Kurdish agricultural peasantry.

For a better comprehension of this most complicated agrarian question concerning the Armenians, as to how and under what circumstances lands were seized by Kurds, I humbly venture to divide it into some paragraphs. You will see from the facts below that the Government, under the old régime, has done its utmost to deprive Christians of land and property, although agriculturist Bayah Kurds also have suffered to a great extent by the persecutions intended only for Christians:—

1. Lands of Armenians sold by the Government to Moslems at the lowest price in return of taxes.

Such cases may be quoted especially from the sanjaks of Bitlis and Mush. In Khultig, Parkhant, Hargorg, &c., Armenian villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Bitlis, the Armenians are struggling with energy for the restitution of their land sold to the Kurds by the Government between 1904–8 at very low prices.

2. Lands of Armenians sold by the Agricultural Bank at lower prices in return of debts due to the bank by the former.

The whole plain of Mush, including the districts of Bulanik and Helazgerd, has cruelly been a victim to the machinations of the Agricultural Bank, the directors of which have invariably been local men of great power and tied by relationship to notorious chiefs. Armenian ignorant peasants have contracted loans under the old régime, and, as they have not been able to fulfil the conditions, the bank has taken advantage in getting the land out of Armenians and selling them to Kurds.

3. Lands of Armenians occupied by Kurdish agas and beys through courts for insignificant debts borrowed by the former.

4. Lands of Armenians usurped by Kurdish false creditors, who have been able to assert through false evidence their claims before the courts.

The case of Aboutakh, Armenian village in Modky, is of the most crying nature. The sheikhs of Kadri here, coveting the land of destitute Armenians of Aboutakh, plotted against the village. They are said of having drawn up a false document just before the proclamation of the constitution in July 1908, by which the villagers are made to state that they owe 60 Turkish liras to the above sheikhs, and that they are mortgaging their land in guarantee of the above amount. Then the proceeding of the transfer is said of being carried out secretly. Two months ago the peasants of

Aboutakh were surprised by the warning of the court here to deliver the lands to the sheikhs of Kadri, without their having the least idea of any such proceeding. The Armenians in question state positively that they have borrowed no money at all, and that they know absolutely nothing of the existence of any such document or transfer. This special case of Aboutakh threatens to be a big scandal. Several such cases are already at hand.

5. Lands of Armenians seized by Kurdish beys through forced transfer for petty debts.

All Kurdish oppressors in Mush and Bitlis have acquired large extents of land in this way. One Haji Nazir Aga, of Mush, is occupying the quarter of the Armenian land in Dom, village in Mush.

6. Lands of emigrating and fugitive Armenians, being considered as "mahlul" (unowned) by the Department of Cadastre here, have been granted or sold to Moslems.

7. Lands of Armenians seized by force without transfer, the title-deeds ("tapu-senedi") of which are in the hands of Armenians, and they pay still the land tax.

8. Lands of Armenians seized by Kurds unlawfully and without transfer, the title-deeds of which are somehow lost by their ignorant proprietors, or, since the establishment of the Land Law in 1859, the Armenians in some parts of these vilayets have not had recorded their land to their names, such as in most villages in Sasun and Guenj. There are, however, the first official records kept at the Cadastre Department here to prove their legitimate ownership.

9. Lands of Armenians seized by Kurds, the title-deeds of which have been secured by Kurdish chiefs through bribery, threats, or other considerations, and the latter pay now the land tax.

10. Lands and property belonging to Armenian churches and monasteries have been usurped as "unowned" ("mahlul"), without recognition of the objections of legitimate trustees.

11. Armenian lands and in certain cases whole villages have been distributed amongst Moslem immigrants under the old Government. The cases of Youjalu, Abri, Hamnasheikh, &c., villages in Bulanik, of Vartenis, Domnerd, &c., in Mush, remain unsolved hitherto.

12. Briefly, Armenian churches, monasteries, and cemeteries have been destroyed by Moslem fanatics, and the materials used for the construction of their houses. Several such cases have occurred in Guenj, Khuyt, and Khinan.

I could no doubt prolong still these series of facts and examples as characteristic of the state of the agrarian question in every district of this vilayet; but those quoted above seem to be sufficiently long as to give you an idea. Most of the land usurped in one way or another from the Armenians of this vilayet has been restored already in the course of the last two years. I understand, however, that some 700 pieces of land belonging to Armenians remain still occupied by Kurdish agas and beys.

Such complicated land disputes were somewhat easily settled by the instructions issued by the Central Government at Constantinople on the 12th September last, on the strength of which any land in dispute was to be delivered to the person in whose name the land was recorded at the Cadastre office here. These instructions, unfortunately, were withdrawn in April last, and new orders, as mentioned at the beginning of this despatch, were issued, which have greatly slackened the course of affairs.

The Christians have ceased lately of addressing themselves to the local courts for agrarian disputes; they are almost sure to lose their case in the arbitrary proceedings of the courts. They are awaiting for the arrival of a commission headed by one Ali Seidi Bey, which is said of having reached Erzeroum some time ago, and the outcome of the representations made by the Armenian Patriarch at the Porte.

Since Tahir Pasha has been at Bitlis as vali things respecting the agrarian question have taken a worse turn. Some villages in Mush and Guenj, which were restored to Armenians under the former valis, have been seized again by Kurdish usurpers during the last three months. Belekli Kurds have invaded Zigag, village in the plain of Mush, and have expelled one part of Armenians from the village. The villages of Giala and Boghlan, in Guenj, Karakaya, in Helazgerd, &c., have suffered the same fate, and the authorities did nothing to prevent such outrageous proceedings.

It is not to be wondered that such a violent struggle is being waged for the possession of land in an agricultural country like Turkey.

From the double standpoints of future cordial relations between Christians and Moslems in this vilayet and the consolidation of the constitutional régime, it is earnestly to be desired that the agrarian question should be settled in such a way as to

satisfy both parties. The projected visit of the Minister of the Interior to these vilayets will probably quicken some sort of solution.

Situation in the Sanjak of Saïrt.—As I had the honour to report by my last despatch, in consequence of the land disputes between Christians and Kurds in the sanjak of Sairt, anarchy is reported as prevailing in Khargan and Bervari (kazas of Sairt), where Moslem chiefs are killing Christians with a view to intimidate the latter and cease their protests. I am assured that in the course of the last fortnight three Armenians have been murdered in Bervari, and that complete insecurity prevails in the sanjak, as under the old Government. Hitherto I have not been able, however, to verify the accuracy of these assertions.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[29511] No. 77.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 555.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 7, 1910.*

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 146 of the 4th August respecting the situation in the Hauran, I have the honour to submit the following details:—

According to one account the trouble began with a raid, in which the villagers of Inkul (about twelve hours' ride south of Damascus) are said to have taken part, on the flocks of the local mudir, Saad-ed-Din. Saad-ed-Din got the authorities to send troops, who attacked Inkul, killing about forty persons, including some women and children; nineteen shells are said to have been fired into the village. Another version says that the raid on Saad-ed-Din's flocks was a mere pretext, and that his only motive in attacking the village was a desire to settle an old grudge against it. His Majesty's consul at Damascus reports that two commissions were sent to make an enquiry, and the second appears to have reported that the bombardment of the village was not justified, that the major in command of the troops, who was absent and had deputed a subaltern in his place, should be court-martialled, as also the major of the Hauran Gendarmerie, while Saad-ed-Din should be brought to Damascus and charged with the instigation of the crime. Saad-ed-Din, however, who is a sheikh of the Beni Sulut Arabs, refuses to come to Damascus, and Mr. Dovey says it would be necessary to employ troops to bring him there.

Mr. Dovey thinks that the incident may be productive of a certain degree of benefit in so far as it may show Bedouin or Druse raiders or other disturbers of the peace that the local authorities can take immediate action without reference to Constantinople. On the other hand, he observes that the people of the Hauran, though a rude, turbulent, and ignorant set of peasants, who are not easy to govern, have never been known to attempt resistance to Government orders, and this unjustifiable massacre of women and children has not improved the popular feeling, which, so Mr. Young reported when he was in charge at Damascus at the time of the incident, had been much irritated by the Government's attitude in various questions touching the Arabs and was strongly against the local authorities, especially the vali and defterdar, who are accused of being the tools of Saad-ed-Din.

Mr. Dovey reported on the 1st instant that there was serious trouble near Bussorah owing to an attack by Drusos on two Moslem villages in connection with a blood feud, and that there were many killed; four battalions were being sent to Dera with four guns. In a further report he states that it has been decided to send a punitive expedition, if the Druses' misconduct continues, in charge of the acting mushir, who has nineteen battalions at his disposal. If it was found necessary to subjugate the Jebel completely, introducing the general taxation and conscription, the mushir will be authorised to call on the forces of the Vth Army Corps.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reports that a Nizam battalion has left for Haifa, and that four Redif battalions have been called out which are also intended for the Hauran; while His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reports that the local reserve brigade of eight battalions is under orders.

I am informed that for the present it is intended to concentrate some thirty battalions with the necessary equipment of artillery, especially quick-firing mountain guns, while reinforcements will be dispatched if required. There seems little doubt that the Hauran and other portions of Syria are going to be dealt with in the same way as Albania. Last year it was stated that the committee had decided to take military

measures to reduce Albania to subjection, and that afterwards would come the turn of Kurdistan and Arabia. The underlying causes of the apparently wanton cruelty displayed by the Turkish forces at Inkul are somewhat obscure, but the report mentioned by Mr. Acting Consul Young that the vali and defterdar were accused of being the tools of Saad-ed-Din would seem to lend colour to the version that the action of the Turkish authorities was intentionally provocative in the expectation that the Druses would have recourse to reprisals and thus give a pretext for the present expedition. The local press here now talks of the "rebellion in the Hauran," though, as Mr. Dovey observes, the people of the Hauran have never been known to attempt resistance to Government orders. Some weeks ago I was told by one in high position, who is intimately acquainted with Arab affairs, that the Hauran would be the next objective of the committee. It seems probable that martial law will be proclaimed and that a certain sternness accompanied by some hangings will be displayed with the purpose of striking terror into the local inhabitants, whose disarmament will then be proceeded with. The object of these expeditions, accompanied by illegality, brutality, and court-martialling and a large unproductive military outlay, leaves behind it a mass of sullen hatred of the constitutional régime, and the objects might be as effectually attained by the gradual process of spending on roads and other such productive works one-half the expenses of a campaign. The natives, by such a policy of peaceful economic penetration of their district, would get accustomed to work, earn their livelihood, and discard their warlike ways and weapons, as has happened in other countries, while they would also acquire a liking, instead of a hatred, of the new régime. There are already signs that the process will be extended to the Mutawallis of the Anti-Lebanon, who recognise the Agha Khan of India as their spiritual chief, as also to the other districts of Syria and Palestine down to the borders of Egypt, if not also in the Hedjaz. The general policy of disarmament is no doubt desirable, but the objectionable features of the committee Government's methods of procedure are their turkifying aims and the ultra-thorough manner in which it is carried out, as in the case of the Bulgarians. When the Arab deputies, as I have already reported, discovered the turkifying tendencies of the committee, they and the Arabs not unnaturally became disaffected to the present Government, and the latter have now evidently determined, by sending a large expedition composed mainly of Turkish troops, to scare and impress the Arabs of Syria and the south, while the Syrian campaign cannot fail also to have its echo in Mesopotamia and in Egypt, where some of the Nationalists may welcome the near approach of the Turks. The present Government, moreover, is not impossibly animated with a desire to check any pro-British leanings the Arabs may have developed as a result of their disgust at Turkey's methods and admiration of ours.

The immediate difficulty that is foreseen by some is the contingency that some of the Druses may take refuge among their brethren in the Lebanon, who have always looked to England as the Maronites look to France, and the consequent demand of the Turkish authorities for the handing over of the refugees. There is already a distinct agitation of the Committee of Union and Progress's adherents in the Lebanon, the object of which is to gradually bring about the abolition of the privileges of the mountain, as part of the general levelling policy of the committee. The presence of a large committee force operating in the neighbourhood of the Lebanon may lead to the accentuation of this agitation and propaganda, while the silence of the protecting Powers in the case of Samos, whither the Government has now sent another battalion in addition to that dispatched in the spring of 1908 (previous to 1908 a weak double company was maintained there) may embolden the central Government to endeavour to secure the curtailment, if not the abolition, of the privileged status of the Lebanese.

The commandant of the force now being concentrated in the Hauran district is Senator Sir Sami Pasha, G.C.V.O., who accompanied Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha on the special mission to London in 1909. He is an Arab from Bagdad, a descendant of one of the early khalifs, and is related by marriage to the Generalissimo Mahmoud Shevket Pasha. He has the reputation of being a good officer as well as a fair-minded man, and his "sacred descent" will carry weight with the Arabs, but his general policy will no doubt be guided by the Young Turk officers on his staff and the instructions he receives from the committee head-quarters.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Cairo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

[29512] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 556.)

Constantinople, August 10, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 499 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on the results of the vali's visit to the Montefik district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 78.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 45.)

Bussorah, July 14, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the vali returned from Montefik on the 3rd instant. Moussa Kadim Effendi, the newly appointed Mutessarif of Montefik, has arrived at Nassriyeh. The vali visited Suk-es-Shiyukh, Nassriyeh, and Shattra, and held meetings of the Arab sheikhs. Prayers were said over the graves of the soldiers killed in conflict with the Arabs. The sheikhs undertook to pay tithes for the years 1325 and 1326; to keep the routes open; and to restore the Mauser rifles taken from the soldiers. I hear twelve rifles have been returned. Some of the sheikhs gave written undertakings in these matters. They declared their submission to the Ottoman Government. A commission has been formed to ascertain the damages and losses to the people of Shattra from the Arab attacks.

The vali seems optimistic, and expressed himself satisfied with the results of his visit. He informed my Russian colleague that Turkey had no better subjects than the Arabs of Montefik. I learn from other sources that the measures taken will be useless, as the Arabs will not listen to their sheikhs.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[29692] No. 79.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received August 15.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August 13, 1910.

Sir,

WE have the honour to enclose translation of a telegram we have received from our agent in Bagdad regarding the destruction, under orders from the vali, of a boundary wall and shops forming part of our business premises in Bagdad. We also enclose a copy of our telegraphic reply to our agent. We request that strong instructions may be telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad to procure the restoration of the property from which we have been arbitrarily evicted pending investigation of the matter.

The telegram from our agent is the only intimation we have received of any question having arisen, and we feel that such arbitrary action will, if acquiesced in by our Government, render trading in Turkey extremely difficult, if not impossible, for British subjects.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.
(Per H. W. M.)

Enclosure in No. 79.

(1.)

Telegram from Bagdad to Messrs. Lynch Brothers, dated August 10, 1910.

(Translation.)

MUNICIPALITY, under orders of the Vali of Bagdad, has demolished the wall and shops extending along the road and forming part of our property, alleging that they are dangerous, but in reality to widen road. The British political agent in Turkish Arabia has pronounced buildings safe. Believing municipality's action illegal, we are entering protest through Turkish court, claiming compensation. The external dimensions of the demolished wall are 140 feet. There is every probability that the municipality will shortly lay hands upon our offices to effect public improvements. Our loss will be very heavy and must be compensated.

(2.)

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Bagdad, dated August 12, 1910.

YOU must claim through consul-general immediate restoration of our property, on which you should erect a temporary fence where wall demolished. We are representing matter to the Foreign Office and regard it as very serious. Point out to the vali if necessary we do not desire to oppose improvements, but in all civilised countries property can only be acquired compulsorily for improvements under special power from central Government and after payment full compensation. Amounts claimed for compensation must be submitted our approval with facts in full before being put forward locally.

[29853] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 557.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, August 16, 1910.

NOTICE was given by the local authorities to Messrs. Lynch's manager and another British subject on the 18th ultimo that their premises, being considered to be unsafe, would be demolished. This demolition was carried out by force on the 7th instant, in spite of the representations which I had made to the Porte, and in spite of the fact that the owners and the consul-general, who had inspected the premises, maintained that the demolition could not be justified on the grounds given. A road is going to be constructed by the municipality across the site of the demolished buildings. Their action in pulling down the premises against the will of the owners, and without indemnifying them on a just valuation is both illegal and arbitrary, and nothing less than confiscation under another name. Messrs. Lynch contemplate bringing an action, and meanwhile have instructed their agent to demand, through His Majesty's consulate-general, that the lands seized may be forthwith restored, and that tents be pitched temporarily on the ground formerly occupied by the wall. I am supporting this demand at the Porte, and at the same time I am protesting vigorously against the action of the municipality.

The local authorities' object in acting thus in this and similar matters is, according to Mr. Lorimer, to injure foreign prestige. Mr. Lorimer reports further that he has heard that the municipality will probably continue the road up to the wall of the British residency grounds, which lies directly in its path, and almost exactly through the middle of the residency compound, although, by following the line of the existing road, which deviates slightly so as not to encroach on the residency, this might easily be avoided.

It seems that it is intended to strike a blow especially against British prestige and interests at Bussorah and Bagdad by means of such high-handed action on the part of the local authorities, although it is true that other foreigners also come in for a smaller share of this treatment. Under these circumstances, with your approval, I think we

should prevent any further encroachments of this nature by making a decided stand against such illegal action. With regard to your despatch No. 226 of the 8th instant, respecting the occupation of the island of Zakhnuniyeh, I can get no straightforward answer from the Turkish Government. I am also reporting by post on the appointment of a mudir to Odeid, of which I have just heard.

[29853] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1910.

DESTRUCTION of Lynch's property at Bagdad.

Your representations, as reported by you in your telegram No. 157 of to-day, have my entire approval.

[29915] No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 28th July, 1910, relative to the Turkish occupation of Zakhnuniyah Island.

India Office, August 16, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, June* 29, 1910.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department letter dated the 25th January, 1910, concerning Turkish action in regard to Zakhnuniyah Island, I have the honour to forward, for such action as may be considered necessary, a copy of the last report received from the political agent, Bahrein, from which it will be seen that a Turkish guard is still located on the island.

I am forwarding a copy of Captain Mackenzie's letter to His Majesty's consul, Bussorah.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Captain Mackenzie to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

June 17, 1910.

WITH reference to my letter dated the 6th May, 1910, I have the honour to inform you that it appears that the soldiers recalled from Zakhnuniyah to Ojair were replaced by four others about a week later, who are said to be still on the island. The Turkish flag is hoisted there on Fridays.

Enclosure 3 in No. 82.

Government of India to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 16, 1910.

PLEASE refer to your letter dated the 29th June. In his letter dated the 28th November last Major Trevor reported that there were no Turks on Zakhnuniyah Island.

It is reported by Captain Mackenzie in his letter of the 17th June that the soldiers recalled to Ojair were replaced by four others a week later. Does this mean that Turkish soldiers have been on the island since June 1909? If so, Major Trevor's report of the 28th November was presumably not correct.

Enclosure 4 in No. 82.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, July* 9, 1910.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 29th June, 1910, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter which I have since received from His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, forwarding a copy of a despatch of the 1st July addressed by him to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, on the subject of the Turkish garrison on Zakhnuniyah Island.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 5 in No. 82.

Consul Crow to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

Sir, *Bussorah, July* 1, 1910.

WITH reference to your endorsement dated the 29th June last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador on the subject of the Island of Zakhnuniyah on the 1st July, 1910.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW

Enclosure 6 in No. 82.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Bussorah, July* 1, 1910.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 29th January last on the subject of the Island of Zakhnuniyah, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter and enclosure received from the British resident at Bushire.*

I have not had occasion to discuss this question with the present wali, Suleyman Nazif Bey, but I understand Suad Bey, the Mutessarif of Hassa, who has on two occasions acted for the wali here during the latter's absence, and who is still in Bussorah, favours the occupation of the island in question, and I should judge he had taken steps to replace the guard, as reported by Major Trevor on the 26th December, 1909, *vide* enclosure in my despatch No. 3 of the 8th January, 1910, and thus to upset the arrangement made by the previous vali for withdrawing the gendarmes, as reported in my telegram No. 69 of the 25th September, 1909.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 7 in No. 82.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *July* 16, 1910.

MY letter and subsequent correspondence. Trevor's report was correct at the time. On the 23rd April, 1910, political agent reported that eight men had been sent recently, but probably would be withdrawn for hot weather. On the 6th May he reported that they had been withdrawn. On the 17th June he reported that they had been replaced a week later by others, who were there still. Further letter posted by last mail.

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* Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, June 29, 1910.

[29259] No. 83.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 11th instant, relative to the difficulties experienced by the Sheikh of Koweit in the matter of the registration of his property at Fadhgia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to recall attention to the similar situation which arose in connection with the purchase by the same chief of date gardens at Fao last year.

In this case also the Vali of Bussorah declined to allow Sheikh Mubarak to complete the transaction unless he consented to describe himself as an Ottoman subject, and, in consequence of his Excellency's attitude, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to make a declaration to the Sublime Porte respecting the status of Koweit, though discretion was left to him as to the choice of a moment for doing so.

In his despatch No. 396 of the 28th May, 1909, Sir G. Lowther stated the reasons for which, in his opinion, it was undesirable at that time to raise this question, which has since been allowed to remain dormant.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey is still unaware of the way in which the difficulty regarding the registration of the sheikh's Fao property was surmounted, as it undoubtedly was, and that he would be glad to be furnished with early information on this point in the hope that it might prove of use in settling the present controversy.

I am accordingly to suggest that, if Viscount Morley sees no objection, a telegram of enquiry should be addressed to the Government of India on the subject.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[28339] No. 84.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1910.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant relative to the demand of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co. to be allowed to ship a further consignment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

This communication has received careful consideration in this department, and Sir E. Grey is far from denying the force of the arguments employed in it, while he entirely shares the opinion expressed that the intention of His Majesty's Government as regards such shipments has been from the first to allow the German firm to take only as much oxide as was needed to enable them to fulfil such contracts as they might have entered into before the cancellation of the lease.

The fact, however, remains that, in three out of four communications which they have addressed to the German Government on this subject (albeit, not in the most important one), they have used language which can be interpreted as an expression of their willingness to allow the removal of all the oxide already mined and lying ready for shipment without reference to the specific requirements of Messrs. Wönckhaus.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that the permission thus given cannot be revoked without laying His Majesty's Government open to a charge of bad faith on the part of the German Government, which it would be technically difficult to rebut, though the spirit of the agreement would not have been violated.

He would therefore propose to inform the German Ambassador, in reply to his Excellency's note of the 26th July, that the desired permission is granted, but he would point out to him at the same time that Messrs. Wönckhaus' demand constitutes a clear violation of the spirit of the agreement arrived at by the two Governments, and that the attitude of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in opposing that demand was not based on a desire to create mere wanton obstruction, but rather on a determination to carry out the intention of His Majesty's Government as expressed in their memorandum of the 10th July, 1908.

Sir E. Grey would add that His Majesty's Government might, in the circumstances, fairly have claimed to adhere to the terms of that communication as expressing their real intention, and to interpret in the light of everything which they have elsewhere written on this subject.

Sir E. Grey does not think that the interests of the Government of India will suffer by allowing this shipment, as the liability which they have indisputably incurred to pay to Messrs. Wönckhaus an indemnity on account of the loss which they have suffered through the suspension of their mining operations will thereby be diminished.

I am to transmit to you herewith, for Lord Morley's consideration, and, as Sir E. Grey hopes, concurrence, draft of a note which he would propose to address to Count Metternich in the above sense,* and to add that, in the circumstances, it would appear undesirable to call on the owners of the utensils mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of your letter to remove them, since they will doubtless be required for use in making the proposed shipment. I am at the same time to request that, if Lord Morley sees no further objection, Colonel Cox may be furnished without delay with the necessary explanations and instructions.

With reference to the last paragraph of your communication, I am to state that Count Metternich's note of the 10th December, 1909, is still being considered in this department in the light of Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's suggestion for a settlement by commercial compromise.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[30056] No. 84*.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 17, 1910.

ENCROACHMENT on Bagdad residency.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad reported to me by telegraph under yesterday's date that object of vali is purely political, and, Mr. Lorimer adds, spiteful. It was conceived with the declared object of reducing the prestige of His Majesty's residency and to lower foreign subjects' interests in the eyes of the population of Bagdad. Mr. Lorimer, therefore, suggested that as, besides the above considerations, there was obviously no question of the ground being wanted for municipal improvements, since the prolongation of street through residency grounds is known to be totally unnecessary, I should demand absolute prohibition of proposed encroachment. His Majesty's consul-general also pointed out that the value of the property of His Majesty's Government would be very much diminished if encroachment were allowed, and added that a mere protest on the part of His Majesty's Embassy at the Porte would only have effect of spurring the Government to countenance vali's proposed depredations, which his Excellency at present showed hesitation in carrying out.

I immediately made strong representations in the above sense, and received assurances that Porte would telegraph instructions immediately to the Vali of Bagdad prohibiting any arbitrary encroachment on the grounds and property of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Lorimer telegraphed in same sense, as I had the honour to report to you above, to the Government of India.

[30167] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 10th August, relative to Zakhnuniya Island.

India Office, August 18, 1910.

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* Printed elsewhere.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 10, 1910.

ZAKHNUNIYA ISLAND. See your telegram dated the 25th July.

Instructions to request that guard may be withdrawn were sent by despatch on the 8th August to Sir G. Lowther. I will in due course communicate result.

[30195] No. 86.

Messrs Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August 18, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to our letter of the 13th instant, we have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a letter from our agent in Bagdad to His Majesty's consul-general in Bagdad, dated the 18th July last, on the subject of the action of the municipal authorities in regard to our premises there.

We have, &c.

LYNCH BROTHERS.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Mr. Parry to Consul-General Lorimer.

Bagdad, July 18, 1910.

Sir,

WE have the honour to inform you that a notice has been presented to us to-day by the municipal authorities, stating that the wall and shops abutting on the main road and running from our offices to the south boundary of our property are to be demolished on the plea that they are in a dangerous condition.

2. We maintain the walls are not in a dangerous condition. The low building is not over 12 feet high, and of sound construction.

3. On the notice being presented to us, we interviewed the chief municipal officer, and he informed us that he had received his orders from the vilayat, and that he would not be able to abstain from carrying them out at once.

4. The notice has only been shown to us and not served in the ordinary manner.

5. It would appear that the allegation of the walls being in a dangerous condition has been made with the object of destroying them in order to widen the road without paying compensation.

6. The dangers of accepting a notice of this sort without vigorous protest are manifest for the following reasons:—

(*a.*) We have no proof that the destruction of the shops and walls cannot be used in connection with the large and permanent building on our premises.

(*b.*) We have no objection to giving a portion of our frontage for the purpose of widening the road, provided, of course, that we are justly recompensed for the loss we have to suffer, but we strongly object to the arbitrary manner in which the work is to be carried out.

(*c.*) As the permanent building on our property extends for some distance along the road, we consider it is due to us to know the intention of the authorities with regard to the whole road-widening scheme, at any rate, as far as regards the portion in which we are interested. Moreover, we expect to have a reasonable period of notice to enable us to make the necessary arrangements to provide other quarters for the tenants who occupy the shops and for the construction of other offices if the whole of the buildings are to be cut through.

7. We solicit your assistance to support us in resisting this arbitrary order, not with a spirit of obstruction, but in the hope that some consideration will be taken of the difficulties we have to contend, and as a protest against the attempt to use the pretext that the walls are dangerous with other objects.

We have, &c.

(*Per pro.* Stephen Lynch and Co.),

FRED W. PARRY.

[30358] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office,—(Received August 20.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 20, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant regarding the demand of Messrs. Wönckhaus to make a further shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

In reply I am to say that Viscount Morley recognises that it must rest with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to decide what course is practicable in replying to the German Government, and, in view of Sir E. Grey's further expression of opinion, he acquiesces in the terms of the draft note to Count Metternich. He ventures to hope, however, that—if it be possible—a sentence may be added to the effect that His Majesty's Government trust that, after the explanations now given, the German Government will not support any further requests of this nature that Messrs. Wönckhaus may make.

A copy of a telegram that has been sent to the Government of India is enclosed for information.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 18, 1910.

ABU MUSA. See your telegram dated the 25th ultimo. Logical soundness of attitude of Resident, Persian Gulf, in regard to further shipment is recognised by His Majesty's Government, but in view of notes of the 10th January and 4th and 23rd July, 1908, to German Government, they consider that, by persisting in refusal, they would lay themselves open to a charge of breach of faith which, although there would have been no violation of spirit of agreement, it would be difficult on technical grounds to rebut. Resident should therefore be instructed that permission to ship must be given; for this purpose it will presumably be necessary to use the utensils mentioned in his letter dated the 5th June, paragraph 3.

As regards paragraph 4, the answer is that Foreign Office are still considering memorandum of German Government in light of suggestion made by Resident.

[30363] No. 88.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 20, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the alleged intention of the vali of Bagdad to cut a road through the British residency.

Nazim Pasha's hostility to the residency was referred to on page 16 of Mr. Lorimer's "Summary of Events" in Turkish Irak for April and May last (paragraph 7), copy of which was sent to your department on the 28th July. For political reasons, as well as on account of the damage involved to Government property, Viscount Morley entirely agrees with the opinion expressed by Sir G. Lowther in his telegram No. 157 of the 16th August, that "a distinct stand should be made by us against illegal action to prevent the process going further," and he trusts that the stand may be so distinct as to leave the Turkish Government under no misapprehension as to the seriousness of His Majesty's Government in making it.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 88.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 18, 1910.

POLITICAL resident at Bagdad telegraphed as follows on the 16th instant :—

"Vali of Bagdad is believed to entertain intention of carrying new public street through the compound of this residency in such a way that buildings will be separated from one another, the value of property of British Government, by being subdivided, being thus wantonly destroyed. It is clear that action on part of local authorities which is apprehended is political and mischievous, as there is an existing road which could be widened. Full particulars have been telegraphed by me to Sir G. Lowther, and reply has been received from him that alleged intention is being deprecated by him. Uncompromising resistance to the encroachment seems to me to be required for sake of our credit at Bagdad. I suggest that Government of India, if they share this view, should communicate with His Majesty's Government immediately. It may be too late otherwise."

Representations of resident, Bagdad, will, we trust, be given the strongest support of His Majesty's Government. Reference is invited to section 9, paragraph 7, of the "Summary of Events" in Turkish Arabia for April and May 1910, copy of which was enclosed in letter of the 7th ultimo from Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

[30056] No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1910.

ACTION of Nazim Pasha at Bagdad. Please see Mr. Lorimer's telegram repeated in your No. 160 of the 17th instant.

Former reports from Bagdad had prepared me for this. Nazim Pasha can hardly have initiated this policy hostile to British interests without encouragement from the Central Government, and you are authorised to protest in the strongest manner against his unwarrantable attitude.

A most unfavourable impression will be produced in this country if the Porte take advantage of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government, and of their desire not to embarrass the new régime, to create difficulties for them, or to discriminate unfavourably against Great Britain, and it will be realised here that a change of rulers at Constantinople has not resulted in a change of Government.

If His Majesty's Government were once convinced that there was a deliberate policy on the part of Turkish authorities to suppress established British commercial interests, the consequences would be most serious. We have no desire to obtain new concessions in Mesopotamia or anywhere in Turkey which would embarrass the Porte or impair Turkish rights, but there have been several indications lately of oppressive action on part of Turkish authorities in cases where British interests are concerned, and to which the Turks can have no reasonable cause for objection.

Such a complaint has just been received from Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company.

[29692] No. 90.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant respecting the destruction by the local authorities at Bagdad of part of your property in that city.

I am to state that a report on this subject has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who has been apprised of the facts by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad. Sir G. Lowther has made a vigorous protest to the Turkish Government on the subject, and has supported the demand for the restoration to your

firm of the land seized and for the erection of temporary tents on the site of the former wall pending the law suit which is in contemplation.

His Excellency's action has been approved by Sir E. Grey.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[30429] No. 91.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 575.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 16, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 536 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the steps taken by the Samos authorities for the suppression of a supposed Phil-Hellenic movement in that island.

I am endeavouring to ascertain the views of my French and Russian colleagues with regard to this matter and to the general complaints against Prince Kopassis in the island; the French Embassy are at present still awaiting reports from their consular representative in Samos; the Russians have no representative there.

Two Samos deputies recently arrived here in order to represent their case against the Governor at head-quarters, but they were arrested on warrants issued by the judicial authorities at Samos and communicated by telegraph to the capital by the Prince, and sent back to Samos.

There seems to be little doubt that the Prince has made himself extremely unpopular, and his recent action appears to be high-handed.

The dispatch of such a considerable number of troops to the island is, of course, in contravention of the engagements given to France, Russia, and ourselves, and the moment may perhaps have come when the Porte should be reminded of those engagements. If the Ottoman Government find that they can disregard engagements as to the privileges of the inhabitants of Samos, they will consider that they may also disregard the organic statute that governs the Lebanon. As will be remembered, according to the statute, the Porte is entitled to keep only fifty men in the island, but, owing to the recurrence of disorders, it was the practice for a number of years to maintain there a weak double company. In the disorders of the spring of 1908, the Samians behaved with great brutality to a number of Turkish troops who had fallen into an ambush, and when the Porte, in consequence, sent a full battalion to the island, the protecting Powers raised no objection, especially in view of the statements of the then Grand Vizier that when calm was restored the garrison would be reduced to its normal strength. Shortly afterwards supervened the revolution of July 1908, and it was generally felt that the state of general unrest in the Empire rendered it inexpedient to attempt to deal with Samos. The Prince Kopassis Effendi, backed, if not egged on, by the Turkish officers and troops, has generally found himself forced into a position of antagonism to the majority of the islanders, as shown by recent elections. The electoral struggle has been chosen as the pretext for the dispatch of a second battalion, and it seems not unlikely that the object of the committee and the Young Turk officers at Samos is to bring about an *impasse* and a general state of unrest which may furnish an occasion for disarming the population and curtailing, if not abolishing, the privileged status of the island. The Samians in the past have not shown much political sagacity and perhaps do not merit much sympathy, but the abolition of their privileges may serve as a precedent, and embolden the Young Turks to seek a similar consummation in the case of the Lebanon, while it must not be forgotten that the Turks have several times suggested that Crete should be given the same status as Samos, i.e., that they should have a small detachment of Turkish troops in the island, the complement of which they would naturally like to make as elastic as the small force they are supposed to retain at Samos. His Majesty's Government has practically no armed force in Cyprus with its 300,000 inhabitants, and two battalions seems more than an excessive garrison to overawe the 45,000 inhabitants of Samos. It becomes then a question whether the three Powers, Russia, France, England, might not make representations to the Porte with a view to deterring the latter from proceeding to a further curtailment of the privileges of the island. It has been suggested that they might dispatch there special functionaries who would report separately or jointly on the present state of affairs, but I am loath to put forward such a suggestion officially at the present moment, and my French and Russian colleagues do not feel certain that

the moment for such a step has yet arisen. If any action becomes necessary, it is essential that the three Powers should act jointly and be prepared to see that their representations are not trifled with or disregarded.

I should add that my Russian colleague has suggested to me that in the event of any representations to the Porte it might be advisable to endeavour to interest Italy in the matter, in view of the fact that, although she is not one of the Powers to whom assurances have been given regarding the statute of Samos, she is nevertheless deeply interested in maintaining the *status quo* in the Mediterranean.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 91.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Smyrna, August* 1, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from the British vice-consul at Samos, reporting upon the steps taken by the authorities to repress a supposed Phil-Hellenic movement in that island.

I have since received a telegram from Mr. Marc reporting that 500 troops had been landed.

I have, &c.
H. D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 91.

Vice-Consul Marc to Consul-General Barnham.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Samos, July* 30, 1910.

IN continuation of my last report sent to you on the 24th instant, I further beg to bring to your notice that the situation of the island becomes daily more acute, and there is every reason to believe that another outbreak is not far distant.

The Prince-Governor, seeing his unpopularity and being anxious to strengthen his position, reported to the Sublime Porte that the Samians were on the verge of a Phil-Hellenic movement, basing this mythical accusation on an accidental visit here of a certain Greek official, M. Fontana, whose mission was the inspection of the Greek consulates in the Levant. For this reason the Turkish Government has sent here three men-of-war, and it is further stated that about 300 troops, in addition to those already stationed at Vathy, are this evening expected from Smyrna.

Knowing the present peaceful attitude of the inhabitants, their grievances being directed only against the Prince's person, I consider it my duty to protest against such unfounded intrigues, and to inform you at the same time that, from what I see, the Turkish Government is seeking an excuse to military occupation, a measure which will undoubtedly lead to very serious disturbances.

It is now rumoured that the Prince-Governor will order the arrest of a few leading persons and of certain electors for having been implicated in the movement above mentioned.

I shall not fail to continue to watch events and to report to you about this unpleasant state of affairs.

I have, &c.
GREGORY D. L. MARC.

No 92.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 579.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 16, 1910.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 157 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that on the 18th July last, notice was received by the manager of Messrs. Lynch and an Armenian British subject and pensioned employé that, in connection with other municipal improvements in Bagdad, part of the premises owned by them would be demolished as dangerous. His Majesty's consul-general, after inspecting the premises

and finding that the pretext was unfounded, wrote the same day to the vali and requested him to postpone any action pending consideration of the matter. On the 28th July Mr. Lorimer forwarded to him officially a petition from the manager praying that the order of demolition might be withdrawn, and informed him at the same time that he has satisfied himself that the structures to be demolished were not dangerous. The vali, however, declined to admit Mr. Lorimer's intervention in the question, which he said was one of non-movable property.

In the meantime I made urgent representations through the Minister of the Interior who telegraphed for explanations. But the vali has not allowed these enquiries to deter him from his purpose. On the 6th August Lynch's manager received notice verbally that the wall, &c., would be demolished on the 7th, and though the manager refused to accept such irregular notice, it was repeated next day, and the demolition began the same evening; while the manager was further informed that the demolition was to include, without further notice, the main front of his chief office, a lofty building which had not hitherto been mentioned.

Lynch's agent has now sent in through Mr. Lorimer a claim for the immediate restoration of the land illegally seized and a request to be allowed to erect tents on the site of the former wall; and his firm contemplate fighting the matter out in the law courts.

The demolitions are apparently being carried out in this arbitrary manner by the municipality, who have no funds for expropriation purposes, in order to obtain without payment ground for carrying through the property affected a road which now threatens the wall of the British residency itself at right angles; and it is locally believed that the municipality intend to carry this road through, instead of diverting it slightly round the residency grounds, and so divide them into two nearly equal parts. The walls of a garden used as a club by the German community at Bagdad but owned by a native, have already been demolished and palms cut down without any proper notice; and the value of all non-movable property at Bagdad has gone down greatly of late in consequence of the vali's high-handed action. His Excellency describes the Lynch case as one of non-movable property; but it appears to be one purely of confiscation on false grounds. Mr. Lorimer learns that when the municipality obtains any funds, they intend to proceed with much expropriation; great loss would thus be inflicted on many British subjects resident at Bagdad.

In continuation of the original representations which I made at the Porte at various times, I have now sent in a *pro-memorid*, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who have promised to telegraph to the vali for explanations of his action. I am also supporting Messrs. Lynch's demand for the restoration of the lands seized, and am strongly deprecating the alleged intention of interfering with the grounds of the residency in a *note verbale* to the Sublime Porte, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

The action of the vali in this present case is by no means an isolated instance of his hasty and drastic policy with regard to foreign subjects and property at Bagdad. There have been, Mr. Lorimer informs me, repeated instances of similar actions on his part in regard to subjects of other Powers. The high-handed nature of the proceeding is interpreted by Mr. Lorimer as intended to lower the prestige of foreigners, a policy which mainly affects British interests.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 92.

Pro-memorid.

LE 18 juillet à la banque le directeur de la Compagnie Lynch, à Bagdad, et un autre sujet anglais ont été avisés d'une décision de démolir des bâtisses leur appartenantes sous prétexte qu'elles menaçaient ruine. Comme, après inspection, il paraissait que ce prétexte n'était nullement fondé, les propriétaires ont adressé au vali, par l'entremise du consulat général d'Angleterre, une pétition avec prière de reconsidérer la décision qui leur avait été communiquée. Le vali a répondu que comme il s'agissait d'une question immobilière il ne pouvait admettre l'intervention du consulat général, et peu de jours après les autorités ont, en effet, démoli les bâtisses en cause. Comme la municipalité a l'intention de construire une route qui traversait l'emplacement de ces maisons—qui, en effet, ne menaçaient pas ruine—on a été

porté à croire qu'il s'agissait d'un acte de spoliation, et que le but était de s'emparer des terrains sans payer la compensation édictée par la Loi sur les Expropriations. D'après cette loi, l'on ne peut procéder à la démolition d'une maison sans avoir obtenu le consentement du propriétaire et sans en avoir fixé d'un commun accord et payé sa valeur. Alors l'action des autorités à Bagdad paraît être non seulement arbitraire mais illégale.

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Constantinople,
le 15 août, 1910.

Enclosure 2 in No. 92.

Note Verbale.

(No. 81.)

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy had yesterday the honour to present to the Sublime Porte a *pro-memorid* in Turkish, giving particulars of the arbitrary and illegal demolition of buildings belonging to British subjects at Bagdad. His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad is requesting the local authorities to restore the lands thus illegally seized until the local tribunals shall have given a decision in the matter, and His Majesty's Embassy trusts that the Sublime Porte will without hesitation send immediate telegraphic instructions to the local authorities to restore this property, which has been appropriated without carrying out the provisions of the "Loi sur les Expropriations."

His Majesty's Embassy also learns that the municipal authorities of Bagdad are thinking of making a new road under construction pass through the middle of the grounds of His Majesty's consulate-general, whereas by a slight deviation it might easily be made to follow an existing road. The ground of the British consulate-general at Bagdad is registered in the name of His Majesty's Embassy, and the latter feels convinced that the Sublime Porte will without delay invite the Bagdad local authorities to refrain from unnecessarily interfering with the official residence of the representative of His Britannic Majesty's Government at Bagdad.

Therapia, August 16, 1910.

[30484] No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 21, 1910.

ATTITUDE of Bagdad local Government.

I am writing you a despatch on the British position in Mesopotamia as viewed from Constantinople, and meanwhile I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be better for me to put off acting on the instructions contained in your telegram No. 212 of to-day. I telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general asking whether the Bagdad local Government had altered their attitude in consequence of the orders sent from here, and Mr. Lorimer has replied that he will be better able to report on this question in a few days, but that the authorities have quietly taken away the flag which had been placed to show the line to be followed through the grounds of the residency by the projected new street.

[29915] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 246.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 226 of the 6th instant on the subject of the reoccupation of Zakhmuniyeh Island by Turkish troops, I transmit herewith to your Excellency copy of further correspondence on the subject from the India Office.*

* No. 82.

With reference to the concluding sentence of your Excellency's telegram No. 157 of the 16th instant, I consider that you should continue to press this matter on the attention of the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30196] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Young.

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1910.

THE Greek Minister called at this Office on the 17th instant and was received by Mr. Mallet.

He said that he had been instructed by his Government to call my attention to the state of affairs in Samos, and to point out that, in spite of the agreement between the Porte and the three Powers in virtue of which Turkey had no right to send troops to the island at all, the Turkish garrison had recently been increased.

Mr. Mallet expressed to M. Gennadius his surprise that the Greek Government should think of raising such a question at a moment when the four Powers were endeavouring to avert a crisis in regard to Cretan affairs, but promised to inform me of his representation and of the desire of the Greek Government that the matter should be raised at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30356] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 26th ultimo, relative to the demand of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co. to be allowed to ship a further consignment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

I venture to remind your Excellency that in paragraph 28 of the "complaint" of that firm against the Sheikh of Sharga, which was communicated to His Majesty's Government in Herr von Stumm's note of the 31st December, 1907, it was implied that the firm had commitments to the extent of at least 2,000 tons of oxide, and that it was to enable them to meet the liability which was thus understood to exist that His Majesty's Government, in a memorandum dated the 10th January, 1908, consented to the removal from the island of the oxide already mined and ready for shipment.

It was equally with this object in view that similar language was employed in the communications of the 4th and 23rd July.

That the real intention of His Majesty's Government was to allow Messrs. Wönckhaus, pending the settlement of the dispute, to remove only so much oxide as would enable them to fulfil obligations previously contracted, and not to place them in a position of unfair advantage over British subjects who were not to be permitted to ship any of the mineral at all, is proved by the authoritative statement of the British attitude contained in the memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, which forms the reasoned reply to Herr von Stumm's note above referred to. This statement is as follows: "They (*i.e.*, His Majesty's Government) are prepared to use their good offices in order that temporary arrangements may be made whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus will be enabled to procure a limited amount of red oxide to place them in a position to fulfil such contracts as they may have entered into before the cancellation of the lease."

That the firm long ago attained their object is proved by a statement made by the German acting consul at Bushire to the British acting consul-general in an official letter dated the 1st March, 1910, to the effect that they had discharged the obligations which they had contracted by means of the oxide shipped on board the steam-ship "Louise" (in April 1908), and by the fact, known to His Majesty's Government, that so recently as the spring of this year they still had 400 tons of the mineral belonging to that consignment lying unsold at Hamburg.

In these circumstances, I cannot but consider that the demand of Messrs. Wönck-

hans constitutes a clear violation of the spirit of the agreement arrived at by the two Governments, and that the attitude of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in opposing that demand was not based on a desire to create mere wanton obstruction, but rather on a determination to carry out the intention of His Majesty's Government as expressed in the memorandum of the 10th July, 1908. His Majesty's Government might therefore fairly have claimed to adhere to the terms of that communication as expressing their real intention, and to interpret in the light of it everything which they have elsewhere written on the subject.

In view, however, of the fact that language has been used in notes to you which can be interpreted as an expression of their willingness to allow the removal of all the oxide already mined and lying ready for shipment without reference to the specific requirements of Messrs. Wönckhaus in connection with obligations previously contracted, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the desired shipment will be permitted, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Cox will be furnished with instructions in this sense.

I venture, however, to express the hope that, in view of the explanations now given, the German Government will abstain from supporting any further requests of this nature which Messrs. Wönckhaus may make.

I presume that the shipment referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your Excellency's note as having been the object of obstructive action on the part of Colonel Cox is that which formed the subject of my note to Herr von Kühlmann of the 2nd May last. In that communication the circumstances which gave rise to the attitude of the consulate-general were fully explained, and I feel confident that, if your Excellency will refer to it once more, you will admit that no fault can justly be found with the action of Major Trevor, who was at that time officiating at Bushire in Colonel Cox's absence.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[30714] No. 97.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 23, 1910.*

ATTITUDE of Bagdad Local Government. Please refer to my telegram of the 21st instant, No. 165.

His Majesty's consul-general telegraphs that he is of opinion that the effect produced by the representations made here has been excellent and will contribute towards making our position easier.

With regard to the threatened encroachment on the grounds and buildings of the residency, Mr. Lorimer has received from the vali an official written statement, which the vali's political secretary has also confirmed in even stronger terms, that the authorities had never contemplated any such action.

On Saturday last a crowd assembled in front of the residency in evident anticipation of witnessing the pulling down of the wall in question, and Mr. Lorimer has reason to disbelieve the vali's denial. He has, however, accepted it without question.

[30356] No. 98.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 23, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, relative to the demand of Messrs. Wönckhaus to make a further shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view of Viscount Morley that an addition should be made to the note about to be addressed to the German Ambassador, to the effect that His Majesty's Government trust that, in view of the explanations now given, the German Government will abstain from supporting any further requests of this nature which the firm may make, and that a paragraph to this effect will be inserted in that communication.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[30889] No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 18th August, relative to the Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fadaghia.

India Office, August 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August 18, 1910.*

PROPERTY at Fadaghia belonging to Sheikh of Koweit. See your telegram dated the 26th ultimo.

Please state whether this is the property mentioned in letter of the 4th February, 1909, from Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary, Political Department, India Office. If it is not the same property, please inform me how the question of registration was solved in that case and in the case of the other gardens at Fao belonging to the sheikh.

[30890] No. 100.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 18th August, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, August 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August 18, 1910.*

ABU MUSA. See your telegram dated the 25th ultimo.

Logical soundness of attitude of Resident, Persian Gulf, in regard to further shipment is recognised by His Majesty's Government, but in view of notes of the 10th January and the 4th and 23rd July, 1908, to German Government, they consider that, by persisting in refusal, they would lay themselves open to a charge of breach of faith which, although there would have been no violation of spirit of agreement, it would be difficult on technical grounds to rebut. Resident should therefore be instructed that permission to ship must be given; for this purpose it will presumably be necessary to use the utensils mentioned in his letter dated the 5th June, paragraph 3.

As regards paragraph 4, the answer is that Foreign Office are still considering memorandum of German Government in light of suggestion made by resident.

[30484] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 218.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 24, 1910.*

ACTION of Nazim Pasha at Bagdad.

You may defer representations to Porte as you suggest (your telegram No. 165).

[30794] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 24, 1910.*

ARBITRARY treatment of Lynch's property.

You should press Turkish Government for a reply to our representations if they have not yet given one.

Reference is to your telegram No. 168 of the 23rd August.

[30961] No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)

Sir, *India Office, August 24, 1910.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you in connection with Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's telegram to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran (which was repeated in the latter's telegram No. 303 of the 26th July last), regarding the assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Viscount Morley has now examined the papers enclosed in Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's despatch No. 2 of the 16th June last to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he has formed the opinion, in which he trusts that Sir E. Grey will concur, that in the dispute between the sheikh and the Vali of Bussorah the former showed a commendable self-restraint and a genuine desire to subordinate his personal inclinations to the policy of His Majesty's Government. It further appears to his Lordship that, on the merits of the question at issue, the sheikh had right on his side, and that, though it would be too much to pretend that his administration has at all times been impeccable, the specific allegations made against him by the vali are sufficiently disposed of in Mr. Wilson's despatch of the 4th June.

In these circumstances, and in view of the sheikh's not unnatural impatience described in Colonel Cox's above-quoted telegram, Lord Morley is strongly of opinion that the assurances of His Majesty's Government's support may now safely be given, and he is prepared, if Sir E. Grey approves, to submit the sheikh's name to the King for the grant of a K.C.I.E.

The attitude of the local Turkish authorities to his Highness in this matter, the alternate pressure and cajolery that they are applying to the Sheikh of Koweit, their attitude to British enterprise in Mesopotamia, the reoccupation of Zakhmuniyah island, and the recent demand made to His Majesty's Government by the Sublime Porte for an explanation of an alleged increase of the British squadron in the Persian Gulf, appear to indicate the growth of Turkish ambitions in those regions which is likely soon to bring them into serious collision with the old-established policy and interests of this country—ambitions which the additions to the Turkish fleet are not likely to diminish. Lord Morley would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the time is rapidly approaching when it would be well for His Majesty's Government to make some counter-demonstration at the head of the gulf. If Sir E. Grey shares this view, the investiture of the sheikh with the K.C.I.E. might be made an occasion for some ceremony, and for a show of considerable naval strength in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah and Koweit.

In conclusion I am to suggest that a copy of the assurances should be furnished to Mr. Consul Crow with such further explanations as to the policy of His Majesty's Government as Sir E. Grey may consider desirable to ensure co-operation between the British consular authorities.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[31090] No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the German Ambassador, and, in reply to the verbal enquiry made by

his Excellency on the 24th instant on the subject of the mines of red oxide on Abu Musa, has the honour to inform him that telegraphic instructions were sent on the 18th instant to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to permit the further shipment desired by Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co.

Foreign Office, August 26, 1910.

[30363] No. 105.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1910.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant respecting the alleged intention of the Vali of Bagdad to encroach on the grounds of His Majesty's residency in that city.

I am to state, for the information of Viscount Morley, that, before issuing any further instructions on this subject, Sir E. Grey proposes to await the receipt of the despatch from Sir G. Lowther mentioned in his telegram No. 165 of the 21st instant, a copy of which was forwarded to you on the next day.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[31379] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 596.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 23, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 346 of the 29th May, reporting on the general condition of the Asiatic provinces, I have the honour to state that, for the most part, there have been no incidents of a disquieting nature in Anatolia during the past few months, and I have received few reports from His Majesty's consular officers in those provinces of late.

The Dersim district appears to have grown more tranquil during the past year. The Vali of Mamuret-ul-Aziz has expressed much satisfaction at the change to His Majesty's consul at Diarbekir, and only regretted that the projected road through the district has so far made no progress. His Excellency had formed a company with a capital of £T. 1,000 for the establishment of a motor omnibus service between Mezreh and Khurput, a distance of only 3 miles, and has ordered a British omnibus, hoping that, if this effort succeeds, motor traffic may extend throughout the vilayet, which is described as being in a tranquil state. At present the condition of the roads makes it impossible to connect Diarbekir and Aleppo by motor service.

The relations between Armenians and Kurds are, however, as cold as ever, and the land question continues to be the one absorbing problem. A record harvest is anticipated, which should do something to improve the condition of the peasants. The fears of the Vali of Erzeroum, as reported to you in my despatches Nos. 503 and 527 of the 26th and 31st July last respectively, that a widespread insurrection was contemplated among the Kurds are not shared by the Vali of Diarbekir, who was sent on a tour by the Minister of the Interior to enquire into the matter, and has returned more or less satisfied that no such insurrection was contemplated. Some few arrests have been made in connection with this supposed movement at Diarbekir, but probably only in order to show any Kurds or other reactionaries who may be contemplating future activity that the authorities are on the alert.

At Aleppo a secret society of "Nihilists" has been formed composed of eleven members, two of whom are Greek subjects, one an Italian, and the rest Ottoman subjects from Beirout and Cairo. The aims of the society are unknown, but, to judge from the fact that one of the members was recently arrested on the charge of trying to extort by threats of violence a sum of 80*l.* from a Christian notable, they would seem to be chiefly of a blackmailing nature.

Some Arabs ran amuck in Aleppo a few days ago and wounded several foreigners, but were promptly arrested, and the incident was apparently merely an act of revenge instigated by an Arab whose wife had been abducted by a native Christian.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[31381] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 598.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 23, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 218 of the 28th July, asking for my opinion as to the likelihood of the Ottoman Government consenting to "the removal of existing restrictions on the Euphrates and Tigris Company's rights or to the explicit recognition of their right to ply on both rivers up to the limit of their navigability."

The largely artificial agitation engineered by certain members of the committee against the fusion scheme has no doubt considerably died down since the scheme practically foundered in the Ottoman Parliament. The resolution then passed authorising the Cabinet to conclude the matter with the proviso that it did not involve any financial engagement on the Turkish Treasury was mainly a manœuvre to avoid the fall of the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet in a way that might have risked the positions of the committee members, Djavid Bey and Talaat Bey, and was never carried to nor received the sanction of the Senate. At the time the opposition was mainly directed against the monopolistic character of the project, but the underlying idea with the Bagdad committee deputies was that the rivers should be thrown open to the Ottoman flag and Lynch's company be strictly limited to their existing rights, while hopes were entertained of eventually running them off the river.

There has been no change yet that would justify a hope of those rights being extended either as regards the number of Lynch's steamers on the Tigris or their being permitted to ply on the reaches above Bagdad or on the Euphrates, though it is not impossible that Lynch's new agent at Bagdad may be able to arrange unofficially to get permit to run other steamers on the rivers in conjunction with native Ottomans and under the Ottoman flag whenever the rivers are thrown open to Ottomans.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[31383] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 600.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 23, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 538 of the 3rd August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Dr. Abdur Rahman, His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Jeddah, reporting on the state of affairs in the Hedjaz.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Acting Consul Dr. Abdur Rahman to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Jeddah, August 5, 1910.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 41 of the 14th July last, on the state of affairs in Hedjaz, I have the honour to report that on or about the 27th July the Grand Shereef left Taif with about 4,000 armed Bedouins. In the beginning his destination was uncertain: some said that he was going to attack the Hedjaz tribes Ghamid and Zahran, and others said that he was going to the east to attack Bin Saoud. But the majority believe this last to be his real destination. It is believed that on his way he is to receive large reinforcements of armed Bedouins. He has left his eldest son, Abdullah Bey, the member of Parliament for Mecca, in Taif as his agent, and has taken his three sons Faisal, Zaid, and Ali with him.

I am informed that the Grand Shereef asked for help from the Turkish authorities, and that the vali was inclined to give him the aid he asked for. But the commander-in-chief refused to give any help till orders be received from Constantinople to this effect. They say the matter was cabled to Constantinople, and reply in the negative was received, and so the Grand Shereef had to go without any help from the Turkish Government.

The object of this invasion is to subdue the refractory Bin Saoud, who had not paid the annual tribute of 900*l.* to the Grand Shereef for the last thirty years, as stated in despatch No. 30 of the 11th June, 1910.

Bin Rashid is to co-operate with the Grand Shereef in this expedition against Bin Saoud.

I further beg to report that nearly all members of the two tribes Ghamid and Zahran have been expelled from Jeddah, as they were from Mecca. The doorkeeper of this consulate, as a result of my representations to the Grand Shereef, has been allowed to stay in Jeddah.

I have, &c.
ABDUR RAHMAN.

[31385] No. 109.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 602.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 23, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 555 of the 7th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Dovey, His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, reporting on the disturbed state of the country and threatened military expedition against Jebel Druse.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Consul Dovey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Damascus, August 2, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to call attention to the unusually and very gravely disturbed condition of this province during the past few weeks, beginning by citing a few instances briefly, mentioning only the more important.

1. The men of Saadeddin Abu Suleiman (who was compromised in the Unkhel affair) attacked servants of Ali Effendi-el-Ahmad, of Sheikh Muskeen town; one man killed, one wounded, and five camels carried off.

2. A raid by Druses against the Ruwela tribe of Bedouins at Ezrak, near Zerka, with some forty killed and sixty wounded. The Druses were worsted, and lost about 100 camels and horses, besides most of the killed and wounded.

3. Three Druses were found killed near Basr-el-Harir.

4. Druses of the Jebel were threatening Busra Eski Sham, so that more soldiers had to be sent to Deraa, and troops were moved thence to Busra Eski Sham simultaneously.

5. About the 9th ultimo Aneyzeh Arabs attacked a small party of Druses bringing wheat and wool to Damascus, and took from them thirty camels and seven rifles.

6. Tenants and produce raisers at Beilin, on Lake Tiberias, threaten to refuse rent and revolt against Damascus landowners.

7. Peasants bringing in their melons and fruit from villages near Damascus were robbed of seventeen camels.

8. In a Druse raid under Jadan and Abdullah Atrash two Christians were killed and their camels were stolen near Yazaizs [? Bezaiz]. The object of this raid was to attack Busra Eski Sham, and the villages of Maariba and Ghazm were then attacked and destroyed during the last fortnight.

9. The eastern road from Damascus to Jebel Druse has been quite impassable during the last fortnight.

10. Villages, again, scattered about Mount Hermon show examples of ill-blood between Moslem and Druse, and in one case a pasturage dispute has taken place with six killed and ten wounded.

11. Meantime the police compel Druses coming into Damascus to give up their rifles and revolvers, and on the evening of the 27th ultimo a caravan thus summoned refused to yield their arms and fired on the police, killing one soldier, but the Government have tried to hush up the matter.

12. On the 1st instant some thirty soldiers employed in repairing the telegraph

wire between Busra Eski Sham and Deraa were fired on by a party of some fifty Druses, but none was wounded, according to the local daily paper "Muktabas."

The above will suffice to show how great is the public insecurity round about Damascus, and mainly owing to the ancient feud between Druses of the Jebel and the Moslem inhabitants of Busra Eski Sham.

It is generally believed at Damascus that the Government consider that the time is now ripe for a complete reduction of the Jebel Druses, who should be disarmed and placed under martial law and compelled to furnish recruits and pay taxes as others do, and that, to effect this, they will employ a very large military force.

It is believed that there are now already eleven battalions in the Hauran (including that which has just arrived from Aleppo), while eight battalions could be summoned from Smyrna and four from Constantinople and one from Acre if it were found necessary to carry out the above proposals fully, thus filling up the depleted 5th Army Corps.

The expedition of General Abdullah Pasha in September 1896 may be recalled with reference to the present state of affairs.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

P.S. *August 4.*—Sami Pasha (Faruki), son-in-law of Mahmud Shewkat Pasha, is the general selected for operations against the Druses, and will come to Damascus at once.

[31386] No. 110.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 603.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 22, 1910.*

ON the 5th July I received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah to the effect that, according to information from the resident at Bushire, Turkish soldiers had again returned to the island of Zakhmuniyeh and that the Turkish flag was hoisted there on Fridays, and later received the despatch from Mr. Crow, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

I immediately brought the matter to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and renewed my representations of the spring of last year on the lines of the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 30th May, 1909, pointing out that the island is situated some 10 miles to the south-east of Ojair, the point recognised by His Majesty's Government as the furthest limit of Ottoman jurisdiction in El Hassa, and that this violation of the *status quo* would only needlessly create a fresh incident. His Excellency promised to study the question and let me know the result later on, but from the evasive nature of his replies to my repeated representations of last summer I have some doubt about obtaining a definite settlement as desired by His Majesty's Government, and suspect that the withdrawal of the military post, reported by me on the 27th September, 1909, was merely owing to the termination of the fishing season, during which the Turks pretended the presence of their gendarmes to be necessary to maintain order among the Dowasir fishermen from Bahrein who frequent the island. In a report received by the Porte from the Mutessarif of El Hassa the latter, after giving the dimensions, &c., of Zakhmuniyeh, maintained that it was practically part of the mainland, thus revealing the pretensions of the Turks not only to the island but to the coast south-east of Ojair.

Mr. Crow, in his telegram of the 6th August, 1910, reported that the Vali of Bussorah has now appointed a mudir, or sub-governor, at Odeid. All this seems to point to a determination to assert and extend Ottoman sovereignty in the neighbourhood of El Katr and it seems to me only prudent that His Majesty's Government should make up its mind as to the attitude to be adopted towards Young Turkey's general forward policy in the regions of the Gulf. Under the old régime we temporised, but it seems that now a more definite and direct attitude may become expedient, if not necessary. The vigorous action of the Vali of Bussorah in dealing with the Sheikh of Mohammerah and in the bombardment of Zein showed a determination to assert Turkish sovereign rights; while Mr. Lorimer, in his telegram of the 16th August, records his conviction that the high-handed methods employed by the authorities of Bagdad in the matter of the demolition of Messrs. Lynch's premises and the threatened encroachments on the residency were intended to demonstrate that

foreign subjects and interests are at their mercy. This policy, if not checked, may be extended to the sepoy guard of the residency and to the "Comet," the presence of both of which is highly distasteful to Turkish national sentiment, whilst it is not impossible that we may eventually find a boycott, as in the case of the Greeks and Austrians, started against Lynch's steamers with the object of driving this foreign company with its foreign flag off Turkish internal waters. The old régime was economically old-fashioned and negative as regards the assertion of its sovereign rights.

After the change in July 1908, and while the Cabinet was composed of the Elder Liberal statesmen who had preserved the traditions of the Aali Pashas and Fuad Pashas of the time of the Crimean war and after, we had pro-British demonstrations reflecting the views of the men in power, and it was felt that Young Turkey, under their guidance, would shrink from raising awkward questions as to our position at Koweit, Bagdad, Cyprus, Egypt, &c. But it was noticed at the time that prominent committeemen took no part in these demonstrations, and seemed rather to discountenance them, and when in 1909 the committee took over the machinery of Government, the Elder Liberal statesmen and pro-British demonstrators were put in the background, and their voices and sentiments silenced by the state of siege, though the present rulers have to reckon with them to a certain extent. The committee, composed of younger men, is more modern and businesslike, while it is also more positive and self-assertive as regards the vindication of its "national" rights. It is not swayed by sentiment, but has adopted the doctrine of "Real-Politik," and not unnaturally believes that Young Turkey has to play a prominent, if not the principal, part in the Asiatic revival, and work in sympathy with cognate forces in Persia, Egypt, and India.

In its internal form the committee appears to be a Judæo-Turkish dual alliance, the Turks supplying a splendid military material and the Jews the brain, enterprise, money (*e.g.*, Djavid Bey's recent loan in Paris), and a strong press influence in Europe; while, as shown by Sionist literature since the revolution, the Jewish world seems to have now turned its eyes towards Mesopotamia as the land best suited to Jewish colonisation and the ultimate formation of a Jewish autonomous State. The Jews, who now seem to inspire and control the inside machinery of the State, and are bent on the economic and industrial capture of Young Turkey, appear determined that no important enterprise shall be started in Mesopotamia without their participation, if not control, and it is perhaps significant that the attacks on Sir William Willcocks' have been led by a Jew in a Jewish organ here, and the opposition to the Lynch scheme in Turkish circles was mainly the work of Sassoon Effendi, the Jewish deputy for Bagdad. The Jews, in order to maintain their position of influence in Young Turkey circles, have to play up to, if not encourage, Turkish "nationalist" tendencies, and the two elements make a distinctly strong combination which has to be reckoned with, especially by those interested in Mesopotamia. It must, moreover, not be forgotten that the present form of constitutionalism in Turkey is not one which the masses have risen up and demanded, but is rather a form which a freethinking oligarchy have imposed on the masses at the point of the bayonet. This minority, who are also in a sense anti-clerical, have felt the necessity of replacing the old theocratic conception of the deeply religious Mussulman by a new Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic creed. Again the purely Turkish element, inspired by its past traditions of conquest and its martial superiority, naturally arrogates to itself the rôle of protector of other Asiatic and Islamic peoples. The result is a strong anti-Russian current, as, in their phraseology, Russia "has usurped and oppresses" Asiatic Mussulmans, and a similar, if less strong anti-British current, owing to our position in India, Aden, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and especially owing to the Anglo-Russian *entente* regarding Persia and Afghanistan. Thus the natural corollary of this perfervid Asiatic-cum-Islamic sentiment is a community of interest between Russia and England, more particularly in Persia, while France, owing to her position in Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco also, though in a lesser degree, comes in for a share of Young Turkey's resentment.

Had Turkey's "constitutionalism" been an approximation to real liberal and popular institutions, allowing a certain amount of free play to the different elements, she would, like Austria, have formed internally a natural equipoise of races, and would have felt no necessity to adopt a chauvinistic attitude in her foreign politics—an attitude which is, so to speak, potentially aggressive.

The Turkish masses put up with thirty odd years of the despotism of Yildiz, and especially the severer form which obtained during the second half, *i.e.*, since the Armenian massacres, practically without a murmur, and there is no reason why they should not similarly endure for a considerable period the more go-ahead despotism of the committee. But should the position of the latter be shaken owing to an explosion

of internal disaffection or external shock, or a combination of both, we should almost certainly see a repetition of the pro-British demonstrations of 1908, somewhat embarrassing as they were.

We must, however, take facts as they are, and, as far as Mesopotamia is concerned, Young Turkey's policy is to spare neither energy nor money to create a strong military force in those regions, to disarm the refractory tribes and bring them under effective control, and, in a word, to impress the Arabs and show them that the Turk is master against all comers, native or foreign. It must, too, be remembered that the present military Governor-General of Bagdad's semi-viceregal powers run from Hekkiari in the north to Mohammerah and to El Katr in the Arabian peninsula, and the Turks have a natural desire and pretension to pose as the protectors of the weaker Asiatic Mussulman state in Persia.

The committee has been compared to a steam-roller, which, in a semi-republican manner, is determined to level all privileges, starting with those of the palace. It has done so in Albania and Roumelia, and is now busy in Syria. It also, somewhat logically, feels a desire to apply the same levelling process to the privileged or predominant position of foreigners, *e.g.*, of the British in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Had they proceeded slowly and gradually their policy would have been more successful and encountered less objection and resistance. But what appears to natives and foreigners as undue haste and abruptness of method seems to be the prevailing characteristics of the new régime, and the recent action of the authorities at Bagdad in the matter of the arbitrary demolition of Lynch's premises and their intention of unnecessarily running a road through the grounds of His Majesty's consulate-general are only instances in point. One cannot help sympathising with the desire of a regained consciousness of national independence to assert itself, but the present mental attitude of the Young Turks is rather destructive and devoid of a feeling of give and take. Given this frame of mind it would seem only prudent of us not to remind them either in the public press or privately of our commercial or political predominance in Irak or the Gulf, as such assertions only serve them to further attempts to diminish our prestige and undermine our predominance.

The external manifestations of our special position in those regions which wound their susceptibilities are, apart from the general situation in the adjoining districts of South Persia, the size of our residency buildings and grounds at Bagdad, the sepoy guard, the R.I.M.S. "Comet," the British flag flown by two of Lynch's steamers on Turkey's internal waters, the status of the Sheikh of Koweit, and his influence and position as regards the Muntefik, Ibn Saoud, &c., Bahrein, and El Katr, if not, indeed, the Trucial Coast and Muscat.

The sepoy guard and the "Comet," which are the survival of a state of things which is passing away in proportion as Bagdad becomes accessible to the outside world, are in a way incompatible with an effective assertion of Turkey's territorial sovereignty, and give a certain legitimate ground for umbrage to the Turkish authorities; but until the new régime is able to stand alone without the prop of martial law in the capital, if not, indeed, until the time comes to do away with the Capitulations, it would seem premature to consider any suggestion towards abolishing them, except, perhaps, as part of a general bargain or liquidation of our position *vis-à-vis* of Turkey in the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf.

After the revival of the constitution an attempt was made to settle the question of the British flag on Lynch's steamers by fusing the latter with the Mehrieh Ottoman Company, and, had Kiamil Pasha or Hilmi Pasha retained power, the scheme would doubtless have been sanctioned; but, as will be remembered, a section of the committee took up an uncompromising attitude, the project fell through, and it only remains for the present to endeavour to protect Lynch's acquired rights, but the possibility of friction ending in an anti-Lynch boycott cannot be excluded.

As regards Koweit and Sheikh Mubarek's sphere of influence, His Majesty's Government in 1902 contended that he had always been independent, and that his father had specially stipulated such independence when he allowed Turkish troops to cross his territory during Midhat Pasha's expeditions to El Hasa (called Nejd by the Turks). The Turks maintained that Koweit was an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, and pointed to the Turkish flag flown there, and the grade of pasha accepted by the sheikh. To this latter argument my predecessor replied that these were merely emblems of the sheikh's spiritual dependence on the Caliph, and the *status quo* basis was agreed to, but the Turks interpreted it as meaning that Koweit was an integral part of their territory. In their mind England's interference there was due to our rivalry with Germany over the terminal section of and point of the Bagdad Railway,

and they expect to get the question settled favourably to their contention when final arrangements are made for the completion of that enterprise.

As regards Zakhnuniyeh, El Katr, and Bahrein which in a way form one group, the active forward policy of the Young Turk Vali of Bussorah and the Mutessarif of El Hasa (Nejd) have already brought us into sharp conflict, and there seems no doubt that we should insist on Turkish exclusion from the district south of Ojair. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after studying the question of Zakhnuniyeh and Odeid and consulting his colleagues, does not give categorical instructions for the non-interference of the Turkish local authorities, it would seem necessary, subject to the views of His Majesty's Government, to take a strong line. For, to the Turkish mind, Zakhnuniyeh is a sort of stepping-stone to El Katr, and perhaps even to the Trucial Coast. The Turks do not put forward any valid claims to justify their territorial acquisitions in those parts, but it is not difficult to glean that they base their claims on the fact that in the beginning of the sixteenth century a Turkish flotilla, under Pirié Pasha, annexed Gwadur, in South Baluchistan, and sailed up the Gulf, compelling the Arab chiefs to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph. They further feel that as the dominant Islamic power they have undefined right to bring under their allegiance and to protect the small Arab Moslem tribes, &c., in the Arabian peninsula.

This second claim is of course untenable from an international law point of view, and is a strange derogation from the much-vaunted principle of "Ottomanism," as opposed to Islamism, supposed to be the keystone of the new régime. The first claim is barred by the absence of effective occupation for close on three centuries, and is consequently inadmissible, as shown by the arrangements with Germany by which His Majesty's Government acknowledged the latter's rights in the Cameroons, South-West Africa, &c.

Should the present Turkish Government prove obdurate in the matters of Zakhnuniyeh and the Mudir of Odeid, it would be well, I think, to remember that in applying the methods of coercion, employed under the old régime, it was a question of bringing pressure to bear on a Sultan who did not allow such incidents to be discussed in the native press; whereas the present rulers, who owing to youthful inexperience have perhaps less sense of caution and responsibility, may, through the native press—which is not allowed to criticise their acts—rouse public opinion by appeals to the fanaticism and ultra-national feelings of the ignorant masses, and by depicting England as aggressively hostile to Islam. I do not, however, think that we should be deterred by such methods. Young Turkey is now on fairly friendly terms with Austria, despite the amputation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while, though the Russian Embassy have been extremely complacent and apparently in relations of most intimate friendship with the leading members of the committee, the latter's organs have not refrained from fierce attacks on Russia and her policy. Again, during the last nine months the blandishments showered by the French Embassy and Government on the Young Turks have not deterred them from taking up a line of sharp antagonism to French semi-official finance in the matter of a recent loan, and courting the displeasure of French Government circles by rather violent criticisms in the "Tanin," &c.

On p. 22 of the Confidential memorandum of February 1908, respecting British interests in the Persian Gulf, the Trucial Coast is said to extend to El Odeid, and the Abu Dhabi are reckoned among the Trucial chiefs, while on p. 42 Colonel Pelly is quoted as having in 1872 regarded El Odeid as properly belonging to Aber Dhabi. In 1904, after the appointment by the Turks of a mudir at Wakra had been cancelled, the Government of India expressed forcibly their view that a treaty should be negotiated with Sheikh Ahmed, but this course was deprecated by my predecessor, Sir N. R. O'Conor, who regarded the conclusion of the proposed treaty as then inopportune. Should His Majesty's Government and the Government of India now decide on the expediency of making such a treaty, there would seem to me no objection from the Constantinople point of view, and the time may not be far distant when, as advocated by Lord Lansdowne in February 1905, a comprehensive, as opposed to piecemeal, treatment of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf, including the withdrawal, absolute or against some *quid pro quo*, of the Turkish post at El Bidaia, may become imperative, if, indeed, it is not forced upon us. In their despatch of the 21st February, 1907, the Government of India expressed the view that the chances of Turkey re-establishing her authority in Eastern Arabia to be remote, and even contemplated the prospect of the Turks disappearing altogether from the whole of Arabia south of Zubeir. The revival of the Turkish constitution in 1908 and the

events of the last two years have considerably, if not profoundly, modified the situation in the near East. The Turkish revolution was not merely a change of régime and reign, as it appeared to some, but meant the awakening of new and powerful forces on the lines of an Asiatic or Turkish revival. In 1903 our position in the Gulf seemed threatened by Russia, and Lord Lansdowne's declaration in the House of Lords had in view the possible aggressive expansion of other Powers than Turkey; but the latter is now bent on an active and forward policy there, and after the recent acquisition of money in Paris and additions to her fleet from Germany, we may soon see one or more Turkish naval units cruising in the Gulf. A ship flying the Turkish flag will certainly produce a greater effect on the Arabs than did the "Variag," while the meddlesome restlessness of Turkish naval officers and their desire to have coaling stations, &c., may give rise to troublesome incidents.

I was recently confidentially informed of the drift of a report on the Persian Gulf and England's position there compiled by Mahmoud Bey, the Ottoman consul-general at Bombay, and his subordinate Jelal Bey, both of whom seem to be keen and active officials. The report sketches the way in which Great Britain has built up her influence by generous pecuniary treatment of the Arab chiefs at Muscat and elsewhere, and urges that the Ottoman Government should employ similar methods, which, it says, ought to be more successful than those of England, owing to the Islamic tie between the Arabs and the Turks.

Some remarks in this despatch may sound like severe criticism of the policy of the present rulers of Turkey, and I may perhaps point out that my official and private relations with those in power are quite cordial, while their professions of friendship for Great Britain are frequent and, I have no doubt, genuine; but I feel that this should not blind us to the main trend of Young Turkey aspirations, and to the likelihood that the prosecution of their national programme will bring British and Ottoman real or fancied interests into conflict in several parts of the Arab world, and perhaps, especially, in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Hussein Jahid Bey, deputy for Constantinople, the "felis Achates" of Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, and the spokesman of the committee in the "Tanin," has recently told us in a couple of signed articles that Young Turkey must strain every nerve to increase her land and naval forces, and that when the Minister of War can dispose of 1,500,000 bayonets, and the Minister of Marine of a considerable naval force, Turkey's Minister for Foreign Affairs will be considered as one of the greatest of European statesmen, and Turkey will then "wreak vengeance on those who do not now treat her with proper regard." Some officers in high positions have been heard indulging in similar outbursts, and an aide-de-camp of the Minister of War recently declared to an Englishman here that Turkey would, if put to it, light the Islamic torch from Calcutta to Morocco. These and other such expressions of a crescentade spirit need not be taken too literally, but they cannot be entirely ignored, as they are indicative of strong undercurrents.

In this connection, I have the honour to enclose copies of three articles which have recently appeared in the "Jeune Turc," a committee-inspired paper, which, like the "Neue Freie Presse" of Vienna, is financed and directed by Jews. The latter's detestation of Russia, which is one of the features of Young Turkey, is frequently reflected in its columns, and in one of the enclosed articles A. A. (*i.e.*, Ahmed Agnef, a Mussulman from the Crimea) represents English statesmen as having of recent years adopted a policy inconsistent with British traditions by concluding certain *ententes* alluding to the Anglo-Russian *entente*. The articles inveigh against what they erroneously call the Triple *Entente*, and try to make Young Turkey incline towards the Triple Alliance.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)

Bussorah, July 1, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 29th January last on the subject of the island of Zakhumiyeh, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter and enclosure received from the British resident at Bushire.

I have not had occasion to discuss this question with the present Vali Suleyman Nazif Bey, but I understand Suad Bey, the Mutessarif of Hassa, who has on two occasions acted for the vali here during the latter's absence, and who is still in Bussorah, favours the occupation of the island in question, and I should judge he had taken steps to replace the guard as reported by Major Trevor on the 26th December, 1909, *vide* enclosure in my despatch No. 3 of the 8th January, 1910, and thus to upset the arrangement made by the previous vali for withdrawing the gendarmes as reported in my telegram No. 69 of the 25th September, 1909.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Consul Crow.

Bushire, June 29, 1910.

A COPY of the under-mentioned communication is forwarded with compliments to His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, for information.

P. Z. COX,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 3 in No. 110.

Copy of a Letter dated June 17, 1910, *from Captain Mackenzie, Political Agent, Bahrein, to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.*

WITH reference to my letter, dated the 6th May, 1910, I have the honour to inform you that it appears that the soldiers recalled from Zakhumiyeh to Ojair were replaced by four others about a week later, who are said to be still on the island. The Turkish flag is hoisted there on Fridays.

Enclosure 4 in No. 110.

Newspaper Extracts

L'ANGLETERRE ET L'ORIENT.

L'EMPIRE britannique traverse actuellement le commencement d'une crise qui devient de jour en jour plus sérieuse. On dirait que cet immense corps ne se contient plus. Plus grand que l'ancien Empire romain, plus immense que le Khalifat de Bagdad, plus vaste que n'importe quel grand État asiatique de l'antiquité, son centre d'attraction commence à osciller et d'innombrables éléments différents dont il est composé ont la tendance à se désagréger, à prendre un mouvement tout différent du mouvement général de l'ensemble. Depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours, l'histoire humaine n'a pas donné un second exemple d'un phénomène pareil à celui de l'Empire britannique. Même l'Empire créé par l'invasion des Tartares de Gengis-Khan ou de Tamerlang, et qui s'étendait pourtant depuis la Mongolie jusqu'aux Karpathes, n'était rien en comparaison avec l'Empire anglais. Celui-ci a tous les caractères d'une domination universelle et, s'étendant sur les cinq parties du monde, y englobe de vastes étendues de terres contenant presque la quatrième partie de l'humanité, appartenant à toutes les races, à toutes les langues, à toutes les coutumes, usages, religions, et degrés de civilisation. En effet, quelle incommensurable différence entre un Irlandais de Belfort et un Arabe d'Aden, un Persan du Béloutchistan et un Hindou de Calcutta, un Siamois et un Canadien, un Australien et un nègre de l'Afrique! Et ce qui est encore plus étonnant, plus imposant, c'est que le peuple qui a créé cet Empire, est celui qui ne connait pas encore le service militaire obligatoire, qui possède le moins de soldats au milieu des Grandes Puissances. De quel génie, de quelle puissance de caractère, de quelle ténacité de volonté devait être pourvu le peuple qui l'a créé et qui le tient entre ses mains!

M. Boutmy et M. Taine nous l'expliquent, le premier dans son "Peuple anglais" et le second dans son "Histoire de la Littérature anglaise." Mais pour se faire une idée de l'Anglais et de l'Angleterre on n'est guère forcé de s'adonner à l'étude des

ouvrages approfondis; de connaître Cromwell ou Milton, Shakespeare, Dickens, Carlyle, Darwin, ou Spencer.

Il suffit pour cela de visiter l'Angleterre, d'être en rapports avec l'Anglais *at home*, chez lui, d'étudier le milieu où il vit. J'ai été deux fois en Angleterre, et, outre Londres, j'ai visité longtemps Cambridge et Oxford et ai bu à la coupe d'or dont on boit depuis Bacon.

Or, rien qu'en contemplant les édifices respectables de ces deux universités, d'où sont sortis presque tous les grands génies de l'Angleterre, on comprend l'Angleterre, son histoire, sa grandeur. Ils sont en quelque sorte la philosophie vivante et muette de l'histoire anglaise. Vous y chercherez en vain cette harmonie de lignes, ce plan d'ensemble qu'on voit dans les édifices en Europe continentale; au contraire, ils vous frapperont tout d'abord par la difformité. Mais étudiez-les de près et bientôt vous découvrirez qu'ici l'extérieur des lignes est remplacé par une harmonie d'âme, par une suite d'esprit qui réunissent tout cet amoncellement de pierres et de bois, leur communiquent une vitalité frappante; vous serez pénétré du sentiment que devant vous se tient un être tout vivant, tout animé, qui vous raconte l'histoire, le passé, les péripéties de la destinée d'un grand peuple. Les siècles sont passés, mais chacun d'eux y a laissé sa trace ineffaçable et ces traces des siècles réunies les unes aux autres composent un ensemble sur lequel plane l'âme nationale! L'Anglais n'a rien détruit; il a conservé avec vénération les acquisitions du passé en y ajoutant, en y superposant ce qu'a donné l'actualité.

C'est là la philosophie du caractère et de l'histoire anglaise. Créer sans détruire, marcher toujours en avant sans secousse ni sursaut, mais toujours en cédant à l'esprit de l'époque, aux exigences du temps—voilà l'Anglais.

L'Angleterre suivait la même voie en politique. L'Anglais apportait partout où il allait l'amour de la liberté, l'esprit de progrès, la conscience de la dignité humaine; sans démolir ce qui existait, se comportant avec respect envers les religions, les coutumes, et les usages du pays, il le poussait au progrès, à l'amélioration des conditions de l'existence. Et quand le moment des concessions arrivait, il allait toujours en avant, cédant à l'esprit de l'époque, aux exigences justes, en allant même dans cette voie jusqu'au renoncement complet de soi-même. Telle était, par exemple, sa ligne de conduite envers le Canada, l'Australie, l'Irlande, et même l'Afrique du Sud.

C'est cette politique sage, à la fois conservatrice et libérale, qui faisait le secret de la domination mondiale anglaise. Grâce à elle, les peuples ne sentaient pour ainsi dire pas le joug anglais. Mais, dans ces pénétrations coloniales, l'Anglais préférait cette voie pacifique; je ne connais pas une seule colonie anglaise qui ait été conquise par les armes. Au contraire de ce que disait Dostoïevsky: "Christ va toujours derrière le soldat du Tsar," l'Anglais peut dire: "Christ va toujours derrière l'esprit anglais." C'est tout d'abord par son commerce, par son industrie, par l'art, par les sciences que l'Angleterre pénétrait dans ces colonies; et c'est seulement après que les indigènes s'étaient initiés au nom anglais et aux choses anglaises que les soldats anglais apparaissaient, et ils ne les voyaient ni ne les sentaient guère!

Mais malheureusement, depuis quelque temps, on remarque un changement assez prononcé dans la psychologie et la mentalité des hommes politiques anglais; ils montrent un penchant de plus en plus fort de rompre avec ces traditions de l'histoire et d'entrer dans une nouvelle voie. Ils ne font plus preuve de cette lucidité d'esprit, de cette fermeté de conception qui caractérisait les hommes d'État anglais de jadis qui les puisaient aux traditions nationales; au contraire, ils commencent à montrer des oscillations, des hésitations, des faiblesses; ils vont à des compromis qui sont en flagrante opposition avec toutes les traditions anglaises. Et ce sont là les symptômes les plus délicats de la crise qui commence.

Ce qui est encore plus à noter, c'est que cette crise intérieure coïncide justement avec le réveil de l'Orient, réveil allant de la Méditerranée jusqu'aux Indes.

L'Angleterre aurait pu jouer juste à cette époque du réveil de l'Orient un rôle humanitaire beau et grand, qui servirait aussi bien ses intérêts que les intérêts de l'Orient; pour cela elle n'avait qu'à aller au-devant de ce réveil, pour le diriger, être son inspirateur et son conducteur.

Mais au lieu de cela qu'a-t-elle fait?

En voyant d'une part le réveil de l'Orient et de l'autre la marche impulsive et irrésistible de l'Allemagne vers ce même Orient, ses hommes d'État ont perdu leur équilibre.

Il se sont jetés dans des ententes qui, tout en étant peu honorables par leurs buts, peu stables par l'opposition absolue des intérêts qui leur servent de base, les compromettent en leur faisant jouer un rôle absolument incompatible avec les traditions anglaises.

Au lieu d'être conductrice du réveil de l'Orient, l'Angleterre devient peu à peu le bourreau du mouvement libéral en Orient et, excitant par là une haine générale contre elle, ouvre elle-même le chemin de Bombay à l'Allemagne.

Les hommes d'État anglais comptent y remédier par le fer et le feu; mais réussiront-ils? C'est ce que nous expliquerons dans notre article de dimanche prochain.

A. A.

Au commencement du XIX^e^ siècle l'Angleterre avait devant soi le problème grandiose de lutter contre la France renaissante, contre la tendance napoléonienne à la domination européenne. Aujourd'hui, à l'aube du XX^e^ siècle, elle a devant soi la même tâche, mais cette fois-ci ce n'est pas contre la France, mais, tout au contraire, contre son alliée d'antan, l'Allemagne renaissante.

La lutte gigantesque engagée entre l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre est tout à la fois politique et économique. Mais il est évident, que, quelque forte, quelque puissante que soit l'Allemagne, l'Angleterre grâce à sa position géographique insulaire, est invulnérable dans les limites de l'Europe. Aucune flotte et aucune armée allemande ne pourront mettre pied sur la terre anglaise; ce que n'a pu faire Napoléon avec son génie et sa puissance ne pourra guère être fait par d'autres.

Mais qu'est-ce que l'Angleterre en elle-même? Quelques pauvres îles perdues dans les brouillards inhospitaliers de l'océan! Sa puissance, sa grandeur, et ses richesses, les sources de sa vie résident non pas dans ces îles, mais bien au delà d'elles dans ces lointaines et immenses colonies qu'elle possède dans toutes les parties du monde et surtout en Orient. Elle est comme ce géant des contes orientaux, dont l'âme est contenue dans un flacon mystérieux: ouvrez ce flacon, cassez-le, et le géant est anéanti. Tous les rivaux et les ennemis de l'Angleterre, tous ceux qui désiraient lui porter une atteinte sérieuse, comprenaient cela et visaient tout d'abord sa position en Orient. Dans le but d'entreprendre une campagne vers les Indes le génial Napoléon entra en pourparlers avec la Russie et la Perse, et même sa campagne d'Egypte était inspirée par cette pensée. La Russie, elle aussi, menaçait longtemps l'Angleterre de ce côté; chaque pas de son avancement vers le Sud de l'Asie effrayait les Anglais et ceux-ci y répondaient toujours par deux pas vers le Nord; fermer tous les trous par lesquels la baïonnette russe pouvait atteindre la couronne anglaise aux Indes, fut longtemps l'idée fixe des hommes politiques anglais.

Mais toutes ces tentatives des rivaux de pénétrer dans les Indes furent rendues stériles grâce à la conduite sage des Anglais, qui fait en même temps la gloire de leur histoire politique; menacée par ses ennemis, l'Angleterre se mettait aussitôt à la tête des peuples dont les intérêts pouvaient être aussi lésés, les organisait, se déclarait protectrice et garante de leur droit à l'indépendance et les poussait contre l'ennemi commun; c'est ainsi qu'elle a mis fin à l'épopée napoléonienne. C'est encore ainsi qu'elle a pu pendant longtemps dresser contre la Russie une barrière infranchissable dans les peuples de l'Afghanistan, de la Perse, et de la Turquie, en les aidant, en les fortifiant et même en les protégeant aux moments du danger, les armes en main.

Mais tout cela rentre dans le passé.

Avec l'entrée en scène de l'Allemagne nous voyons l'Angleterre suivre une tout autre voie; elle abandonne absolument ses traditions nationales et change du tout au tout sa ligne de conduite d'une part envers ses colonies, de l'autre, envers les États indépendants qui les entourent.

Au lieu d'accorder aux colonies, comme elle en avait l'habitude historique, les réformes nécessitées par l'esprit de l'époque, elle veut, au contraire, les tenir dans la soumission par les rigueurs, par le fer et le feu; au lieu d'organiser, de fortifier les États orientaux voisins, elle veut, au contraire, les détruire, accélérer leur chute.

D'après nous, ce changement dans la politique anglaise a pour causes principales les faits suivants: (*a*) l'occupation par l'Angleterre de l'Égypte; (*b*) l'affaiblissement de la Russie; (*c*) le réveil de l'Orient.

Après avoir occupé l'Égypte et s'y être fortifiés les Anglais se croient maîtres de la clef des Indes et de l'Orient; ayant entre leurs mains le Canal de Suez, ils sont convaincus qu'ils sont invulnérables et qu'avec leur puissante flotte ils peuvent écraser tout ennemi qui oserait marcher vers les Indes du côté de la Turquie ou de la Perse; de là cette conclusion toute logique qu'ils n'ont plus besoin de la Turquie et de la Perse comme des barrières, qu'ils peuvent les abandonner sans risques à leur sort. L'affaiblissement de la Russie préparé et consommé par les Anglais est venu les fortifier dans cette conviction. Jusque-là le seul ennemi immédiat qui faisait peur et hantait l'imagination anglaise, c'était la Russie. Lisez les ouvrages érudits de l'ancien Vice-Roi

des Indes Lord Curzon, "Russia in Central Asia" et "Persia and the Persian Question," et vous verrez jusqu'à quel degré d'hallucination arrivait dans le temps la peur du Russe.

C'est cette peur étourdissante qui poussait l'Angleterre à se cramponner aux États orientaux restés debout, pour s'en faire un bouclier contre la Russie. Mais, aujourd'hui, cette peur n'existe plus ; la Russie, abattue et affaiblie, est devenue d'ennemie-amie et alliée ; donc, la seconde raison de soutenir et de fortifier les États voisins tombe d'elle-même.

Quant au réveil de l'Orient, celui-ci a tout à fait troublé les Anglais ; dans les mouvements nationalistes qui se dessinent de plus en plus des Indes jusqu'à l'Égypte les Anglais voient une menace directe et plus sérieuse que les plans de Napoléon ou les ambitions des Russes, dirigée contre les intérêts et la situation des Anglais en Orient.

Toutes ces causes combinées et surtout cette dernière ont fait dévier les Anglais de la politique traditionnelle qu'ils suivaient jusqu'à maintenant envers leurs colonies et les États voisins.

Nous reviendrons sur ce sujet dans un prochain article.—A. A.

Les Alliances.

Cette question a fait, ces jours derniers, couler beaucoup d'encre. Étant loin du pays, je n'ai pu participer à la polémique si vive qui s'était engagée dans la presse. Aujourd'hui, profitant de l'occasion qu'offre le voyage du Grand Vizir à Marienbad, je me permets d'émettre à ce sujet quelques idées bien personnelles.

Peut-être y aura-t-il dans cette esquisse quelques répétitions, quelques emprunts faits aux études de nos autres collaborateurs ; cela importe peu ; pour nous, notre but est de présenter à nos lecteurs un ensemble de principes.

En vue de quelle éventualité conclue-t-on des alliances et des ententes militaires?

Il est bien aisé de répondre à cette question : en vue de se défendre contre ses ennemis ou de les attaquer, s'il n'y a pas d'autre issue, et, en tout cas, dans le but du maintien de la paix universelle. Il est bien entendu que tous les alliés doivent avoir des adversaires éventuels communs et des intérêts qui ne soient pas trop opposés. Toute autre alliance ne peut être qu'une chicane politique, comme celle de Hunkiar-Iskélessi ou un protectorat déguisé toujours au détriment du faible.

Or donc, avant de préciser avec quel groupe il faut s'entendre, il y a lieu de connaître qui sont nos adversaires. Malheureusement, la nation peu édifiée sur ses amis et sur ses antagonistes, laissée dans l'ignorance, grâce à un régime de fer et de feu qui n'a pas duré moins de trente-trois ans, et n'ayant pu cultiver ses haines et ses amitiés, est sur le point d'oublier son histoire. J'ai remarqué même, parmi de grands journalistes de ce pays, des gens qui ne savent pas répondre immédiatement à cette question pourtant si simple, si banale : Quel est notre principal ennemi ?

Cherchons nos ennemis dans deux concerts—celui des petites et celui des grandes Puissances. Dans le concert des petits États, excepté la Roumanie—pays aujourd'hui isolé de nous et n'ayant plus de frontière commune avec nous—nous ne voyons pas d'amis dans l'acception non diplomatique du mot. C'est même trop que de dire ainsi, il n'y a pas également de pays qui soient sincèrement neutres à notre égard. Tous ces pays, détachés par la force des choses de l'Empire ottoman, n'ont d'autre objectif que notre ruine, parce qu'ils ne se considèrent que comme ses héritiers naturels.

Certes, tous ne sont pas des antagonistes à un degré égal : il faut distinguer entre la Serbie et la Grèce, le Monténégro et la Bulgarie.

Il est donc au-dessus de toute possibilité de former une confédération balkanique pour pouvoir défendre des "intérêts communs," car il n'y a pas, selon nos antagonistes, d'intérêt commun. Et l'humanité est trop peu avancée pour pouvoir comprendre qu'il y a utilité pour tous à laisser enfin de côté les armes et à travailler paisiblement pour le bien du peuple, pour son avancement, pour la civilisation.

Mais, tout de même, il serait possible aussi de former une pareille confédération. Qui sait si, dans le courant du siècle, une Turquie forte et prospère n'accepterait pas une entente qui lui serait proposée par les petits États, afin de couper court avec les disputes continuelles?

Quant aux grandes Puissances, il est très naturel de les diviser en deux groupes : celles formant la Triple Entente et celles qui composent la Triple Alliance.

Nous voyons que, dans la première combinaison, deux de nos plus grands antagonistes prennent une part prépondérante. La Russie, qui, pour sa propre conservation et son agrandissement ne peut viser que notre destruction, ne peut, en aucune

façon, devenir notre alliée. C'est en vue de nous défendre contre elle que nous conclurons, éventuellement, des ententes et des alliances. Il est donc insensé d'envisager l'éventualité d'entrer dans une combinaison où la Russie prédomine. La France, pour sa propre défense, peut-elle conclure une alliance avec l'Allemagne?

Nous sommes exactement dans la même situation. Cela serait l'entente du mouton et du loup. Pour plus d'une raison la Puissance moscovite ne veut-elle pas, on le voit, écarter l'Empire Ottoman du concert des pays avancés, voire même de la carte du monde, comme naguère la Royale République de Pologne?

Ouvrez une carte historique et voyez de quelle manière l'Empire des Tsars s'est développé toujours aux dépens de notre patrimoine national. Étudiez l'histoire et constatez de quelle manière ce même Empire a réduit la Suède, qui était une grande Puissance ; détruit la Pologne, également grande Puissance ; le Khanat de Crimée, naguère notre vassal ; les petits États du Caucase ; le Turkestan, assujetti et privé de ses droits, qu'il avait lui-même solennellement garantis, la Finlande, la Boukharie, Khiva, &c., et, aujourd'hui il veut partager, à notre grand malheur, avec la complicité de la Grande-Bretagne, l'infortunée Perse!

Dites-nous donc, dans ces conditions, en vue de quelle probabilité, de quel malheur, cette entente, n'importe sa forme et son titre, se fera?

Passons à l'Angleterre. Ce pays est pour nous une Russie plus civilisée, plus coulante, mais tout de même une Russie. C'est en raison de l'Égypte, de Chypre, de l'Hinterland d'Aden qui nous a été récemment enlevé, enfin pour notre prestige mondial que nous voulons être forts ; et l'Angleterre, par ses principes mêmes, ne voudra jamais que nous soyons en état de défendre nos intérêts.

Reste la France. Ce pays nous est sympathique à plus d'un point de vue. Nous avons besoin de son argent, mais non pas de beaucoup de ses usuriers et hommes d'affaires ; nous avons besoin de sa science et non point de sa culture, de sa langue et non de son argot, de ses principes de liberté, d'égalité, de justice, de fraternité, et jamais, par exemple, des principes qu'il applique dans ses colonies.

Nous ne voulons pas dire par là que la France ne nous a jamais dérangés. Pouvons-nous jamais oublier la Tunisie, comme les Français peuvent-ils jamais et à à juste raison oublier l'Alsace-Lorraine?

Nous n'oublions, en aucun cas, les procédés brusques et stupides de Waldeck-Rousseau lors de l'affaire Tubini, Lorando et consorts, l'affaire toute récente des instructeurs militaires de Fez, &c. Cela ne nous empêche pas de savoir gré à cette même France, patrie des Voltaire, des Montesquieu, des Diderot, des Hugo, des Renan, de sa dernière intervention à propos des affaires crétoises.

Il est donc très désirable, dans l'intérêt des deux pays, qu'une entente cordiale se fasse entre eux, mais non point une alliance, la France ayant comme alliée et comme associée politique deux de nos plus terribles antagonistes.

Une alliance probable avec la Triplice ne peut pas empêcher, naturellement, notre rapprochement avec la France; de même qu'une convention offensive et défensive avec l'Allemagne n'a pas empêché un rapprochement de l'Italie avec sa grande sœur latine.

Ce rapprochement des pays faisant partie des groupements diplomatiques divers et opposés est même très désirable au point de vue de la paix universelle ; il multiplie les rapports amicaux, et, dans le cas de conflit, il crée des moyens de réconciliation prompte. A-t-on oublié, lors de l'incident de Hull, l'intervention si amicale de la France? Sans elle la Russie et l'Angleterre eussent été aux prises et une seconde guerre, plus néfaste, plus sanglante, et plus générale eût succédé, au détriment de l'humanité entière, à la guerre russo-japonaise.

Qui sont donc ceux qui ont des intérêts communs avec nous et qui peuvent être, pour le moment, nos associés naturels? Je n'hésiterai pas à répondre : Ce sont les pays de la Triple Alliance.

On nous dira : Quel bien l'Allemagne vous a-t-elle déjà fait? Je dirai qu'en nous envoyant des hommes d'affaires despotes, de mauvais financiers, &c., elle nous a causé un tort très grand.

Nous ne pouvons pas oublier la fameuse convention de Bagdad. Mais tout cela ne veut pas dire qu'un rapprochement soit rendu problématique dans le domaine militaire. Peut-être, même, grâce à une entente pareille, pourrons-nous liquider à l'amiable et en une fois, tous nos conflits financiers avec l'Allemagne.

On nous dira : Avez-vous sitôt oublié la Bosnie-Herzégovine, cette usurpation célèbre dans vos annales? Non, nous ne l'avons certainement pas oubliée et nous pleurons, à nos moments de mélancolie, nos chères provinces turques. Mais que faire? En laissant de côté cette plaie, nous devons reprendre, pour notre bien et notre avenir,

notre sang-froid et chercher à savoir laquelle des deux combinaisons est la meilleure: entente avec de plus grands usurpateurs ou avec de moindres? Vu que, actuellement, l'Autriche-Hongrie ne peut plus avoir des velléités sur notre patrimoine, surtout après l'évacuation du sandjiak de Novi-Bazar, et qu'elle a les mêmes antagonistes que nous, ne vaudrait-il pas mieux se tourner du côté où la monarchie Habsbourgeoise se trouve? Du reste, n'est-il pas dans l'intérêt de la Germanie, sans cesse grandissante, de protéger partout ceux que l'Angleterre, la France, et la Russie oppriment ou menacent?

Selon moi, il y a tout lieu de féliciter Hakki Pacha d'avoir compris cette situation, laquelle ne manque sûrement pas de clarté, et d'avoir entamé la conversation, en temps et lieu, avec M. d'Aehrenthal.

Par tout ce que nous disons nous ne préconisons pas une alliance à la hâte avec la Triplice. Non! Nous ne sommes pas à même de juger si le temps est opportun. Un publiciste qui n'a pas de caractère public ne peut pas préciser tout. Du reste, cela dépend absolument des conditions. Que nous offre-t-on, que leur offrons-nous? Il n'est pas possible pour nous de le déterminer.

Mais notre but dans cette esquisse est de contribuer à éloigner nos bien-pensants de la probabilité d'un rapprochement avec la Triple Entente.

Il y a à résoudre un dernier problème:

Est-ce qu'il est bien temps de conclure une alliance?

Il y a de cela plus d'une année, je croyais que ce temps n'était pas venu et qu'il fallait encore plusieurs années (cinq ou six), pour que la Turquie puisse reprendre ses forces, augmenter ses moyens sur terre et sur mer, assainir ses finances, enfin se faire respecter par tous, pour pouvoir entrer dans une combinaison déterminée. Mais, à ma très grande et très légitime satisfaction, je vois que je me trompais. Si, grâce à la prodigieuse rénovation de notre armée et à la continuation de nos réformes, nous ne sortions pas de la catégorie des pays négligeables, la presse mondiale tant officieuse, comme le "Temps" de Paris, qu'indépendante, n'aurait pas fait autant de bruit autour de la probabilité d'une alliance de l'Allemagne avec nous.—DJELAL NOURY.

[31935] No. 111.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, September 1, 1910.

Sir,

WE have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, on the subject of our Bagdad property.

We now enclose a further telegram from our Bagdad agents, from which you will gather that our request that the confiscated portion of our property should be restored, pending discussion of the question at issue, has been disregarded by the local authorities, who are proceeding to deal with the property in dispute as though it already belonged to them.

In a previous communication you informed us that His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople had been desired to support our request. But we understand from the telegram that no formal demand for the temporary restoration of the property has yet been made by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad. We fear it may now be too late to take this course.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Telegram from Bagdad Agents, dated August 29, 1910.

THE political agent in Turkish Arabia and His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople are in communication with each other, and, consequently, formal demand for the restoration of the property has been delayed.

The Vali of Bagdad's secretary informed the political agent in Turkish Arabia that it would be impossible to comply with such a demand.

The opinion prevails here that the Vali of Bagdad cannot withdraw from position without loss of prestige, because many natives will demand same treatment.

We do not expect to be able to arrange the matter amicably, or even legally, at Bagdad without sacrificing our interests. Pressure is being put on our lawyer.

Earth is being deposited inside the line of the wall to widen road. The political agent in Turkish Arabia has been notified.

[31936] No. 112.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

India Office, September 1, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter of this Office, dated the 18th June last, communicating copy of correspondence as to the establishment by Dr. Bennett, of the American Dutch Reformed Church Mission, of a medical dispensary at Koweit, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India on the subject.

Viscount Morley agrees in their view that it is unnecessary to approach the Government of the United States in this matter, and, subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, he would propose to approve the suggested instructions to Colonel Cox.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 19, 1910.*

AMERICAN mission dispensary at Koweit. See letter dated the 8th May from Resident, Persian Gulf, copy of which was enclosed in letter of the 26th May from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department. Following telegram, dated the 14th instant, received from Colonel Cox:—

"Dr. Bennett, of the United States Mission in the Persian Gulf, has been in Koweit for some months cultivating sheikh's friendship and practising medicine. Sheikh has now been induced by him to agree, subject to the consent of the British Government, to give a site for a permanent habitation either on lease or by purchase. Letter has been written by the doctor in which he states that the establishment at Koweit will be entirely independent of the mission at Bussorah; that special position of British in Koweit is recognised by the mission, and that he has no doubt of readiness on the part of the directors of the mission to give a written undertaking that their difficulties will always be referred to the arbitration or good offices of the British agent at Koweit in the event of disagreement with the sheikh, and that reference to the Turkish authorities at Bussorah will in no circumstances be made. I and the political agent are disposed to welcome the missionary doctor's advent if the above safeguards, which are approved by the sheikh, are confirmed by the head of the mission. But Government will perhaps prefer to obtain a similar assurance from the United States Government, in view of the recent difficulty in a similar connection at Muscat. Doctor is anxious to place British authorities reply and stipulations, as well as draft agreement with sheikh about site for building, before general meeting of mission, which is to be held early in November at Bahrein. I should therefore be glad of an early reply."

Question of status of Koweit might possibly be raised if United States Government were approached, and there seems to be no necessity for such a step provided the undertaking referred to is given by the directors of the mission. It is proposed to instruct the resident in this sense subject to your approval.

[32224] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 614.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 30, 1910.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 234 of the 13th instant, enclosing a letter from Mr. W. R. Paton, describing the unsatisfactory conditions which are said to be prevailing in Samos owing to the arbitrary and illegal rule of Prince Copassis, the governor, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a further telegram which I have received from the Senators Orphanos and Mantafounis, complaining of the governor's methods of tampering with the elections and flagrant violations of the law, and of the rights of the citizens. These gentlemen have addressed another statement of their grievances (copy enclosed) to the press, in which they picture the island as groaning under the military and despotic governance of Prince Copassis, contrary to all the stipulations of their long-established privileges.

On the other hand, another Samiote senator, Dr. A. Alexandrow, makes a communication to the papers here, in which, as you will see from the enclosed copy, he declares that perfect tranquillity and peace reign in the land, thanks to the precautionary measures taken by the governor, and states that the two so-called deputies who recently came to Constantinople to lay the grievances of the islanders before the Turkish authorities, and who were at once arrested and sent back again, were not deputies at all, and had no mandate from the General Assembly, which has not yet been convoked, and which when it does meet will be favourable to the Conservative party.

It is extremely difficult to form any judgment as to the real condition of affairs in face of these contradictory accounts, and it is evident that a great deal of personal acrimony must exist among the chief men in the island, who no doubt work up the islanders to take their part against Prince Copassis's severe régime. The governor has now issued a public proclamation, copy of which I have the honour to forward herewith, in which he retorts that the military measures which he has taken were necessitated by the agitation engineered by malcontents at the time of the elections, and in consequence of MM. Orphanos and Mantafounis's threats that armed bands would make their appearance in the island, that they had the full approval of the Government, and that they were effective in preserving absolute order in the island. He complains of the intrigues of his enemies, who have only their personal aims at heart, and who therefore intrigue against his efforts to promote the welfare of the island, to advance the interests of agriculture by establishing agricultural banks, &c., and to bring its condition up to the level of that of the prosperous neighbouring islands. The proclamation touches upon the other benefits the prince has conferred upon the island, and closes with a declaration of his readiness to receive all grievances and petitions, and deal with them equitably in accordance with the law.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

Telegram received by Sir G. Lowther and the French Embassy at Constantinople from MM. Mantafounis and Orphanos.

Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne, Ambassade de France :

Excellences, *Chio, le 26 août, 1910.*

COPASSIS, disposant de l'armée et de la flotte turques et par ces moyens menaçant tout le monde, continue la même politique de ruine et d'extermination, poursuivant des plans inconnus. Il ne passe un jour sans qu'il ne procède à un nouveau coup d'État, ne respectant ni la constitution ni les lois du pays. Dans l'impossibilité d'allier à son parti le député de Coumaradli, Copassis a voulu effectuer hier une nouvelle élection sans aucun motif légal, mais, n'ayant sur trente et un électeurs que cinq qui lui sont acquis, il a envoyé, vers minuit, dans cette localité un détachement de gendarmerie, qui, après avoir cerné le village, a arrêté le maire et les électeurs, les a ligotés, battus, pillés, et enlevé au maire vingt-huit pièces de 20 fr. Cela fait, les gendarmes ont enfermé les prisonniers dans un souterrain, où ils les ont laissés jusqu'au lendemain matin, et de là ils les ont conduits de force à un endroit quelconque où ils les ont obligés à voter après les avoir maltraités de nouveau. En présence de ces actes de vandalisme et de

sauvagerie, et étant donné que la Porte reste indifférente, nous sommes abandonnés à la vengeance du prince, dans l'impossibilité d'arrêter l'exaltation du peuple samien, et protestons vivement contre la violation flagrante des lois et droits du pays, en suppliant vos Excellences de bien vouloir, au nom de l'humanité et de la justice, prendre en considération la question samienne et intervenir pour faire cesser cet état de choses en exigeant le rappel de Copassis, sous le joug duquel se débat le peuple samien. Nous Samiens nous avons aussi l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de vos Excellences que Copassis, pour faire croire qu'il est aimé par le peuple, force les paysans à signer les déclarations de loyauté et de reconnaissance. Toute personne refusant d'obéir y est obligée par la baïonnette, arrêtée immédiatement et conduite en prison. En terminant, nous tenons remarquer à vos Excellences que les représentants Nicolaïdis et Malis, récemment arrêtés à Constantinople, sont tous les jours soumis à des tortures de tous genres. Dans l'espoir d'une énergique intervention de votre part, de laquelle dépend le salut de notre malheureux pays, nous prions vos Excellences de vouloir agréer l'hommage de notre considération la plus respectueuse.

Les Sénateurs de Samos,
A. MANTAFOUNIS.
D. ORPHANOS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 113.

Newspaper Extract.

A SAMOS.

NOUS avons reçu hier une dépêche datée de Chio, 22 août, que l'heure tardive ne nous a pas permis de publier. Nous la publions aujourd'hui :—

"Les délégués et représentants légitimes du peuple samien arrêtés à Constantinople ont été amenés à Samos ; ils ont subi des souffrances et des humiliations. A Vathy, capitale de l'île, une compagnie de soldats, baïonnette au canon, les a arrêtés conduits par les rues centrales et jetés en prison, où ils sont tenus dans l'isolement le plus sévère, sous la garde des soldats. Pendant leur arrestation et depuis leur emprisonnement Copassis n'a pas observé les apparences même de la loi, apparences par lesquelles il sait toujours légaliser des actes les plus illégaux et les plus injustes, à savoir, que les personnes arrêtées étaient retenues sans mandat d'arrêt du procureur compétent, car tous les juges appelés l'un après l'autre par Copassis ont refusé de signer l'exécution de ce mandat. Le peuple gémit sous le joug. Les élections légitimes ont été invalidées par Copassis arbitrairement, l'Assemblée samienne ayant seule le droit de se prononcer sur la validité des actes électoraux. La capitale de Samos est occupée militairement. Les villes de Carlovassi et de Marathocampo sont aussi occupées par des troupes installées pour la première fois depuis l'érection de Samos en principauté. L'état est déplorable et inspire des craintes. Nous vous prions instamment d'élever la voix en faveur des droits d'un peuple privé de la liberté pour laquelle lutte votre journal libéral ; le peuple samien vous en sera toujours très reconnaissant.

"Les Sénateurs,
"A. MANTAFOUNIS.
"D. ORPHANOS."

D'autre part nous recevons la communication suivante :—

"Une tranquillité et une sécurité parfaites règnent dans toute l'île de Samos. La population vaque tranquillement à ses affaires. Nos agriculteurs sont satisfaits des prix qu'ils obtiennent cette année pour leurs produits agricoles. Tout cela est le résultat des mesures efficaces prises pour le maintien de l'ordre public, grâce aux moyens que le haut Gouvernement constitutionnel a mis avec promptitude à la disposition du prince.

"Nicolaïdis et Malis, arrêtés à Constantinople et envoyés à Samos, ont été arrêtés en vertu d'un mandat d'arrêt rendu contre ces deux hommes politiques par la justice de la principauté, qui les poursuit comme meneurs principaux des derniers agissements subversifs.

"Ce ne sont pas des députés, et ils n'avaient reçu aucun mandat de l'Assemblée générale, qui n'est pas encore convoquée.

"Les élections légalement faites ont donné la majorité au parti conservateur; toutes les assertions contraires sont erronnées.

"L'Assemblée générale sera bientôt convoquée en session régulière, conformément à la charte organique.

"DR. A. ALEXANDROU, *Sénateur.*"

Enfin, nous trouvons dans la "Néa Samos" la proclamation suivante du prince au peuple de Samos:—

"Au peuple de Samos.

"Tandis que les affaires de l'île suivaient leurs cours normal, tandis que les politiciens promettaient solennellement jusqu'à la veille des élections qu'ils se conformeraient aux conseils paternels que je ne cessais pas de leur adresser relativement au maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité publiques et à une collaboration sincère pour servir les intérêts bien entendus du pays, tout d'un coup, le jour des élections, plusieurs événements prémédités et contraires à la loi ont eu lieu, comme, par exemple, des agressions armées contre la gendarmerie, des cernements des gendarmes, des emprisonnements des électeurs, des violences, des pressions et divers mauvais traitements contre des citoyens paisibles, des invasions de personnes armées dans certains villages et plusieurs autres agissements incroyables et déloyaux qui auraient pu, indubitablement, troubler l'ordre public en général dans le pays, si, ayant à temps pourvu aux moyens nécessaires, je n'avais pas ordonné les mesures qui ont, jusqu'à un certain degré, écarté le danger. Et pour comble de tout cela, les auteurs de ces scènes abominables avaient coupé aussi les fils du téléphone afin que ce qui se passait ne puisse pas être porté à temps à ma connaissance.

"Les meneurs connus de ces scènes ont provoqué ces événements regrettables dans le but d'enlever une majorité artificielle pour servir leurs propres intérêts et leurs propres projets. Ils ont voulu, ensuite, attribuer intentionnellement ces désordres aux organes du pouvoir public, tandis qu'il est de notorité publique que les organes du Gouvernement ont rempli à cette occasion leur devoir avec un zèle digne d'éloge et qu'ils ont, autant qu'il leur était possible, maintenu l'ordre public.

"La réunion comme a eu lieu ensuite à Carlovassi, à la suite des invitations que M. Nicolaïdis avait lancées, après une entente préalable avec J. Hadjiyannis et ses autres associés à Carlovassi. Après certaines autres démarches auxquelles cette réunion a procédé, démarches contraires à la loi et visant le remplacement du prince, MM. Aristote Mantafounis et Démétrius Orphanos, sénateurs, se sont présentés devant moi et, calomniant ouvertement le peuple paisible de l'île, m'ont déclaré, en leur qualité officielle, que 'des bandes armées' feraient leur apparition dans le pays.

"Le haut Gouvernement constitutionnel s'est déjà prononcé, en ce qui concerne la démarche illégale de la réunion susmentionnée, pour le prince, et je n'ai pas manqué de publier le texte officiel de ses résolutions, qui, étant en tout point conformes à la charte organique, doivent être respectées par tous; mais les déclarations des deux sénateurs relatives à l'apparition imminente, comme ils le disaient, 'des bandes armées' dans l'île, provenant des personnes qui sont revêtues de la plus haute dignité du pays et faites officiellement et par ordre, ainsi qu'ils me l'ont affirmé, de la réunion de Carlovassi, ces déclarations, dis-je, combinées avec l'apparition de quelques personnes armées qui parcouraient isolément certains points de l'île et avec diverses autres informations authentiques ne pouvaient, certainement, que faire naître le soupçon basé, voire même la conviction qu'un mouvement se préparait afin que l'ordre public soit troublé par ceux qui y avaient intérêt.

"Connaissant les sentiments de loyalisme du peuple samien ainsi que sa fidélité et son dévouement au Gouvernement souverain, je n'ai prêté aucune attention aux calomnies que des personnes servant leurs propres intérêts lançaient contre le peuple de Samos; mais, comme il était possible que ces gens-là, qui sont accoutumés de se cacher toujours derrière le peuple et de considérer les habitants des villages comme leurs serfs, procédassent à troubler, par leurs organes perturbateurs, l'ordre public, le haut Gouvernement constitutionnel dont le désir consiste à faire maintenir l'ordre et imposer la force des lois, a bien voulu, pour me renforcer, m'accorder tous les moyens qui étaient nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre public dans l'île et imposer l'empire et la force des lois.

"Par conséquent, les mesures que j'ai décrétées, ainsi que je l'ai dit dans ma proclamation du 18 de ce mois, et toutes les autres mesures que je prends par les moyens que le haut Gouvernement constitutionnel, dans ses intentions paternelles pour la prospérité du pays, a bien voulu mettre à ma disposition, toutes ces mesures, dis-je,

provoquées par les agissements subversifs plus haut mentionnés et par les déclarations menaçant l'ordre public que les deux sénateurs m'ont faites, ne visent qu'à maintenir et à consolider l'ordre public et la sécurité des habitants paisibles de l'île et à faire imposer la force des lois.

"Le pays a toujours besoin de tranquillité; mais cette nécessité se fait sentir davantage à l'époque présente où les agriculteurs sont préoccupés de la récolte de leurs vignes et des soins que leurs autres travaux agricoles exigent. Je ferai donc tout ce qui est nécessaire pour protéger et maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité publiques.

"Les agriculteurs savent bien que j'ai des sympathies pour eux et que je prends une large part à leurs maux. C'est avec douleur que je me suis informé, depuis longtemps déjà, que leurs créanciers les pressent de diverses manières et qu'ils tâchent d'attaquer même la liberté de leur volonté et de les tenir toujours comme serfs, les menaçant que dans le cas où ils ne seraient pas soumis à leurs caprices, ils s'empresseraient de mettre aux enchères leurs biens hypothéqués pour les ruiner. Nous avons un grand nombre d'exemples de pareilles pressions.

"Pour accorder des facilités aux agriculteurs, j'ai fondé la Caisse agricole. Les capitaux en sont aujourd'hui 300,000 piastres et seront augmentés dans l'avenir par la somme de 100,000 piastres que le Fisc doit verser chaque année à la Caisse agricole, conformément au projet y relatif qui a été voté, sur ma proposition, par l'Assemblée générale et que j'ai sanctionné; mais cette Caisse agricole ne suffit pas à accorder aux agriculteurs toutes les facilités dont ils ont besoin pour se sauver de l'usure et des pressions des usuriers.

"Il est nécessaire qu'une banque agricole soit créée à Samos. Cette question a été l'objet de mes préoccupations et j'ai réussi à trouver des groupes des capitalistes qui s'offrent de créer une banque à Samos. J'ai mis comme condition *sine qua non* que dans la banque qui sera créée il sera fondé une section agricole, destinée à accorder des facilités importantes aux agriculteurs. Les négociations à ce sujet avancent suffisamment et j'ai le ferme espoir que j'y réussirai. Ainsi, d'une part la banque qui sera créée et d'autre part la Caisse agricole fourniront aux agriculteurs toutes les facilités dont ils ont besoin pour se délivrer totalement des pressions des usuriers et pour progresser, en même temps, dans l'agriculture, qui est la source de richesse et du bien-être.

"En même temps, les mêmes groupes de capitalistes offrent l'emprunt dont le pays a besoin pour ouvrir dans l'intérieur de l'île des routes destinées à faciliter les agriculteurs. Les capitalistes m'ont, pas deux télégrammes, répété leurs propositions pour cet emprunt. Je prépare ces questions pour les soumettre aux délibérations de l'Assemblée générale.

"Tandis que je m'occupe sans cesse de pareilles questions vitales tant pour les agriculteurs que pour le pays en général, tandis que j'en ai fait part à divers politiciens à plusieurs reprises, ceux qui ne regardent que leurs propres intérêts et ne poursuivent que leurs propres desseins, montrant une pleine indifférence soit pour les intérêts des agriculteurs, soit pour ceux du pays, ont essayé et continuent à essayer d'employer des moyens illégaux et subversifs qui ont menacé et menacent de troubler à nouveau l'ordre public et la tranquillité des habitants paisibles, de nuire au crédit du pays, de faire échouer mes projets susmentionnés si importants pour le pays et si utiles aux agriculteurs, et, enfin, de troubler le marché des vins, qui, d'après mes renseignements, trouveront cette année-ci des prix satisfaisants grâce aussi à la sévérité avec laquelle j'ai appliqué la loi qui restreint l'importation à Samos des raisins secs, des raisins étrangers et des mistelles, et qui a mis, ainsi, un frein à la falsification des vins renommés de Samos.

"Cette belle île, messieurs, cette belle Samos, par un bon usage des privilèges précieux dont elle est dotée, pouvait et devait être un vrai paradis dans la Mer Egée; malheureusement, au lieu de cela, l'île de Samos resté beaucoup en arrière des autres îles, de Mételin, par exemple, et de Chio. L'île de Mételin, malgré qu'elle verse au Trésor de l'Empire plus de £T. 250,000 annuellement, malgré qu'elle ne jouit pas des privilèges comme ceux de Samos, marche dans la voie du progrès et du bien-être. Elle possède des routes magnifiques dans l'intérieur, facilitant des communications et le transport des produits agricoles; elle possède plusieurs banques et un grand nombre d'établissements industriels et présente tant d'autres œuvres, prouvant son progrès, son développement. Nous devons dire la même chose en ce qui concerne l'île de Chio.

"Je pourrais citer d'autres exemples; mais je garde le silence avec l'espoir que l'île de Samos aussi entrera finalement dans la voie du progrès et du bien-être, et que le peuple de cette belle île—peuple noble, paisible, et loyal—qui commence à s'élever contre ceux qui ne servent que leurs intérêts personnels et qui sont la cause principale du

malheur du pays, obligera, enfin, ceux-ci aussi à prendre une voie conforme aux vrais intérêts de l'île.

"Depuis mon arrivée à Samos j'ai proclamé mon programme relatif à l'amélioration des affaires de l'île, malgré les difficultés, parfois insurmontables, que je rencontre; je n'ai pas cessé de suivre ce programme aussi fidèlement que strictement.

"J'avais dit alors publiquement les paroles suivantes :—

"'Le temps est précieux; il passe et il ne revient plus. Il ne faut pas user votre temps à des querelles personnelles et à des conflits de partis, car rien de bon n'en résulte. Ces querelles et ces conflits ne font naître que des haines, des passions, et des malheurs. Pensez combien il serait noble, combien il serait satisfaisant pour vous, si vous transmettiez à vos descendants du bonheur au lieu du malheur, de la richesse au lieu de pauvreté, des sentiments d'amour réciproque au lieu des haines et des passions. Pourquoi, chers Samiens, nous ne devrions pas tâcher que de bonnes œuvres de notre époque aussi, réalisées par des efforts communs pour le bien du pays, soient inscrites élogieusement dans les pages de l'histoire de l'île? Qu'est-ce qui nous empêche de faire le bien pour la patrie? Unissez, chers Samiens, vos forces dans ce but.'

"Ces paroles je les ai dites publiquement le 30 décembre, 1907, c'est-à-dire trois jours après mon arrivée dans l'île. Depuis, je n'ai pas cessé de suivre fidèlement mon programme longuement développé dans le discours que j'ai prononcé ce jour-là, et d'adresser à tous mille conseils paternels. Cependant, ceux qui nourrissent d'autres projets et qui ont d'autres vues, lorsqu'ils voient que la conduite loyale du prince et son attitude visant le bien public, ne se concilient pas avec leurs propres intérêts et leurs desseins, s'élèvent contre le prince, suivant des anciennes coutumes illégales qui ne trouvent plus écho aujourd'hui: ils veulent ainsi se débarrasser de l'empêchement qui va, d'après leurs idées, à l'encontre de leurs intérêts personnels. Un pareil mouvement illégal avait eu lieu aussi au mois de septembre passé, mouvement qui a provoqué dans le pays un certain trouble moral d'une durée de quelques mois.

"Cependant, n'en tenant nullement rancune, j'ai admis auprès de moi avec aménité les auteurs de ce mouvement lorsque, repentis, ils se sont adressés à moi, et je n'avais pas cessé de leur adresser des conseils paternels. Mais ce fut en vain! Cette fois-ci encore ceux qui prennent la première place dans les entretiens sur les mesures à prendre pour améliorer les affaires de l'île, et feignaient en apparence d'être dévoués aux intérêts du pays, promettant, jusqu'au dernier jour, une collaboration sincère, ceux-là même, le lendemain, ont pris, tout d'un coup, la première place dans les agissements subversifs qui ont menacé, d'après un dessein prémédité, de troubler l'ordre public dans le pays.

"Malgré tant cela, je reste complètement fidèle à mon programme, et, me conformant aux bonnes et paternelles intentions du haut Gouvernement constitutionnel pour le pays, ne me laissant pas faire l'organe des caprices et des volontés de l'un et de l'autre, et, remplissant fidèlement mon devoir et rien que le devoir, je préserverai et je consoliderai l'ordre, la tranquillité, et la sécurité publiques; je ferai appliquer les lois d'une manière égale par tous; j'imposerai l'empire et la force des lois; je protégerai les habitants paisibles, et je poursuivrai la punition, selon les lois en vigueur, des coupables de n'importe quel acte punissable.

"En même temps je conseille de nouveau à tous de cesser les querelles et les conflits de partis, si nuisibles au pays, et j'invite le peuple paisible à s'occuper de ses travaux en paix et en tranquillité; d'avoir confiance aux mesures que je prends pour préserver l'ordre et la tranquillité publiques, pour imposer l'empire et la force des lois et pour faire subire la punition légale aux perturbateurs, et de ne pas prêter attention aux insinuations malveillantes de ceux qui, déligurant la vérité, ne pensent qu'à servir leurs intérêts personnels et leurs desseins au détriment du peuple paisible.

"Quiconque serait dérangé par un autre est invité à s'adresser librement à moi; je ferai toujours le nécessaire, selon la loi, pour que justice lui soit rendue.

"La présente proclamation sera affichée aux centres de toutes les communes, par les soins des maires, et sera en même temps lue dans toutes les églises.

"Fait à Port-Vathy de Samos, le 23 juillet, 1910.

"Le Prince de Samos,
"A. E. Corassis."

[32231] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September 5.*)

(No. 621.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 31, 1910.

IN my despatch No. 992 of the 29th December, 1909, I had the honour to forward extracts from the "Jeune Turc" on the colonisation of Mesopotamia by Jews, and alluding to the offer by Jewish capitalists to accommodate Turkey with the sums necessary to balance the recurring deficits in her budget as a *quid pro quo* for unrestricted Jewish immigration.

The conclusion of the recent loan by Djavid Bey with mainly Jewish banking-houses in Paris has again reminded some Turkish circles of this aspect of the Young Turkey problem, and some suspect that Jewish immigration projects are in some way connected with the transaction, especially as Djavid Bey, who is himself a Jew, was some years ago actually employed on Sionist work. I have recently been given a copy of a pamphlet in Turkish, translation of which I have the honour to enclose, emanating from the German branch of the J.C.A., or Jewish Colonisation Association, and distributed privately among would-be Young Turkey sympathisers with Jewish immigration schemes. The latter, which represent the natural yearnings of the people of Israel to escape from what they call their bondage among Gentile races and to return to their "ancestral homes," are not of recent date. As far back as the first grand vizierate of Kiamil Pasha, from 1886 to 1891, the representatives of Edmond Rothschilde came here and by liberal offers of *largesse* and other methods endeavoured to induce the Grand Vizier to accept the principle of unrestricted immigration of Jews into Turkey. Kiamil Pasha was a bitter opponent of any such policy, and explained to the ex-Sultan its ultimate dangerous tendencies for the Ottoman State, with the result that Abdul Hamid set his face rigidly against Sionism in any form. During the grand vizierates of Djevad Pasha and his successor, Khalil Rifaat Pasha, further attempts met with similar ill-success, while the great Sionist leader, Herzl, of the "Neue Freie Press," though he twice procured audiences from the ex-Sultan through the intervention of Arminius Vambéry, was unable to induce Abdul Hamid to waive his opposition. The new régime seemed to offer greater hopes of success, and Dr. Nazim, the official representative of the Committee of Union and Progress, at the outset openly declared himself in favour of introducing 200,000 Roumanian Jews into Macedonia and some millions of Russian Jews into Mesopotamia. Israel Zangwill, in the April number of the "Fortnightly Review," also expresses the hope that under the grand vizierate of Hakki Pasha, whose private secretary and official and private friends are Jews, the realisation of schemes for founding an autonomous Jewish State in Mesopotamia may become possible. The open advocacy of these schemes has, however, frightened some Young Turks, and the partisans of Jewish immigration have consequently of late become less obtrusive, while some of the Jewish leaders have deprecated overt action in the matter.

The enclosed pamphlet is meant to present the subject in an inoffensive if not seductive form, and to overcome Turkish suspicions and objections. It states that the scheme is purely humanitarian and non-political, that the Ottoman Government has only to sign a contract and the Jews will do the rest, that, if Turkey accepts, Jews occupying high positions in other countries will use all their influence for the political and economic advancement of the Ottoman constitutional Government, that important advantages will thus accrue to Turkey and the way of sure and influential alliances will be opened to her, and that the Ottoman statesmen who undertake the foundation of "this lasting alliance," *i.e.*, with the Jewish nation, will earn the gratitude of the latter. It also states that when the right to form a *crédit foncier*, &c., shall have been obtained (by the Jews), capital will be forthcoming in abundance for colonisation purposes.

A partial success in the latter scheme has just been obtained by a group of Jews closely connected with the inner workings of the Committee of Union and Progress. Among them is a certain Jacques Menasché, whose brother-in-law is private secretary to the Grand Vizier, and whose wife's charms have a special attraction for his Highness. Menasché is also the Constantinople agent of Rouvier and representative of the would-be concessionnaires of the match monopoly and other monopolies now on the *tapis*. He has also arranged the recent advances made by the Banque de Salonique and other Jewish banking houses, and has been connected with Djavid Bey's recent loan negotiations.

The parts of Turkey which the pamphlet mentions as intended for Jewish settle-

ment are the Shatt-el-Arab (*i.e.*, Mesopotamia, Anatolia (Asia Minor), Syria, Palestine, Cyprus, and Egypt. These districts include practically the whole of Asiatic Turkey, while I hear that a Jewish syndicate has recently been quietly buying up extensive tracts in Macedonia, and especially the large "chiftliks," or farms, where Greek and Bulgarian labour has become scarce owing to emigration, &c., resulting from the troubles of the last few years.

In the pamphlet, and in other such literature, the Jew calls Turkey "La Patrie," with apparently a different shade of meaning from the other non-Turkish elements. His conception seems to be that the Ottoman Empire, which contains his "ancestral lands," is his real "Patrie." His professed patriotism for Turkey has therefore a more genuine ring and meaning than similar professions of Greeks, Bulgarians, Arabs, &c.

I have dwelt at some length on this subject owing to the important bearing it has on Young Turkey politics, despite the disclaimer of political designs in the Jewish immigration movement.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Project of the Jewish General Colonisation Society, formed in Berlin under the name "Allgemeine Jüdische Kolonisations-Organisation," for the Emigration of Jews to the Ottoman Dominions and their Settlement there.

SINCE the glorious establishment of constitutional government in Turkey certain members of the Chamber of Deputies and the newspapers which are the organs of the Young Turks have repeatedly brought forward the following idea:—

"It is desirable that Jews living in other countries should come to Turkey, should work uncultivated lands in Ottoman territory, and extend agriculture and cultivation, and should bring the natural capacity and riches of those lands in to a profitable condition. The need of Turkey of a people so industrious, active, and honest as the Jews is clear, and if the Government gives the necessary facilities for Jewish immigration it will be to the advantage of the country."

It is a curious coincidence that in the two mixed conferences held at Berlin by the leading Jews they have discussed the modifications necessary in the proposals directed towards the benevolent object of the emigration and settlement of the Jews. In these conferences it was unanimously agreed to be desirable that a new land other than America should be opened to Jewish immigration; this land may be the Eastern countries in the widest sense of the term.

On the resolutions adopted by these conferences the Jewish General Colonisation Society was founded to carry out this idea.

In beginning the pursuit of this object we think it our chief duty to explain clearly what our society is. The centres which form the source and basis of our society are the well-chosen, most enlightened Jews of various countries, the wide world of commerce, and the economic world.

As our "règlement" proves, our society is headed by persons occupying the very highest positions. The heads of many Jewish societies existing in the world belong to our central council. Finally, Jewish philanthropic and capitalist circles met for the first time, owing to the importance of the object of our enterprise, and were prepared, on one hand, to provide for life the sums required, and, on the other, to pay the capital to the companies taking part in the enterprise.

As to the personal convictions of the members of the Jewish General Colonisation Society from the political point of view, some of them belong to the nationality of their own countries, while some are orthodox. Right from the beginning the two parties have had no understanding whatever with political Sionism. The general character of the emigration and settlement project of the Jewish General Colonisation Society is opposed to these convictions of conscience. According to the "règlement" and official programme of our society, the object it follows is this:—

The object of the society is to encourage and promote the settlement of Jews in the East as workmen, artisans, and merchants. The Jewish General Colonisation Society seeks purely humanitarian interests; it repudiates and is entirely free from any tendency to politics, nationalism, or party.

Therefore, before beginning our undertaking it is necessary to say that we desire no special favour, either political or national, and that it never entered our heads to demand autonomy for Jews not yet resident in any part of the Ottoman Empire. It is far from our thoughts to demand assurances of any kind from other Governments, or to place Jewish immigrants under the protection of the countries to which they formerly belonged. On the contrary, the only favour we ask is that the immigrants may obtain Ottoman nationality as quickly as possible, so that, living under the ægis of the Ottoman laws and government, they may be assured an industrious life, and may strive as Ottomans to promote the progress and advancement of their common country.

To come to the lands to be colonised: we desire not that the immigration and settlement should be confined specially to one part of the Ottoman dominions, but that the Jewish immigrants should be distributed to different parts. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that sending the immigrants to various points does not entail the entire separation of individuals and families from each other; for, in order to be able to fulfil his religious duties, a Jew is forced to live among his co-religionists. Then, too, the bonds uniting the Jews to each other are so strong that it would be absolutely impossible to form them into small isolated groups. Moreover, to start agricultural settlements it is necessary to have the mutual assistance of many families.

The desire to avoid the mistakes made in social organisations of the Jews in other places leads us to give a trial to the method of distribution according to professions. We desire to see our co-religionists established in the towns as merchants, artisans, doctors, engineers, and teachers, and at the same time we wish them to be scattered in the provinces and connected with agriculture.

The parts of Turkey which seem most favourable for our present enterprise are Shatt-el-Arab, Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine.

The plan of distributing and separating the Jewish units in a reasonable way seems to us so important that we have chosen the East as an immigration ground for them and strongly desire to direct the present emigration even to places beyond the Ottoman boundaries. Although Irak is large enough to contain ten times as many Jews as there are in the world, our programme includes the settlement of Jews in Cyprus and Egypt.

The advantages that will accrue from the organised immigration of Jews into the Ottoman Empire are obvious.

Lands and districts which are to-day deserted and uncultivated, which produce nothing, and which are a burden to the Government to administer, will gradually be filled with honest, industrious, contented people who will bring their capital with them; the lands will begin to be fruitful; buried wealth will be discovered. These places will then pay land tax to the Government and provide soldiers for the army. As the increase in strength which results from an increase in population is of great advantage to countries which stand in need of it, extraordinary expenditure is usually incurred to ensure it. The Governments of Argentina, Canada, Brazil, and Australasia have made great sacrifices to induce people to settle there.

As the settlement of Jews in Turkey will entail no expense on the part of the Ottoman Government, it presents numerous solid advantages and benefits from many points of view.

Our co-religionists will emigrate and settle at their own expense with the help of the bank and societies formed with the object of facilitating emigration.

The rôle played by the Jews in the economic development of Germany, Austria, Russia, and North and South America is sufficiently well known. They will bring knowledge and science to Turkey, where they will be able to display greater activity than in Russia, and will take a serious part in serving the cause of the progress of present-day civilisation in the Ottoman dominions. There is no doubt that as a result of their help astonishing progress will be made.

The Ottoman Government can view the spread and progress of the Jewish element with perfect calm and confidence; for this element will never cause the difficulties of political complications. Jews who are received by Turkey will have no political aim but that of the development and advancement of a strong, independent Turkey to protect them.

There will come into existence a state of affairs very profitable for Turkey and one worth consideration. The Jews in all parts of the world will be inclined to work for the happiness and prosperity of their brothers in Turkey. To-day they show the kindly feelings they cherish towards them by establishing schools and other philanthropic and benevolent institutions of all kinds.

If Turkey opens her doors to Jewish immigration, our co-religionists who occupy

high positions, without running counter to the duties they owe their own countries, will use all their influence for the political and economical advancement of the constitutional Ottoman Government. Important advantages will thus accrue to Turkey as she makes her way straight towards progress and advancement, and the way of sure and influential alliances will be opened to her. The Ottoman statesmen who undertake the foundation of this lasting alliance may be certain of obtaining the thanks and gratitude of the nation.

We can promise and assure the attachment and friendship of the Jews towards the new Jewish emigration centre and towards the Government which protects them, for we have the means of bringing about these feelings. As we are a society composed of representatives of the largest Jewish societies, we are sure that our recommendations and requests will be well received by the persons and circles that direct the Jews.

This is why our society seems the most fitting and most favourable to undertake the benevolent work in question.

There is another reason. We are aware that the Ottoman press—especially during the last few months—has been considering the question of Jewish immigration from the "Sionist" point of view; and as a settlement question involving a definite nationalism would give rise to political aims and tendencies, this discussion has caused some difference in Ottoman public opinion. On the other hand, it has been unanimously agreed that it is necessary for Turkey to profit by her uninhabited lands through a people possessing such qualities as those of the Jews.

Now we show how to solve the question. The fact that our society is purely economic and humanitarian gives a strong assurance that the enterprise undertaken with our help will not cause any political complications.

The Ottoman Government can count on our help and support, and can be sure that the immigration of the Jews will not endanger the national interests in any way, but will serve to ensure the economic interests of the Government.

The decision and announcement that the settlement of the Jewish immigrants will conform to the rules and conditions laid down by the Jewish General Colonisation Society, which is free from any suspicion of connection with politics, will suffice to reassure public opinion.

The organised settlements taking place to-day in nearly all countries are all carried out by companies and societies.

The conclusion by the Ottoman Government of a contract with the Jewish General Colonisation Society will be nothing but the acceptance of a principle, the practical use of which has been generally admitted.

Settlement societies enjoy privileges more or less wide in proportion to the advantage they bring to the country; but our society, being not a company for enterprise but a humanitarian institution, asks for no economic privilege. All it demands is that measures should be adopted to facilitate the immigration and settlement, and to ensure swift and prosperous progress to this benevolent project.

The conditions of the agreement to be arrived at can be settled by oral negotiations. One thing we can say to-day with certainty: that our society will use all its wide influence and power to look after the emigration and settlement of our co-religionists, and to adopt the necessary measures; our society will spend all its energies to bring the enterprise to a successful conclusion in all respects.

The Ottoman Government has nothing to do but to announce that the settlement carried out by the Jewish General Colonisation Society will be well received, and to show its good intentions by ordering the adoption of certain administrative measures necessary for organised colonisation. For instance, it will be necessary to provide facilities for the new-comers to obtain Ottoman nationality, to purchase land, to lease State lands, and to erect dwellings. If there are other very important conditions for the increase of colonisation, the assurance for their certain application depends on the carrying out of general reforms in the Ottoman laws. When such rights as the power to form *crédit foncier* and large limited liability companies, &c., have been obtained, capital will be poured out with confidence for colonisation enterprises.

The Jewish General Colonisation Society have deputed Dr. Alfred Nossig (?), head of the administrative council, to proceed to Constantinople to begin negotiations and prepare the way for an agreement.

The society hopes that the Ottoman Government will delay their definite decision in the matter until the discussion to take place has succeeded in removing all possibility of misunderstanding and in clearing up all points.

The Imperial Government will thus make possible an object consonant with the interests both of the country and of the Jewish people. This will not only be to it a

source of economic profit, but at the same time the benevolent work, which is a humanitarian enterprise, will give to the new Ottoman administration a proud name that shall never be forgotten.

Jewish General Colonisation Society:—

DR. J. GINSBERG, *Treasurer.*
LOUIS VEISSI, *Kaiserlicher Kommerzienrat* (?).
GERSON SIMON, *ditto* *ditto.*
BENJAMIN HIRSCH, *ditto* *ditto.*
GEORGES MARKS, *ditto* *ditto.*
Professor DR. H SENATOR.
DR. ALFRED NOSSIG.

[32169] No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 5, 1910.*

VIOLATION of Capitulations.

Please let me have your views on Damascus telegram of the 3rd September.

[32484] No. 116.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 26th August, 1910, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, September 5, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August 26, 1910.*

ABU MUSA. Please refer to my telegram of the 18th August.

In the note to the German Ambassador, the view which His Majesty's Government take of the agreement is explained, and, after a statement that this shipment will be permitted, the hope is expressed that, in view of the explanations now furnished, no further requests of this nature that may be made by Wönckhaus will receive the support of the German Government.

[32540] No. 117.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 6, 1910.*

VIOLATION of Capitulations at Damascus.

With reference to your telegram No. 261 of yesterday's date, I am going into the matter with my Russian and French colleagues.

There have lately been frequent cases in which the Capitulations have been violated to the detriment of British and other missions, and several cases still remain in which we have so far failed to obtain satisfaction.

[32605] No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th August, 1910, relative to the appointment of a mudir at Odaid by the Vali of Bussorah.

India Office, September 6, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, August* 8, 1910.

I HAVE received information from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah that the Vali of Bussorah has appointed mudir, at Odaid in Abu Thabi territory. Consul has informed the vali that Odaid is Abu Thabi territory, and has communicated with the Ambassador at Constantinople.

[32586] No. 119.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 6, 1910.

IN continuation of the letter of the 24th August regarding the assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India on the subject of the differences between the Sheikh and the Vali of Bussorah.

As may be inferred from the letter above-quoted, Viscount Morley concurs generally in the views of the Government of India, but he is inclined to think that a local demonstration such as he has suggested may be more effective than the representation to the Turkish Government recommended by the Government of India, or, at all events, that the latter should not be regarded as an adequate substitute for the former.

I am, &c.
COLIN J. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *Simla, August* 11, 1910.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your Lordship's telegram of the 31st May, 1910, we have the honour to forward herewith the correspondence* detailed in the annexed schedule relative to the friction which has recently arisen between the Turkish authorities on the Shatt-el-Arab and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

2. On a review of the papers, we are of opinion that the aggressive proceedings of the Vali of Bussorah were unjustified, and that the Sheikh of Mohammerah acted throughout the crisis not only with moderation, but with much prudence and foresight. At the initial stage of the imbroglio, he endeavoured to placate the Vali of Bussorah by seeking an interview with a view to an amicable settlement, and, on receiving a rebuff, wisely withdrew to Ahwaz, averting an armed conflict with the Turks, and maintaining a calm attitude before his tribesmen, whose indignation had been roused by the vali's action. This pacific attitude of the sheikh, under British advice, despite the bombardment of Zain, the shelling of his mother's house, the accusations brought against him, and the offensive circular promulgated by the vali is greatly to the

* Not printed.

[31729] No. 119*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 7, 1910.*

REGISTRATION of Fao property.

Please telegraph to Mr. Crow and find out what form the settlement of this question took (see your despatch No. 396 of the 28th May, 1909).

sheikh's credit, and constitutes a strong claim to the support of His Majesty's Government.

3. It is undeniable that in this corner of the Shah's dominions, important alike strategically, politically, and commercially, the authority of the Central Government is almost non-existent, and that, while in other parts of Persia chronic unrest has prevailed, peace has been maintained in and around Mohammerah by the wise administration of the sheikh, whose assistance the Persian Government quite recently invoked to establish order in the portions in the north outside his jurisdiction. The trade of the country through the southern ports has been seriously dislocated, and were the sheikh to become ill-disposed consequent on our failure to afford him adequate support in connection with the present incident, various British enterprises on the Karun and in south-west Persia would be seriously hampered. But the result of failure to support the sheikh heartily to obtain honourable terms in this dispute will not be limited to Mohammerah alone. There are not wanting indications that the vali's action at Mohammerah was a *ballon d'essai*, and that unless his proceedings are discredited, Turkish activity will extend to Koweit, Bahrein, and along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf, as also to the southern portion of the Turco-Persian boundary, endangering the stability of British influence and prestige throughout the region mentioned.

4. We trust that His Majesty's Government will be in accord with our view, and will make a strong representation to the Turkish Government on behalf of the sheikh, whose good-will is essential to the maintenance of British interests in the Karun region, and we would earnestly invite attention to the hope expressed by Colonel Cox in the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 3 of his letter dated the 16th June, 1910, that it may be possible to enunciate some common lines of policy for the guidance of His Majesty's consuls at Bussorah and Mohammerah, by the joint pursuit of which they will be able to keep the Turkish authorities and the Sheikh of Mohammerah within constitutional bounds, and, by so doing, jointly safeguard our position and great interests at the head of the gulf.

We have, &c.
MINTO.
O'M. CREAGH.
GUY FLEETWOOD WILSON.
S. P. SINHA.
J. L. JENKINS.
R. W. CARLYLE.
B. ROBERTSON.

[31935] No. 120.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, September 7, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, respecting the confiscated portion of your property at Bagdad.

I am to inform you, in reply, that a copy of your letter has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople for such further action as may be considered possible.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[32854] No. 121.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 9, 1910.*

I BEG to refer you to Foreign Office despatch No. 262 of the 3rd instant and to your telegram No. 221 of the 24th ultimo.

The Vali of Bagdad, in spite of my continued representations to Porte both in writing and otherwise, has not desisted from his unsatisfactory attitude. In consequence of the recent loan they have obtained from the Ottoman Bank, the Bagdad municipality should now be in a position to pay Lynch expropriation indemnities which are his

legal due, more especially as the municipality appears to have acted at the start as if Lynch's land were their own property—an attitude which they were obliged to alter. Total loss to the British owners, who have already been expropriated or whose lands are threatened, according to Mr. Lorimer, will amount to £ T. 4,800.

On pretext of an ancient regulation which used to be enforced forty-six years ago in regard to boilers and steam engines, after threats, vali made an endeavour a short time ago to shut up two British-Indian ice manufactories, because their owners refused to lower their price of 1*d.* per kilogramme of ice to ½*d.*, which is price charged by municipality. Regulation could in no case apply, seeing that the engines used in their works are non-dangerous and driven by oil, but a temporary delay of vali's proposed action is all I have up till now been able to obtain at the Porte.

[31936] No. 122.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant respecting the establishment by Dr. Bennett, of the American Dutch Reformed Church Mission, of a medical dispensary at Koweit.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in Viscount Morley's proposal to approve the suggested instructions to Colonel Cox.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[32967] No. 123.

Mr. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, September* 10, 1910.

I RECEIVED a visit to-day from a member of the Cyprus Legislative Council named M. Theophanus Theodotou. He came to tell me that the students from Cyprus were desirous of proposing as a candidate for one of the seats vacated by the three Cretans a Cypriote gentleman who, I understand, is of Hellenic nationality in this country. M. Theodotou said that he was doing his best to persuade the Cypriotes to desist, and that they were ready to do so if they received advice from the British Legation in that sense. I sent by my informant the message indicated by the circumstances.

It appears that the Samians wish to put forward the late Prime Minister of Samos, M. Sofoulis, as a candidate, and that the Cypriotes thought they would not be behindhand.

32975] No. 124

Mr. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, September* 11, 1910.

I FEAR from your telegram to me No. 142 of yesterday's date that my telegram No. 130 of the same day left a false impression. I should have explained that the candidates alluded to for eventual vacancies in the constituency of Attica-Beotia are being put forward by the students from Samos and Cyprus now in Athens, and that there is not to my knowledge any intention to elect them as representatives of either of those two islands.

[33037] No. 125.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 628.)
Sir, *Therapia, September* 4, 1910.

FROM the few despatches of interest which I have received from His Majesty's consular officers in Asia Minor since the date of my despatch No. 596 of the

[31967] No. 126*

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the accompanying copy of a telegram, dated the 10th September, from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Athens respecting the intention of Cyprus students to put forward a Cypriote candidate for the Greek Assembly.

The Assembly which met in 1862 contained representatives of Greek communities resident in foreign countries, *e.g.*, at such places as Smyrna, Alexandria, and even Manchester; and at one time, in order to promote the annexation of the island of Crete to Greece, it was proposed by certain politicians in Greece that a similar procedure should be followed in regard to the Assembly which is to meet at Athens on the 14th September, but the consuls of the protecting Powers at Canea addressed the accompanying communication to the Cretan Executive Committee in February, expressing their determination to prevent the election of deputies for the Greek Assembly in Crete.†

Sir E. Grey is persuaded that the representation of Cyprus in the Greek Parliament would be looked upon as a further provocation by Turkey, and for this and other reasons he proposes to instruct His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Athens to intimate to the Greek Government that His Majesty's Government cannot allow Cyprus to be represented in the Greek Assembly.

Sir E. Grey trusts that the High Commissioner of Cyprus may be instructed by telegraph to take all necessary measures locally to put a stop to the movement in question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 123.

† Communication to Cretan Executive, February 1910.

23rd ultimo, it appears that the country is, on the whole, in a quiet condition and likely to remain so, at any rate during the month of Ramazan, which commences to-day. The Minister of the Interior was to have paid a visit to Kurdestan this summer to study local conditions and devise some means of solution for the Kurdish question, but stress of work at Constantinople prevented him from going at the last moment. Though the situation at Diarbekir is reported as normal, there is no doubt that the Kurds of the district are discontented with the position there: there are probably secret societies among them who are arming their members, but they are not organised in any way, and they seem unready for any movement. They cannot reconcile themselves to the idea of equality between Moslems and Christians, nor do they relish the suppression of brigandage and of intertribal fighting. Summonses to the law courts are becoming more frequent, and failure to attend is met by punishment. Abuses in the administration continue, and there is an uncomfortable feeling abroad that those responsible for the government of the vilayet cannot effect any real changes for the better. This impression has recently been strengthened by some prison riots which the authorities could well have stopped and by renewed fighting among Arab tribes in the district necessitating military intervention.

Two judicial inspectors have been travelling through the vilayet examining into the character of the personnel and officials of the law courts, some of whom have, as a result, been dismissed. The Chambre des Mises en Accusations of Diarbekir decided a short while ago that the long-delayed trial of Ibrahim Pasha's three sons for the troubles of August 1908 should be continued before the court at Veranshehir. The local Committee of Union and Progress have protested at this, declaring the chambre was bribed £T. 2,000 to give this decision, and the public prosecutor has at their instigation appealed to the Ministry of Justice here. The interference of the Committee of Union and Progress in this matter seems most injudicious, and suggests the idea that they have already decided in their own minds, in conjunction with Ibrahim's enemies, what the result of the trial shall be.

The ill-considered talk of the Diarbekir-Kharput Armenians has also contributed to make the general position somewhat unsettled. The vali suspects them of contemplating a nationalist movement, and is inclined to exercise undue severity. In one instance an Armenian bookshop was overhauled by the police—an occurrence that had been unknown since Abdul Hamid's days—for seditious literature, but nothing save a few unimportant revolutionary songs was found.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[33041] No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 632.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 7, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 602 of the 23rd August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting movement of troops in connection with the disturbances in the Hauran, and commenting on the conciliatory attitude of the Ottoman authorities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Damascus, August 22, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit further information respecting the Druse matter, which was referred to in my despatch No. 33.

Troops arrived from Constantinople on the 11th instant, and altogether eight battalions with twelve guns entrained by the Hejaz Railway for Deraa during the past fortnight.

Sami Pasha reached Damascus yesterday morning from Smyrna viâ Port Said, Haiffa, and Beirut; but the various troops who went with him proceeded from Haiffa direct to Deraa, being, I believe, three battalions with eight guns.

A staff captain, Wejihi Bey, was sent to take the place of the Mutessarif of Hauran, Jemal Bey, and his appointment has been confirmed. This young officer is of energetic, firm, and upright character, and is visiting the villages of his district to ascertain what hopes there may be of Druse submission, and finds them greatly terrified and inclined to accept many or most of the conditions which it is the intention of Government to impose upon them.

A deputation of six Druse notables of Lebanon are going to the Jebel to use their influence and persuade their fellows to keep order and give up their arms. Good advice is being tendered to the mountain Druses from all sides, which indeed, there are hopes, if only faint ones, may yet be followed; and the higher military authorities would appear to be desirous of still leaving open a door of conciliation. For instance, the recent withdrawal of the small garrison at Salkhad was interpreted by some Druse sheikhs as indicating the set purpose of Government to send troops and occupy the place in strength. But the acting mushir corrected this error for them, explaining that the reason for the withdrawal was to prevent any trifling incident, as a quarrel or collision between any one of the troops and a Druse inhabitant might in the present excited state of feeling on either side provoke an immediate outburst which would be irretrievable. Whereas in the larger towns Bozra and Deraa, where there are stationed many troops, under the strict discipline of higher officers, no such incident would be likely to occur.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[33249] No. 127.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 12, 1910.*

SHEIKH of Koweit's property at Fao.

With reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 265 of the 7th instant, I learn from Mr. Crow that the consulate at Bussorah gave no assistance and had no knowledge of the settlement of the matter, which was arranged privately by the sheikh with the Ottoman authorities. For former's own statements see my despatch to Foreign Office of the 28th March, 1909, in which I transmitted a despatch from Mr. Crow containing a letter on this subject from the political agent.

[33373] No. 128.

Mr. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, September 13, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to state, in reply to the enquiries made in your telegram No. 147 of yesterday's date, that I have ascertained that M. Sofoulis, who has claims to be considered a Greek subject, is now in Athens.

M. Theodotou, who gave me the information respecting the Cypriote candidate contained in my telegram No. 130 of the 10th instant, was leaving on the following day for Cyprus, and if you desire more information on that subject it may be obtained through the Cyprus Government.

[30961] No. 129.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 14, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo, relative to the question of the renewal and extended assurances which it is proposed to give to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey entirely shares the view held by Viscount Morley that, in the dispute between the sheikh and the Vali of Bussorah, the conduct of the former was correct and that of the latter completely unjustified, and that as soon as he learns of the King's consent to confer on the sheikh the distinction

of a K.C.I.E. he will instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to cause the assurances to be conveyed to the sheikh, since the two announcements would produce a greater effect if made to his Excellency simultaneously.

Sir E. Grey further concurs in the opinion expressed in the penultimate paragraph of your letter as to the unsatisfactory character of the attitude lately adopted by the Turkish Government and local authorities towards British interests, and is considering what representations His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be instructed to make on the subject. When he has reached a decision on this question a further communication will be addressed to you, but in the meanwhile he considers it better to avoid, for the present, a naval demonstration at the head of the Persian Gulf, and to arrange that, when His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire proceeds to Mohammerah to give the assurances to the sheikh, he should be conveyed to that port in a gun-boat.

I am to add that the text of the assurances in question will be forwarded to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah as suggested in the last paragraph of your letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[33595] No. 130.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 352.)
Sir, *Paris, September 15, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 343 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Temps" of this evening, an account of an incident between the police authorities at Smyrna and the French consulate at that port arising out of the arrest of a Tunisien.

The "Temps" points out that this incident, like the one reported in my above-mentioned despatch, proves that the Ottoman Government are determined to treat the Mussulmans of Algeria and Tunis as Ottoman subjects, thereby violating the rights conferred on French citizens and protected persons by the Capitulations.

The "Temps" goes on to state that the Touareg chieftains now in Paris, who were received by M. Pichon to-day, drew his Excellency's attention to the proceedings of the Turkish authorities in the hinterland of Algeria and of Tunis, and especially to the occupation by Ottoman troops of Djanet, where the Turkish flag has been flying for some time past, although that oasis is considered to be French.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Extract from the "Temps" of September 16, 1910.

NOUVEAUX INCIDENTS FRANCO-TURCS : LA TURQUIE ET LES TUNISIENS.—L'OCCUPATION DE DJANET PAR LES TURCS.

NOUS recevons de Smyrne la nouvelle d'un grave incident qui s'est produit dans cette ville entre les autorités ottomanes et le consulat de France. Voici l'exposé des faits :—

Il y a quelque temps un Tunisien, nommé Kitani, employé en Égypte dans une administration, se rendit coupable de détournements, prit la fuite et se réfugia à Smyrne.

Le Gouvernement égyptien, dès qu'il eut connaissance de la retraite de Kitani, s'adressa à la Légation de France au Caire et lui demanda l'autorisation de poursuivre le voleur devant le consulat français de Smyrne.

Cette demande fut transmise par la Légation de France au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Paris, ainsi qu'il était nécessaire. Le service du contentieux, auquel elle parvint, donna sans plus tarder un avis favorable et envoya au consul de France à Smyrne le permis d'arrestation.

Dès qu'il eut reçu cette pièce, le consul de France fit saisir Kitani par deux cavas du consulat, à bord d'un bateau qui se disposait à quitter Smyrne.

Kitani, dès qu'il fut appréhendé, se mit à crier qu'il était Ottoman (alors qu'il est incontestablement sujet français). La police de Smyrne l'arracha des mains des cavas, le conduisit au commissariat, où on trouva sur lui un passeport français. Néanmoins, sous prétexte qu'il était Ottoman et malgré les réclamations réitérées du consul de France, le commissaire refusa de remettre Kitani à nos cavas.

Les choses en étaient là au départ du courrier qui nous apporte cette nouvelle.

Cette affaire, on s'en rendra compte, est du même ordre que celles que nous avons signalées récemment et qui se sont produites en Syrie, arrestations de Tunisiens sans autorisation des consuls de France et refus par le mutessarif de Jérusalem d'accepter une requête provenant d'un Algérien et transmise par le consulat général de France.

Elles indiquent la volonté bien arrêtée du Gouvernement turc de considérer les musulmans d'Algérie et de Tunisie comme des sujets ottomans et de violer ainsi les droits que les citoyens français et les protégés de la France tiennent des Capitulations.

D'autre part, nous apprenons que M. Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à reçu ce matin le Gouverneur général de l'Algérie et les chefs touareg, accompagnés du Colonel Laperrine et du Capitaine Nieger.

Les chefs touareg, dit l'agence Havas, ont entretenu M. Pichon des questions relatives à l'hinterland algéro-tunisien et lui ont fourni à ce sujet des indications qui ont très vivement intéressé le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et dont il a pris une note spéciale.

Nous avons des raisons de croire que les chefs touareg et les officiers français ont entretenu le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des agissements des autorités turques dans l'hinterland algéro-tunisien et notamment de l'occupation de Djanet par les troupes ottomanes.

Le drapeau turc flotte en effet depuis quelque temps sur cette oasis, que nous considérons comme française.

Si l'on rapproche cette affaire de celle des Kaouar, que nous avons exposée récemment, on se rend compte que les autorités ottomanes poursuivent en Afrique également une politique systématique.

[33806] No. 131.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September 17, 1910.*

YOUR telegram No. 572 [of 15th September]: Sofoulis's candidature.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent desired instructions to Athens.

[33839] No. 132.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 612.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 9, 1910.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 264 of the 5th instant and to my telegram No. 183 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that, after consultation with my French colleague here on the question of the violation of the capitulations by the Damascus authorities, I have sent the following instructions to His Majesty's consul there, which I trust will meet with your approval.

I informed him that we cannot refuse the Turkish police the right to arrest foreign subjects if it is a clear case of flagrant delict. The police would in the first instance take the prisoner to the police office to establish his identity, but once this has been done and his foreign nationality has been shown, they are bound to hand him over to his consulate within twenty-four hours.

As regards the right claimed by the police authorities to enter purely foreign establishments, as this is a very complicated and difficult question, I have instructed Mr. Devey to avoid discussing it unless a special occasion should arise, but the inviolability of churches and factories should in any case be recognised.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[33841] No. 133.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 614.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 11, 1910.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 255 of the 22nd ultimo and to previous correspondence on the subject of the present situation in Samos, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a further telegram which I have received, signed by a number of Samian deputies, complaining of the violent and illegal measures of Prince Copassis, especially in connection with the recent elections. The enclosed report which has just reached me from the vice-consul at Samos seems to bear out the complaints of these deputies, and points to extremely arbitrary conduct on the part of the Prince, who on his side maintains that the intrigues and restlessness in the island have necessitated these measures.

The conditions described by Mr. Marc do not at all bear out Rifaat Pasha's assurances to me, when I broached the subject to his Excellency a few days ago, that absolute peace reigned in the island and that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the political differences came to an end. From the tone of his language to me in discussing the situation in Samos it is evident that the Turkish Government have no thought of making any change at present as regards the governor of the island.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 133.

Vice-Consul Marc to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Samos, September 4, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that the general assembly of the island took place quite unexpectedly last Wednesday, the 31st August, the Prince having with his party twenty-three deputies, of which only six are the legally elected, the remaining seventeen having been practically nominated by Kopassy Bey himself.

I further beg to bring to your notice that, by order of the Prince Governor, some of the legally elected deputies who have attempted to enter the House at the first sitting have been thrown into prison on false accusation, and it would not be at all surprising if these persons are condemned to a long term of imprisonment, the Prince having the courts of justice under his influence.

With regard to the Turkish troops, I must say there are at present 1,300 soldiers occupying the principal centres of the island. All sorts of ammunition are regularly sent here from Smyrna, and yesterday morning a sailing-vessel from Cos landed four big mountain guns (Krupp system), fifty cases of shells, and about fifty barrels of different other sorts of ammunition, to the great amazement of the inhabitants.

I have, &c.
GREGORY D. W. MARC.

Enclosure 2 in No. 133.

Samian Deputies to Sir G. Lowther.

(Télégraphique.) *En clair.* *Samos, le 1er septembre, 1910.*

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous soumettre que l'Assemblée illégalement constituée continue ses travaux. Quatorze députés élus légalement en furent exclus violemment; quatre autres furent arrêtés. On prépare les élections municipales, où les mêmes violences et illégalités seront répétées. Nous protestâmes à la Porte et aux consulats. Nous sollicitons protection et examen des dénonciations en nous référant aux témoignages des consuls.

Veuillez, &c.
[Suivent les signatures de quatorze députés.]

[33850] No. 134.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 653.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 14, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus reporting further respecting Druse matters, and particularly in regard to the Turkish forces at Deraa.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 134.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Damascus, September* 1, 1910.

REFERRING to my last despatch, I have the honour to state that Sami Pasha left for Deraa this morning to inspect the troops assembled there, and will probably return here in three or four days and then go to Haifa to complete all preparations of his expedition.

About twenty-five battalions are understood to be either at Deraa or on the way there at this moment, while ten more may be called up, making a total of thirty-five battalions. Among these twenty-five are eight battalions of Damascus, four of Adana, four of Aintab of the 5th army corps, and three battalions of the 1st army corps. Officers commanding include Colonel Abdul Hamid, of the staff; Colonel Naim Bey, Major Salah-ed-Din, and a staff officer, Nouri Bey. There are three battalions of artillery also. A strong medical staff is attached, which will give special attention to sanitary matters, and search-lights, field telephones, &c., are supplied. 50,000*l.* has been sent from Constantinople.

The troops from Damascus (Nizam) are much inferior to those of Smyrna (Redif), both in point of numbers in the battalions and in training and discipline.

The Druses have been holding conferences, which have not produced much result. From some parts of the Jebel they have been sending their families and valuables into the desert tract Tulul-es-Safa. There are even now hopes that they will not attempt to resist seriously, and the authorities appear to be anxious to give them every chance of making submission without resorting to force. The Druses naturally pretext that they cannot give up their arms, as they would be left defenceless against the Bedouins, who, indeed, are at this moment showing some inclination to volunteer and join the army against them. But such offers, needless to say, are rejected absolutely.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[33964] No. 135.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 16, 1910.

IN continuation of Sir R. Ritchie's letter of the 20th August last, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy relative to the Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fadaghia.

It will be seen that the property in question is the same as that referred to in the letter of the 4th February, 1909, from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, copy of which was communicated to the Foreign Office on the 15th March, 1909.

In that letter it was stated that the demand that Sheikh Mubarak should describe himself as an Ottoman subject had never before been made. No solution of the present difficulty, therefore, is to be found in a reference to the case of the Fao property. The further details promised by the Government of India will be forwarded on receipt.

I am also to enclose, for the information of Sir E. Grey, copy of correspondence

that has been received from the Government of India, and to draw attention to the letter of the political agent, Koweit, dated the 3rd August, 1910, with regard to the reported proceedings of the vali in this matter, and to the possibility of his removal from Bussorah.

I have, &c.
COLIN J. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) *September* 9, 1910.

YOUR telegram of the 18th August, Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fadaghia. This property is the same as that referred to in Butler's letter dated the 4th February, 1909, to Ritchie. As regards sheikh's previous purchases, general answer is that acceptance of Turkish tazkirah was not pressed (*vide* letter from Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther of the 12th July, 1909, received with Political Secretary's letter dated the 10th September, 1909). Fao properties are in a different category, and were apparently acquired by predecessor of sheikh before registry office was opened (*vide* inclosures to letter from political resident in Persian Gulf of the 20th February, 1902, forwarded in the Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 20th March, 1902). Cox states that details in each case will be sent as soon as political agent obtains them from sheikh. These will follow on receipt.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Captain Birdwood to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, August* 12, 1910.

WITH reference to this Office letter dated the 31st July, 1910, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the communication received from the political agent, Koweit, on the subject of Sheikh Mubarak's difficulties with the Vali of Bussorah regarding the registration of his Fadaghia property.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Resident),
L. BIRDWOOD,
First Assistant Resident.

Enclosure 3 in No. 135.

Captain Shakespear to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Koweit, August* 3, 1910.

WITH reference to the correspondence regarding Sheikh Mubarak's affairs on the Shatt-al-Arab and his relations with the Bussorah Vali, Suliman Nathif Bey, ending with your second assistant's endorsement, dated the 20th July, 1910, I have the honour to give below some further information communicated to me by the sheikh this morning.

2. The sheikh said he had recently sent his secretary, Abdul Aziz-bin-Salim, to Bussorah, at Ahmad Pasha-az-Zuhair's request, and on his return, a day or two ago, he related the following account of what passed during his visit: Abdul Aziz met Ahmad Pasha first, and the latter, after some preliminaries, admitted that the vali had instigated him to impugn Mubarak's title to the Fadaghia property. Ahmad Pasha had himself remonstrated with the vali, pointing out the absurdity of repudiating the sale in the face of the sale-deeds held by Mubarak, which bore, besides his own signature, those of all the Bussorah notables as well as that of the British consul. He also objected to compromising his own good name in what, from his own side, would be a thoroughly bad case. However, the vali offered to send the Turkish gun-boat "Marmaris" to eject Mubarak's men from the Fadaghia gardens by force if they should refuse a hint to leave quietly. In short, the whole of the story already detailed was confirmed categorically by Ahmad Pasha himself as having been suggested by the vali, who promised his utmost support,

Ahmad Pasha apparently valued his own reputation too much to fall in with the vali's suggestions, and told the sheikh's secretary he would have no hand in any such ignoble scheme. The sheikh appears to be thoroughly satisfied with the assurance, and remarked that he no longer feared Ahmad Pasha making any difficulties over the Fadaghia property.

3. Subsequently, Abdul Aziz saw the vali, who appears to have opened the interview with a general complaint against Mubarak for putting him in a false position with his superiors in the Turkish Government. On Abdul Aziz's enquiring how this could be, the vali said he had telegraphed to Constantinople that Mubarak had agreed to the Fadaghia property being registered in the names of his four sons, who would all take out Turkish nationality certificates, and, moreover, that two of them would enter the Turkish army! Abdul Aziz then appears to have taken the vali rather severely to task, pointing out that he, though himself a Turk, and so not likely to minimise any of Mubarak's acknowledgments, was also the sheikh's interpreter (for Turkish), and his secretary and he never remembered Mubarak ever admitting, either verbally or in writing, anything which could by any stretch of imagination be construed into the substance of this telegram. The conversation was a long one, of much to the same effect, and seems to have been not without effect on the vali, who, as the sheikh graphically described it, "had no word, and became completely silent."

Subsequently, the vali appears to have discussed with Abdul Aziz the agreement between the Turkish and British Governments for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Koweit, alleging that the British Ambassador in Constantinople was always urging this plea upon the Turkish Government in any little matter which came up between Koweit and Bussorah, whilst the British representative in Koweit, who must be aware of Mubarak's raid upon Zobeir, made no effort to prevent or dissuade him from harrying Turkish subjects.

4. I am inclined to credit the truth of most of the above, for the sheikh was particularly frank, and seemed considerably less anxious than he has been for some time. The conversation described in the last paragraph above would seem to point to some strictures having been passed on Suliman Nathif Bey by the Turkish Government, whether at the instance of His Majesty's Ambassador or not I am of course not in a position to conjecture. The sheikh told me some little time ago that he had news from Bagdad that Sulman Nathif Bey was to be transferred from Bussorah, being replaced by Fakhri Pasha from Aleppo, and he sincerely hoped the news would prove true. A letter which I received from the political resident at Bagdad confirmed this rumour, though the latest news from Bussorah states that the vali has given the lie to the report, which first reached Bussorah in a Bagdad newspaper.

5. On the score of workable relations between the sheikh and the Bussorah authorities, it is to be hoped that Sulman Nathif Bey will be moved shortly; for, though his energy in making improvements in the Bussorah roads and in apprehending vagabonds or bad characters may be laudable, his methods in dealing with powerful chiefs like the sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah certainly appear to lack tact, *savoir-faire*, and appreciation of their position, and will almost as certainly lead to trouble both for Turkish officials and ourselves, if he is permitted to pursue his present irresponsible course.

I have, &c.
W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR,
Political Agent, Koweit.

[34054] No. 136.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 657.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 16, 1910.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 265 of the 7th September, 1910, and to my telegram No. 190 of the 12th September, I have the honour to point out that there are two separate questions concerning the property of the Sheikh of Koweit in the Caza of Fao.

1. A question about some land near the fort at Fao, which had belonged to the sheikh for some time. There was a dispute between the sheikh and the Turks, who wished to destroy an embankment raised by the sheikh near the fort. This dispute was amicably settled, as reported in my despatch No. 170 of the 10th March, 1909. My telegram No. 190 referred to this question.

2. The question of the acquisition by the sheikh of some date gardens at Fedaghia, in the Caza of Fao, to which the first part of my despatch No. 196 of the 28th May, 1909, referred.

I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, saying that the question of this registration is apparently still at a standstill, and there is nothing fresh to report since his despatch No. 34, sent to you in my despatch No. 460 of the 6th July of this year. Mr. Crow adds that he is making further enquiries.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[34139] No. 137.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 20.)

Sir, *India Office, September 20, 1910.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 15th September, 1910, as to the appointment by the Vali of Bussorah of a mudir at El Odeid in Abu Thabi territory, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees with Secretary Sir E. Grey that this appointment should be made the subject of a protest to the Turkish Government.

With reference to the wording of the draft telegram which it is proposed to address to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Morley would only remark that, though the assurances of 1871 were undoubtedly understood to cover El Odeid, it might be held that geographically speaking El Odeid is not a part of "Southern Arabia." In these circumstances, it might be preferable to substitute for that expression in the draft telegram some wider form of words.

I am, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[34139] No. 138.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 20, 1910.*

YOUR Excellency should hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs a written protest against the appointment of mudir at El Odeid, and tell him that His Majesty's Government will not recognise the appointment as valid. El Odeid is in the territory of one of the trucial chiefs, who are under the protection of His Majesty's Government, and you should request that the appointment be immediately rescinded.

You will remember that in 1904 a similar appointment at Wakra was cancelled, and it might also be well to recall the assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir H. Elliot in 1871 (see his despatch No. 422 of the 10th December, 1871), that the Porte had no intention of obtaining supremacy over the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.

[34268] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 21, 1910.*

EL ODEID.

With reference to your telegram No. 279.

I am putting off making a written protest till Saturday, the 24th instant, as Rifaat Pasha has promised to let me have a definite answer within a few days.

[34337] No. 140.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 1st September, relative to Zakhnuniyah Island and the Turks.

India Office, September 21, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, August* 29, 1910.

MY letter dated the 30th July. On the 26th instant the Political Agent, Bahrein, reported that a fresh party of Turkish soldiers had been dispatched from Ojair to Zakhnuniyah Island.

[34279] No. 141.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copies of telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the recent appointment of a mudir at El Odeid,* a place which is within the territory of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, of which it forms the western limit.

As their Lordships are aware, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi is one of the trucial chiefs who are under the protection of His Majesty's Government.

Sir E. Grey is of course unable to predict what may be the result of the representations which His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to make to the Ottoman Government; but, in the event of their not having the desired result, it is necessary to consider what further action could be taken to assert the rights of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.

I am accordingly to enquire whether, if His Majesty's Government should decide to resort to forcible measures, their Lordships consider that it would be possible to effect a landing at El Odeid for the purpose of expelling the Turkish mudir.

A paper, received from the Government of India, is enclosed, setting forth the number and force of Turkish garrisons in the region of the Persian Gulf.

The nearest Turkish garrison is at El Bidaa on the El Katr peninsula, and it is believed to consist of sixty men and four guns.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[34492] No. 142.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September* 23, 1910.

IN reply to your letter of the 22nd instant respecting the possibility of effecting a landing at El Odeid for the purpose of expelling the Turkish mudir, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State that information about this locality is very meagre. Anchorage is reported to exist in from 6 to 10 fathoms close to the shore of the northern entrance point of

* Nos. 138 and 139.

Khor-al-Odeid, which is described as a winding inlet 5 miles in length opening out into a lagoon about 5 miles long and 3 miles wide. Landing from boats would probably be easy on the shore of the inlet and lagoon, the depths of which vary considerably.

2. I am to state that, in the event of His Majesty's Government deciding to resort to forcible measures, their Lordships consider that any military action necessary to expel the mudir should be taken by Indian troops, the part of the navy being limited to assisting in the landing operations.

3. The experience which has recently been gained by the employment of the R.I.M. ship "Hardinge," which was utilised for raids on the Mekran Coast in connection with the operations against the arms traffic in the Gulf, should facilitate any action which may be necessary.

In these operations the "Hardinge" carried a military force of about 14 officers and 685 men.

4. The Secretary of State will no doubt consult the Secretary of State for India should it be decided to take action of the nature indicated.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[34734] No. 143.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 669.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 20, 1910.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 628 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report further on current events in Asiatic Turkey.

The Vali of Adana, who had heard while at Constantinople of certain criticisms sent to his embassy by the Russian consul, in the course of conversation with His Majesty's vice-consul emphasised his resentment at any foreign interference or criticisms. His Excellency spoke of the Committee of Union and Progress as beset with enemies, which made general disarmament imperative. In Asia the Hauran would be dealt with first, then Syria, then Kurdistan, and, lastly, the Yemen, which was unimportant. The vali's hatred of Greece has led him to order all houses of Ottoman subjects which happen to be painted in the Hellenic colours to be whitewashed, and informed Mr. Rawlins that Greeks ought not to be allowed to flaunt their flag in Turkey.

In the Mosul vilayet the Kurds, particularly the Hamavand Kurds, owing to whose activity the road between Kerkuk and Suleimanieh is still unsafe, are causing trouble. In July a small punitive expedition was sent against the Atrash tribe at Dhok, but I have heard of no serious fighting. The murderers of Sheikh Seyyid and those implicated in the outrage on him of January 1909, who had been in prison eighteen months, were tried in July and condemned to various terms of imprisonment; but it is a suggestive general fact that more than 100 insignificant persons and only two men of any local importance have been sentenced. The proceedings for the enrolment of non-Moslem recruits are also being proceeded with at Mosul, and a certain concentration of troops at Kerkuk has placed eight more battalions than hitherto within easy reach of the Persian frontier. The arrival of fifty gendarmes from Bagdad and the appointment of a new commander of police at Kerkuk may foreshadow certain reorganisation of that force, while an attempt is being made locally to get one Ullak Bey, who is known to be strongly opposed to granting concessions to foreigners, appointed Vali of Mosul.

From Erzeroum I learn that the suspected "reactionary" Kurdish conspiracy (see my despatch No. 527 of the 31st July) has been enquired into, and the vali informed His Majesty's consul on the 20th ultimo that he had ceased to have any misgivings on the subject with regard to any organised movement against the present régime. The whole thing in fact appears to have been a *canard*, and the person arrested as an agent of the Kurdish committee at Diarbekir has proved to be a mere adventurer.

In the Bitlis vilayet, however, Kurds have committed a considerable number of acts of lawlessness, which are not, however, due to any political disturbances, but merely to the laxity of the administration. Three Armenians have been murdered with impunity, and the notorious brigand, Sheikh Seyyid Ali, is reported to be again active. Several robberies have also been committed both on Moslem and Armenian merchants and caravans, the only arrest being that of Sheikh Suleiman, who was tortured and compelled to disgorge his plunder, and Tahir Pasha, Vali of Bitlis, appears to let such

things pass, and to be chiefly occupied in furthering his personal interests and those of his friends.

The representatives of the Chester group were well received by the Vali of Diarbekir, who himself escorted them on their journey to Bitlis, and when passing through the territory of the Bisheri Kurds, his Excellency was the object of a hostile demonstration by their chiefs, who refused to obey his summons to his presence, and stated plainly that they did not recognise him as governor. His Excellency is said to have telegraphed details to Constantinople. His Majesty's vice-consul at Diarbekir further reports that the Yezidi persecution has been put an end to (see my despatch No. 509 of the 26th July), and Mir Ismail, Sheikh of the Yezidis (see my despatch No. 408 of the 22nd June), and also the Christians arrested, have been released. All the lands of the late Ibrahim Pasha are to be confiscated except those registered in the name of his three sons, who are still awaiting the continuation of their trial, and who apparently only possess a few villages. The Hamidieh regiments, drawn from sedentary tribes, are to be disbanded, and the other regiments, drawn from nomadic tribes, are to be retained in future known as light cavalry regiments ("Khafif Suwari Alaileri").

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[34736] No. 144.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 671.)
Sir,
Constantinople, September 21, 1910.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 168 of the 23rd August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, submitting copy of a letter addressed to the Government of India respecting the threatened aggression by Turkish authorities on the residency premises at Bagdad.

The annexures referred to in Mr. Lorimer's despatch are not forwarded herewith,* being only correspondence of which I have already had the honour to communicate to you the purport.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(Secret.)
Sir,
Bagdad, August 22, 1910.

IN continuation of my letter No. 711 of the 13th August, 1910, I have the honour to submit copies of further telegraphic correspondence (purports only) on the subject of an apprehended aggression by the Turkish local Government on the British political residency at Bagdad. I also enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from the vali, showing that the danger has now been removed.

2. A fact not mentioned in any of the telegrams, because it did not immediately come to my knowledge, is that Eram Bey, the vali's political secretary, himself enquired of a member of my staff during the period of suspense whether there would be any objection to the new street being carried across the residency grounds, and what the results of such an arrangement would be. To this question the officer interrogated not inaptly replied that the amenity of the residency would be destroyed, and that an increase of the residency guard would be necessitated, as two compounds would require more sentries to watch them than one.

3. The point chiefly urged by the political secretary in his conversation with me, referred to in my telegram of the 22nd August, was that I should have addressed myself to him if I thought that the residency was in danger, and not to the Turkish engineer of works. This seems at first sight a plausible objection; but, as explained in my last letter, the object of the local Government was probably to force me to begin on humiliating terms a discussion with them of the immunities and privileges of this residency—a discussion which might have acquired a wider scope as it proceeded.

* Annexures received from India Office, October 17, 1910.

For this reason, instead of referring to the political secretary, I gave the engineer of works, with whom I am personally acquainted, a sufficient opportunity of contradicting, either directly or through the vali's political office, the sinister rumours, which, if he did not himself set them afloat, he at least knew to be current and to be generally believed. It will be seen that my note to the engineer was worded in such a way as neither to give offence to Turkish susceptibilities nor to admit any anxiety on my part on account of the residency.

3. I trust that my action throughout this matter, which now appears closed, may be approved by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER.

Annexure No. 1.

Purport of a Telegram from the Political Resident, Bagdad, to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated August 16, 1910.

The Vali of Bagdad is believed to have the intention of continuing, through the compound of the British residency, a public street which is now in process of construction. The buildings of this residency would thereby be separated from one another, and the subdivision of the property would much diminish its market value; and it would, besides, be an act of wantonness on the vali's part. Already there exists a road which could be widened. This apprehended action of the local Government would be manifestly malicious in intention, and carried through with a political purpose. The consul-general wired to the Ambassador, whose reply was that he would see to the matter in Constantinople, and deprecate the alleged intention to interfere with the residency grounds. The consul-general is strongly of opinion that our credit in Bagdad depends upon our offering uncompromising resistance to any such project, and requests that, if the Government of India are of that opinion, they will immediately communicate with the British Government, as otherwise it may be too late to do anything.

Annexure No. 2.

Purport of a Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, dated August 17, 1910.

Refers to the Ambassador's wire of the 16th August, and states that the intention of the local authorities in the matter of the threatened encroachment on the grounds of the British residency is purely political and malicious. By taking steps to interfere with the residency the local Government would show to what extent foreigners and foreign interests are in their power. It is not a question of surrendering a portion of the grounds to enable the municipality to carry out projected improvements, but of yielding to the early-avowed policy of the vali of forcibly reducing the status of the British consulate-general; also, by permitting subdivision of the grounds, a valuable Government property would be much depreciated in value.

To deprecate interference might only embolden the Turks to carry out a project over which they were hesitating, and the consul-general is therefore of opinion that the case is one for absolute prohibition. Mr. Lorimer has wired to the Government of India explaining to them the position of affairs, because they are jointly interested with His Majesty's Government in the Bagdad residency. He would repeat once more that there is no reason at all for continuing the new street farther than the place where it will reach the wall of the residency garden.

Annexure No. 3.

Purport of a Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, dated August 17, 1910.

The Acting Grand Vizier, who is also the Minister of Justice, has assured the Ambassador that he will permit no arbitrary encroachment on the grounds of the British consulate-general at Bagdad. He is communicating by telegram with the vali on the subject.

Annexure No. 4.

Purport of a Telegram from the British Political Resident, Bagdad, to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated August 19, 1910.

The Resident, Bagdad, refers to his telegram to the Foreign Office, Simla, dated the 16th August, and states that the British Ambassador has received assurances that encroachment will not be permitted. It has been noticed here that a Turkish flag, which for some days past had flown over a wall close to the enclosing wall of the British residency, has since been removed.

Annexure No. 5.

Purport of a Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, dated August 19, 1910.

His Excellency refers to the consul-general's telegram dated the 17th August, and enquires whether, during the last two days, the attitude of the local authorities has undergone any alteration. It is possible that the political attitude of the vali is not entirely the outcome of his own personal conviction, but that his entourage may have had something to do in inspiring it.

Annexure No. 6.

Purport of a Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, dated August 20, 1910.

States in reply to the Ambassador's telegram of the preceding day that a Turkish flag which had been erected near the wall of the residency to mark the direction of the new street was quietly taken away on the 17th August, but that the consul-general may not be able to answer his Excellency's question about the attitude of the local authorities for a few days. His personal relations with the Governor-General, however, are still perfectly friendly.

Annexure No. 7.

Copy of a Letter from his Excellency the Vali of Bagdad to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, dated August 6 (19), 1910.

M. le Consul général,

Je reçois avec le plus grand étonnement un télégramme de la Sublime Porte me faisant savoir que, sur votre demande, votre Ambassade à Constantinople avait adressé des plaintes contre ce vilayet sous prétexte que le terrain de votre consulat général allait être coupé et traversé par une rue, et cela sans qu'il n'y ait aucune nécessité.

Je suis d'autant plus étonné de cette démarche inattendue que je n'ai jamais entretenu votre consulat général, ni verbalement ni par écrit, au sujet d'un tel projet, dont à aucun moment je n'ai eu connaissance.

Je viens de télégraphier dans ce sens à la Sublime Porte.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Gouverneur général,
Commandant de la VI^e^ Armée.
H. NAZIM.

Annexure No. 8.

Purport of a Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, dated August 22, 1910.

Mentions, in continuation of the consul-general's telegram of the 20th August, that the Turkish Governor-General has now written to him officially repudiating all knowledge of the supposed scheme of encroaching on the residency. The political

secretary has also called on the consul-general bearing a message to the same effect, but more strongly expressed. In despatches which have been sent by post the Ambassador will find the consul-general's reasons for questioning the truthfulness and sincerity of these belated assurances. The consul-general, however, has not challenged their truth, but in receiving them he remarked that the circumstances which led him to take action were certainly calculated to inspire doubt. The consul-general has promised the vali's political secretary that though the question of the residency wall was still exciting the town, and though only last Saturday a crowd collected to look at it in expectation of its being pulled down, he would observe a discreet silence on the subject of what had passed. It cannot be questioned that the Turkish officials knew perfectly well what was expected by the populace, and did nothing to dispel the idea.

The recent unceremonious treatment of the German community, and the fact that the Turkish engineer of works, with whom he was personally acquainted, neither replied to his letter himself nor caused a reply to be sent to it through the proper office, are the principal grounds on which the consul-general entertained suspicions.

In the consul-general's opinion, his Excellency the Ambassador's action at Constantinople has had a most salutary effect in maintaining British prestige at Bagdad, and it may even assist the solution of certain other difficulties outstanding locally.

Enclosure 2 in No. 144.

Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bagdad, September 3, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, in continuation of my letter of the 22nd August, 1910, a copy of a communication which I made to the political secretary of the Bagdad vilayet on the 24th August, 1910, in regard to a threatened encroachment by the Turkish local authorities upon the precincts of this residency. The occasion of this letter was a private request made to me on the evening of the 23rd August, on a steamer excursion organised by his Excellency the Vali, that I should report to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that the whole question of interference with the residency had arisen in consequence of a "misunderstanding," presumably on my part.

As the Government of India will observe, I have been careful to rebut this suggestion, which to me seems to argue a guilty consciousness on the part of the Turkish authorities. Everyone in Bagdad, whether European or native, believes that some sort of *coup de main* against this residency had been prepared; and, in view of the remarks which have been and continue to be made to me by various foreigners and persons in a position to know the real intentions of the Turks, I can only congratulate myself on having brought the matter to notice in time to avert a very disagreeable incident.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER,
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.

Enclosure 3 in No. 144.

Consul-General Lorimer to Eram Bey.

(Private.)

Dear M. Eram Bey, *Bagdad, August 24, 1910.*

THIS refers to what you said to me yesterday evening about the British consulate-general grounds and the new street.

I am not aware of any misunderstanding ("malentendu") on my own part, but I am satisfied that there is not now any intention of interfering with our buildings or grounds, and I have telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the matter should be buried in oblivion.

Yours very truly,
J. G. LORIMER.

Enclosure 4 in No. 144.

Government of India to Consul-General Lorimer.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Simla, September* 28, 1910.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 3rd September, 1910, I am directed to say that your action in connection with the apprehended Turkish interference with the British residency at Bagdad meets with the entire approval of the Government of India.

I am, &c.

E. H. S. CLARKE,

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

[34738] No. 145.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 673.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 21, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad submitting translation of a pamphlet circulated in that city in regard to the rule of Nazim Pasha, Vali of Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 736/37.)

Your Excellency, *Bagdad, August* 22, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to enclose free translations of a pamphlet and a placard, which have made their appearance at Bagdad during the last few days, and which illustrate the bitter hostility with which the rule of Nazim Pasha, the present Governor-General, is regarded in some quarters here.

The pamphlet was undoubtedly written at Bagdad and printed at Cairo. It arrived at Bagdad by the last overland mail, and it has been widely circulated. Attempts are being made by the police to trace all the persons to whom copies were addressed. The authorship is, of course, a matter of conjecture. It is strongly suspected that 'Abdul Hasib Antaki Bey, an Egyptian journalist recently expelled by Nazim Pasha, was concerned in its production (see monthly Summary for June 1910, XII, 1), and such may be the case, but from internal evidence it appears to be, in all essential respects, the work of local malcontents. Unfortunately, it contains more than a substratum of truth, especially in the sections which relate to arbitrary municipal improvements at Bagdad. Some of the personal touches are ludicrously life-like.

The scurrilous placard which forms the second enclosure of this letter was posted up during the night of the 17th–18th August on the walls of the city near the north gate, and in the Hidan quarter. Some fifteen or sixteen copies are said to have existed, but they were quickly taken possession of by the police. None were found in the sheikh quarter, where the influence of the Nakib is supreme. Arrests have already been made in connection with the incident, and Nazim Pasha, with characteristic courage, would have caused the placard to be reprinted verbatim in all the newspapers had he not been dissuaded by cooler-headed advisers. So far as I am aware, the allegations made in the placard are altogether malicious and unfounded.

Nazim Pasha has not yet been four months in power at Bagdad, and it is impossible to regard without concern the undoubtedly serious opposition to his rule which has already been called into existence. There can be no doubt, I think that the prime instigators of resistance are the local representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the vali evidently regards one of these—the late Maktubji Murad Bey, a half-brother of Mahmud Shaukat Pasha, Minister of War—as his most dangerous enemy at Bagdad (see monthly Summary for June 1910, V, 12). The difficulty by which observers of the situation are confronted is the same as they experienced in connection with the "affaire Lynch" last December, that, namely, of knowing to what

extent the agitation is genuine and what proportion of the population is involved in or sympathises with it.

There has been much to find fault with in Nazim Pasha's municipal government and in his treatment of foreign subjects, and British interests have suffered along with the rest; but his errors have been largely due, I believe, to inexperience of civil administration and to a mistaken belief, of which he must soon be cured, that there is no obstacle which cannot be removed by force. His military and tribal policies, as I have already had the honour of reporting to your Excellency (see monthly Summary for June 1910, V, 11), appear at least to promise well. If Nazim Pasha should be displaced without a fair trial, in consequence of the machinations of his enemies, this very fact will go far, it is to be feared, towards postponing the establishment of a stable administration in this country; for his successor's position will be more difficult even than his own was in the beginning, and the door will be permanently opened to all sorts of party intrigues and abuses.

My principal object in writing this is to inform your Excellency that, though as British consul-general I have had grave cause to complain of more than one of Nazim Pasha's official acts, I by no means consider the downfall of his administration desirable or expect that it would be succeeded by a better one.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, I.C.S.,

Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Annexure (A).

Irak.

A memorandum presented to His Majesty Sultan Mohammed Rashad Khan V (may he long live); to the Right Honourable Hakki Pasha, the Prime Minister; to all the members of his Cabinet; to the Senate and Parliament; and to all Ottomans.

To the whole Arabic press in Egypt, Syria, Tunis, America, and Constantinople; to all those who pronounce the letter "dhâd" correctly (i.e., to all Arabs); and particularly to his Excellency Mahmud Shaukat Pasha, the victor of Constantinople, who is a native of Irak.

To His Majesty the Khalif, the aristocracy, and all our brethren according to the Constitution.

Men of tender sympathy and intelligence, is there any help for the people of Irak now that matters have reached a climax? A Nazim* ("reformer") has come to us who, by his efforts, is not likely to improve our condition, but rather to make us to shrink or revolt. It need hardly be said that Irak is a country to which the attention of all Ottomans is directed, owing to the fertility of the land and the numerous rivers that run in it, and which, if properly looked after, could be made like the Garden of Eden where God created Adam.

In the time of the Abbasite dynasty Irak attained to the highest pitch of civilisation, education, and industry, and had no equal in any respect. This is a fact well known to all those who have a knowledge of history. But when the Abbasite dynasty was abolished, the schools were closed, the arts were neglected, and everything deteriorated.

At last Irak was reduced to such a pitiful condition that it occasioned grief to all its well-wishers and joy to all its enemies; and it continued in that state until the time when the constitution was proclaimed, the reactionary Sultan was dethroned, and all his subordinates were degraded. Then we praised Almighty God and looked to the Committee of Union and Progress, which had taken the reins of administration into their hands. When the events mentioned above took place, we all expected that Irak would attain its former prosperous condition, especially when the services of Sir William Willcocks, the renowned English engineer, were secured. All the world was eagerly watching to see the progress which Irak would make, and how it would be turned into a land more fertile than Egypt.

* The name Nazim happens to mean "one who sets in order."

Lynch Company Amalgamation.

We were all lost in these dreams when his Excellency Hilmi Pasha, the late Prime Minister, made an agreement to give over the Hamidieh steamers, which ply between Bussorah and Bagdad, to Lynch and Co., giving the monopoly of navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates from Bussorah to Maskanah, near Aleppo, to the said company. Hilmi Pasha's action was due to ignorance of a danger which this amalgamation would have created—one which perhaps might prove an even severer calamity to the nation than the concession for a German railway to Bagdad. One of these two calamities, if not both, we may perhaps suffer sooner or later.

As we, the inhabitants of Irak, were proud of our Ottoman citizenship and jealous of the honour of the Ottoman Empire, being assured that it is through the existence of the latter that our Mahommedan religion is maintained and flourishes, some of us, inhabitants of Bagdad, immediately raised our voices and began to communicate with Constantinople by telegram, bringing to the notice of the authorities there the political and moral drawbacks of the amalgamation; so much so that Hilmi Pasha resigned, and we were informed that the amalgamation had been cancelled. This was in order to calm the people until Nazim Pasha could be sent out to bring us all under his sway by depriving us of our freedom, and then notify us of the amalgamation.

Who is Nazim Pasha?

It was then that Nazim Pasha was appointed vali of our vilayet, commander-in-chief of the VIth Army Corps, and "reformer" of Irak, including the vilayets of Musal, Bagdad, and Bussorah. We were pleased at this appointment, more especially as the word "reform" sounded pleasant in our ears, and made us forget the last post which Nazim Pasha held when Abdul Hamid, in conjunction with Kamil Pasha, tried on the 31st March to overthrow the constitution and the Committee of Union and Progress. No better man could be found for the appointment than our "reformer," the supporter of the constitution, &c. He was made Minister of War without the sanction of Parliament, and there followed the overthrow of Kamil Pasha's Cabinet and of the arch-autocrat Abdul Hamid, the circumstances of which are already known and require no repetition.

Yes; the people of Irak forgot—or, rather, feigned to forget—Nazim Pasha as an autocrat. They looked at the brighter side of things, and as he came as a "reformer" they expected some good of him, and they awaited his arrival as anxiously as a good Mahommadan keeping the fast awaits the appearance of the new moon. At last his Excellency arrived with a large staff of officers, &c., and a magnificent reception was given to him. The people received and treated the Pasha with great respect, not because they were cowards and dreaded him, but because they did not want to interfere with his work of reform. They felt that if they interfered he would oppress the people as a preparation for justifying his shortcomings before Parliament when the time came for him to give an account of all his dealings in Irak to the nation—which time, we hope, is not far off.

The new Nazim ("reformer") arrived in Bagdad grave and self-confident. He began to make the reforms, of which mention is made hereafter, without consulting anyone.

On the day of his arrival, when he entered Bagdad, in order to show his strength and influence, he refused to receive any of the notables who came to visit him.

The first time that he presided over the Administrative Council he asked the clerk to read all the papers to him, and all the time he kept nodding his head as if he knew all the conditions of the vilayet by divine prescience. All the members were treated like pieces of wood, he never consulted them; and when any members ventured to object he cried out, "It is settled."

A further proof of his self-confidence is the fact that, after according Suleiman Nazif Bey (the Vali of Bussorah) an enthusiastic reception on his arrival at Bagdad, he did not listen to him or ever agree to his suggestions, although Suleiman Nazif Bey was in Irak before Nazim Pasha and had more experience in its affairs. Finally they could not agree, and Suleiman Nazif Bey returned to Bussorah. This disagreement gradually assumed a bitter form, and it has turned into an enmity which exposes the two vilayets to grave danger.

We do not wish to enter into more details about the autocratic disposition of Nazim Pasha, but we give below some of his reforms which may serve as a sufficient proof of his having been born an autocrat.

Reforms of Nazim Pasha.

1. *Suppression of the Arabic Language.*

The first reforming order which Nazim Pasha issued was that no petition or document should be submitted to Government at Bagdad or its dependencies in Arabic, and that if such documents were submitted, they should not be taken into consideration. He issued this order in the official newspaper "Zaurah." The people of Bagdad were thunderstruck at this order, for they knew that most of them did not understand Turkish, and that, if they obeyed the order, their business would be delayed and their rights violated. When it was proposed in the Constantinople press that the language of the Kuran should be made official like the Turkish language, the press at Bagdad kept silent about Nazim Pasha's arbitrary order for fear of him.

It was only the "Rakib," of which the editor (Abdul Latif Thinaiyan) is well known for his liberal ideas, that dared to criticise this Nazim's ("reformer's") reform which was contrary to common sense. He did so in a couple of well-chosen lines which caused Nazim Pasha to send him this message: "If you mean to criticise me personally, I will excuse you; but if you intend to criticise the action of the Government, I will break your neck." The editor was greatly alarmed by Nazim's fury and the official message. He became sensible that there was no freedom of the press, as provided in the constitution; and henceforward he began to burn the incense of false eulogies before the said vali. By this action Nazim Pasha gave the first blow to the constitution in Irak.

It is one of the principal articles of the constitution that the press should be free. The press being the mouth-piece of the people, it is through the press that the Government hears of the grievances, &c., of its subjects and is enabled to take steps for remedying them and for improving the condition of the people. Freedom of the press, which has wrought wonders in other countries, was conferred by a law passed in both Houses of Parliament after the establishment of the constitution by the sword; and it therefore cannot be violated by any person, however exalted his position. The same inviolable law also permits any person to criticise the action of any administrative official or officials, on condition of his criticism being impersonal and well founded; consequently Abdul Latif Effendi Thinaiyan was right in his criticism and ought not to have been interfered with by Nazim Pasha.

Now may not Thinaiyan call Nazim Pasha despotic? The pasha has an administrative council, but he does not consult them. He prevents the submission of any document in Arabic. He gives orders, accompanied by threats, to paint the shops. He opens a wide street by pulling down houses, shops, &c., by force, without paying compensation for the ground; and he thus causes great loss to the people. All of these facts he, Thinaiyan, may criticise freely; but he may not say that Nazim Pasha drinks at night, even if he does drink; and he may not say that Nazim Pasha omits to pray three times a-day, even if the pasha never prays. These are personal matters, and do not concern the public. We cannot suppose that Nazim Pasha, in issuing his orders to Thinaiyan, ignored the constitution; we can only think that he is an enemy of the constitution.

We may frankly state that all the newspapers at Bagdad, Bussorah, and Musal are now conducted under the supervision of the local Government; that the editors cry with wide-open mouths that they are not free; and that Nazim Pasha and his subordinates threaten them with punishment in case they should dare to write against him.

2. *Painting of Shops.*

Nazim Pasha next ordered the outside of the shops and bazaars in Bagdad to be painted; and he threatened the people with heavy punishment unless they conformed with this beneficial order. The editor of the "Rakib" wrote in one of its issues an article cancelling one that had appeared before it. This was the purport: "The city of Mansur and Harun-ar-Rashid has put on its gala clothes, according to the orders of Nazim Pasha. The labourers being mostly outlaws, vagabonds, and pickpockets, the city is relieved of them." Is this not ridiculous? Are you not ashamed of it, Abdul Latif Effendi?

We are not aware whether our friend Abdul Latif Effendi Thinaiyan wrote his article with sarcastic intent, or whether he honestly meant what he said? We only know that he wrote it at the time when we enjoy constitutional government, and that

he published it under the auspices of Nazim. We are divided into two parties in opinion. Some of us think that Nazim has ordered the "Nakib" to make fun of the people of Irak. Others say that Abdul Latif Effendi wrote this article in order to put the wisdom of the people to the test, and to show them that there is no freedom of the press in Bagdad, and that Nazim Pasha only likes those who praise him whether he is right or wrong.

Painting such as that in question is only an external decoration, and it is quite uncalled for, more especially as it is not lasting, and the shops' fronts will soon be reduced to their former state. When the painting of Bagdad is all over where will the bad characters be employed? It would be a good plan if Nazim Pasha were to order the painting and whitewashing of the insides of houses, which might thus in the end escape being demolished, and would create more work for the bad characters, so getting them out of the way and completing the reform of Irak.

3. *Making Wide Streets in Bagdad.*

The reforms mentioned above are nothing in comparison with another great improvement which the wise Nazim ("reformer") has ordered. He saw that the streets were very narrow and old-fashioned, and not sufficiently wide for his carriage to pass. He has directed the opening out of wide streets, 20 metres broad, and he has asked for sanction to spend £T. 100,000 on the work, whereas, if he intended to treat the houseowners fairly, he ought to have applied for £T. 2,000,000. In spite of the complaints of the people he has begun to put his plans into execution. A member of the committee informed Nazim Pasha that the inhabitants of Bagdad were all grumbling at having their houses pulled down, and suggested that a site should be chosen outside the town where a new town could be built according to the latest system, as at Aleppo and Damascus. What do you think his Excellency said? He said in a sarcastic tone, "If you go against my will, you had better not attend a committee meeting again." Is this not ridiculous?

As an example of the hypocrisy of some of us, a few notables, whose names we do not think it right to mention, went to the vali, Nazim Pasha, and volunteered to forego compensation for their houses which were to be taken for the streets. They aimed by their action at securing the goodwill of the vali. Thank God, there are still some amongst us who consider the favour of the vali as the grace of God. This is due to their ignorance of constitutional principles, under which valis and judges are merely automata in the hands of the law. Those who have offered their houses free and voluntarily contributed to the vali's plan lose nothing, for they are well-off; but they cause a large number of poor people to lose their residences and houses in the abyss which Nazim has opened. The rich lose nothing, because their houses are large enough to spare a portion for this road, together with a likelihood of getting double price for the rest; but the poor will be crushed. No one can properly appreciate the calamity which has befallen the poor people of Bagdad through the unwise policy of Nazim except those who have visited it and have seen the poverty of the inhabitants.

Whoever visits Bagdad now will find all its inhabitants plunged in mourning and grief on account of the actions of this Nazim ("reformer"), which are quite unprecedented. Midhat Pasha, the hero of the constitution, did about thirty-six years ago make a plan for a road to be cut through the middle of the town; but, when he saw that he would cause great loss to the inhabitants by it, he did not feel justified in carrying it out and ultimately abandoned it. About ten valis succeeded him, among whom there were wise and ignorant, good, and bad men; but none of them dreamt of such an injustice, except Nazim Pasha who was sent here as a reformer.

We have thought over the question carefully, but we cannot see that it is of any benefit to the inhabitants in general. If by opening a main street it is intended to make the city look better externally, we say that it would be better to improve the personal condition of the inhabitants first. If it is with the view of allowing plenty of room for carriage traffic, we reply that the people of Bagdad are too poor to afford carriages now, and that, when they grow rich, thanks to Nazim Pasha's reforms, it will be time enough to take measures to widen the streets.

Besides all this, the expenses of making the street will be a burden on the municipality of Bagdad; and the municipality will spend all its income in merely paying the interest on the money, and will not be able to spare anything for improvement of the town. Lord Cromer, the great reformer of Egypt, has said "It is not right on the part of a Government to spend borrowed money upon enterprises which bring in no revenue. Governments should devote the proceeds of loans to productive works so that by means of the profits they can pay off both capital and interest." Will not Nazim (the reformer) take into consideration and respect this important principle of economy?

It is not necessary to point out to Nazim Pasha that the whitewashing of shops and bazaars and the widening of streets are not any part of the reforms that he was sent here to carry out; they are external improvements which can be made afterwards. He ought first to give his attention to agriculture; and the £T. 200,000 which he is going to borrow in the name of the municipality had much better be spent on the improvement of arts, agriculture, and industry. As we have said above, it is hardly worth pointing this out to him, as he is despotic in his views.

4. *The Arab Questions.*

His fourth reform has been to obtain "fatwas" from eminent doctors of the sacred law declaring that, according to the law, it is necessary to punish the Arabs who fight with each other, and plunder one another's property, and disturb the public security in the country. He summoned some of the chiefs and sheikhs of the Arabs to his presence and threatened them, and then sent them back to their homes. Indeed, a military man of limited brains like Nazim Pasha could not do otherwise. If he had been a wise man he would have questioned the chiefs as to the cause of the fighting, and would have thought of some means of preventing it, like a good physician who first questions the patient, examines him, finds out about his case, and then gives medicine.

Nazim asked the Sunni and Sai'ah doctors to give the "fatwa" in question condemning the wars of the Arabs, and it is said that valid "fatwas" have been given. Was there not any doctor of them all, with Arab blood in his veins, who could dare to say to Nazim: "We give you these 'fatwas' against fighting on the understanding that you yourself will keep the fear of God before your eyes in your dealing with the Arabs?"

Nazim Pasha has also asked the Arab chiefs to pay the Government taxes. He did not ask them whether these taxes were levied justly or not; he did not ask them about their cultivation and their harvests.

Is this how reformers act? Nazim Pasha does not know everything. He is a military man, and has given his orders to the Arabs to keep quiet. That is all he could do, and now he is watching to see that his instructions are carried out. If he remains as vali in this vilayet and continues to carry out his (?) thorough-going ideas, he will, no doubt, resort to armed force in order to collect money from the poor people, and the vilayet will again assume the aspect which it wore under the old régime. There will be fighting, and Mahommedan blood will be shed, the public safety will be disturbed, and the little which we have will be destroyed.

Nazim has also ordered the Arabs to collect their rifles and hand them over to him. This order is quite impossible of execution, for Nazim did not explain to the Arabs the reasons for the order, and did not guarantee to protect them if they handed over their arms and were afterwards attacked by other Arabs, &c. He does not enquire from the Arabs the reasons of their mutual fighting and plundering, so that he may endeavour to remove the causes of disturbance and so diffuse peace and security among the tribes. If he did so he would be within his rights in ordering the collection of arms; and the Arabs would hand them over, because they would no longer need them. The Arab is intelligent enough to understand the cunning of Nazim; and, moreover, the Arab requires weapons to defend himself against tribal aggressions and to fight with Nazim Pasha's men who come to collect taxes.

We are not prophets, but we judge of things by common sense. Governments which do not look after the prosperity of their people and allow for differences in religion and race cannot expect large revenues. A cow must be fed well in order to give good milk.

In the time of Abdul Hamid the former valis, when fighting with these poor Arabs, used to lead Abdul Hamid and his advisers to believe that the Arabs intended to recover the Khalifate for Arabia, and that they were fighting them for this reason. Now, if Nazim Pasha does not change his policy, but fights with the Arabs, he will tell Constantinople just the same thing as his predecessors did. As a matter of fact the Arabs have no such ideas as those ascribed to them. They are sure that the Khalifate is in safe hands with the Turks, notwithstanding that the Turks treat the Arabs with suspicion.

5. *Removal of Arab Officers.*

The fifth of Nazim Pasha's reforms consists in the removal from the VIth Army Corps of all Arab officers—some by placing them on the retired list and others by

sending them to remote places—and their replacement by Turkish officers. Wise men amongst us took this as a sign of his bad intentions, or at least as a hint to the Arabs that he was their enemy; notwithstanding that the Arabs, since the establishment of the constitution, have considered themselves the equals of their brethren the Turks in all civil rights, among which is employment in Government service. By Nazim's action bitter feeling has been renewed in the breasts of the Arabs, also hatred of the Turks, in spite of the allegiance which they show to the Government. What our Arab officers have done in order to meet with this sad fate we cannot understand. Nazim has not been content with removing the Arab officers only; he has also begun to dismiss the civil officials, one after another.

Public opinion varies as to the cause of the removal of the Arab officers. Some think that the Government intends to make Irak, subdued by Turkish soldiers, into Turkey; others believe that Nazim Pasha wishes to show the power of the Government in Irak before announcing to its people that the Hamidieh line has been handed over to Lynch; others hold that, he being a military man, the idea has struck him of crushing the Arabs by military force. We ourselves refrain from expressing an opinion; but we offer the above conjectures to his Excellency so that he may take the best of them and adopt it as his justification. We only say that we, the people of Irak, are most loyal to our Government and Khalifate, and that we cannot understand why our brethren the Turks should suspect us. If our combined demonstration against the Lynch Company amalgamation frightened them and made them change their opinion, we would explain that our action was not taken for personal causes, but with a view to protecting the dominions of the Turkish Government. We should like them to explain the real cause to us, in order that we may immediately abstain from offering any opposition to their views.

We advise our Government at Constantinople not to wink at arbitrary actions which may lead to bad results, but to treat us as their equals according to the constitution, so that we can co-operate with them in upholding the glory of Islam and of the Ottoman Khalifate.

Nazim's oppressions cannot crush or kill us, whatever he and his subordinates may think, but they will cause our rich land and our strong men to be lost to the Government. We do not think that the Government will lose sight of the selfishness of foreigners or how they seek a good opportunity to swallow us; nor do we think them oblivious of the fact that not all the Turkish element are faithful to the Ottoman throne.

6. *Sir William Willcocks and his Staff.*

Nazim's sixth reform was that he wrote to Constantinople to recall Sir William Willcocks and his staff from Irak. Apparently he wishes to impede irrigation work. By acting as he recommends the Government would lose £T. 30,000, the amount already spent by the engineers on surveys, &c., and the nation would be bereft of one of its best hopes.

Perhaps Nazim will say that Willcocks is not capable of carrying out the work and that is why he dismisses him. If this is the real cause, why does the vali not make it known, and why does he not say how he will arrange for the irrigation projects for which our constitutional Government sent out Willcocks? Why does he not call a meeting and take the opinion of the wise people of Bagdad before dispensing with Willcocks's services? One of the principal articles of the constitution is that a governor should not act on his own account but in harmony with his council, even if he is as wise as Solomon and Lokman, as strong as Alexander the Great, as eloquent as Sibban, as brave as Antar, as sagacious as Ayas, and as shrewd as Mu'awiyan and Ibn-al-As.

If the Imperial Government have sent Nazim Pasha to introduce reforms, they have made a mistake; but, if they have sent him to exercise oppression, that is quite a different matter, one which is inadmissible, and one which neither our constitutional form of Government nor our Arab descent, not Ottoman unity, will tolerate.

Conclusion.

We meant at first to seek the assistance of the Bagdad press in presenting this our complaint to the heads of the State, but Nazim permits no freedom, and again we reflected that, if we telegraphed it to Constantinople, he would intercept it. We therefore, the doctors and wise men of Bagdad, held a meeting, secretly composed this pamphlet, and sent it to Egypt to be printed and distributed.

Be it known to all Ottomans that we do not wish to be anything but Ottomans, or

anything but constitutionalists. We say this in order that alarmists may not accuse us of being reactionaries. In confirmation whereof we hereby curse all reactionaries, saying: "Damned be all who advocate the re-establishment of the era of Abdul Hamid; the curse of God and his Prophets be upon all despots, past, present, and future; the curse of God and his angels rest on those who make distinctions between the races comprising the Ottoman Empire!"

In conclusion, be it known to all Ministers, members of Parliament and notables, and to the press, that we are most loyal supporters of Ottoman unity, and that we pray for the long continuance of the Ottoman dynasty. But, if justice is not done and our complaint is not heard, we will, with the assistance of the Committee of Union and Progress who overthrew the throne of Abdul Hamid, the arch-autocrat, overthrow the throne of Nazim Pasha; for we all hate despotism, and have sworn to fight it.

We do not think that there are any left amongst us who would consent to undergo further oppression after the thirty-five years' cruel reign of Abdul Hamid.

We deem it a duty to mention here the name of our brethren at Musal, who are sharers with us in subjection to Nazim's tyranny, on account of the manner in which they have co-operated with us in upholding the Constitution.

As for our brethren at Bussorah, they are discontented like ourselves; but they have centred their hopes in their vali, and they expect that he will combat Nazim's despotism. We wish them success; but, supposing their vali is able to stop Nazim's interference in the civil administration of Bussorah, how can he stop his interference as Commander-in-chief of the forces? We invite them, however, to unite with us in protecting the life of Irak and the rights of its people, in order that it may exist for ever as a worthy member of the Ottoman Empire and minister to the glory of Islam.

We request our Arab contemporaries in Egypt, Syria, America, Tunis, and Constantinople to reproduce this pamphlet in their valuable columns, and thus to assist us in bringing the facts to the notice of our statesmen at Constantinople, &c.

Written at Bagdad this 10th day of Jumadi-al-Akhir, 1328 (corresponding to 17th June, 1910).

Annexure (B).

"Oh, people of Bagdad, you are all pimps, especially the Nakib, who is the greatest pimp of you all. You have no patriotism. If you had even a little self-respect you would not allow your wives and daughters to be used as prostitutes by the vali."

[34750] No. 146.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 49. Consular. Secret.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 21, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 60 and 61, Consular, of the 8th September, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch addressed by His Majesty's consul-general in Bagdad to the Government of India on the question of the reduction of expenditure on his post and its transfer to the Levant consular service.

I fully endorse Mr. Lorimer's arguments against the proposed change; they seem to me sound and convincing, especially in the state of affairs existing at the present moment.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Ambassador),
GEORGE A. MOUNSEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.

(No. 728, Secret.)

Bagdad, August 20, 1910.

Sir,

IN continuation of my predecessor Colonel Ramsay's letters No. 856 of the 7th August, 1909, and No. 859 of the 9th August, 1909, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum by myself on the "Proposed Reduction of Expenditure in the British Consulate-General at Bagdad and transfer of that post from the Indian Political Service to the Levant Consular Service."

Two copies of the enclosure have been sent to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople."

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, I. C. S.,

Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Enclosure 2 in No. 146.

Memorandum by Consul-General Lorimer respecting the proposed Reduction of Expenditure in the British Consulate-General at Bagdad and transfer of that post from the Indian Political Service to the Levant Consular Service.

THE motives of the proposal are apparently two: (1) economy, and (2) abolition of dual control. These are desirable objects, but can they be attained without an undue sacrifice of political influence and administrative efficiency?

2. The chief causes of the expensiveness of the Bagdad station are the presence of the Royal Indian Mail steamer "Comet," and an Indian military guard, and the largeness of the buildings and grounds of the residency. If one of these items even can be eliminated, a substantial saving will be effected, but not otherwise. It seems to me, after nearly eight months' experience of the country, that the future of Turkey as a whole, and of this province particularly, is too uncertain to admit as yet of the removal either of the "Comet" or of the military guard.

We have lately seen the town of Shatrah occupied and sacked by tribal Arabs in broad daylight, notwithstanding the presence in it of a Turkish garrison of five* battalions with five guns; and interruption of the navigation of the Tigris by tribal insurrection has been frequent in late years. It is also possible that Bagdad city, hitherto almost exempt from religious and racial animosities, may be more disturbed by such in future, in consequence partly of the grant of the constitution, which has encouraged the non-Mahommedan elements, and partly of the proceedings of that occult body, the "Committee of Union and Progress," which is anti-foreign and narrowly Turkish.

I therefore do not think that the present is a suitable time for the removal of the military guard, which has existed since the foundation of the residency in 1798; or for sending away the "Comet," which affords the means of placing European women and children beyond danger in an emergency; or for parting with the extensive walled grounds of the residency, which are capable of sheltering all the Europeans at Bagdad in case of disturbances. Yet one or all of them must go, if any serious reduction of expenditure is to be effected. The ship and guard being abolished, the present residency buildings would become needlessly extensive.

Some minor reductions of expenditure are possible, in my opinion, but they are not of a fundamental character.

3. The question of dual control may be a difficult one in Persia; but at Bagdad, so far as my experience and knowledge go, no inconvenience attributable to dual control has ever arisen. The matters in which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India respectively are interested seem to be, in this country, entirely distinct; and I have never felt in practice the slightest embarrassment due to the fact that I am serving two masters. Than this, probably, no more delicate test could be applied.

Perhaps the arguments relating to unification of control and to the Anglo-Russian agreement have been used, however, with reference to posts in Persia only. In that case the sole objection to the present arrangements at Bagdad lies in their expensiveness.

* A larger garrison than that by which Bagdad is sometimes held.

4. The next point is the essential one of political influence, and the extent of its dependence upon the scale on which the British consulate-general at Bagdad is maintained. In my opinion the dependence is very close and great, both with the Turks and with others.

The vali cannot but treat with respect and attention a foreign representative whose establishments* equal, if they do not excel his own; and his social relations with the British residency are a valuable check upon him from the point of view of British interests. This may sound absurd; but it is really a serious aspect of the matter. One of the weakest points about the new local government recently established here is the manifest anxiety of the staff, not excluding the vali himself, to stand well in European society.

On the other hand, a British traveller just returned from northern Central Arabia told me lately that the only foreign Power ever mentioned in his hearing by the inhabitants of Nejd was the British; and that to them the residency at Bagdad was the chief emblem of the dignity and character of our Government.

It should be borne in mind that the residency establishments form, in the eyes of the Turks, a single whole. The removal of the "Comet" would encourage them to demand the removal of the guard also; and, if this were conceded, the case for the retention of the British post-office, which is almost a necessity, would be weakened. If the post-office were abolished, nothing but the superior size of our more than half-empty buildings and the freehold character of the site would remain to differentiate this historic residency, founded under Sir Harford Jones to counteract the intrigues of Napoleon in the East, adorned by the scholarship of Claudius Rich, visited by Sir John Malcolm on his return from two of his missions to Persia, and famous for the great work done by Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Arnold Kemball in their prime, all of them Indian political officers drawn from the civil service or the army, from the mushroom consulates of Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy, and America.

5. The only remaining, but perhaps the most important, question is that of the general suitability and efficiency of the present arrangements as compared with those which it is proposed to introduce; and here, I think, the case against any immediate change is a very strong one.

(*a.*) Irak is the chief country of Shi'ah pilgrimages. I cannot ascertain here what proportion of the 62,500,000 of Indian Mahommedans are Shi'ahs; but I am under the impression that, though a minority, it is a substantial and weighty minority. It is believed, though exact figures are not yet available, that the Indian Shi'ah pilgrims visiting Irak every year are numbered by thousands, and this much is certain that the country is studded with permanently settled colonies, groups, and individuals of Indian origin, whom, or whose ancestors, religious sentiment in the first instance drew to these regions. It is believed that there are about 3,000 persons of Indian descent now living in Irak who are entitled to British nationality and protection. Some of them represent the ancient ruling families of Delhi, Lucknow, and the Carnatic, and are in receipt of stipends from the Government of India; a few are retired pensioned officials; some are traders on a small scale; and a great many are stranded pilgrims or their descendants, sometimes living from hand to mouth and sometimes starving.

Large numbers of Sunni Mahommedans from India and Afghanistan also visit Irak to pay their devotions at the shrine of Sheikh Abdul Kadir at Bagdad, and some of these also settle down in the country.

It will be conceded, I think, that an Indian political officer knowing Hindustani, which nearly all the Indian immigrants speak and understand, is in a better position for dealing with these people than a Levant consular officer, especially for the purpose of settling their disputes and cases with each other about inheritances, &c., which are numerous.† In many cases the Indian political officer will have had long experience of Afghans also, as I have had, in their homes, and will be able to talk to them in their own language. An officer from India is less likely to be imposed on by Indians in questions of nationality, need of charitable assistance, &c., than a consular officer who will not be able in many cases to distinguish an Indian from an Afghan, or either of

* It may be noted that there is no "sumptuary allowance" at Bagdad, and that all entertainments at the residency are consequently given at the resident's private expense. This is an important point in connection with the pay of the appointment. I have no fear of exaggerating the truth when I say that the British residency has for long been the chief social centre of Bagdad.

† Indian business, official and unofficial, at present occupies one or two hours of every working day. Possibly there is some accumulation of work, owing to my having been away a good deal on tour during the winter; but, on the other hand, this is not the pilgrim season. There will always be a quantity of Indian work at Bagdad and Kerbala.

these from a Persian. The ability to cross-examine with a knowledge of people and places in India is invaluable here. Moreover, a consular officer cannot be expected to feel that sympathy for Indians which an Indian officer naturally feels, and which is a tradition of the Bagdad residency.

b. The resident at Bagdad has already much to do with the administration of various Indian endowments, of which the Oudh Bequest is the most important and the best known. The disbursements under this last great bequest are about 10,000 rupees or 666*l.*, a-month, and the management of it is a very thorny task. The Shi'ah Mohammedans of India have of late years instituted an annual conference, at which resoluitons expressive of the wishes and views of the whole Shi'ah community in India are discussed; and one of the resolutions passed at the last Shi'ah conference at Lucknow referred to the Oudh Bequest. This resolution should no doubt be regarded as a first tentative move; and we must expect that in future the administration of the Oudh Bequest will be closely and jealously watched by the parliament of the Indian Shi'ah world. It has also lately been asserted that a large number of other Indian trusts and endowments,* exist in this country, of which nothing had hitherto been known officially, and that the proceeds are in many cases being quietly devoured by Turkish and Persian subjects. I am not yet in a position to say how far these assertions are true; but the subject is one which is sure to engage the attention of the All India Shi'ah Conference sooner or later, and a demand for a strict investigation through the British representative at Bagdad is likely to be the result.

It appears to me that, in consequence of the new organised movement among the Indian Shi'ahs, the British resident or consul-general here will probably during the next few years, have his hands full of work connected with Indian ndowments; and an Indian service officer is obviously better equipped for undertaking such work than a Levant consular officer with no experience of India.

(*c.*) Another reason for which, I think, an Indian political officer is better qualified than any other to hold the Bagdad appointment is that he will ordinarily be a man of personal administrative experience,† and therefore in a superior position to an officer who has all his life been only an outside spectator of administration by others. He will understand better both the difficulties and the failures of the Turkish Government in this country; and he will probably therefore be more ready to make allowances for the Turks, where allowances are really due, and at the same time less liable to be deceived by false excuses, when such are offered. A political officer who has had to deal with famines, epidemics, racial and religious riots, and tribal outbreaks in a responsible capacity, sometimes even to the extent of using military force, will necessarily be a better critic, or rather judge, of the handling of similar matters by the Turks than a consular officer with no executive experience.

In many cases the political resident at Bagdad will have accompanied troops in the field in frontier operations, as I myself did during the general rising on the Indian north-west frontier in 1897, and again in the Mahsud blockade of 1900–1902. The experience of military affairs so acquired is of daily value at Bagdad as an aid to understanding the position of the Turks in this province. Again, the knowledge of politics and human nature derived from direct dealings with semi-independent tribes, and from endless discussions with their headmen in open Jirgah, is an invaluable asset at Bagdad. Every item of news about Turkish relations with Arabs and Kurds has a familiar ring to an officer who has gone through a frontier training in India; and many members of the Indian political department have spent the best years of their youth in tribal work.

The advantages of the Indian political officer in this respect extend to the civil departments, and embrace such matters as irrigation, assessment of land revenue, maintenance of land records, &c., but I do not wish to labour the point. It is enough to observe that the Indian Political Department is a great administrative service, as well as being a school of Oriental and tribaldiplomacy, and that the fact gives its members great advantages at Bagdad over the members of any other service whatsoever.

(*d.*) Age is an important factor in a country where travelling is rough and uncomfortable, as it is here. Hardly any European at Bagdad ever stirs from headquarters who is not obliged to do so by the nature of his avocations; yet really good work cannot be done in Mesopotamia and Kurdistan without a great deal of travelling,

* I may refer in this connection to paragraph 14 of my letter of the 11th April, 1910, and to paragraph 8 of the enclosure in the Government of India's letter of the 3rd June, 1910, to my address.

† It will be remembered that the Indian political department is a great administrative as well as a diplomatic service. It governs the whole of the north-western frontier province and Baluchistan, not to mention some fragments of British territory (such as Aimir) down country.

that is without a great deal of discomfort and exposure. The intimate first-hand knowledge of people, places, and things, which is the secret of success in political work, is not to be acquired except by actual moving about in the cold weather, and even in the hot.

Now, if I am not misinformed, a consul-general of the consular service at Bagdad would generally be a man of 55 to 65 years of age—which would be a great drawback in the matter of tours; whereas, a consul-general supplied by the Indian Political Department would ordinarily, as Bagdad is a third-class residency, be between 40 and 50. Moreover, frequent touring is an established rule of all the Indian services, while, from the little that I have seen of the Levant consular service, I am led to conclude that with them it is otherwise. The average Indian officer is a man inured to field sports and fond of them—a trait which will recommend him to the hardy Arabs and Kurds of Irak, and will give him an influence with them that a sedentary European cannot acquire.

(*e.*) As to languages, an Indian officer at Bagdad will generally start with a thorough command of Hindustani, which no consular officer possesses and which (as already indicated) is very important here, and with a good knowledge of Persian to which he can rapidly add colloquial facility. A large amount of the work here can be done in Persian, especially at Karbala, which is practically a Persian town. In some cases, as in my own, the Indian officer will be a qualified interpreter, or will possess other equally good qualifications, in Arabic also. In fact, I think I am right in saying that the Government of India could always provide an officer with the requisite qualifications in Arabic and Persian, except colloquial facility—which latter can be acquired in a few months—and these in addition to the almost indispensable Hindustani. It may be added that the Indian officer will in a proportion of cases be able to speak Pashto, which is the surest road to the heart of the Afghans, of whom a number are met with here.

In Turkish the Levant officer would certainly have an initial advantage, but I understand that Turkish presents no serious difficulties to an Arabic and Persian scholar; besides which the superior Turkish civil officers can nearly all converse in French, and the higher officers of the army (of the modern school) in German. In French and German the Civil Service members of the Indian Political Department are probably as well qualified as the Levant Consular Service, at least after a little renewed practice. These languages are, or were, important subjects in the examination for admission to the Indian Civil Service.

On a recent tour in Kurdistan I collected some specimens of sentences, and compiled a small vocabulary of Kurdish, which I found to be very closely related to Persian, and with affinities to Pashto.

(*f.*) In the matter of work under the Ottoman Order in Council, the Consular Regulations, &c., I do not think that an Indian political officer is at a disadvantage. In India he will probably have had some years of judicial experience, criminal and civil, in different grades, and will be perfectly conversant with the interpretation of laws and regulations. In some instances, as in my own, he will have exercised the powers of a Sessions and Divisional Judge in India, which include the passing of death sentences and the determination of property suits of high value.

(*g.*) It may be urged that this province has a greater trade with the United Kingdom than with India, and such is the fact at the present time; but I see no reason why British trade should not continue to be safe with the Indian officers under whom it has grown to its present dimensions, and I see indications, on which I need not enlarge here, that the trade of Mesopotamia in the future is likely to be with India in an increasing degree.

6. I am strongly of opinion that the existing arrangements ought to be maintained for the present, or even, in view of the Indian work, permanently. Of course it is impossible to say what changes may be produced in the situation by the opening of rapid communication with Europe. Who can say, however, how soon or how late a railway from Europe will reach Bagdad? At the present time, when a Turkish Governor-General has just been appointed to Bagdad with a greater establishment and ampler powers, extending to the Bussorah and Musal vilayets, than his predecessors, the retention of a "political resident in Turkish Arabia" to negotiate with this almost viceregal personage appears from every point of view desirable.

J. G. LORIMER, I. C. S.,
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Bagdad, August 20, 1910.

[34898] No. 147.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd September, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, September 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 147.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 22, 1910.

ABU MUSA. Please refer to the last paragraph of my telegram of the 18th August.

Apart from the question of commercial compromise, please understand that for the reply to Germany we shall require the material referred to in the letter from the Resident, Persian Gulf, dated the 5th June, paragraph 4. Can you inform me when it is likely to reach me?

[34337] No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1910.

YOU should call attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the fact that on the 26th August political agent at Bahrein reported the dispatch of a fresh party of Turkish soldiers to Zakhnuniyeh Island from Ujair.

Please enquire of His Majesty's consul at Bussorah whether mudir appointed at El Odeid has actually gone there, and report by telegraph.

[34492] No. 149.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 23rd September,* from the Admiralty, discussing the measures to be taken if the expulsion of the Turkish mudir from El Odeid becomes necessary.

I am to state that, before considering what action may be required locally, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it is desirable to ascertain definitely whether or not the mudir has actually arrived at Odeid, and Sir E. Grey would suggest that the Government of India should be requested to furnish precise information on this point by telegraph.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35030] No. 150.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

* No. 142.

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 1st September, 1910, relative to Turkish encroachments on British property in Bagdad.

India Office, September 26, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.

(No. 711. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bagdad, August* 15, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the purport of a cypher telegram which I dispatched on the 14th August to His Britannic Majesty's Ambas-ador at Constantinople, together with the substance of three earlier telegrams connected with it. The facts affecting this residency are, I think, so clear as not to require additional explanations.

2. In ordinary circumstances, it would be inconceivable that the Turkish authorities should contemplate violent encroachment on the precincts of a British residency and consulate-general, and I have held, as long as I prudently might, to the view that no such action could possibly be intended by them. But the question has now been on foot for about a month, and the rumours of contemplated encroachment, instead of dying away, have steadily become more positive. The attitude and language of the Turkish authorities is, as will be seen from my telegram to the Ambassador, disquieting, and groups of people have latterly been collecting before the residency wall, discussing among themselves the exact point where it will be cut and the probable width of the breach. It was after very careful consideration, and most reluctantly, that I decided at last to bring the matter to the notice of the British Embassy at Constantinople, and I trust that my action in doing so may be approved both by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government.

3. It is probable that the Turkish local Government, being now forestalled, will profess surprise at my having believed them capable of such irregular action as that in question. But it is clear to me that, whether they have ever really intended to violate the residency precincts or not, they have at least encouraged a belief of their meaning to do so—and that with great success—among the inhabitants of Bagdad. The object of the authorities was, perhaps, to drive me into undignified action, as, for example, by asking the vali officially whether he meant to make a street through the British residency; but apart from the reference to Colonel Jawad Bey, a copy of my letter to whom is enclosed, I have been careful to show no outward signs of concern. I considered it necessary to make one reference to a Turkish official, lest the Turks should say afterwards that I had given them no opportunity of contradicting the current rumours.

4. My summary of events for the month of July 1910, forwarded by this mail, contains numerous examples of the arbitrary action of the present vali, who appears to have very little respect either for foreign treaties or for Turkish law; and my summary for August will probably contain others. Peculiar as it may appear, however, my personal relations with Nazim Pasha and his staff continue to be not merely friendly, but cordial, and I think I may promise that, if they should cease to be so, the fault will not be on my side.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER,
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Annexure No. 1.

Purport of Cypher Telegram from the British Political Resident at Bagdad to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, August 14, 1910.

(232 groups.)

(Confidential.)

The following is urgent, and should be read in continuation of my telegrams of the 8th and 9th August.

Messrs. Lynch have directed their representative at Bagdad to demand through this

consulate-general the instant return to them of their land illegally taken possession of by the Bagdad municipality, and to set up a temporary fence along the line of the wall which has been demolished. I venture to think that the action intended is correct if Messrs. Lynch are going to lodge a claim in court, as I understand they are. Instructions are solicited whether a representative of the residency should be present at the proceedings.

A new street which has been opened up by destroying buildings, &c., is now approaching the outer wall of this residency in a menacing fashion, and will strike it at right angles. It is generally thought that the Turkish authorities mean to continue this street through the residency, which it would divide approximately, both buildings and garden, into half. There is no justification at all for such a proceeding. The street can easily be deflected a little, and follow a road which already exists. Even the engineer employed by the municipality, a Frenchman, seems to be imbued with the idea that forcible encroachment is intended.

To the best of my belief this residency is the property of His Britannic Majesty. I understand that it is entered in the Turkish records in the name of the British Embassy at Constantinople, and that the Government of India hold the title-deeds.

I wrote to the Turkish engineer directing the work on the 12th August in order to ascertain his views, but he has failed to send me any written reply. He and another Turkish officer have reassured me verbally; but the manner of both struck me as embarrassed, and they seemed to me anxious to avoid discussion.

In an ordinary case, it would be highly ridiculous to suspect the vali of intending to take forcible steps of the kind suggested, especially without any warning; but Nazim Pasha is at the present time behaving so dictatorially that it is impossible to foresee what rash act he may not commit. The walls of the German Club garden have been levelled, and some of the trees cut down, without any notice which the members could understand having been given them, though the native proprietor of the ground was no doubt informed. In part at least, the vali's actions are probably intended to lower the respect felt here for foreign countries. Immovable property at Bagdad has lost for the time being its entire sale and mortgage value, the cause being Nazim Pasha's arbitrary conduct during the past month.

If any attempt is made to enter the residency grounds by force I shall act according to my own judgment, with due regard to the circumstances. If there were to be any delay in communicating with the Porte at Constantinople, the results might be serious.

Annexure No. 2.

Substance of Telegram received by the British Resident at Bagdad from His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, dated August 3, 1910.

(Confidential.)

Refers to residency telegram dated the 27th July, and states that, as the present vali of Bagdad has been given wide powers, the Minister of the Interior is loath to interfere with his administration. He has, however, sent to him by telegram a request for a detailed account of the case.

Annexure No. 3.

Substance of Telegram from the British Resident at Bagdad to the British Ambassador, Constantinople, dated August 8, 1910.

Refers to telegram of the 3rd August from the Ambassador, and informs him that the municipal authorities have begun to demolish Lynch's wall and shops. They started last night. A résumé of what preceded follows.

It was on the 18th July that Mr. Parry heard of the contemplated demolition. The consul-general was informed, and sent an official letter to the vali on the same day, requesting postponement until the matter could be considered. On the 28th July, a petition from Mr. Parry praying that the order for the demolition should be withdrawn was forwarded by the consul-general to the vali with an official letter, in which it was explained that, after personally inspecting the buildings condemned by the municipality as dangerous and therefore to be demolished, the consul-general was satisfied that the statement was incorrect, viz., that the buildings were not dangerous. A reply from the

vali reached the consul-general on the 2nd August, to the effect that the question was one of immovable property, and that, therefore, no consular interference was admissible. After receipt of Ambassador's wire of the 3rd August, Mr. Lorimer considered that for the moment the situation had become safe. On the 6th August, however, Mr. Parry received a verbal intimation that next day the wall would be demolished. This intimation, as being irregularly made, he refused to accept; but on the 7th August another intimation was given, and demolition was commenced that evening.

This procedure on the part of the vali is, no doubt, due to the fact that the municipality has no funds with which to pay for expropriations.

The latest information received by Mr. Parry is to the effect that, without further notice being given, the demolitions will be extended so as to carry away the main front of the office buildings of Lynch and Co. This is a lofty structure, and nothing had been said previously about possible interference with it.

Annexure No. 4.

Substance of Telegram from British Political Resident, Bagdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, dated August 9, 1910.

The members of the various foreign communities at Bagdad are much disturbed by the behaviour of the present Governor-General, whose proceedings are sometimes contrary to treaty, or even to Turkish law. They are also taken so suddenly in some cases as not to allow time for reference by consuls to their respective Ambassadors. It has been proposed to the British consul-general that he should join with some of his foreign colleagues in a collective remonstrance to the vali; but, recognising the futility of such a measure, he has declined. It may be of importance for his Excellency the Ambassador, however, to know how matters stand, in case of a general consultation upon Bagdad affairs taking place among the embassies at Constantinople. There are matters of dispute outstanding between the local Government and the German, Italian, American, and Austrian consulates, and the French consulate is not unlikely to become involved. Foreign claims will continue to mount up unless the vali can be prevailed upon to change his methods, and these claims will ultimately have to be adjusted at Constantinople.

Annexure No. 5.

Consul-General Lorimer to Colonel Djavad Bey.

Mon cher Colonel, *Le* 12 *août*, 1910.

Je n'ai pas très bien compris ce que vous me disiez hier sur le compte de la nouvelle rue.

Serait-il trop de peine que de m'envoyer un petit tracé de cette rue, qui doit passer le consulat de Grande-Bretagne, et qui sera pour nous, peut-être, notre principal moyen de nous rendre au Babe Chargi et aux consulats de Suède et d'Autriche?

Votre dévoué,

J. G. LORIMER.

[35204] No. 151.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 28, 1910.

EL ODEID.

With reference to my telegram No. 197 to Foreign Office and to Foreign Office telegram No. 279.

Rifaat Pasha, to whom, in accordance with your instructions, I made representations in writing on the 24th instant, has just told me that Sublime Porte have not appointed a mudir at El Odeid, and have instructed the Bussorah authorities to cancel

any such appointment if already made by them, and to abstain from any such nomination in future.

2. Zaknuniyeh. (See Foreign Office telegram No. 286.)

His Excellency is awaiting the arrival of Grand Vizier before replying to me, and assured me in the course of conversation he would do so as soon as possible.

[35313] No. 152.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 29, 1910.*

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad telegraphs that Nazim Pasha, after causing the demolition of certain British-Indian property situated at Kelbela and Kazimia, declined to indemnify the owners in accordance with Expropriation Law, and told Mr. Lorimer that he could not entertain his protests. His Excellency declared that if he were to indemnify the British subjects in question he would probably have also to pay the Ottoman subjects who have been expropriated, and who would then be able to force him to do so by appealing to the Turkish law.

I have to-day again made strong representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but, as his Excellency's repeated assurances that the vali had been ordered to deal justly with British interests and property and to adhere strictly to the Expropriation Law while carrying out his municipal improvements—assurances which were repeated to me again yesterday—have in no way arrested the vali's depredations, I fear that any renewed representations will have as little effect as the numerous protests which I have already made.